+
+| id |
+name |
+summary |
+metatechnique |
+tactic |
+responsetype |
+
+
+| C00001 |
+Better models of info spread up the layers |
+ |
+metatechnique |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+ALL |
+
+
+| C00003 |
+How can we safeguard against extremists using the tools that we will produce? |
+ |
+metatechnique |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+ALL |
+
+
+| C00004 |
+Managing like a chronic disease |
+ |
+metatechnique |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+ALL |
+
+
+| C00005 |
+Policy: makers, terminology, elements: a) broad, b) specific |
+ |
+metatechnique |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+ALL |
+
+
+| C00006 |
+Charge for social media |
+No corresponding AMITT technique. |
+friction |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00007 |
+Create framework for BetterBusinessBureau (BBB) for news media |
+No corresponding AMITT technique. |
+scoring |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00008 |
+Create shared fact-checking database |
+Snopes is best-known example |
+scoring |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00009 |
+Educate high profile influencers on best practices |
+ |
+resilience |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00010 |
+Enhanced privacy regulation for social media |
+No corresponding AMITT technique. |
+friction |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00011 |
+Media literacy. Games to identify fake news |
+ |
+resilience |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00012 |
+Platform regulation |
+ |
+metatechnique |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00013 |
+Rating framework for news - full transcripts, link source, add items, BBB for news |
+Technique should be in terms of "strategic innoculation", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news. No corresponding AMITT technique. |
+scoring |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00014 |
+Real-time updates to fact-checking database |
+existing examples at Buzzfeed and Fema, especially during disasters |
+scoring |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00015 |
+Reputation scores for social media users |
+ |
+scoring |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00016 |
+Social media as a privilege not right |
+ |
+cleaning |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00017 |
+Media campaign promoting in-group to out-group in person communication / activities |
+Technique could be in terms of forcing a reality-check by talking to people instead of reading about bogeymen. No corresponding AMITT technique. |
+countermessaging |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00018 |
+Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers |
+Duplicate of "Promote playbooks to call out dividers" |
+daylight |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00019 |
+Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers |
+Duplicate of "Promote constructive communication by shaming dividers" |
+daylight |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00020 |
+Deligitimise the 24 hour news cycle |
+Unsure |
+friction |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00021 |
+Encourage in-person communication |
+ |
+resilience |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00022 |
+Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety - to counter ability and fear based attacks |
+Unsure |
+resilience |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00023 |
+Promote civility as an identity that people will defend |
+ |
+resilience |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00024 |
+Promote constructive narratives i.e. not polarising. Pro-life, pro-choice, or pro-USA? |
+ |
+resilience |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00025 |
+Promote identity neutral narratives |
+ |
+countermessaging |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00026 |
+Shore up democracy based messages (peace, freedom) - make it sexy |
+Unsure |
+countermessaging |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00027 |
+Create culture of civility |
+ |
+resilience |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D7 Deter |
+
+
+| C00028 |
+Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments |
+Use blockchain technology to require collaborative validation before posts or comments are submitted.
+
+This could be used to adjust upvote weight via a trust factor of people and organisations you trust, or other criteria. |
+verification |
+TA02 Objective Planning |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00029 |
+Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise |
+ |
+diversion |
+TA02 Objective Planning |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00030 |
+Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based) |
+ |
+diversion |
+TA02 Objective Planning |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00031 |
+Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify |
+Create competing narratives. Included "Facilitate State Propaganda" as diluting the narrative could have an effect on the pro-state narrative used by volunteers, or lower their involvement. |
+dilution |
+TA02 Objective Planning |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00032 |
+Hijack content and link to truth- based info (platform) |
+ |
+diversion |
+TA02 Objective Planning |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00033 |
+Build cultural resistance to false content |
+Cultural resistance to bullshit |
+resilience |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00034 |
+Create more friction at account creation |
+Counters fake account |
+friction |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00035 |
+Friction |
+ |
+friction |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00036 |
+Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) |
+All of these would be highly affected by infiltration or false-claims of infiltration. |
+targeting |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00039 |
+Standard reporting for false profiles |
+Deplatform. Reporting fake profiles is the only solution (identity issues). Only resolution |
+removal |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00040 |
+third party verification for people |
+counters fake experts |
+verification |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00042 |
+Address truth contained in narratives |
+ |
+countermessaging |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00043 |
+Detect hijacked accounts and reallocate them |
+ |
+cleaning |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00044 |
+Keep people from posting to social media immediately |
+My interpretation is that this is method would be used to slow down activities or force a small delay between posts or replies to new posts. |
+friction |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00045 |
+S4d detection and re-allocation approaches |
+What's S4D? |
+friction |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00046 |
+Marginalise and discredit extremist |
+Duplicate of "Name and Shame" - recommend removal. No, not quite. |
+targeting |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00047 |
+Coordinated inauthentics |
+ |
+data pollution |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D5 Deceive |
+
+
+| C00048 |
+Name and Shame |
+ |
+daylight |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D7 Deter |
+
+
+| C00049 |
+Influence literacy training |
+Inoculate against "cult" recruiting |
+resilience |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00050 |
+Anti-elicitation training |
+ |
+resilience |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00051 |
+Phishing prevention education etc |
+ |
+resilience |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00052 |
+Infiltrate platforms |
+Detect and degrade |
+targeting |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00053 |
+Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts |
+ |
+cleaning |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00054 |
+Media literacy training. |
+Leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Covers detect, deny and degrade. |
+resilience |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00055 |
+Empower existing regulators to govern social media |
+Also covers Destroy. |
+metatechnique |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00056 |
+Get off social media |
+ |
+friction |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00057 |
+Privacy standards |
+ |
+scoring |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00058 |
+Report crowdfunder as violator |
+counters crowdfunding |
+removal |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00059 |
+Verification of project before posting (counters funding campaigns) |
+ |
+verification |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00060 |
+Enhanced legal enforcement against for-profit follower/engagement factories |
+ |
+targeting |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00061 |
+Innoculating at language |
+ |
+resilience |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00062 |
+Free open library sources worldwide |
+Open-source libraries could be created that aid in some way for each technique. Even for Strategic Planning, some open-source frameworks such as AMITT can be created to counter the adversarial efforts. |
+countermessaging |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D6 Destroy |
+
+
+| C00063 |
+Ban political microtargeting |
+ |
+removal |
+TA05 Microtargeting |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00065 |
+Ban political ads |
+ |
+removal |
+TA05 Microtargeting |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00066 |
+Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back) |
+ |
+dilution |
+TA05 Microtargeting |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00067 |
+Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding) |
+ |
+targeting |
+TA05 Microtargeting |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00068 |
+Expose online funding as fake |
+ |
+daylight |
+TA05 Microtargeting |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00069 |
+Mark clickbait visually |
+ |
+daylight |
+TA05 Microtargeting |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00070 |
+Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. |
+TA02*: DDOS at the critical time (ie. midterm-2018 elections DDOS against troll farms) to deny an adversary's time-bound objective.
+
+T0008: A quick response to a proto-viral story will affect it's ability to spread and raise questions about their legitimacy.
+
+Hashtag: Against the platform, by drowning the hashtag.
+
+T0046 - Search Engine Optimization: Sub-optimal website performance affect its search engine rank, which I interpret as "blocking access to a platform". |
+removal |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00071 |
+Block source of pollution |
+ |
+removal |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00072 |
+Content censorship in non-relevant domains e.g. Pinterest antivax |
+ |
+removal |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00073 |
+Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution |
+Strategic planning included as innoculating population has strategic value. Example is the "Learn to Discern" Program, funded by the Canadian government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016. The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in ‘’safe, informed media consumption techniques,’’ including avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech, verifying expert credentials, detecting censorship, and debunking news, photos, and videos." |
+resilience |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00074 |
+Identify identical content and mass deplatform |
+
+ |
+cleaning |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00075 |
+normalise language |
+ |
+countermessaging |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00076 |
+Prohibit images in political discourse channels |
+ |
+removal |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00077 |
+Active defence: replay "develop people" |
+ |
+targeting |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00078 |
+Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content. More specifically, change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists |
+Note: Suggest a more generic technique since this applies to non-image content and to non-hate groups. |
+diversion |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00079 |
+Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side |
+ |
+diversion |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00080 |
+Create competing narrative |
+ |
+diversion |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00081 |
+Discredit by pointing out the "noise" and informing public that "flooding" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of "noise" |
+ |
+daylight |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00082 |
+Ground truthing as automated response to pollution |
+ |
+countermessaging |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00084 |
+Steal their truths |
+Try technique T0003. |
+diversion |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00085 |
+Demuting content |
+Unsure. My interpretation is that disinformation campaigns can be disrupted by archiving their contents online, for intelligence analysis and public transparency.
+
+In some phases, contents would be archives of websites, social media profiles, media and copies of published advertisements.
+
+In others, content would be archives of comments attributed to bad actors, as well as anonymized metadata about users who interacted with them and analysis of the effect.
+
+Having these tagged and shamed for as associated by bad actors would be beneficial for public vigilance. |
+daylight |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00086 |
+Distract from noise with addictive content |
+Example: Interject addictive links or contents into discussions of disinformation materials and measure a "conversion rate" of users who engage with your content and away from the social media channel's "information bubble" around the disinformation item. Use bots to amplify and upvote the addictive content.
+
+Note: This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted comments are all jokes, preventing serious discussion from being discovered by those who filter by upvotes. |
+diversion |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00087 |
+Make more noise |
+Recommend Removal: I see "Make More Noise" as similar to "Do everything in AMITT, better than the adversary". It is not a counter in itself but rather an adversarial attack tool that can be used for blue team narratives. |
+dilution |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00088 |
+Poison pill recasting of message |
+Unsure how to interpret. The techniques listed all involve some amount of promotion which could be manipulated. For example, online fundings or rallies could be advertised, through compromised or fake channels, as being associated with "far-up/down/left/right" actors. "Long Game" narratives could be subjected in a similar way with negative connotations. |
+diversion |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00089 |
+Throttle number of forwards |
+ |
+friction |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00090 |
+Fake engagement system |
+ |
+diversion |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D5 Deceive |
+
+
+| C00091 |
+Honeypot social community |
+ |
+diversion |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D5 Deceive |
+
+
+| C00092 |
+Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers |
+ |
+scoring |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D7 Deter |
+
+
+| C00093 |
+Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers |
+ |
+resilience |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D7 Deter |
+
+
+| C00094 |
+Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research |
+ |
+daylight |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D7 Deter |
+
+
+| C00095 |
+Keep score |
+ |
+scoring |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D7 Deter |
+
+
+| C00096 |
+Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers |
+ |
+scoring |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D7 Deter |
+
+
+| C00097 |
+Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment |
+ |
+friction |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00098 |
+Revocation of "verified" |
+ |
+friction |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00099 |
+Strengthen verification methods |
+ |
+friction |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00100 |
+Hashtag jacking |
+ |
+diversion |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00101 |
+Create participant friction |
+ |
+friction |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00102 |
+Make repeat voting harder |
+ |
+friction |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00103 |
+Create a bot that engages / distract trolls |
+Use T00030 backstop personas |
+diversion |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D5 Deceive |
+
+
+| C00105 |
+Buy more advertising than the adversary to shift influence and algorithms |
+ |
+dilution |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00106 |
+Click-bait centrist content |
+Create emotive centrist content that gets more clicks |
+diversion |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00107 |
+Content moderation |
+ |
+scoring |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00109 |
+De-escalation |
+ |
+resilience |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00110 |
+Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist content |
+ |
+friction |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00111 |
+Present sympathetic views of opposite side |
+ |
+resilience |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00112 |
+"Prove they are not an op!" |
+This applies to the entirety of the matrix as I read this as "create awareness around the use of all of these techniques" |
+friction |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00113 |
+Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials. Attack audience quality of fake expert |
+ |
+daylight |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00114 |
+Don't engage with payloads |
+ |
+friction |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00115 |
+Expose actor and intentions |
+ |
+daylight |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00116 |
+Provide proof of involvement |
+ |
+daylight |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00117 |
+Downgrade de-amplify label promote counter to disinformation |
+ |
+countermessaging |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00118 |
+Repurpose images with new text |
+ |
+countermessaging |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00119 |
+Engage payload and debunk. Provide link to facts. |
+Might be okay. |
+countermessaging |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D7 Deter |
+
+
+| C00120 |
+Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes |
+ |
+metatechnique |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D7 Deter |
+
+
+| C00121 |
+Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. |
+ |
+resilience |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D7 Deter |
+
+
+| C00122 |
+Content moderation. Censorship? |
+ |
+friction |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00123 |
+Bot control |
+ |
+friction |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00124 |
+Don't feed the trolls |
+ |
+friction |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00125 |
+Prepare the population with pre-announcements |
+ |
+resilience |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00126 |
+Social media amber alert |
+ |
+daylight |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00128 |
+Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other "decelerants" |
+ |
+dilution |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00129 |
+Use banking to cut off access |
+fiscal sanctions; parallel to counter terrorism |
+reduce resources |
+TA10 Go Physical |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00130 |
+Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously. |
+ |
+resilience |
+TA10 Go Physical |
+D7 Deter |
+
+
+| C00131 |
+Seize and analyse botnet servers |
+ |
+removal |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00133 |
+Deplatform Account* |
+Note: Similar to Deplatform People but less generic. Perhaps both should be left. |
+removal |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00135 |
+Deplatform message groups and/or message boards |
+Merged two rows here. |
+removal |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00136 |
+Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages |
+ |
+countermessaging |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00137 |
+Pollute the AB-testing data feeds |
+Polluting A/B testing requires knowledge of MOEs and MOPs. A/B testing must be caught early when there is relatively little data available so infiltration of TAs and understanding of how content is migrated from testing to larger audiences is fundamental. |
+data pollution |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00138 |
+Spam domestic actors with lawsuits |
+ |
+reduce resources |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00139 |
+Weaponise youtube content matrices |
+ |
+friction |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00140 |
+"Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls |
+Applies to most of the content used by exposure techniques except "T0055 - Use hashtag" |
+data pollution |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00141 |
+"Hey this story is old" popup when messaging with old URL |
+This assumes that this technique is based on visits to an URL shortener or a captured news site that can publish a message of our choice. |
+friction |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00142 |
+"This has been disproved - do you want to forward it" |
+ |
+friction |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00143 |
+(botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time |
+ |
+targeting |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00144 |
+Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs |
+ |
+reduce resources |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00145 |
+Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!) |
+ |
+data pollution |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00147 |
+Make amplification of social media ports expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days) |
+ |
+friction |
+TA12 Measure Effectiveness |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00148 |
+Add random links to network graphs |
+If creators are using network analysis to determine how to attack networks, then adding random extra links to those networks might throw that analysis out enough to change attack outcomes. Unsure which AMITT techniques. |
+data pollution |
+TA12 Measure Effectiveness |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00149 |
+Poison the monitoring & evaluation data |
+ |
+data pollution |
+TA12 Measure Effectiveness |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00150 |
+“calling them out” |
+Identify social media accounts as sources of propaganda—“calling them out”— might be helpful to prevent the spread of their message to audiences that otherwise would consider them factual |
+daylight |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00151 |
+“fight in the light” |
+Use leadership in the arts, entertainment, and media to highlight and build on fundamental tenets of democracy. |
+daylight |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00152 |
+“name and shame” |
+USAID has been restructuring its programs to address predatory Chinese development projects and the information operations that support them. USAID’s new strategy has tailored programs to counter Chinese educational exchange programs and to support free and fair elections, youth empowerment, democratic governance, and free press. USAID’s Russia regional teams have also been compiling a strategy for Russia’s information operations. One strong point of USAID’s programming is a system of indicators and measurements for a country’s vulnerability to foreign influence and information operations |
+daylight |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00153 |
+Use offensive cyber action |
+Align offensive cyber action with information operations and counter disinformation approaches, where appropriate. |
+targeting |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00154 |
+Ask media not to report false information |
+ |
+removal |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00155 |
+Ban incident actors from funding sites |
+ |
+removal |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00156 |
+Better tell the U.S., NATO, and EU story. |
+Civil engagement activities conducted on the part of EFP forces. In Latvia, for example, U.S. soldiers have reportedly conducted numerous civil engagements with the local populations. In one example, soldiers cut firewood for local Russian-speaking Latvians. Locals were reportedly overheard saying, “A Russian soldier wouldn’t do that.” NATO should likewise provide support and training, where needed, to local public affairs and other communication personnel. Local government and military public affairs personnel can play their part in creating and disseminating entertaining and sharable content that supports the EFP mission. |
+countermessaging |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00157 |
+Build alternative news sources |
+Create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets |
+countermessaging |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00158 |
+Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations. |
+NGO Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, with some international funding, provides training to journalists in the Baltics and conducts media literacy training in the region. In addition to helping journalists avoid becoming “unwitting multipliers of misleading information,” the organization works with school teachers in the region to help them “decode media and incorporate media research into teaching.” concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training |
+resilience |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00159 |
+Campaign mindset and associated toolbox |
+A campaign plan for the gray zone must account for U.S. vulnerabilities and strengths and must take care not to over-rely on any one tool of statecraft or line of effort. If the United States is to engage seriously in gray zone competition, it will need to identify and employ a broad spectrum of its national power to deter, compete, and counter (where necessary) other countries’ approaches. It is therefore critical that the United States understands its own capabilities, the capabilities of its adversaries, and international standards of conduct to compete in, shrink the size, and ultimately deter use of the gray zone. |
+metatechnique |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00160 |
+find and train influencers |
+Identify key influencers (e.g. use network analysis), then reach out to identified users and offer support, through either training or resources. |
+resilience |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00161 |
+Coalition Building and Third-Party Inducements: |
+Advance coalitions across borders and sectors, spanning public and private, as well as foreign and domestic, divides. Improve mechanisms to collaborate, share information, and develop coordinated approaches with the private sector at home and allies and partners abroad. |
+metatechnique |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D7 Deter |
+
+
+| C00162 |
+collect data/map constellations of Russian“civil society”. Unravel/target the Potemkin villages |
+Kremlin’s narrative spin extends through constellations of “civil society” organizations, political parties, churches, and other actors. Moscow leverages think tanks, human rights groups, election observers, Eurasianist integration groups, and orthodox groups. A collection of Russian civil society organizations, such as the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, together receive at least US$100 million per year, in addition to government-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), at least 150 of which are funded by Russian presidential grants totaling US$70 million per year. |
+targeting |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00164 |
+compatriot policy |
+protect the interests of this population and, more importantly, influence the population to support pro-Russia causes and effectively influence the politics of its neighbors |
+targeting |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00165 |
+Limit access to alterable documents |
+e.g. for leaked legal documents, use court motions to limit future discovery actions |
+friction |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00167 |
+Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft |
+Promote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess U.S. messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacy |
+countermessaging |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00169 |
+develop a creative content hub |
+international donors will donate to a basket fund that will pay a committee of local experts who will, in turn, manage and distribute the money to Russian-language producers and broadcasters that pitch various projects. |
+countermessaging |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00170 |
+elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft |
+Shift from reactive to proactive response, with priority on sharing relevant information with the public and mobilizing private-sector engagement. Recent advances in data-driven technologies have elevated information as a source of power to influence the political and economic environment, to foster economic growth, to enable a decision-making advantage over competitors, and to communicate securely and quickly. |
+metatechnique |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00171 |
+social media content take-downs |
+e.g. facebook or Twitter content take-downs |
+removal |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00172 |
+social media page removal |
+e.g. facebook page removal |
+removal |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00174 |
+Free and Fair Press |
+Create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom. |
+metatechnique |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00176 |
+Improve Coordination with and feedback from the U.S. private sector |
+gray zone challenges are increasingly multidisciplinary, there are few organizations within the U.S. national security structure that are equipped with the broad-spectrum capability to effectively counter Russian and Chinese gray zone tactics in real-time. Furthermore, institutional hurdles currently impede diverse subject matter experts, hailing from outside of the traditional national security and foreign policy disciplines (e.g., physical science, engineering, media, legal, and economics fields), from contributing to the direct development of national security countermeasures to emerging gray zone threat vectors. Driving key lines of interagency alignment through a Gray Zone Action Group (GZAG), akin to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), in areas such as: Strategic narrative in coordination with DHS, DoS, DoD, Intelligence Community (IC), and other implementing agencies. Particular focus on the nexus of cyber and information operations; |
+metatechnique |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D7 Deter |
+
+
+| C00178 |
+Fill information voids with non-disinformation content |
+e.g. increase Russian-language programming. The Economist notes, in May, Current Time videos were viewed 40 million times online (“America’s Answer to Russian Propaganda TV,” 2017). It would certainly be a positive development if Current Time could draw viewers away from Russian TV programming of RT and Sputnik. One effort that might assist in this regard is expanding programming to include more conventional entertainment programming |
+dilution |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00179 |
+Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target Russia-based nonattributed social media accounts |
+Impact of and Dealing with Trolls - "Chatham House has observed that trolls also sometimes function as decoys, as a way of “keeping the infantry busy” that “aims to wear down the other side” (Lough et al., 2014). Another type of troll involves “false accounts posing as authoritative information sources on social media," |
+removal |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00182 |
+malware detection/quarantine/deletion |
+(2015) Trustwave reported that a Bedep Trojan malware kit had begun infecting machines and forcing them to browse certain sites, artificially inflating traffic to a set of pro-Russia |
+removal |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00184 |
+Media exposure |
+ |
+daylight |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D4 Degrade |
+
+
+| C00188 |
+Newsroom/Journalist training to counter SEO influence |
+August 2014, Russian news agency Rossiya Segodnya commissioned a poll in France with poorly worded questions and a statistically insignificant subsample that RT used to back a story titled “15% of French people back ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] militants, poll finds.” The story and summary infographic circulated on the internet, initially appearing primarily on French sites. After a week, the generally respectable digital U.S. news outlet Vox ran the story, now titled “One in Six French People Say They Support ISIS.” Although this effect has now worn off or been overwritten, for a time—despite a later story from The Washington Post debunking the claim—typing “ISIS France” into Google resulted in an autosuggestion of “ISIS France support” (Borthwick, 2015). |
+resilience |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00189 |
+Ongoing analysis/monitoring of "flagged" profiles |
+Confirm whether platforms are actively removing flagged accounts, and raise pressure via e.g. government organizations to encourage removal |
+daylight |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D6 Destroy |
+
+
+| C00190 |
+open engagement with civil society |
+U.S. government should also open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. It should seek to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by U.S. competitors. |
+resilience |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00193 |
+promotion of a “higher standard of journalism” |
+journalism training “would be helpful, especially for the online community |
+resilience |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00194 |
+Provide an alternative to Russian information by expanding and improving local content. |
+To effectively compete, others argue, is to develop content that can displace the pro-Russia narrative. given the importance of affecting the entire media environment, we should note that these recommendations for alternative content span both new and old media alike. |
+diversion |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00195 |
+Redirect Method |
+Use Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or Russian propaganda themes. Taking advantage of the technology behind Google AdWords, this method identifies potential ISIS recruits through their Google searches and exposes them to curated YouTube videos debunking ISIS recruiting themes. Apply this method to Russian propaganda. |
+diversion |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00196 |
+Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media |
+The European Union created significant new regulations in 2018; the U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance |
+metatechnique |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00197 |
+remove suspicious facebook accounts |
+ |
+removal |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00200 |
+Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo |
+Has been done in e.g. India |
+countermessaging |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00202 |
+Set data 'honeytraps' |
+ |
+diversion |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00203 |
+Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets |
+ |
+friction |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00204 |
+Strengthen local media |
+Improve effectiveness of local media outlets. Using eastern Latvia media outlets as an example, one expert noted that the media outlets are “very weak,” are often politically affiliated, or have “little local oligarchs that control them.” |
+resilience |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00205 |
+strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting |
+Increase civic resilience by partnering with business community to combat gray zone threats and ensuring adequate reporting and enforcement mechanisms. |
+metatechnique |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00207 |
+tit-for-tat campaign |
+As used by Saudis? |
+targeting |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D7 Deter |
+
+
+| C00210 |
+Use encrypted apps for confidential communication |
+ |
+resilience |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00211 |
+Use humorous counter-narratives |
+ |
+countermessaging |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00212 |
+build public resilence by making civil society more vibrant |
+Increase public service experience, and support wider civics and history education. |
+resilience |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00214 |
+Create policy that makes social media police disinformation |
+German model: facebook forced to police content by law. |
+metatechnique |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00215 |
+Use fraud legislation to clean up social media |
+ |
+metatechnique |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
+| C00216 |
+Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors |
+ |
+reduce resources |
+TA05 Microtargeting |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00217 |
+Registries alert when large batches of newsy URLs get registered together |
+ |
+daylight |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00218 |
+Censorship |
+Alter and/or block the publication/dissemination of adversary controlled information |
+removal |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D2 Deny |
+
+
+| C00219 |
+Add metadata to content - out of the control of the adversary |
+ |
+daylight |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D3 Disrupt |
+
+
diff --git a/detections_index.md b/detections_index.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..63af51d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections_index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,754 @@
+# AMITT Detections:
+
+
+
+| id |
+name |
+summary |
+metatechnique |
+tactic |
+responsetype |
+
+
+| F00001 |
+Analyse aborted / failed campaigns |
+ |
+ |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00002 |
+Analyse viral fizzle |
+ |
+ |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00003 |
+Exploit counter-intelligence vs bad actors |
+ |
+ |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00004 |
+Recruit like-minded converts "people who used to be in-group" |
+ |
+ |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00005 |
+SWOT Analysis of Cognition in Various Groups |
+ |
+ |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00006 |
+SWOT analysis of tech platforms |
+ |
+ |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00007 |
+Monitor account level activity in social networks |
+ |
+ |
+TA02 Objective Planning |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00008 |
+Detect abnormal amplification |
+ |
+ |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00009 |
+Detect abnormal events |
+ |
+ |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00010 |
+Detect abnormal groups |
+ |
+ |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00011 |
+Detect abnormal pages |
+ |
+ |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00012 |
+Detect abnormal profiles, e.g. prolific pages/ groups/ people |
+ |
+ |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00013 |
+Identify fake news sites |
+ |
+ |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00014 |
+Trace connections |
+for e.g. fake news sites |
+ |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00015 |
+Detect anomalies in membership growth patterns |
+I include Fake Experts as they may use funding campaigns such as Patreon to fund their operations and so these should be watched. |
+ |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00016 |
+Identify fence-sitters |
+Note: In each case, depending on the platform there may be a way to identify a fence-sitter. For example, online polls may have a neutral option or a "somewhat this-or-that" option, and may reveal who voted for that to all visitors. This information could be of use to data analysts.
+
+In TA08-11, the engagement level of victims could be identified to detect and respond to increasing engagement. |
+ |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00017 |
+Measure emotional valence |
+ |
+ |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00018 |
+Follow the money |
+track funding sources |
+ |
+TA03 Develop People |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00019 |
+Activity resurgence detection (alarm when dormant accounts become activated) |
+ |
+ |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00020 |
+Detect anomalous activity |
+ |
+ |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00021 |
+AI/ML automated early detection of campaign planning |
+ |
+ |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00022 |
+Digital authority - regulating body (united states) |
+ |
+ |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00023 |
+Periodic verification (counter to hijack legitimate account) |
+ |
+ |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00024 |
+Teach civics to kids/ adults/ seniors |
+ |
+ |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00025 |
+Boots-on-the-ground early narrative detection |
+ |
+ |
+TA05 Microtargeting |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00026 |
+Language anomoly detection |
+ |
+ |
+TA05 Microtargeting |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00027 |
+Unlikely correlation of sentiment on same topics |
+ |
+ |
+TA05 Microtargeting |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00028 |
+Associate a public key signature with government documents |
+ |
+ |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00029 |
+Detect proto narratives, i.e. RT, Sputnik |
+ |
+ |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00030 |
+Early detection and warning - reporting of suspect content |
+ |
+ |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00031 |
+Educate on how to identify information pollution |
+Strategic planning included as innoculating population has strategic value. |
+ |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00032 |
+Educate on how to identify to pollution |
+DUPLICATE - DELETE |
+ |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00033 |
+Fake websites: add transparency on business model |
+ |
+ |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00034 |
+Flag the information spaces so people know about active flooding effort |
+ |
+ |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00035 |
+Identify repeated narrative DNA |
+ |
+ |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00036 |
+Looking for AB testing in unregulated channels |
+ |
+ |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00037 |
+News content provenance certification. |
+Original Comment: Shortcomings: intentional falsehood. Doesn't solve accuracy. Can't be mandatory.
+
+Technique should be in terms of "strategic innoculation", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news. |
+ |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00038 |
+Social capital as attack vector |
+Unsure I understood the original intention or what it applied to. Therefore the techniques listed (10, 39, 43, 57, 61) are under my interpretation - which is that we want to track ignorant agents who fall into the enemy's trap and show a cost to financing/reposting/helping the adversary via public shaming or other means. |
+ |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00039 |
+standards to track image/ video deep fakes - industry |
+ |
+ |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00040 |
+Unalterable metadata signature on origins of image and provenance |
+ |
+ |
+TA06 Develop Content |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00041 |
+Bias detection |
+Not technically left of boom |
+ |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00042 |
+Categorize polls by intent |
+Use T00029, but against the creators |
+ |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00043 |
+Monitor for creation of fake known personas |
+ |
+ |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00044 |
+Forensic analysis |
+Can be used in all phases for all techniques. |
+ |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00045 |
+Forensic linguistic analysis |
+Can be used in all phases for all techniques. |
+ |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00046 |
+Pump priming analytics |
+ |
+ |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00047 |
+trace involved parties |
+ |
+ |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00048 |
+Trace known operations and connection |
+ |
+ |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00049 |
+trace money |
+ |
+ |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00050 |
+Web cache analytics |
+ |
+ |
+TA08 Pump Priming |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00051 |
+Challenge expertise |
+ |
+ |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00052 |
+Discover sponsors |
+Discovering the sponsors behind a campaign, narrative, bot, a set of accounts, or a social media comment, or anything else is useful. |
+ |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00053 |
+Government rumour control office (what can we learn?) |
+ |
+ |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00054 |
+Restrict people who can @ you on social networks |
+ |
+ |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00055 |
+Verify credentials |
+ |
+ |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00056 |
+Verify organisation legitimacy |
+ |
+ |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00057 |
+Verify personal credentials of experts |
+ |
+ |
+TA09 Exposure |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00058 |
+Deplatform (cancel culture) |
+*Deplatform People: This technique needs to be a bit more specific to distinguish it from "account removal" or DDOS and other techniques that get more specific when applied to content.
+
+For example, other ways of deplatforming people include attacking their sources of funds, their allies, their followers, etc. |
+ |
+TA10 Go Physical |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00059 |
+Identify susceptible demographics |
+All techniques provide or are susceptible to being countered by, or leveraged for, knowledge about user demographics. |
+ |
+TA10 Go Physical |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00060 |
+Identify susceptible influencers |
+I assume this was a transcript error. Otherwise, "Identify Susceptible Influences" as in the various methods of influences that may work against a victim could also be a technique. Nope, wasn't a transcript error: original note says influencers, as in find people of influence that might be targetted. |
+ |
+TA10 Go Physical |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00061 |
+Microtargeting |
+ |
+ |
+TA10 Go Physical |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00062 |
+Detect when Dormant account turns active |
+ |
+ |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00063 |
+Linguistic change analysis |
+ |
+ |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00064 |
+Monitor reports of account takeover |
+ |
+ |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00065 |
+Sentiment change analysis |
+ |
+ |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00066 |
+Use language errors, time to respond to account bans and lawsuits, to indicate capabilities |
+ |
+ |
+TA11 Persistence |
+D1 Detect |
+
+
+| F00067 |
+ |
+Data forensics |
+ |
+I00029,I00045 |
+ |
+
+
+| F00068 |
+ |
+Resonance analysis |
+ |
+ |
+ |
+
+
+| F00069 |
+ |
+Track Russian media and develop analytic methods. |
+ |
+ |
+ |
+
+
+| F00070 |
+ |
+Full spectrum analytics |
+ |
+ |
+ALL |
+
+
+| F00071 |
+ |
+Network analysis Identify/cultivate/support influencers |
+ |
+ |
+ |
+
+
+| F00072 |
+ |
+network analysis to identify central users in the pro-Russia activist community. |
+ |
+ |
+ |
+
+
+| F00073 |
+ |
+collect intel/recon on black/covert content creators/manipulators |
+ |
+ |
+ |
+
+
+| F00074 |
+ |
+identify relevant fence-sitter communities |
+ |
+ |
+ |
+
+
+| F00075 |
+ |
+leverage open-source information |
+ |
+ |
+ |
+
+
+| F00076 |
+ |
+Monitor/collect audience engagement data connected to “useful idiots” |
+ |
+ |
+ |
+
+
+| F00077 |
+ |
+Model for bot account behavior |
+ |
+ |
+TA03 Develop People |
+
+
+| F00078 |
+ |
+Monitor account level activity in social networks |
+ |
+ |
+TA03 Develop People |
+
+
+| F00079 |
+ |
+Network anomaly detection |
+ |
+ |
+TA05 Microtargeting |
+
+
+| F00080 |
+ |
+Hack the polls/ content yourself |
+ |
+ |
+TA07 Channel Selection |
+
+
+| F00081 |
+ |
+Need way for end user to report operations |
+ |
+ |
+TA09 Exposure |
+
+
+| F00082 |
+ |
+Control the US "slang" translation boards |
+ |
+ |
+TA11 Persistence |
+
+
+| F00083 |
+ |
+Build and own meme generator, then track and watermark contents |
+ |
+ |
+TA11 Persistence |
+
+
+| F00084 |
+ |
+Track individual bad actors |
+ |
+ |
+TA03 Develop People |
+
+
+| F00085 |
+ |
+detection of a weak signal through global noise |
+ |
+ |
+ |
+
+
+| F00086 |
+ |
+Outpace Competitor Intelligence Capabilities |
+ |
+ |
+TA02 Objective planning |
+
+
+| F00087 |
+metatechnique |
+Improve Indications and Warning |
+ |
+ |
+ |
+
+
+| F00088 |
+metatechnique |
+Revitalize an “active measures working group,” |
+ |
+ |
+ |
+
+
+| F00089 |
+daylight |
+target/name/flag "grey zone" website content |
+ |
+ |
+TA04 Develop Networks |
+
+
+| F00090 |
+metatechnique |
+Match Punitive Tools with Third-Party Inducements |
+ |
+ |
+TA01 Strategic Planning |
+
+
+| F00091 |
+metatechnique |
+Partner to develop analytic methods & tools |
+ |
+ |
+ |
+
+
+| F00092 |
+daylight |
+Warn social media companies about an ongoing campaign (e.g. antivax sites). |
+ |
+I00002 |
+TA09 |
+
+
diff --git a/incidents/I00001.md b/incidents/I00001.md
index a067ad1..f0a630b 100644
--- a/incidents/I00001.md
+++ b/incidents/I00001.md
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
* **Countries:** Russia , USA
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-02-24
diff --git a/incidents/I00002.md b/incidents/I00002.md
index 4599ad8..067f46e 100644
--- a/incidents/I00002.md
+++ b/incidents/I00002.md
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
* **Countries:** Russia , World
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-02-24
diff --git a/incidents/I00003.md b/incidents/I00003.md
index 3c6c09f..e8c3718 100644
--- a/incidents/I00003.md
+++ b/incidents/I00003.md
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
* **Countries:** Russia , USA
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-02-24
diff --git a/incidents/I00004.md b/incidents/I00004.md
index 32a9d1a..1857e1c 100644
--- a/incidents/I00004.md
+++ b/incidents/I00004.md
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
* **Countries:** Russia , France
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-02-24
diff --git a/incidents/I00005.md b/incidents/I00005.md
index 54bc14d..d4c1f19 100644
--- a/incidents/I00005.md
+++ b/incidents/I00005.md
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ The report adds that although officially the Russian government asserted its neu
* **Countries:** Russia , UK
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-02-24
diff --git a/incidents/I00006.md b/incidents/I00006.md
index 14060de..6986c3e 100644
--- a/incidents/I00006.md
+++ b/incidents/I00006.md
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
* **Countries:** Russia , USA
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-02-24
diff --git a/incidents/I00007.md b/incidents/I00007.md
index f8908d0..f2e2e63 100644
--- a/incidents/I00007.md
+++ b/incidents/I00007.md
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
* **Countries:** Russia , USA
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-02-24
diff --git a/incidents/I00008.md b/incidents/I00008.md
index fa2a246..381f240 100644
--- a/incidents/I00008.md
+++ b/incidents/I00008.md
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
* **Id:** I00008
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2017
* **Countries:** Russia , Serbia
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-02-24
diff --git a/incidents/I00009.md b/incidents/I00009.md
index 8654749..1e3367b 100644
--- a/incidents/I00009.md
+++ b/incidents/I00009.md
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
* **Countries:** Russia , Philippines
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-02-24
diff --git a/incidents/I00010.md b/incidents/I00010.md
index 3152ffc..f44540c 100644
--- a/incidents/I00010.md
+++ b/incidents/I00010.md
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
* **Countries:** ?? , USA
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-02-01
diff --git a/incidents/I00011.md b/incidents/I00011.md
index bcdcdd9..d06ca73 100644
--- a/incidents/I00011.md
+++ b/incidents/I00011.md
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
* **Id:** I00011
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2019
* **Countries:** ?? , USA
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-02-01
diff --git a/incidents/I00012.md b/incidents/I00012.md
index c186c7d..a77be87 100644
--- a/incidents/I00012.md
+++ b/incidents/I00012.md
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
* **Id:** I00012
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2011
* **Countries:** China , China
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-02-24
diff --git a/incidents/I00013.md b/incidents/I00013.md
index f826430..0185bb4 100644
--- a/incidents/I00013.md
+++ b/incidents/I00013.md
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
* **Id:** I00013
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2014
* **Countries:** Russia , France
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-02-24
diff --git a/incidents/I00014.md b/incidents/I00014.md
index a32f2ec..ee2c740 100644
--- a/incidents/I00014.md
+++ b/incidents/I00014.md
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
* **Id:** I00014
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2018
* **Countries:** Russia , France
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-02-24
diff --git a/incidents/I00015.md b/incidents/I00015.md
index 2f0d3fb..00b1437 100644
--- a/incidents/I00015.md
+++ b/incidents/I00015.md
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
* **Countries:** Russia , USA
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-02-01
diff --git a/incidents/I00016.md b/incidents/I00016.md
index 1765c4b..6f915c7 100644
--- a/incidents/I00016.md
+++ b/incidents/I00016.md
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
* **Id:** I00016
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2014
* **Countries:** Russia , Lithuania
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-02-01
diff --git a/incidents/I00018.md b/incidents/I00018.md
index e0806b0..27a5655 100644
--- a/incidents/I00018.md
+++ b/incidents/I00018.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* **Id:** I00018
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2016
diff --git a/incidents/I00020.md b/incidents/I00020.md
index 21c2737..2766a50 100644
--- a/incidents/I00020.md
+++ b/incidents/I00020.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* **Id:** I00020
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2017
diff --git a/incidents/I00021.md b/incidents/I00021.md
index f3e6355..f74566a 100644
--- a/incidents/I00021.md
+++ b/incidents/I00021.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* **Id:** I00021
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2017
diff --git a/incidents/I00023.md b/incidents/I00023.md
index 127886e..7287e9e 100644
--- a/incidents/I00023.md
+++ b/incidents/I00023.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* **Id:** I00023
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2017
diff --git a/incidents/I00024.md b/incidents/I00024.md
index 1e75a29..e2ed622 100644
--- a/incidents/I00024.md
+++ b/incidents/I00024.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* **Id:** I00024
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2017
diff --git a/incidents/I00026.md b/incidents/I00026.md
index 8467a12..cc7d71b 100644
--- a/incidents/I00026.md
+++ b/incidents/I00026.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* **Id:** I00026
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2016
diff --git a/incidents/I00027.md b/incidents/I00027.md
index 429217e..f45bfbe 100644
--- a/incidents/I00027.md
+++ b/incidents/I00027.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* **Id:** I00027
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2014
diff --git a/incidents/I00028.md b/incidents/I00028.md
index 53fca9f..675f336 100644
--- a/incidents/I00028.md
+++ b/incidents/I00028.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* **Id:** I00028
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2014
diff --git a/incidents/I00030.md b/incidents/I00030.md
index 314ac03..e20bb89 100644
--- a/incidents/I00030.md
+++ b/incidents/I00030.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* **Id:** I00030
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2018
diff --git a/incidents/I00031.md b/incidents/I00031.md
index 2635f88..1cb4955 100644
--- a/incidents/I00031.md
+++ b/incidents/I00031.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* **Id:** I00031
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2018
diff --git a/incidents/I00036.md b/incidents/I00036.md
index 1c8ebbf..7c74a20 100644
--- a/incidents/I00036.md
+++ b/incidents/I00036.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* **Id:** I00036
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2014
diff --git a/incidents/I00037.md b/incidents/I00037.md
index 557286e..3cd6e69 100644
--- a/incidents/I00037.md
+++ b/incidents/I00037.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* **Id:** I00037
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2016
diff --git a/incidents/I00038.md b/incidents/I00038.md
index 9786032..ed31e3d 100644
--- a/incidents/I00038.md
+++ b/incidents/I00038.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* **Id:** I00038
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2016
diff --git a/incidents/I00040.md b/incidents/I00040.md
index a471b63..2bbc912 100644
--- a/incidents/I00040.md
+++ b/incidents/I00040.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* **Id:** I00040
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2015
diff --git a/incidents/I00041.md b/incidents/I00041.md
index 19075a4..33d4eee 100644
--- a/incidents/I00041.md
+++ b/incidents/I00041.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* **Id:** I00041
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2017
diff --git a/incidents/I00043.md b/incidents/I00043.md
index f6c6c0e..2df572f 100644
--- a/incidents/I00043.md
+++ b/incidents/I00043.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* **Id:** I00043
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2017
diff --git a/incidents/I00044.md b/incidents/I00044.md
index 62b52e2..cb65a94 100644
--- a/incidents/I00044.md
+++ b/incidents/I00044.md
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
* **Year started:** 2015
-* **Countries:** nan , USA
+* **Countries:** , USA
* **Found via:** MIS
diff --git a/incidents/I00045.md b/incidents/I00045.md
index 3ba34e0..9678606 100644
--- a/incidents/I00045.md
+++ b/incidents/I00045.md
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
* **Countries:** Russia , UK
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00046.md b/incidents/I00046.md
index 04b59bc..09c4610 100644
--- a/incidents/I00046.md
+++ b/incidents/I00046.md
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
* **Id:** I00046
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2018
* **Countries:** Russia , Macedonia
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00047.md b/incidents/I00047.md
index dbf4b95..02cd97e 100644
--- a/incidents/I00047.md
+++ b/incidents/I00047.md
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which is also responsible for border
* **Countries:** Russia , World
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00048.md b/incidents/I00048.md
index f4b4104..0a72efb 100644
--- a/incidents/I00048.md
+++ b/incidents/I00048.md
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
* **Id:** I00048
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2015
* **Countries:** Russia , World
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00049.md b/incidents/I00049.md
index f147d8d..8ad95d7 100644
--- a/incidents/I00049.md
+++ b/incidents/I00049.md
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
* **Countries:** Russia , World
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00050.md b/incidents/I00050.md
index 4a0c1f3..add666f 100644
--- a/incidents/I00050.md
+++ b/incidents/I00050.md
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Maduro has remained defiant in the face of domestic and international pressure,
* **Countries:** Russia , World
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00051.md b/incidents/I00051.md
index 7cc4f55..fc1ed29 100644
--- a/incidents/I00051.md
+++ b/incidents/I00051.md
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ The FCO comments on the IfS were issued after a news report said the group had r
* **Countries:** Russia , World
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00052.md b/incidents/I00052.md
index 9567bb3..4b060d0 100644
--- a/incidents/I00052.md
+++ b/incidents/I00052.md
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
* **Id:** I00052
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2015
* **Countries:** China , World
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00053.md b/incidents/I00053.md
index c2c74ed..6b49a24 100644
--- a/incidents/I00053.md
+++ b/incidents/I00053.md
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Geopolitically complex issue combines US/China trade; Security concerns/issues r
* **Countries:** China , World
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00054.md b/incidents/I00054.md
index 01a321f..6df15e0 100644
--- a/incidents/I00054.md
+++ b/incidents/I00054.md
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
* **Id:** I00054
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2018
* **Countries:** China , World
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00055.md b/incidents/I00055.md
index c806a92..986cf7a 100644
--- a/incidents/I00055.md
+++ b/incidents/I00055.md
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
* **Id:** I00055
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2008
* **Countries:** China , World
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00056.md b/incidents/I00056.md
index 577cdf1..d8eb38c 100644
--- a/incidents/I00056.md
+++ b/incidents/I00056.md
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ While there is history to Iran’s information/influence operations, starting wi
* **Countries:** Iran , World
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00057.md b/incidents/I00057.md
index 2e27dc8..ca74a01 100644
--- a/incidents/I00057.md
+++ b/incidents/I00057.md
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
* **Id:** I00057
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2018
* **Countries:** Russia/domestic , Mexico
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00058.md b/incidents/I00058.md
index 03aa3f7..604b509 100644
--- a/incidents/I00058.md
+++ b/incidents/I00058.md
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
* **Id:** I00058
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2018
* **Countries:** Russia , Germany
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00059.md b/incidents/I00059.md
index ba64f8a..71aef86 100644
--- a/incidents/I00059.md
+++ b/incidents/I00059.md
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
* **Id:** I00059
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2014
* **Countries:** Myanmar , Myanmar
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00060.md b/incidents/I00060.md
index 4cfcff3..3384487 100644
--- a/incidents/I00060.md
+++ b/incidents/I00060.md
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
* **Id:** I00060
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2018
* **Countries:** Russia , World
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00061.md b/incidents/I00061.md
index 4e4019b..8ddde1a 100644
--- a/incidents/I00061.md
+++ b/incidents/I00061.md
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
* **Id:** I00061
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2017
* **Countries:** Russia , US
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00062.md b/incidents/I00062.md
index babbb1b..e9dafcf 100644
--- a/incidents/I00062.md
+++ b/incidents/I00062.md
@@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
* **Id:** I00062
-* **Summary:** nan
+* **Summary:**
* **Year started:** 2015
* **Countries:** Russia/domestic , UK
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-03-20
diff --git a/incidents/I00063.md b/incidents/I00063.md
index 4bf780f..4ee23ac 100644
--- a/incidents/I00063.md
+++ b/incidents/I00063.md
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ The investigation found corroborating evidence after conducting witness intervie
* **Countries:** Russia , World
-* **Found via:** nan
+* **Found via:**
* **Date added:** 2019-04-06
diff --git a/incidents_list.md b/incidents_index.md
similarity index 85%
rename from incidents_list.md
rename to incidents_index.md
index 5ec9bf0..22c9283 100644
--- a/incidents_list.md
+++ b/incidents_index.md
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@