@@ -672,33 +568,23 @@ function handleTechniqueClick(box) {
C00111: Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views
C00189: Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts
C00091: Honeypot social community
-
C00193: promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”
-
C00151: “fight in the light”
+
C00153: Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure
C00197: remove suspicious accounts
C00094: Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research
-
C00204: Strengthen local media
-
C00153: Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure
-
C00106: Click-bait centrist content
-
C00158: Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations
-
C00107: Content moderation
C00159: Have a disinformation response plan
-
C00142: Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content
+
C00106: Click-bait centrist content
C00161: Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements
-
C00165: Ensure integrity of official documents
-
C00167: Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft
-
C00171: social media content take-downs
+
C00107: Content moderation
C00170: elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft
-
C00202: Set data 'honeytraps'
+
C00142: Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content
C00174: Create a healthier news environment
-
C00219: Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators
+
C00165: Ensure integrity of official documents
C00176: Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private
+
C00202: Set data 'honeytraps'
C00190: open engagement with civil society
-
C00194: Provide an alternative to disinformation content by expanding and improving local content
-
C00196: Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media
+
C00219: Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators
C00205: strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting
C00212: build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant
-
C00214: Create policy that makes social media police disinformation
-
C00215: Use fraud legislation to clean up social media
C00220: Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan
C00221: Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors
C00223: Strengthen Trust in social media platforms
diff --git a/counters/C00012.md b/counters/C00012.md
index 79fb2d7..a59f6d3 100644
--- a/counters/C00012.md
+++ b/counters/C00012.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Counter C00012: Platform regulation
-* **Summary**: Empower existing regulators to govern social media. Also covers Destroy.
+* **Summary**: Empower existing regulators to govern social media. Also covers Destroy. Includes: Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media - The European Union created significant new regulations in 2018; the U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance. Includes Create policy that makes social media police disinformation - example: German model: facebook forced to police content by law. Includes: Use fraud legislation to clean up social media
* **Playbooks**: P0001: Develop a regulatory body like the CFPB to regulate and enforce regulation for digital organizations. P0002: Government regulation. Government shutdown.
@@ -26,17 +26,36 @@
| Counters these Techniques |
| ------------------------- |
-| [T0002 Facilitate State Propaganda](../techniques/T0002.md) |
-| [T0007 Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups](../techniques/T0007.md) |
-| [T0014 Create funding campaigns](../techniques/T0014.md) |
-| [T0015 Create hashtag](../techniques/T0015.md) |
-| [T0025 Leak altered documents](../techniques/T0025.md) |
-| [T0043 Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps](../techniques/T0043.md) |
-| [T0046 Search Engine Optimization](../techniques/T0046.md) |
-| [T0047 Muzzle social media as a political force](../techniques/T0047.md) |
-| [T0048 Cow online opinion leaders](../techniques/T0048.md) |
-| [T0051 Fabricate social media comment](../techniques/T0051.md) |
+| [T0001 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)](../techniques/T0001.md) |
+| [T0056 Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution](../techniques/T0056.md) |
| [T0055 Use hashtag](../techniques/T0055.md) |
+| [T0054 Twitter bots amplify](../techniques/T0054.md) |
+| [T0053 Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate](../techniques/T0053.md) |
+| [T0052 Tertiary sites amplify news](../techniques/T0052.md) |
+| [T0051 Fabricate social media comment](../techniques/T0051.md) |
+| [T0049 Flooding](../techniques/T0049.md) |
+| [T0048 Cow online opinion leaders](../techniques/T0048.md) |
+| [T0047 Muzzle social media as a political force](../techniques/T0047.md) |
+| [T0046 Search Engine Optimization](../techniques/T0046.md) |
+| [T0045 Use fake experts](../techniques/T0045.md) |
+| [T0043 Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps](../techniques/T0043.md) |
+| [T0026 Create fake research](../techniques/T0026.md) |
+| [T0025 Leak altered documents](../techniques/T0025.md) |
+| [T0024 Create fake videos and images](../techniques/T0024.md) |
+| [T0022 Conspiracy narratives](../techniques/T0022.md) |
+| [T0021 Memes](../techniques/T0021.md) |
+| [T0018 Paid targeted ads](../techniques/T0018.md) |
+| [T0017 Promote online funding](../techniques/T0017.md) |
+| [T0016 Clickbait](../techniques/T0016.md) |
+| [T0015 Create hashtag](../techniques/T0015.md) |
+| [T0014 Create funding campaigns](../techniques/T0014.md) |
+| [T0013 Create fake websites](../techniques/T0013.md) |
+| [T0009 Create fake experts](../techniques/T0009.md) |
+| [T0008 Create fake or imposter news sites](../techniques/T0008.md) |
+| [T0007 Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups](../techniques/T0007.md) |
+| [T0002 Facilitate State Propaganda](../techniques/T0002.md) |
+| [T0057 Organise remote rallies and events](../techniques/T0057.md) |
+| [T0061 Sell merchandising](../techniques/T0061.md) |
diff --git a/counters/C00026.md b/counters/C00026.md
index cd4727e..98912f5 100644
--- a/counters/C00026.md
+++ b/counters/C00026.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Counter C00026: Shore up democracy based messages
-* **Summary**: Messages about e.g. peace, freedom. And make it sexy
+* **Summary**: Messages about e.g. peace, freedom. And make it sexy. Includes Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft: Promote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess U.S. messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacy
* **Playbooks**:
diff --git a/counters/C00030.md b/counters/C00030.md
index 89c42dd..8aa363d 100644
--- a/counters/C00030.md
+++ b/counters/C00030.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
# Counter C00030: Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)
-* **Summary**:
+* **Summary**: Example: Reality Team.
+https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Counter-narrative-Handbook_1.pdf
* **Playbooks**:
diff --git a/counters/C00056.md b/counters/C00056.md
index 439d194..485d727 100644
--- a/counters/C00056.md
+++ b/counters/C00056.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Counter C00056: Get off social media
-* **Summary**:
+* **Summary**: We don't expect this to work
* **Playbooks**:
diff --git a/counters/C00073.md b/counters/C00073.md
index 73ab077..40b93b3 100644
--- a/counters/C00073.md
+++ b/counters/C00073.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Counter C00073: Inoculate populations through media literacy training
-* **Summary**: Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution. Build cultural resistance to false content, e.g. cultural resistance to bullshit. Influence literacy training, to inoculate against “cult” recruiting. Media literacy training: leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Inoculate at language. Strategic planning included as inoculating population has strategic value. Example is the "Learn to Discern" Program, funded by the Canadian government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016. The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in ‘’safe, informed media consumption techniques,’’ including avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech, verifying expert credentials, detecting censorship, and debunking news, photos, and videos.” Covers detect, deny, and degrade.
+* **Summary**: Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations. Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution. Build cultural resistance to false content, e.g. cultural resistance to bullshit. Influence literacy training, to inoculate against “cult” recruiting. Media literacy training: leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Inoculate at language. Strategic planning included as inoculating population has strategic value. Example is the "Learn to Discern" Program, funded by the Canadian government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016. The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in ‘’safe, informed media consumption techniques,’’ including avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech, verifying expert credentials, detecting censorship, and debunking news, photos, and videos.” Example: NGO Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, with some international funding, provides training to journalists in the Baltics and conducts media literacy training in the region. In addition to helping journalists avoid becoming “unwitting multipliers of misleading information,” the organization works with school teachers in the region to help them “decode media and incorporate media research into teaching.” concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training. Covers detect, deny, and degrade.
* **Playbooks**:
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
| Counters these Techniques |
| ------------------------- |
| [T0016 Clickbait](../techniques/T0016.md) |
+| [T0048 Cow online opinion leaders](../techniques/T0048.md) |
+| [T0045 Use fake experts](../techniques/T0045.md) |
+| [T0044 Seed distortions](../techniques/T0044.md) |
| [T0040 Demand unsurmountable proof](../techniques/T0040.md) |
| [T0039 Bait legitimate influencers](../techniques/T0039.md) |
| [T0027 Adapt existing narratives](../techniques/T0027.md) |
@@ -40,9 +43,6 @@
| [T0023 Distort facts](../techniques/T0023.md) |
| [T0022 Conspiracy narratives](../techniques/T0022.md) |
| [T0021 Memes](../techniques/T0021.md) |
-| [T0044 Seed distortions](../techniques/T0044.md) |
-| [T0045 Use fake experts](../techniques/T0045.md) |
-| [T0045 Use fake experts](../techniques/T0045.md) |
| [T0010 Cultivate ignorant agents](../techniques/T0010.md) |
| [T0056 Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution](../techniques/T0056.md) |
| [T0056 Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution](../techniques/T0056.md) |
diff --git a/counters/C00090.md b/counters/C00090.md
index 75d7614..6f806c0 100644
--- a/counters/C00090.md
+++ b/counters/C00090.md
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
* **Resources needed:**
-* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA12
+* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
| Actors | Sectors |
diff --git a/counters/C00101.md b/counters/C00101.md
index d99d4c7..8ce139f 100644
--- a/counters/C00101.md
+++ b/counters/C00101.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Counter C00101: Create friction by rate-limiting engagement
-* **Summary**:
+* **Summary**: Create participant friction. Includes Make repeat voting hard, and throttle number of forwards.
* **Playbooks**:
diff --git a/counters/C00103.md b/counters/C00103.md
index 9a40dae..a1bc144 100644
--- a/counters/C00103.md
+++ b/counters/C00103.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Counter C00103: Create a bot that engages / distract trolls
-* **Summary**:
+* **Summary**: This is reactive, not active measure (honeypots are active). It's a platform controlled measure.
* **Playbooks**:
diff --git a/counters/C00107.md b/counters/C00107.md
index 9d3ed8b..979f675 100644
--- a/counters/C00107.md
+++ b/counters/C00107.md
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
# Counter C00107: Content moderation
-* **Summary**:
+* **Summary**: includes social media content take-downs, e.g. facebook or Twitter content take-downs
* **Playbooks**:
-* **Metatechnique**: M006 - scoring
+* **Metatechnique**: M006 - scoring, M005 - removal
* **Resources needed:**
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
| Actors | Sectors |
| ------ | ------- |
+| [A031 social media platform adminstrator](../actors/A031.md) | Social Media Company |
diff --git a/counters/C00111.md b/counters/C00111.md
index d4b09ee..7a7a90a 100644
--- a/counters/C00111.md
+++ b/counters/C00111.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Counter C00111: Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views
-* **Summary**:
+* **Summary**: Example: The Commons Project (BuildUp) work.
* **Playbooks**:
diff --git a/counters/C00117.md b/counters/C00117.md
index fa560a5..0f14793 100644
--- a/counters/C00117.md
+++ b/counters/C00117.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Counter C00117: Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people
-* **Summary**:
+* **Summary**: Label promote counter to disinformation
* **Playbooks**:
diff --git a/counters/C00122.md b/counters/C00122.md
index 6b6d3d2..789c884 100644
--- a/counters/C00122.md
+++ b/counters/C00122.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Counter C00122: Content moderation
-* **Summary**:
+* **Summary**: Beware: content moderation misused becomes censorship.
* **Playbooks**:
diff --git a/counters/C00139.md b/counters/C00139.md
index 4f310ab..0a9512e 100644
--- a/counters/C00139.md
+++ b/counters/C00139.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Counter C00139: Weaponise youtube content matrices
-* **Summary**:
+* **Summary**: God knows what this is. Keeping temporarily in case we work it out.
* **Playbooks**:
diff --git a/counters/C00144.md b/counters/C00144.md
index c4a2ac0..41a8a30 100644
--- a/counters/C00144.md
+++ b/counters/C00144.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Counter C00144: Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs
-* **Summary**: Degrade the infrastructure.
+* **Summary**: Degrade the infrastructure. Could e.g. pay to not act for 30 days. Not recommended
* **Playbooks**:
diff --git a/counters/C00149.md b/counters/C00149.md
index 7b11b79..7fe8bdb 100644
--- a/counters/C00149.md
+++ b/counters/C00149.md
@@ -1,12 +1,15 @@
# Counter C00149: Poison the monitoring & evaluation data
-* **Summary**:
+* **Summary**: Includes Pollute the AB-testing data feeds: Polluting A/B testing requires knowledge of MOEs and MOPs. A/B testing must be caught early when there is relatively little data available so infiltration of TAs and understanding of how content is migrated from testing to larger audiences is fundamental.
* **Playbooks**: Playbook 1: Distort TA demographics by posting irrelevant content, misleading demogaphic data, etc.
Playbook 2: Work with the media platform to distort publicly available metrics. Can we work with Twitter to get crappy off-brand memes artificially bumped without needing to create fake accounts, etc.?
Playbook 3: Use adtech to promote content inconsistent with TA demographics. If the adversary is reverse engineering a groups demographics by analyzing ads placed on the platform/group, by spamming ads for out-group stuff it may distort analysis of the group.
Playbook 4: Distort Google Trends and other publicly available source of metrics using bots, cyborgs, adtech.
Playbook 5: Distort TA emotional response to content/narratives.
+Playbook 6: Promote damp squibs. Within a known TA promote/inflate crappy off-brand memes which are unlikley to resonate.
+Playbook 7: Detect early trending/engagement and undermine the content by responding with 5Ds, toxic community behaviour, satirical responses, etc.
+Playbook 8: If adtech is used, fake clicks and engagements on the content.
* **Metatechnique**: M008 - data pollution
@@ -30,6 +33,7 @@ Playbook 5: Distort TA emotional response to content/narratives.
| [T0020 Trial content](../techniques/T0020.md) |
| [T0046 Search Engine Optimization](../techniques/T0046.md) |
| [T0057 Organise remote rallies and events](../techniques/T0057.md) |
+| [T0063 Message reach](../techniques/T0063.md) |
diff --git a/counters/C00172.md b/counters/C00172.md
index b7985ba..66d3209 100644
--- a/counters/C00172.md
+++ b/counters/C00172.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Counter C00172: social media source removal
-* **Summary**: e.g. facebook page removal
+* **Summary**: Removing accounts, pages, groups, e.g. facebook page removal
* **Playbooks**:
diff --git a/counters/C00174.md b/counters/C00174.md
index 76cf94b..4e817e7 100644
--- a/counters/C00174.md
+++ b/counters/C00174.md
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
# Counter C00174: Create a healthier news environment
-* **Summary**: Free and fair press: create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom. Note difference between news and editorialising. Build alternative news sources: create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets. Delegitimize the 24 hour news cycle
+* **Summary**: Free and fair press: create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom. Note difference between news and editorialising. Build alternative news sources: create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets. Delegitimize the 24 hour news cycle. includes Provide an alternative to disinformation content by expanding and improving local content: Develop content that can displace geopolitically-motivated narratives in the entire media environment, both new and old media alike.
* **Playbooks**: Elected officials lead return to First Amendment norms that embrace free and fair media as central to democracy.
-* **Metatechnique**: M007 - metatechnique
+* **Metatechnique**: M007 - metatechnique, M002 - diversion
* **Resources needed:**
diff --git a/counters/C00178.md b/counters/C00178.md
index 8b725e1..9500c45 100644
--- a/counters/C00178.md
+++ b/counters/C00178.md
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
# Counter C00178: Fill information voids with non-disinformation content
-* **Summary**: e.g. increase Russian-language programming. The Economist notes, in May, Current Time videos were viewed 40 million times online (“America’s Answer to Russian Propaganda TV,” 2017). It would certainly be a positive development if Current Time could draw viewers away from Russian TV programming of RT and Sputnik. One effort that might assist in this regard is expanding programming to include more conventional entertainment programming
+* **Summary**: 1) Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!). 2) fill data voids with relevant information, e.g. increase Russian-language programming in areas subject to Russian disinformation. Examples include using Current Time videos (viewed 40 million times online) to draw viewers away from Russian TV programming in RT and Sputnik. POtential content for this includes conventional entertainment programming (source: The conomist, “America’s Answer to Russian Propaganda TV,” 2017).
* **Playbooks**:
-* **Metatechnique**: M009 - dilution
+* **Metatechnique**: M009 - dilution, M008 - data pollution
* **Resources needed:**
diff --git a/counters/C00182.md b/counters/C00182.md
index ae3ef53..08b0cfe 100644
--- a/counters/C00182.md
+++ b/counters/C00182.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-# Counter C00182: malware detection/quarantine/deletion
+# Counter C00182: Redirection / malware detection/ remediation
-* **Summary**: (2015) Trustwave reported that a Bedep Trojan malware kit had begun infecting machines and forcing them to browse certain sites, artificially inflating traffic to a set of pro-Russia
+* **Summary**: Detect redirction or malware, then quarantine or delete. Example: (2015) Trustwave reported that a Bedep Trojan malware kit had begun infecting machines and forcing them to browse certain sites, artificially inflating traffic to a set of pro-Russia
* **Playbooks**:
diff --git a/counters/C00188.md b/counters/C00188.md
index 7db3aa0..54f3363 100644
--- a/counters/C00188.md
+++ b/counters/C00188.md
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
# Counter C00188: Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves
-* **Summary**: August 2014, Russian news agency Rossiya Segodnya commissioned a poll in France with poorly worded questions and a statistically insignificant subsample that RT used to back a story titled “15% of French people back ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] militants, poll finds.” The story and summary infographic circulated on the internet, initially appearing primarily on French sites. After a week, the generally respectable digital U.S. news outlet Vox ran the story, now titled “One in Six French People Say They Support ISIS.” Although this effect has now worn off or been overwritten, for a time—despite a later story from The Washington Post debunking the claim—typing “ISIS France” into Google resulted in an autosuggestion of “ISIS France support” (Borthwick, 2015).
+* **Summary**: Includes SEO influence. August 2014, Russian news agency Rossiya Segodnya commissioned a poll in France with poorly worded questions and a statistically insignificant subsample that RT used to back a story titled “15% of French people back ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] militants, poll finds.” The story and summary infographic circulated on the internet, initially appearing primarily on French sites. After a week, the generally respectable digital U.S. news outlet Vox ran the story, now titled “One in Six French People Say They Support ISIS.” Although this effect has now worn off or been overwritten, for a time—despite a later story from The Washington Post debunking the claim—typing “ISIS France” into Google resulted in an autosuggestion of “ISIS France support” (Borthwick, 2015). Includes promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”: journalism training “would be helpful, especially for the online community. Includes Strengthen local media: Improve effectiveness of local media outlets. Using eastern Latvia media outlets as an example, one expert noted that the media outlets are “very weak,” are often politically affiliated, or have “little local oligarchs that control them.”
-* **Playbooks**:
+* **Playbooks**: TechCamp bringing together local journalists, with a several-day training program that includes a sponsored yearlong investigative project
* **Metatechnique**: M001 - resilience
@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@
| Counters these Techniques |
| ------------------------- |
+| [T0001 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)](../techniques/T0001.md) |
+| [T0003 Leverage Existing Narratives](../techniques/T0003.md) |
+| [T0022 Conspiracy narratives](../techniques/T0022.md) |
+| [T0027 Adapt existing narratives](../techniques/T0027.md) |
+| [T0045 Use fake experts](../techniques/T0045.md) |
+| [T0008 Create fake or imposter news sites](../techniques/T0008.md) |
+| [T0010 Cultivate ignorant agents](../techniques/T0010.md) |
| [T0039 Bait legitimate influencers](../techniques/T0039.md) |
| [T0046 Search Engine Optimization](../techniques/T0046.md) |
diff --git a/counters/C00190.md b/counters/C00190.md
index f680ff4..0a9ab0e 100644
--- a/counters/C00190.md
+++ b/counters/C00190.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Counter C00190: open engagement with civil society
-* **Summary**: U.S. government should also open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. It should seek to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by U.S. competitors.
+* **Summary**: Government open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. Government seeks to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by competitor nations. Includes “fight in the light”: Use leadership in the arts, entertainment, and media to highlight and build on fundamental tenets of democracy.
* **Playbooks**:
diff --git a/counters/C00195.md b/counters/C00195.md
index d7ca0ac..049e1e0 100644
--- a/counters/C00195.md
+++ b/counters/C00195.md
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
# Counter C00195: Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content
-* **Summary**: Use Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or Russian propaganda themes. Taking advantage of the technology behind Google AdWords, this method identifies potential ISIS recruits through their Google searches and exposes them to curated YouTube videos debunking ISIS recruiting themes. Apply this method to Russian propaganda.
+* **Summary**: Use Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or Russian propaganda themes. Taking advantage of the technology behind Google AdWords, this method identifies potential ISIS recruits through their Google searches and exposes them to curated YouTube videos debunking ISIS recruiting themes. Apply this method to Russian propaganda. Includes Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist content.
* **Playbooks**:
* **Metatechnique**: M002 - diversion
-* **Resources needed:**
+* **Resources needed:** R002 - funding
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
diff --git a/counters/C00200.md b/counters/C00200.md
index 6b21141..4f93d6c 100644
--- a/counters/C00200.md
+++ b/counters/C00200.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Counter C00200: Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo
-* **Summary**: Has been done in e.g. India
+* **Summary**: Has been done in e.g. India. FIXIT: standardize language used for influencer/ respected figure.
* **Playbooks**:
diff --git a/counters/C00211.md b/counters/C00211.md
index 86df7e4..f13d4ba 100644
--- a/counters/C00211.md
+++ b/counters/C00211.md
@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
# Counter C00211: Use humorous counter-narratives
-* **Summary**:
+* **Summary**: Examples:
+
+* Baltic Elves.
+https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/07/disinformation-nation-the-slovaks-fighting-in-defence-of-facts/
+* Taiwan humor over rumor strategy.https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/feb/17/humour-over-rumour-taiwan-fake-news
+* Taiwan “humor over rumour"
+https://internews.org/story/using-comedy-and-social-media-educate-disinformation
* **Playbooks**:
diff --git a/counters_index.md b/counters_index.md
index 99de7de..92c5e91 100644
--- a/counters_index.md
+++ b/counters_index.md
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
Empower existing regulators to govern social media. Also covers Destroy.
+
Empower existing regulators to govern social media. Also covers Destroy. Includes: Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media - The European Union created significant new regulations in 2018; the U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance. Includes Create policy that makes social media police disinformation - example: German model: facebook forced to police content by law. Includes: Use fraud legislation to clean up social media
Messages about e.g. peace, freedom. And make it sexy
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Messages about e.g. peace, freedom. And make it sexy. Includes Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft: Promote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess U.S. messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacy
M010 - countermessaging
TA01 Strategic Planning
D4 Degrade
@@ -158,7 +158,8 @@ This could be used to adjust upvote weight via a trust factor of people and orga
Inoculate populations through media literacy training
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Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution. Build cultural resistance to false content, e.g. cultural resistance to bullshit. Influence literacy training, to inoculate against “cult” recruiting. Media literacy training: leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Inoculate at language. Strategic planning included as inoculating population has strategic value. Example is the "Learn to Discern" Program, funded by the Canadian government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016. The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in ‘’safe, informed media consumption techniques,’’ including avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech, verifying expert credentials, detecting censorship, and debunking news, photos, and videos.” Covers detect, deny, and degrade.
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Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations. Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution. Build cultural resistance to false content, e.g. cultural resistance to bullshit. Influence literacy training, to inoculate against “cult” recruiting. Media literacy training: leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Inoculate at language. Strategic planning included as inoculating population has strategic value. Example is the "Learn to Discern" Program, funded by the Canadian government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016. The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in ‘’safe, informed media consumption techniques,’’ including avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech, verifying expert credentials, detecting censorship, and debunking news, photos, and videos.” Example: NGO Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, with some international funding, provides training to journalists in the Baltics and conducts media literacy training in the region. In addition to helping journalists avoid becoming “unwitting multipliers of misleading information,” the organization works with school teachers in the region to help them “decode media and incorporate media research into teaching.” concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training. Covers detect, deny, and degrade.
M001 - resilience
TA01 Strategic Planning
D2 Deny
@@ -473,19 +474,11 @@ Note: This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted co
Polluting A/B testing requires knowledge of MOEs and MOPs. A/B testing must be caught early when there is relatively little data available so infiltration of TAs and understanding of how content is migrated from testing to larger audiences is fundamental.
Includes Pollute the AB-testing data feeds: Polluting A/B testing requires knowledge of MOEs and MOPs. A/B testing must be caught early when there is relatively little data available so infiltration of TAs and understanding of how content is migrated from testing to larger audiences is fundamental.
Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations
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NGO Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, with some international funding, provides training to journalists in the Baltics and conducts media literacy training in the region. In addition to helping journalists avoid becoming “unwitting multipliers of misleading information,” the organization works with school teachers in the region to help them “decode media and incorporate media research into teaching.” concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training
e.g. Create a campaign plan and toolkit for competition short of armed conflict (this used to be called “the grey zone”). The campaign plan should account for own vulnerabilities and strengths, and not over-rely on any one tool of statecraft or line of effort. It will identify and employ a broad spectrum of national power to deter, compete, and counter (where necessary) other countries’ approaches, and will include understanding of own capabilities, capabilities of disinformation creators, and international standards of conduct to compete in, shrink the size, and ultimately deter use of competition short of armed conflict.
@@ -993,14 +938,6 @@ Note: This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted co
Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft
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Promote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess U.S. messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacy
international donors will donate to a basket fund that will pay a committee of local experts who will, in turn, manage and distribute the money to Russian-language producers and broadcasters that pitch various projects.
@@ -1017,17 +954,9 @@ Note: This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted co
Free and fair press: create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom. Note difference between news and editorialising. Build alternative news sources: create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets. Delegitimize the 24 hour news cycle
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M007 - metatechnique
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Free and fair press: create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom. Note difference between news and editorialising. Build alternative news sources: create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets. Delegitimize the 24 hour news cycle. includes Provide an alternative to disinformation content by expanding and improving local content: Develop content that can displace geopolitically-motivated narratives in the entire media environment, both new and old media alike.
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M007 - metatechnique, M002 - diversion
TA01 Strategic Planning
D2 Deny
@@ -1051,15 +980,15 @@ Note: This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted co
Fill information voids with non-disinformation content
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e.g. increase Russian-language programming. The Economist notes, in May, Current Time videos were viewed 40 million times online (“America’s Answer to Russian Propaganda TV,” 2017). It would certainly be a positive development if Current Time could draw viewers away from Russian TV programming of RT and Sputnik. One effort that might assist in this regard is expanding programming to include more conventional entertainment programming
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M009 - dilution
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1) Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!). 2) fill data voids with relevant information, e.g. increase Russian-language programming in areas subject to Russian disinformation. Examples include using Current Time videos (viewed 40 million times online) to draw viewers away from Russian TV programming in RT and Sputnik. POtential content for this includes conventional entertainment programming (source: The conomist, “America’s Answer to Russian Propaganda TV,” 2017).
(2015) Trustwave reported that a Bedep Trojan malware kit had begun infecting machines and forcing them to browse certain sites, artificially inflating traffic to a set of pro-Russia
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Redirection / malware detection/ remediation
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Detect redirction or malware, then quarantine or delete. Example: (2015) Trustwave reported that a Bedep Trojan malware kit had begun infecting machines and forcing them to browse certain sites, artificially inflating traffic to a set of pro-Russia
M005 - removal
TA09 Exposure
D2 Deny
@@ -1075,7 +1004,7 @@ Note: This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted co
Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves
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August 2014, Russian news agency Rossiya Segodnya commissioned a poll in France with poorly worded questions and a statistically insignificant subsample that RT used to back a story titled “15% of French people back ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] militants, poll finds.” The story and summary infographic circulated on the internet, initially appearing primarily on French sites. After a week, the generally respectable digital U.S. news outlet Vox ran the story, now titled “One in Six French People Say They Support ISIS.” Although this effect has now worn off or been overwritten, for a time—despite a later story from The Washington Post debunking the claim—typing “ISIS France” into Google resulted in an autosuggestion of “ISIS France support” (Borthwick, 2015).
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Includes SEO influence. August 2014, Russian news agency Rossiya Segodnya commissioned a poll in France with poorly worded questions and a statistically insignificant subsample that RT used to back a story titled “15% of French people back ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] militants, poll finds.” The story and summary infographic circulated on the internet, initially appearing primarily on French sites. After a week, the generally respectable digital U.S. news outlet Vox ran the story, now titled “One in Six French People Say They Support ISIS.” Although this effect has now worn off or been overwritten, for a time—despite a later story from The Washington Post debunking the claim—typing “ISIS France” into Google resulted in an autosuggestion of “ISIS France support” (Borthwick, 2015). Includes promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”: journalism training “would be helpful, especially for the online community. Includes Strengthen local media: Improve effectiveness of local media outlets. Using eastern Latvia media outlets as an example, one expert noted that the media outlets are “very weak,” are often politically affiliated, or have “little local oligarchs that control them.”
M001 - resilience
TA08 Pump Priming
D3 Disrupt
@@ -1091,44 +1020,20 @@ Note: This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted co
U.S. government should also open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. It should seek to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by U.S. competitors.
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Government open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. Government seeks to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by competitor nations. Includes “fight in the light”: Use leadership in the arts, entertainment, and media to highlight and build on fundamental tenets of democracy.
Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content
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Use Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or Russian propaganda themes. Taking advantage of the technology behind Google AdWords, this method identifies potential ISIS recruits through their Google searches and exposes them to curated YouTube videos debunking ISIS recruiting themes. Apply this method to Russian propaganda.
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Use Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or Russian propaganda themes. Taking advantage of the technology behind Google AdWords, this method identifies potential ISIS recruits through their Google searches and exposes them to curated YouTube videos debunking ISIS recruiting themes. Apply this method to Russian propaganda. Includes Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist content.
Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media
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The European Union created significant new regulations in 2018; the U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance
Standard reporting for false profiles (identity issues). Includes detecting hijacked accounts and reallocating them - if possible, back to original owners.
@@ -1139,7 +1044,7 @@ Note: This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted co
Improve effectiveness of local media outlets. Using eastern Latvia media outlets as an example, one expert noted that the media outlets are “very weak,” are often politically affiliated, or have “little local oligarchs that control them.”
strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting
Increase civic resilience by partnering with business community to combat gray zone threats and ensuring adequate reporting and enforcement mechanisms.
@@ -1187,7 +1084,13 @@ Note: This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted co