chg: rename notes column

counters/C00011.md

@@ -2,9 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: 
 
-* **Playbooks**: Game Mechanics:
+* **Playbooks**: 
--Show examples of fake news and train the user to identify them on the basis of various types of indicators
--Use a crowd-sourced mechanism so that the public can categorize newly spreading news sources or articles ala Re-Captcha
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M001 - resilience
 

counters/C00012.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Empower existing regulators to govern social media. Also covers Destroy.  Includes: Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media - The European Union created significant new regulations in 2018; the U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance. Includes Create policy that makes social media police disinformation - example: German model: facebook forced to police content by law. Includes: Use fraud legislation to clean up social media
 
-* **Playbooks**: P0001: Develop a regulatory body like the CFPB to regulate and enforce regulation for digital organizations. P0002: Government regulation. Government shutdown. 
+* **Playbooks**: 
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M007 - metatechnique
 

counters/C00019.md

@@ -2,12 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: includes Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers, and Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers
 
-* **Playbooks**: Spread Infographics & Training Material teaching ways to identify and counter divisive rhetorical techniques and content, by stimulating their sense of outrage at being manipulated. Show them how to address the rhetorical technique rather than the content
+* **Playbooks**: 
-
--Twitter hashtags & paid advertising
--Teach people to identify non-civil/unconstructive conversations and call them out
--Popularize (via memes, infographics) and get the centrists demographic who are tired of polarization to identify such messaging, call it out and display their outrage on the basis of divisive rhetorical techniques rather than merely arguing about the content
-
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M003 - daylight
 

counters/C00027.md

@@ -2,10 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: This is passive.  Includes promoting civility as an identity that people will defend. 
 
-* **Playbooks**: Playbook 1: Recruit respected thought leaders to model behavior
+* **Playbooks**: 
-Playbook 2: Feature established respected thought leaders to model behavior
-Playbook 3: Promote dialog from communities with disparate viewpoints
-Playbook 4: Establish facilitation guidelines for "civil" interaction.
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M001 - resilience
 

counters/C00029.md

@@ -2,11 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: 
 
-* **Playbooks**: -Identify ignorant agents (ex: anti-vaxx people willing to pay money to advertise their cause)
+* **Playbooks**: 
--Sell physical merchandise that has instructive counter-effect
-
-Secondary Objective:
--Obtain real-life identity of ignorant agents, to further disrupt their influence activities
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M002 - diversion
 

counters/C00031.md

@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Create competing narratives. Included "Facilitate State Propaganda" as diluting the narrative could have an effect on the pro-state narrative used by volunteers, or lower their involvement.
 
-* **Playbooks**: Playbook 1: Create multiple versions of the narrative and amplify. 
+* **Playbooks**: 
-Playbook 2: Dissect narrative, piecemeal the components and then amplify
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M009 - dilution
 

counters/C00032.md

@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Link to platform
 
-* **Playbooks**: Playbook 1: Hijack hashtag and redirect conversation to truth based content. 
+* **Playbooks**: 
-Playbook 2: Hijack (man in the middle) redirect from bad content to good content
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M002 - diversion
 

counters/C00036.md

@@ -2,9 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: All of these would be highly affected by infiltration or false-claims of infiltration.
 
-* **Playbooks**: -Discredit via backstopped blogs/websites showing their past activity and opinions as being opposite to their current ingroup
+* **Playbooks**: 
--Create a trail of commentary about their idea of infiltrating the enemy (current in-group)
--Publicize this by targeting their in-group competitors (ignorant agents)
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M013 - targeting
 

counters/C00040.md

@@ -2,9 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: counters fake experts
 
-* **Playbooks**: - Verify personal credentials 
+* **Playbooks**: 
-- Syndicated reputation management (fact-checking syndication) 
-- Academia ISAO
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M011 - verification
 

counters/C00044.md

@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Platforms can introduce friction to slow down activities, force a small delay between posts, or replies to posts.
 
-* **Playbooks**: Rate restrict via regulation posting above a statistical threshold
+* **Playbooks**: 
-Unless account is de-anonymized and advertised as automated messaging
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M004 - friction
 

counters/C00048.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Think about the different levels: individual vs state-sponsored account.  Includes “call them out” and “name and shame”.  Note that USAID operations were at a different level. Identify social media accounts as sources of propaganda—“calling them out”— might be helpful to prevent the spread of their message to audiences that otherwise would consider them factual. USAID has been restructuring its programs to address predatory Chinese development projects and the information operations that support them. USAID’s new strategy has tailored programs to counter Chinese educational exchange programs and to support free and fair elections, youth empowerment, democratic governance, and free press. USAID’s Russia regional teams have also been compiling a strategy for Russia’s information operations. One strong point of USAID’s programming is a system of indicators and measurements for a country’s vulnerability to foreign influence and information operations.  Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target externally-based nonattributed social media accounts.  Impact of and Dealing with Trolls - "Chatham House has observed that trolls also sometimes function as decoys, as a way of “keeping the infantry busy” that “aims to wear down the other side” (Lough et al., 2014). Another type of troll involves “false accounts posing as authoritative information sources on social media”.
 
-* **Playbooks**: Identify the accounts, the real person's name and shame them on social media.
+* **Playbooks**: 
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M003 - daylight
 

counters/C00053.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: 
 
-* **Playbooks**: Social media companies remove inactive accounts. Account holders remove accounts they're no longer using. Influencers encourage people to remove their inactive accounts "Do you really need that old account" campaign, world-war-two poster-style. Create alternative memorial websites for accounts of deceased people, so their accounts can't be reactivated on 'live' sites. Educate/scare users on the risks of losing control over a dormant account (would their employer be forgiving if an account associated with the user suddenly starting posting extremist content?).
+* **Playbooks**: 
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M012 - cleaning
 

counters/C00074.md

@@ -3,12 +3,7 @@
 * **Summary**: 
 
 
-* **Playbooks**: In all cases some checks need to prevent deplatforming of highly correlated organic traffic such as a community group copy/pasting their bake sale advert.
+* **Playbooks**: 
-Playbook 1: Platform adds a hash of the post to the post metadata and make it publicly available (content addressing). Scrape for duplicate content and deplatform the content/users across affected platforms.
-Playbook 2: Platform adds plagiarism score metadata to a post and makes it publicly available. Scrape for duplicate content and deplatform the content/users across affected platforms.
-Playbook 3: Use message hashing and fuzzy hashing to detect identical/similar content.
-Playbook 4: Use plagiarism algorithm to detect similar blog posts.
-Playbook 5: Use basic web scraping techniques, Google dorks, etc to identify similar head lines, uniques phrases, authorship, embedded links and any other correlating data point.
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M012 - cleaning
 

counters/C00098.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: 
 
-* **Playbooks**: Affected person contacts platform for action
+* **Playbooks**: 
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M004 - friction
 

counters/C00136.md

@@ -2,9 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: 
 
-* **Playbooks**: Playbook 1: Work with platform to identify active target audiences through finanical data and messaging.
+* **Playbooks**: 
-Playbook 2: Use a platform's publicly available advertising/targeting capabilities to enumerate a list of possible microtargeted demographics. Compare these to known TAs of past/ongoing influence ops to identify the vulnerable demographics. 
-
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M010 - countermessaging
 

counters/C00140.md

@@ -2,9 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Applies to most of the content used by exposure techniques except "T0055 - Use hashtag”. Applies to analytics
 
-* **Playbooks**: Playbook 1: DDoS adversary link shorteners by spamming real links.
+* **Playbooks**: 
-Playbook 2: Compromise service and reroute links to benign content or counter messaging.
-
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M008 - data pollution
 

counters/C00148.md

@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: If creators are using network analysis to determine how to attack networks, then adding random extra links to those networks might throw that analysis out enough to change attack outcomes. Unsure which AMITT techniques.
 
-* **Playbooks**: Playbook 1: Degrade TA engagement using bots; direct the adversary to engage insular bot communities-within-communities rather than the authentic target audience.
+* **Playbooks**: 
-Playbook 2: Degrade MOEs/MOPs by faking inter-community sharing.
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M008 - data pollution
 

counters/C00149.md

@@ -2,14 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Includes Pollute the AB-testing data feeds: Polluting A/B testing requires knowledge of MOEs and MOPs. A/B testing must be caught early when there is relatively little data available so infiltration of TAs and understanding of how content is migrated from testing to larger audiences is fundamental.
 
-* **Playbooks**: Playbook 1: Distort TA demographics by posting irrelevant content, misleading demogaphic data, etc.
+* **Playbooks**: 
-Playbook 2: Work with the media platform to distort publicly available metrics. Can we work with Twitter to get crappy off-brand memes artificially bumped without needing to create fake accounts, etc.?
-Playbook 3: Use adtech to promote content inconsistent with TA demographics. If the adversary is reverse engineering a groups demographics by analyzing ads placed on the platform/group, by spamming ads for out-group stuff it may distort analysis of the group.
-Playbook 4: Distort Google Trends and other publicly available source of metrics using bots, cyborgs, adtech.
-Playbook 5: Distort TA emotional response to content/narratives.
-Playbook 6: Promote damp squibs. Within a known TA promote/inflate crappy off-brand memes which are unlikley to resonate.
-Playbook 7: Detect early trending/engagement and undermine the content by responding with 5Ds, toxic community behaviour, satirical responses, etc.
-Playbook 8: If adtech is used, fake clicks and engagements on the content.
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M008 - data pollution
 

counters/C00174.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Free and fair press: create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom.  Note difference between news and editorialising.  Build alternative news sources: create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets. Delegitimize the 24 hour news cycle.  includes Provide an alternative to disinformation content by expanding and improving local content: Develop content that can displace geopolitically-motivated narratives in the entire media environment, both new and old media alike.
 
-* **Playbooks**: Elected officials lead return to First Amendment norms that embrace free and fair media as central to democracy.
+* **Playbooks**: 
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M007 - metatechnique, M002 - diversion
 

counters/C00188.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Includes SEO influence.  August 2014, Russian news agency Rossiya Segodnya commissioned a poll in France with poorly worded questions and a statistically insignificant subsample that RT used to back a story titled “15% of French people back ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] militants, poll finds.” The story and summary infographic circulated on the internet, initially appearing primarily on French sites. After a week, the generally respectable digital U.S. news outlet Vox ran the story, now titled “One in Six French People Say They Support ISIS.” Although this effect has now worn off or been overwritten, for a time—despite a later story from The Washington Post debunking the claim—typing “ISIS France” into Google resulted in an autosuggestion of “ISIS France support” (Borthwick, 2015). Includes promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”: journalism training “would be helpful, especially for the online community.  Includes Strengthen local media: Improve effectiveness of local media outlets. Using eastern Latvia media outlets as an example, one expert noted that the media outlets are “very weak,” are often politically affiliated, or have “little local oligarchs that control them.”
 
-* **Playbooks**: TechCamp bringing together local journalists, with a several-day training program that includes a sponsored yearlong investigative project
+* **Playbooks**: 
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M001 - resilience
 

counters/C00197.md

@@ -2,25 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Standard reporting for false profiles (identity issues).  Includes detecting hijacked accounts and reallocating them - if possible, back to original owners. 
 
-* **Playbooks**: Playbook 1: Create a standard reporting format and method for social platforms for reporting false accounts. 
+* **Playbooks**: 
-Playbook 2: 
-- Is the account compromised? 
-- Is it known to be associated with threat actors 
-- common/random name 
-- Names violate terms of service 
-- Dormant account 
-- Change of country IP
-- Social network growth patterns (number of friends etc) 
-- Evidence of linguistic artifacts (multiple fingerprints, terms/idiosyncrasies )
-- Community vs. narrative vs. individuals 
-Playbook 3: Report suspected bots. 
-- Report ToS violations. 
--  In all playbooks the platform must force user verification, credential reset and enable MFA. Suspend the account if it cannot be verified.
-Playbook 1: Use sites like https://haveibeenpwned.com to detect compromised and at risk user accounts. 
-Playbook 2: Monitor for unusual account usage (use of VPN, new geographic location, unusual usage hours, etc). 
-Playbook 3: Detect sudden deviation in user sentiment such as suddenly dropping hashtags linked to extremist content.
-Playbook 4: Purchase "likes", "retweets" and other vehicles which identify a bot and/or hijacked account. Ban the account.
-Playbook 5: Detect hijacked account and spam their posts. "OP is a known disinformation bot. http://link.to.proof[.]com"
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M005 - removal
 

counters/C00219.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 * **Summary**: Steganography. Adding date, signatures etc to stop issue of photo relabelling etc. 
 
-* **Playbooks**: Add date and source to images
+* **Playbooks**: 
 
 * **Metatechnique**: M003 - daylight