From e4479f9f076e4a310b2946831c9d37f7780ce2de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sara-Jayne Terp Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 13:07:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Added index file for each object type --- .../AMITT_create_counters_summaries.ipynb | 0 .../generate_amitt_counters.py | 0 .../test_new_code-checkpoint.ipynb | 377 +--- .../generate_amitt_ttps.cpython-38.pyc | Bin 24316 -> 26001 bytes HTML_GENERATING_CODE/generate_amitt_ttps.py | 101 +- HTML_GENERATING_CODE/test_new_code.ipynb | 406 ++--- actors_index.md | 49 + counter_tactics/TA01counters.md | 56 +- counter_tactics/TA02counters.md | 26 +- counter_tactics/TA03counters.md | 44 +- counter_tactics/TA04counters.md | 38 +- counter_tactics/TA05counters.md | 26 +- counter_tactics/TA06counters.md | 126 +- counter_tactics/TA07counters.md | 28 +- counter_tactics/TA08counters.md | 68 +- counter_tactics/TA09counters.md | 112 +- counter_tactics/TA10counters.md | 36 +- counter_tactics/TA11counters.md | 20 +- counter_tactics/TA12counters.md | 4 +- counters/C00001.md | 6 +- counters/C00003.md | 6 +- counters/C00004.md | 6 +- counters/C00005.md | 6 +- counters/C00006.md | 2 +- counters/C00007.md | 4 +- counters/C00008.md | 2 +- counters/C00009.md | 4 +- counters/C00010.md | 2 +- counters/C00011.md | 2 +- counters/C00012.md | 2 +- counters/C00013.md | 4 +- counters/C00014.md | 2 +- counters/C00015.md | 4 +- counters/C00016.md | 6 +- counters/C00017.md | 2 +- counters/C00018.md | 4 +- counters/C00019.md | 2 +- counters/C00020.md | 2 +- counters/C00021.md | 6 +- counters/C00022.md | 4 +- counters/C00023.md | 4 +- counters/C00024.md | 6 +- counters/C00025.md | 6 +- counters/C00026.md | 4 +- counters/C00027.md | 6 +- counters/C00028.md | 4 +- counters/C00029.md | 4 +- counters/C00030.md | 6 +- counters/C00031.md | 2 +- counters/C00032.md | 4 +- counters/C00033.md | 4 +- counters/C00034.md | 4 +- counters/C00035.md | 6 +- counters/C00036.md | 2 +- counters/C00039.md | 2 +- counters/C00040.md | 2 +- counters/C00042.md | 6 +- counters/C00043.md | 2 +- counters/C00045.md | 4 +- counters/C00046.md | 4 +- counters/C00047.md | 6 +- counters/C00048.md | 4 +- counters/C00049.md | 2 +- counters/C00050.md | 4 +- counters/C00051.md | 4 +- counters/C00052.md | 2 +- counters/C00053.md | 2 +- counters/C00054.md | 2 +- counters/C00056.md | 6 +- counters/C00057.md | 6 +- counters/C00058.md | 4 +- counters/C00059.md | 6 +- counters/C00060.md | 4 +- counters/C00061.md | 6 +- counters/C00062.md | 4 +- counters/C00063.md | 4 +- counters/C00065.md | 4 +- counters/C00066.md | 6 +- counters/C00067.md | 6 +- counters/C00068.md | 6 +- counters/C00069.md | 6 +- counters/C00070.md | 4 +- counters/C00071.md | 6 +- counters/C00072.md | 6 +- counters/C00073.md | 2 +- counters/C00075.md | 6 +- counters/C00076.md | 6 +- counters/C00077.md | 6 +- counters/C00078.md | 4 +- counters/C00079.md | 6 +- counters/C00080.md | 6 +- counters/C00081.md | 6 +- counters/C00082.md | 6 +- counters/C00084.md | 4 +- counters/C00085.md | 4 +- counters/C00086.md | 4 +- counters/C00087.md | 4 +- counters/C00088.md | 4 +- counters/C00089.md | 6 +- counters/C00090.md | 6 +- counters/C00091.md | 6 +- counters/C00092.md | 6 +- counters/C00093.md | 6 +- counters/C00094.md | 6 +- counters/C00095.md | 6 +- counters/C00096.md | 6 +- counters/C00097.md | 4 +- counters/C00098.md | 2 +- counters/C00099.md | 4 +- counters/C00100.md | 6 +- counters/C00101.md | 4 +- counters/C00102.md | 4 +- counters/C00103.md | 2 +- counters/C00105.md | 4 +- counters/C00106.md | 4 +- counters/C00107.md | 6 +- counters/C00109.md | 6 +- counters/C00110.md | 4 +- counters/C00111.md | 4 +- counters/C00112.md | 4 +- counters/C00113.md | 6 +- counters/C00114.md | 4 +- counters/C00115.md | 6 +- counters/C00116.md | 6 +- counters/C00117.md | 6 +- counters/C00118.md | 6 +- counters/C00119.md | 4 +- counters/C00120.md | 6 +- counters/C00121.md | 6 +- counters/C00122.md | 4 +- counters/C00123.md | 6 +- counters/C00124.md | 4 +- counters/C00125.md | 6 +- counters/C00126.md | 6 +- counters/C00128.md | 4 +- counters/C00129.md | 4 +- counters/C00130.md | 6 +- counters/C00131.md | 4 +- counters/C00133.md | 2 +- counters/C00135.md | 2 +- counters/C00136.md | 4 +- counters/C00137.md | 2 +- counters/C00138.md | 6 +- counters/C00139.md | 6 +- counters/C00140.md | 2 +- counters/C00141.md | 2 +- counters/C00142.md | 4 +- counters/C00143.md | 4 +- counters/C00144.md | 6 +- counters/C00145.md | 6 +- counters/C00147.md | 4 +- counters/C00149.md | 4 +- counters/C00150.md | 4 +- counters/C00151.md | 4 +- counters/C00152.md | 4 +- counters/C00153.md | 2 +- counters/C00154.md | 4 +- counters/C00155.md | 4 +- counters/C00156.md | 2 +- counters/C00157.md | 4 +- counters/C00158.md | 2 +- counters/C00159.md | 4 +- counters/C00160.md | 2 +- counters/C00161.md | 4 +- counters/C00162.md | 4 +- counters/C00164.md | 4 +- counters/C00165.md | 4 +- counters/C00167.md | 4 +- counters/C00169.md | 4 +- counters/C00170.md | 4 +- counters/C00171.md | 2 +- counters/C00172.md | 2 +- counters/C00174.md | 2 +- counters/C00176.md | 4 +- counters/C00178.md | 4 +- counters/C00179.md | 4 +- counters/C00182.md | 2 +- counters/C00184.md | 6 +- counters/C00188.md | 2 +- counters/C00189.md | 4 +- counters/C00190.md | 2 +- counters/C00194.md | 4 +- counters/C00195.md | 4 +- counters/C00196.md | 2 +- counters/C00197.md | 6 +- counters/C00200.md | 2 +- counters/C00202.md | 6 +- counters/C00203.md | 4 +- counters/C00204.md | 2 +- counters/C00205.md | 2 +- counters/C00207.md | 2 +- counters/C00210.md | 6 +- counters/C00211.md | 6 +- counters/C00212.md | 2 +- counters/C00214.md | 2 +- counters/C00215.md | 4 +- counters/C00216.md | 4 +- counters/C00217.md | 4 +- counters/C00218.md | 2 +- counters/C00219.md | 4 +- counters_index.md | 1517 +++++++++++++++++ detections_index.md | 754 ++++++++ incidents/I00001.md | 2 +- incidents/I00002.md | 2 +- incidents/I00003.md | 2 +- incidents/I00004.md | 2 +- incidents/I00005.md | 2 +- incidents/I00006.md | 2 +- incidents/I00007.md | 2 +- incidents/I00008.md | 4 +- incidents/I00009.md | 2 +- incidents/I00010.md | 2 +- incidents/I00011.md | 4 +- incidents/I00012.md | 4 +- incidents/I00013.md | 4 +- incidents/I00014.md | 4 +- incidents/I00015.md | 2 +- incidents/I00016.md | 4 +- incidents/I00018.md | 2 +- incidents/I00020.md | 2 +- incidents/I00021.md | 2 +- incidents/I00023.md | 2 +- incidents/I00024.md | 2 +- incidents/I00026.md | 2 +- incidents/I00027.md | 2 +- incidents/I00028.md | 2 +- incidents/I00030.md | 2 +- incidents/I00031.md | 2 +- incidents/I00036.md | 2 +- incidents/I00037.md | 2 +- incidents/I00038.md | 2 +- incidents/I00040.md | 2 +- incidents/I00041.md | 2 +- incidents/I00043.md | 2 +- incidents/I00044.md | 2 +- incidents/I00045.md | 2 +- incidents/I00046.md | 4 +- incidents/I00047.md | 2 +- incidents/I00048.md | 4 +- incidents/I00049.md | 2 +- incidents/I00050.md | 2 +- incidents/I00051.md | 2 +- incidents/I00052.md | 4 +- incidents/I00053.md | 2 +- incidents/I00054.md | 4 +- incidents/I00055.md | 4 +- incidents/I00056.md | 2 +- incidents/I00057.md | 4 +- incidents/I00058.md | 4 +- incidents/I00059.md | 4 +- incidents/I00060.md | 4 +- incidents/I00061.md | 4 +- incidents/I00062.md | 4 +- incidents/I00063.md | 2 +- incidents_list.md => incidents_index.md | 134 +- metatechniques/cleaningcounters.md | 2 +- metatechniques/countermessagingcounters.md | 28 +- metatechniques/data pollutioncounters.md | 10 +- metatechniques/daylightcounters.md | 36 +- metatechniques/dilutioncounters.md | 8 +- metatechniques/diversioncounters.md | 32 +- metatechniques/frictioncounters.md | 18 +- metatechniques/metatechniquecounters.md | 20 +- metatechniques/reduce resourcescounters.md | 6 +- metatechniques/removalcounters.md | 16 +- metatechniques/resiliencecounters.md | 26 +- metatechniques/scoringcounters.md | 14 +- metatechniques/targetingcounters.md | 12 +- metatechniques/verificationcounters.md | 6 +- metatechniques_index.md | 74 + phases_index.md | 29 + resources_by_responsetype_table.md | 10 + resources_needed/counters.md | 135 ++ responsetype_index.md | 44 + tactics_index.md | 86 + tasks/TK0002.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0003.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0004.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0005.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0006.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0007.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0008.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0009.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0010.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0011.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0012.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0013.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0014.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0015.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0016.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0017.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0018.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0019.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0020.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0021.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0022.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0023.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0024.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0025.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0026.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0027.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0028.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0029.md | 2 +- tasks/TK0030.md | 2 +- tasks_index.md | 190 +++ techniques_index.md | 421 +++++ 306 files changed, 4525 insertions(+), 1574 deletions(-) rename {HTML_GENERATING_CODE => AMITT_HISTORY}/AMITT_create_counters_summaries.ipynb (100%) rename {HTML_GENERATING_CODE => AMITT_HISTORY}/generate_amitt_counters.py (100%) create mode 100644 actors_index.md create mode 100644 counters_index.md create mode 100644 detections_index.md rename incidents_list.md => incidents_index.md (85%) create mode 100644 metatechniques_index.md create mode 100644 phases_index.md create mode 100644 resources_needed/counters.md create mode 100644 responsetype_index.md create mode 100644 tactics_index.md create mode 100644 tasks_index.md create mode 100644 techniques_index.md diff --git a/HTML_GENERATING_CODE/AMITT_create_counters_summaries.ipynb b/AMITT_HISTORY/AMITT_create_counters_summaries.ipynb similarity index 100% rename from HTML_GENERATING_CODE/AMITT_create_counters_summaries.ipynb rename to AMITT_HISTORY/AMITT_create_counters_summaries.ipynb diff --git a/HTML_GENERATING_CODE/generate_amitt_counters.py b/AMITT_HISTORY/generate_amitt_counters.py similarity index 100% rename from HTML_GENERATING_CODE/generate_amitt_counters.py rename to AMITT_HISTORY/generate_amitt_counters.py diff --git a/HTML_GENERATING_CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/test_new_code-checkpoint.ipynb b/HTML_GENERATING_CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/test_new_code-checkpoint.ipynb index 6f827a0..db9b8c5 100644 --- a/HTML_GENERATING_CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/test_new_code-checkpoint.ipynb +++ b/HTML_GENERATING_CODE/.ipynb_checkpoints/test_new_code-checkpoint.ipynb @@ -11,8 +11,92 @@ "name": "stdout", "output_type": "stream", "text": [ + "Updating ../counters/C00008.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00009.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00011.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00012.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00014.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00016.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00020.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00022.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00023.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00024.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00025.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00026.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00027.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00031.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00036.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00039.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00040.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00042.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00043.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00044.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00045.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00048.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00049.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00050.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00051.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00052.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00053.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00055.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00060.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00063.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00065.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00066.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00067.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00068.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00069.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00070.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00071.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00072.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00073.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00074.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00076.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00078.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00079.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00088.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00089.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00090.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00091.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00092.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00093.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00094.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00095.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00096.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00097.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00098.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00099.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00101.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00102.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00103.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00107.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00112.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00113.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00114.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00115.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00116.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00117.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00118.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00119.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00120.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00121.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00123.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00126.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00129.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00131.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00133.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00135.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00136.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00137.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00144.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00145.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00147.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00149.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00202.md\n", + "Updating ../counters/C00210.md\n", "updated ../incidents_list.md\n", "updated ../amitt_red_framework.md\n", + "updated ../amitt_blue_framework.md\n", "updated ../amitt_red_framework_clickable.html\n", "Writing ../counter_tactics/TA01counters.md\n", "Writing ../counter_tactics/TA02counters.md\n", @@ -116,299 +200,6 @@ "###. TEST AREA" ] }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 5, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "data": { - "text/plain": [ - "[['P01',\n", - " 'P01',\n", - " 'P02',\n", - " 'P02',\n", - " 'P02',\n", - " 'P02',\n", - " 'P02',\n", - " 'P03',\n", - " 'P03',\n", - " 'P03',\n", - " 'P03',\n", - " 'P04'],\n", - " ['TA01',\n", - " 'TA02',\n", - " 'TA03',\n", - " 'TA04',\n", - " 'TA05',\n", - " 'TA06',\n", - " 'TA07',\n", - " 'TA08',\n", - " 'TA09',\n", - " 'TA10',\n", - " 'TA11',\n", - " 'TA12'],\n", - " ['C00001',\n", - " 'C00028',\n", - " 'C00033',\n", - " 'C00049',\n", - " 'C00063',\n", - " 'C00070',\n", - " 'C00097',\n", - " 'C00112',\n", - " 'C00122',\n", - " 'C00129',\n", - " 'C00131',\n", - " 'C00147'],\n", - " ['C00003',\n", - " 'C00029',\n", - " 'C00034',\n", - " 'C00050',\n", - " 'C00065',\n", - " 'C00071',\n", - " 'C00098',\n", - " 'C00113',\n", - " 'C00123',\n", - " 'C00130',\n", - " 'C00133',\n", - " 'C00148'],\n", - " ['C00004',\n", - " 'C00030',\n", - " 'C00035',\n", 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'',\n", - " 'C00212',\n", - " '',\n", - " '',\n", - " ''],\n", - " ['C00020', '', 'C00179', '', '', 'C00089', '', '', 'C00218', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00021', '', 'C00189', '', '', 'C00090', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00022', '', 'C00197', '', '', 'C00091', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00023', '', '', '', '', 'C00092', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00024', '', '', '', '', 'C00093', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00025', '', '', '', '', 'C00094', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00026', '', '', '', '', 'C00095', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00027', '', '', '', '', 'C00096', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00153', '', '', '', '', 'C00165', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00159', '', '', '', '', 'C00167', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00161', '', '', '', '', 'C00171', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00176', '', '', '', '', 'C00172', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00205', '', '', '', '', 'C00202', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00207', '', '', '', '', 'C00210', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['', '', '', '', '', 'C00219', '', '', '', '', '', '']]" - ] - }, - "execution_count": 5, - "metadata": {}, - "output_type": "execute_result" - } - ], - "source": [ - "import pandas as pd\n", - "import os\n", - "tocsv=True\n", - "\n", - "arr = [['' for i in range(amitt.num_tactics)] for j in range(amitt.max_num_counters_per_tactic)] \n", - "for index, tactic in amitt.df_tactics.iterrows():\n", - " arr[0][index] = tactic['phase_id']\n", - " arr[1][index] = tactic['id']\n", - " if tactic['counter_ids'] == '':\n", - " continue\n", - " for index2, technique in enumerate(tactic['counter_ids']):\n", - " arr[index2+2][index] = technique\n", - "\n", - "#Save grid to file\n", - "if tocsv:\n", - " csvdir = '../generated_csvs'\n", - " if not os.path.exists(csvdir):\n", - " os.makedirs(csvdir)\n", - " pd.DataFrame(arr).to_csv(csvdir + '/counters_tactics_table.csv', index=False, header=False)\n", - "arr" - ] - }, { "cell_type": 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z{{rX-AQ`Ej=yQqYr6G_DcD=e_nEqBGoaamJM!U;y_;(EF7#RZ94d5905U9rh?5W~m z!P$ufi%CHJD}>k|{|0Jq%lX8_Hseu9r+xkv3zw;P0i%GM?)zU;Z&*Kdga1!}D`}0ft^B?#$>;1|0{GCMdkAG@Cs2;#3z!tzcz!=~`z{dex zm|p<(DBy9xCjp!)`BHfq&F=ud5BLG#F9ClAcmwdafXhad@EXV~0Cqdfn|J5zM6(az zB)~P1qd|tx>0hHa$To*RtmATL&o1K8{RtVKfPSKNCs0t#Qw1%SYbcS<+(~jd7c~vx z5$ad^nrvQ#?Y7*Rk)h$UmLoH)(z+(qUH>cMs`miAkRtTyc&c_uua62CDq)=Ed87C* J;B))L{{uExQBwc_ diff --git a/HTML_GENERATING_CODE/generate_amitt_ttps.py b/HTML_GENERATING_CODE/generate_amitt_ttps.py index ba91b3c..c17d2ca 100644 --- a/HTML_GENERATING_CODE/generate_amitt_ttps.py +++ b/HTML_GENERATING_CODE/generate_amitt_ttps.py @@ -38,16 +38,20 @@ Reads template files: * template_task.md * template_technique.md * template_incident.md +* template_counter.md Creates markdown files: -* ../matrix.md -* ../incidents.md +* ../amitt_blue_framework.md +* ../amitt_red_framework.md +* ../amitt_red_framework_clickable.md +* ../incidents_list.md * ../counter_tactic_counts.md -* ../counter_metatag_counts.md -* ../counter_resource_counts.md +* ../metatechniques_by_responsetype.md +* ../resources_by_responsetype.md +* ../tactics_by_responsetype.md * ../counter_tactics/*counters.md -* ../counter_metatag/*counters.md -* ../counter_resource/*counters.md +* ../metatechniques/*.md +* ../resources_needed/*.md Updates markdown files: * ../phases/*.md @@ -55,6 +59,11 @@ Updates markdown files: * ../techniques/*.md * ../incidents/*.md * ../tasks/*.md +* ../counters/*.md + +Creates CSVs +* ../generated_csvs/counters_tactics_table.csv +* ../generated_csvs/techniques_tactics_table.csv todo: * add all framework comments to the repo issues list @@ -76,6 +85,7 @@ class Amitt: xlsx = pd.ExcelFile(infile) for sheetname in xlsx.sheet_names: metadata[sheetname] = xlsx.parse(sheetname) + metadata[sheetname].fillna('', inplace=True) # Create individual tables and dictionaries self.df_phases = metadata['phases'] @@ -86,6 +96,8 @@ class Amitt: self.df_counters[['tactic_id', 'tactic_name']] = self.df_counters['tactic'].str.split(' ', 1, expand=True) self.df_actors = metadata['actors'] self.df_responsetypes = metadata['responsetypes'] + self.df_metatechniques = metadata['metatechniques'] + self.df_detections = metadata['detections'] self.it = self.create_incident_technique_crosstable(metadata['incidenttechniques']) self.df_tactics = metadata['tactics'] @@ -518,30 +530,79 @@ class Amitt: return - def write_incidentlist_file(self, outfile='../incidents_list.md'): - # Write HTML version of incident list to markdown file + def write_object_indexes_to_file(self): + ''' Create an index file for each object type. + ''' - html = '''# AMITT Incidents: + self.write_object_index_to_file( + 'phases', ['name', 'summary'], + self.df_phases, '../phases_index.md') + + self.write_object_index_to_file( + 'tactics', ['name', 'summary', 'phase_id'], + self.df_tactics, '../tactics_index.md') + + self.write_object_index_to_file( + 'techniques', ['name', 'summary', 'tactic_id'], + self.df_techniques, '../techniques_index.md') + + self.write_object_index_to_file( + 'tasks', ['name', 'summary', 'tactic_id'], + self.df_tasks, '../tasks_index.md') + + self.write_object_index_to_file( + 'response types', ['name', 'summary'], + self.df_responsetypes, '../responsetype_index.md') + + self.write_object_index_to_file( + 'metatechniques', ['name', 'summary'], + self.df_metatechniques, '../metatechniques_index.md') + + self.write_object_index_to_file( + 'actors', ['name', 'summary'], + self.df_actors, '../actors_index.md') + + self.write_object_index_to_file( + 'detections', ['name', 'summary', 'metatechnique', 'tactic', 'responsetype'], + self.df_detections, '../detections_index.md') + + self.write_object_index_to_file( + 'counters', ['name', 'summary', 'metatechnique', 'tactic', 'responsetype'], + self.df_counters, '../counters_index.md') + + self.write_object_index_to_file( + 'incidents', ['name', 'type', 'Year Started', 'To country', 'Found via'], + self.df_incidents, '../incidents_index.md') + + return + + + def write_object_index_to_file(self, objectname, objectcols, dfobject, outfile): + ''' Write HTML version of incident list to markdown file + + Assumes that dfobject has columns named 'id' and 'name' + ''' + + html = '''# AMITT {}: -''' - - cols = ['name', 'type', 'Year Started', 'From country', 'To country', - 'Found via'] +'''.format(objectname.capitalize()) + # Create header row html += '\n'.format('id') - for col in cols: - html += '\n'.format(col) + html += ''.join(['\n'.format(col) for col in objectcols]) html += '\n' - for index, row in self.df_incidents[self.df_incidents['name'].notnull()].iterrows(): + # Add row for each object + for index, row in dfobject[dfobject['name'].notnull()].iterrows(): html += '\n' - html += '\n'.format(row['id']) - for col in cols: - html += '\n'.format(row[col]) + html += '\n'.format(objectname, row['id']) + html += ''.join(['\n'.format(row[col]) for col in objectcols]) html += '\n' html += '
{}{}{}
{0}{}{1}{}
\n' + + # Write file with open(outfile, 'w') as f: f.write(html) print('updated {}'.format(outfile)) @@ -633,7 +694,7 @@ function handleTechniqueClick(box) { def generate_and_write_datafiles(self): self.update_markdown_files() - self.write_incidentlist_file() + self.write_object_indexes_to_file() self.write_amitt_red_framework_file() self.write_amitt_blue_framework_file() self.write_clickable_amitt_red_framework_file() diff --git a/HTML_GENERATING_CODE/test_new_code.ipynb b/HTML_GENERATING_CODE/test_new_code.ipynb index 0406ecf..c147dc0 100644 --- a/HTML_GENERATING_CODE/test_new_code.ipynb +++ b/HTML_GENERATING_CODE/test_new_code.ipynb @@ -11,7 +11,16 @@ "name": "stdout", "output_type": "stream", "text": [ - "updated ../incidents_list.md\n", + "updated ../phases_index.md\n", + "updated ../tactics_index.md\n", + "updated ../techniques_index.md\n", + "updated ../tasks_index.md\n", + "updated ../responsetype_index.md\n", + "updated ../metatechniques_index.md\n", + "updated ../actors_index.md\n", + "updated ../detections_index.md\n", + "updated ../counters_index.md\n", + "updated ../incidents_index.md\n", "updated ../amitt_red_framework.md\n", "updated ../amitt_blue_framework.md\n", "updated ../amitt_red_framework_clickable.html\n", @@ -43,6 +52,7 @@ "Writing ../metatechniques/targetingcounters.md\n", "Writing ../metatechniques/verificationcounters.md\n", "updated ../metatechniques_by_responsetype_table.md\n", + "Writing ../resources_needed/counters.md\n", "Writing ../resources_needed/DHScounters.md\n", "Writing ../resources_needed/NGOcounters.md\n", "Writing ../resources_needed/activistscounters.md\n", @@ -119,295 +129,139 @@ }, { "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 5, + "execution_count": 1, "metadata": {}, "outputs": [ { "data": { "text/plain": [ - "[['P01',\n", - " 'P01',\n", - " 'P02',\n", - " 'P02',\n", - " 'P02',\n", - " 'P02',\n", - " 'P02',\n", - " 'P03',\n", - " 'P03',\n", - " 'P03',\n", - " 'P03',\n", - " 'P04'],\n", - " ['TA01',\n", - " 'TA02',\n", - " 'TA03',\n", - " 'TA04',\n", - " 'TA05',\n", - " 'TA06',\n", - " 'TA07',\n", - " 'TA08',\n", - " 'TA09',\n", - " 'TA10',\n", - " 'TA11',\n", - " 'TA12'],\n", - " ['C00001',\n", - " 'C00028',\n", - " 'C00033',\n", - " 'C00049',\n", - " 'C00063',\n", - " 'C00070',\n", - " 'C00097',\n", - " 'C00112',\n", - " 'C00122',\n", - " 'C00129',\n", - " 'C00131',\n", - " 'C00147'],\n", - " ['C00003',\n", - " 'C00029',\n", - " 'C00034',\n", - " 'C00050',\n", - " 'C00065',\n", - " 'C00071',\n", - " 'C00098',\n", - " 'C00113',\n", - " 'C00123',\n", - " 'C00130',\n", - " 'C00133',\n", - " 'C00148'],\n", - " ['C00004',\n", - " 'C00030',\n", - " 'C00035',\n", - " 'C00051',\n", - " 'C00066',\n", - " 'C00072',\n", - " 'C00099',\n", - " 'C00114',\n", - " 'C00124',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00135',\n", - " 'C00149'],\n", - " ['C00005',\n", - " 'C00031',\n", - " 'C00036',\n", - " 'C00052',\n", - " 'C00067',\n", - " 'C00073',\n", - " 'C00100',\n", - " 'C00115',\n", - " 'C00125',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00136',\n", - " ''],\n", - " ['C00006',\n", - " 'C00032',\n", - " 'C00039',\n", - " 'C00053',\n", - " 'C00068',\n", - " 'C00074',\n", - " 'C00101',\n", - " 'C00116',\n", - " 'C00126',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00137',\n", - " ''],\n", - " ['C00007',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00040',\n", - " 'C00054',\n", - " 'C00069',\n", - " 'C00075',\n", - " 'C00102',\n", - " 'C00117',\n", - " 'C00128',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00138',\n", - " ''],\n", - " ['C00008',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00042',\n", - " 'C00055',\n", - " 'C00216',\n", - " 'C00076',\n", - " 'C00103',\n", - " 'C00118',\n", - " 'C00151',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00139',\n", - " ''],\n", - " ['C00009',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00043',\n", - " 'C00056',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00077',\n", - " 'C00105',\n", - " 'C00119',\n", - " 'C00156',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00140',\n", - " ''],\n", - " ['C00010',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00044',\n", - " 'C00057',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00078',\n", - " 'C00106',\n", - " 'C00120',\n", - " 'C00158',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00141',\n", - " ''],\n", - " ['C00011',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00045',\n", - " 'C00058',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00079',\n", - " 'C00107',\n", - " 'C00121',\n", - " 'C00169',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00142',\n", - " ''],\n", - " ['C00012',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00046',\n", - " 'C00059',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00080',\n", - " 'C00109',\n", - " 'C00154',\n", - " 'C00178',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00143',\n", - " ''],\n", - " ['C00013',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00047',\n", - " 'C00060',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00081',\n", - " 'C00110',\n", - " 'C00188',\n", - " 'C00182',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00144',\n", - " ''],\n", - " ['C00014',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00048',\n", - " 'C00061',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00082',\n", - " 'C00111',\n", - " 'C00193',\n", - " 'C00184',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00145',\n", - " ''],\n", - " ['C00015',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00150',\n", - " 'C00062',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00084',\n", - " 'C00195',\n", - " 'C00203',\n", - " 'C00190',\n", - " '',\n", - " '',\n", - " ''],\n", - " ['C00016',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00155',\n", - " 'C00152',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00085',\n", - " 'C00196',\n", - " 'C00204',\n", - " 'C00194',\n", - " '',\n", - " '',\n", - " ''],\n", - " ['C00017',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00160',\n", - " 'C00157',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00086',\n", - " 'C00214',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00200',\n", - " '',\n", - " '',\n", - " ''],\n", - " ['C00018',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00164',\n", - " 'C00162',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00087',\n", - " 'C00215',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00211',\n", - " '',\n", - " '',\n", - " ''],\n", - " ['C00019',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00170',\n", - " 'C00174',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00088',\n", - " 'C00217',\n", - " '',\n", - " 'C00212',\n", - " '',\n", - " '',\n", - " ''],\n", - " ['C00020', '', 'C00179', '', '', 'C00089', '', '', 'C00218', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00021', '', 'C00189', '', '', 'C00090', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00022', '', 'C00197', '', '', 'C00091', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00023', '', '', '', '', 'C00092', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00024', '', '', '', '', 'C00093', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00025', '', '', '', '', 'C00094', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00026', '', '', '', '', 'C00095', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00027', '', '', '', '', 'C00096', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00153', '', '', '', '', 'C00165', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00159', '', '', '', '', 'C00167', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00161', '', '', '', '', 'C00171', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00176', '', '', '', '', 'C00172', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00205', '', '', '', '', 'C00202', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['C00207', '', '', '', '', 'C00210', '', '', '', '', '', ''],\n", - " ['', '', '', '', '', 'C00219', '', '', '', '', '', '']]" + "'Aaaa'" ] }, - "execution_count": 5, + "execution_count": 1, "metadata": {}, "output_type": "execute_result" } ], "source": [ - "import pandas as pd\n", - "import os\n", - "tocsv=True\n", + "\"aaaa\".capitalize()" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 5, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [], + "source": [ + "cols = ['name', 'type', 'Year Started', 'To country', 'Found via']\n", "\n", - "arr = [['' for i in range(amitt.num_tactics)] for j in range(amitt.max_num_counters_per_tactic)] \n", - "for index, tactic in amitt.df_tactics.iterrows():\n", - " arr[0][index] = tactic['phase_id']\n", - " arr[1][index] = tactic['id']\n", - " if tactic['counter_ids'] == '':\n", - " continue\n", - " for index2, technique in enumerate(tactic['counter_ids']):\n", - " arr[index2+2][index] = technique\n", + "h2 = " + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 4, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "'name\\ntype\\nYear Started\\nTo country\\nFound via\\n'" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 4, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "html =''\n", + "for col in cols:\n", + " html += '{}\\n'.format(col)\n", + "html" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 6, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "True" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 6, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "html == h2" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 4, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "'# AMITT Incidents:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n
idnametypeYear StartedTo countryFound via
I00001Blacktivists facebook groupincident2016USAnan
I00002#VaccinateUScampaign2014Worldnan
I00003Beyonce protest ralliesincident2016USAnan
I00004#Macrongateincident2017Francenan
I00005Brexit votecampaign2016UKnan
I00006Columbian Chemicalsincident2014USAnan
I00007Incirlik terroristsincident2016USAnan
I00008Bujicincident2017Serbianan
I00009PhilippinesExpertincident2017Philippinesnan
I00010ParklandTeensincident2018USAnan
I00011CovingtonTeenincident2019USAnan
I00012ChinaSmogincident2011Chinanan
I00013FranceBlacktivistsincident2014Francenan
I00014GiletsJaunePileonincident2018Francenan
I00015ConcordDiscoveryincident2019USAnan
I00016LithuanianElvescampaign2014Lithuanianan
I00017US presidential electionscampaign2016USAOII
I00018DNC email leak incidenttactic2016USAOII
I00019MacronTiphaineincident2017FranceOII
I000203000 tanksincident2017WorldOII
I00021Armenia electionscampaign2017ArmeniaOII
I00022#Macronleaksincident2017FranceOII
I00023#dislikemacronincident2017FranceOII
I00024#syriahoaxincident2017USAOII
I00025EU Armyincident2018EUOII
I00026Netherlands referendum on Ukraineincident2016NetherlandsOII
I00027crucifiedboyincident2014UkraineOII
I00028mh17 downedincident2014UkraineOII
I00029MH17 investigationcampaign2016UkraineOII
I00030LastJediincident2018WorldOII
I00031antivaxapt2018WorldOII
I00032Kavanaughincident2018USAOII
I00033China 50cent Armyapt2014ChinaOII
I00034DibaFacebookExpeditionincident2016TaiwanOII
I00035Brazilelectionscampaign2014BrazilOII
I00036BrazilPresDebateincident2014BrazilOII
I00037Rioelectionsincident2016BrazilOII
I00038Brazilimpeachmentincident2016BrazilOII
I00039MerkelFacebookincident2017GermanyOII
I00040modamaniSelfieincident2015GermanyOII
I00041Refugee crime mapincident2017GermanyOII
I00042Saudi/Qatar bot disputeincident2017QatarMIS
I00043FCC commentsincident2017USAMIS
I00044JadeHelm exerciseincident2015USAMIS
I00045Skripalincident2018UKnan
I00046North Macedoniaincident2018Macedonianan
I00047Sea of Azovincident2018Worldnan
I00048White Helmetscampaign2015Worldnan
I00049White Helmets: Chemical Weaponsincident2017Worldnan
I00050#HandsOffVenezuelaincident2019Worldnan
I00051Integrity Initiativeincident2018Worldnan
I00052China overiewcampaign2015Worldnan
I00053China Huawei CFO Arrestincident2018Worldnan
I00054China Muslimsincident2018Worldnan
I0005550 Cent Armycampaign2008Worldnan
I00056Iran Influence Operationscampaign2012Worldnan
I00057Mexico Electionincident2018Mexiconan
I00058Chemnitzincident2018Germanynan
I00059Myanmar - Rohingya campaign2014Myanmarnan
I00060White Genocidecampaign2018Worldnan
I00061Military veterans Targettingcampaign2017USnan
I00062Brexit/UK ongoingcampaign2015UKnan
I00063Olympic Doping Scandalcampaign2016Worldnan
\\n'" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 4, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "objectname = 'incidents'\n", + "objectcols = ['name', 'type', 'Year Started', 'To country', 'Found via']\n", + "dfobject = amitt.df_incidents\n", + "outfile='../incidents_list.md'\n", "\n", - "#Save grid to file\n", - "if tocsv:\n", - " csvdir = '../generated_csvs'\n", - " if not os.path.exists(csvdir):\n", - " os.makedirs(csvdir)\n", - " pd.DataFrame(arr).to_csv(csvdir + '/counters_tactics_table.csv', index=False, header=False)\n", - "arr" + "html = '''# AMITT {}:\n", + "\n", + "\n", + "\n", + "'''.format(objectname.capitalize())\n", + "\n", + "# Create header row\n", + "html += '\\n'.format('id')\n", + "html += ''.join(['\\n'.format(col) for col in objectcols])\n", + "html += '\\n'\n", + "\n", + "# Add row for each object\n", + "for index, row in dfobject[dfobject['name'].notnull()].iterrows():\n", + " html += '\\n'\n", + " html += '\\n'.format(objectname, row['id'])\n", + " html += ''.join(['\\n'.format(row[col]) for col in objectcols])\n", + " html += '\\n'\n", + "html += '
{}{}
{1}{}
\\n'\n", + "html" + ] + }, + { + "cell_type": "code", + "execution_count": 3, + "metadata": {}, + "outputs": [ + { + "data": { + "text/plain": [ + "'# AMITT Incidents:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n'" + ] + }, + "execution_count": 3, + "metadata": {}, + "output_type": "execute_result" + } + ], + "source": [ + "html" ] }, { diff --git a/actors_index.md b/actors_index.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f6c7331 --- /dev/null +++ b/actors_index.md @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +# AMITT Actors: + +
idnametypeYear StartedTo countryFound via
I00001
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
idnamesummary
A001Nonprofits
A002Civil Society
A003Government Agency
A004Academics
A005Activists
A006TargetPerson being targeted by disinformation campaign
A007Social network platforms
A008Corporations
diff --git a/counter_tactics/TA01counters.md b/counter_tactics/TA01counters.md index f4033a1..95c2950 100644 --- a/counter_tactics/TA01counters.md +++ b/counter_tactics/TA01counters.md @@ -4,45 +4,45 @@ ### ALL -* C00001: Better models of info spread up the layers (needs nan) -* C00003: How can we safeguard against extremists using the tools that we will produce? (needs nan) -* C00004: Managing like a chronic disease (needs nan) -* C00005: Policy: makers, terminology, elements: a) broad, b) specific (needs nan) +* C00001: Better models of info spread up the layers (needs ) +* C00003: How can we safeguard against extremists using the tools that we will produce? (needs ) +* C00004: Managing like a chronic disease (needs ) +* C00005: Policy: makers, terminology, elements: a) broad, b) specific (needs ) ### D2 Deny * C00006: Charge for social media (needs platform_admin:socialmedia) -* C00007: Create framework for BetterBusinessBureau (BBB) for news media (needs nan) +* C00007: Create framework for BetterBusinessBureau (BBB) for news media (needs ) * C00008: Create shared fact-checking database (needs factcheckers) * C00009: Educate high profile influencers on best practices (needs influencers,educators) * C00010: Enhanced privacy regulation for social media (needs government:policymakers) * C00011: Media literacy. Games to identify fake news (needs educators,gamesdesigners,developers) * C00012: Platform regulation (needs government:policymakers) -* C00013: Rating framework for news - full transcripts, link source, add items, BBB for news (needs nan) +* C00013: Rating framework for news - full transcripts, link source, add items, BBB for news (needs ) * C00014: Real-time updates to fact-checking database (needs factcheckers) * C00015: Reputation scores for social media users (needs data_scientist,datastreams) -* C00016: Social media as a privilege not right (needs nan) +* C00016: Social media as a privilege not right (needs ) ### D3 Disrupt * C00017: Media campaign promoting in-group to out-group in person communication / activities (needs media) -* C00018: Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers (needs nan) -* C00019: Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers (needs nan) +* C00018: Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers (needs ) +* C00019: Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers (needs ) * C00153: Use offensive cyber action (needs infosec) -* C00159: Campaign mindset and associated toolbox (needs nan) +* C00159: Campaign mindset and associated toolbox (needs ) * C00205: strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting (needs companies,government) ### D4 Degrade * C00020: Deligitimise the 24 hour news cycle (needs media) -* C00021: Encourage in-person communication (needs nan) -* C00022: Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety - to counter ability and fear based attacks (needs nan) -* C00023: Promote civility as an identity that people will defend (needs nan) -* C00024: Promote constructive narratives i.e. not polarising. Pro-life, pro-choice, or pro-USA? (needs nan) -* C00025: Promote identity neutral narratives (needs nan) -* C00026: Shore up democracy based messages (peace, freedom) - make it sexy (needs nan) +* C00021: Encourage in-person communication (needs ) +* C00022: Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety - to counter ability and fear based attacks (needs ) +* C00023: Promote civility as an identity that people will defend (needs ) +* C00024: Promote constructive narratives i.e. not polarising. Pro-life, pro-choice, or pro-USA? (needs ) +* C00025: Promote identity neutral narratives (needs ) +* C00026: Shore up democracy based messages (peace, freedom) - make it sexy (needs ) ### D7 Deter -* C00027: Create culture of civility (needs nan) -* C00161: Coalition Building and Third-Party Inducements: (needs nan) -* C00176: Improve Coordination with and feedback from the U.S. private sector (needs nan) +* C00027: Create culture of civility (needs ) +* C00161: Coalition Building and Third-Party Inducements: (needs ) +* C00176: Improve Coordination with and feedback from the U.S. private sector (needs ) * C00207: tit-for-tat campaign (needs government,platforms) ## by technique @@ -52,23 +52,23 @@ * C00008: Create shared fact-checking database (needs factcheckers) * C00014: Real-time updates to fact-checking database (needs factcheckers) * C00015: Reputation scores for social media users (needs data_scientist,datastreams) -* C00023: Promote civility as an identity that people will defend (needs nan) -* C00024: Promote constructive narratives i.e. not polarising. Pro-life, pro-choice, or pro-USA? (needs nan) -* C00025: Promote identity neutral narratives (needs nan) +* C00023: Promote civility as an identity that people will defend (needs ) +* C00024: Promote constructive narratives i.e. not polarising. Pro-life, pro-choice, or pro-USA? (needs ) +* C00025: Promote identity neutral narratives (needs ) * C00073: Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution (needs educators) ### T0001 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide) * C00020: Deligitimise the 24 hour news cycle (needs media) ### T0002 Facilitate State Propaganda -* C00022: Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety - to counter ability and fear based attacks (needs nan) -* C00026: Shore up democracy based messages (peace, freedom) - make it sexy (needs nan) -* C00031: Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify (needs nan) +* C00022: Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety - to counter ability and fear based attacks (needs ) +* C00026: Shore up democracy based messages (peace, freedom) - make it sexy (needs ) +* C00031: Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify (needs ) * C00055: Empower existing regulators to govern social media (needs government:policymakers,government,platform_admin) -* C00088: Poison pill recasting of message (needs nan) +* C00088: Poison pill recasting of message (needs ) ### T0003 Leverage Existing Narratives -* C00031: Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify (needs nan) +* C00031: Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify (needs ) ### T0004 Competing Narratives -* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs nan) +* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs ) diff --git a/counter_tactics/TA02counters.md b/counter_tactics/TA02counters.md index fa16ddd..cfa25cf 100644 --- a/counter_tactics/TA02counters.md +++ b/counter_tactics/TA02counters.md @@ -4,27 +4,27 @@ ### D3 Disrupt -* C00028: Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments (needs nan) -* C00029: Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise (needs nan) -* C00030: Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based) (needs nan) -* C00031: Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify (needs nan) -* C00032: Hijack content and link to truth- based info (platform) (needs nan) +* C00028: Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments (needs ) +* C00029: Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise (needs ) +* C00030: Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based) (needs ) +* C00031: Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify (needs ) +* C00032: Hijack content and link to truth- based info (platform) (needs ) ## by technique ### TA02 -* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs nan) +* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs ) ### T0005 Center of Gravity Analysis -* C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) (needs nan) -* C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages (needs nan) +* C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) (needs ) +* C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages (needs ) ### T0006 Create Master Narratives * C00008: Create shared fact-checking database (needs factcheckers) * C00014: Real-time updates to fact-checking database (needs factcheckers) -* C00023: Promote civility as an identity that people will defend (needs nan) -* C00024: Promote constructive narratives i.e. not polarising. Pro-life, pro-choice, or pro-USA? (needs nan) -* C00025: Promote identity neutral narratives (needs nan) -* C00031: Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify (needs nan) -* C00088: Poison pill recasting of message (needs nan) +* C00023: Promote civility as an identity that people will defend (needs ) +* C00024: Promote constructive narratives i.e. not polarising. Pro-life, pro-choice, or pro-USA? (needs ) +* C00025: Promote identity neutral narratives (needs ) +* C00031: Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify (needs ) +* C00088: Poison pill recasting of message (needs ) diff --git a/counter_tactics/TA03counters.md b/counter_tactics/TA03counters.md index 15dd41f..1f6fb31 100644 --- a/counter_tactics/TA03counters.md +++ b/counter_tactics/TA03counters.md @@ -4,49 +4,49 @@ ### D2 Deny -* C00033: Build cultural resistance to false content (needs nan) -* C00034: Create more friction at account creation (needs nan) -* C00035: Friction (needs nan) -* C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) (needs nan) -* C00039: Standard reporting for false profiles (needs nan) -* C00040: third party verification for people (needs nan) -* C00150: “calling them out” (needs nan) +* C00033: Build cultural resistance to false content (needs ) +* C00034: Create more friction at account creation (needs ) +* C00035: Friction (needs ) +* C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) (needs ) +* C00039: Standard reporting for false profiles (needs ) +* C00040: third party verification for people (needs ) +* C00150: “calling them out” (needs ) * C00155: Ban incident actors from funding sites (needs platform_admin:fundingsites) * C00160: find and train influencers (needs data_scientist,influencers) -* C00197: remove suspicious facebook accounts (needs nan) +* C00197: remove suspicious facebook accounts (needs ) ### D3 Disrupt -* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs nan) +* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs ) * C00043: Detect hijacked accounts and reallocate them (needs platform_admin,activists,civil_society,money) * C00044: Keep people from posting to social media immediately (needs platform_algorithms) -* C00045: S4d detection and re-allocation approaches (needs nan) -* C00164: compatriot policy (needs nan) -* C00170: elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft (needs nan) -* C00179: Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target Russia-based nonattributed social media accounts (needs nan) +* C00045: S4d detection and re-allocation approaches (needs ) +* C00164: compatriot policy (needs ) +* C00170: elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft (needs ) +* C00179: Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target Russia-based nonattributed social media accounts (needs ) ### D4 Degrade -* C00046: Marginalise and discredit extremist (needs nan) +* C00046: Marginalise and discredit extremist (needs ) ### D5 Deceive -* C00047: Coordinated inauthentics (needs nan) +* C00047: Coordinated inauthentics (needs ) ### D6 Destroy -* C00189: Ongoing analysis/monitoring of "flagged" profiles (needs nan) +* C00189: Ongoing analysis/monitoring of "flagged" profiles (needs ) ### D7 Deter -* C00048: Name and Shame (needs nan) +* C00048: Name and Shame (needs ) ## by technique ### TA03 * C00011: Media literacy. Games to identify fake news (needs educators,gamesdesigners,developers) -* C00085: Demuting content (needs nan) +* C00085: Demuting content (needs ) ### T0007 Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups * C00012: Platform regulation (needs government:policymakers) -* C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) (needs nan) -* C00039: Standard reporting for false profiles (needs nan) +* C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) (needs ) +* C00039: Standard reporting for false profiles (needs ) * C00055: Empower existing regulators to govern social media (needs government:policymakers,government,platform_admin) * C00133: Deplatform Account* (needs platform_admin) * C00135: Deplatform message groups and/or message boards (needs platform_admin) @@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ * C00008: Create shared fact-checking database (needs factcheckers) * C00014: Real-time updates to fact-checking database (needs factcheckers) * C00053: Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts (needs platform_admin,platform_admin:socialmedia,public:account_owners) -* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs nan) +* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs ) ### T0009 Create fake experts * C00008: Create shared fact-checking database (needs factcheckers) * C00014: Real-time updates to fact-checking database (needs factcheckers) -* C00040: third party verification for people (needs nan) +* C00040: third party verification for people (needs ) * C00133: Deplatform Account* (needs platform_admin) diff --git a/counter_tactics/TA04counters.md b/counter_tactics/TA04counters.md index 208d00f..7a7591f 100644 --- a/counter_tactics/TA04counters.md +++ b/counter_tactics/TA04counters.md @@ -8,18 +8,18 @@ * C00050: Anti-elicitation training (needs educators) * C00051: Phishing prevention education etc (needs educators) * C00055: Empower existing regulators to govern social media (needs government:policymakers,government,platform_admin) -* C00056: Get off social media (needs nan) -* C00057: Privacy standards (needs nan) -* C00058: Report crowdfunder as violator (needs nan) -* C00059: Verification of project before posting (counters funding campaigns) (needs nan) -* C00152: “name and shame” (needs nan) -* C00157: Build alternative news sources (needs nan) -* C00174: Free and Fair Press (needs nan) +* C00056: Get off social media (needs ) +* C00057: Privacy standards (needs ) +* C00058: Report crowdfunder as violator (needs ) +* C00059: Verification of project before posting (counters funding campaigns) (needs ) +* C00152: “name and shame” (needs ) +* C00157: Build alternative news sources (needs ) +* C00174: Free and Fair Press (needs ) ### D3 Disrupt * C00060: Enhanced legal enforcement against for-profit follower/engagement factories (needs government:policymakers) -* C00061: Innoculating at language (needs nan) -* C00162: collect data/map constellations of Russian“civil society”. Unravel/target the Potemkin villages (needs nan) +* C00061: Innoculating at language (needs ) +* C00162: collect data/map constellations of Russian“civil society”. Unravel/target the Potemkin villages (needs ) ### D4 Degrade * C00052: Infiltrate platforms (needs activists) @@ -27,23 +27,23 @@ * C00054: Media literacy training. (needs educators,libraries,schools,DHS,NGO,platform_outreach,media,community_groups,religious_organisations) ### D6 Destroy -* C00062: Free open library sources worldwide (needs nan) +* C00062: Free open library sources worldwide (needs ) ## by technique ### TA04 * C00011: Media literacy. Games to identify fake news (needs educators,gamesdesigners,developers) -* C00085: Demuting content (needs nan) +* C00085: Demuting content (needs ) ### T0010 Cultivate ignorant agents * C00009: Educate high profile influencers on best practices (needs influencers,educators) -* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs nan) -* C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages (needs nan) +* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs ) +* C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages (needs ) ### T0011 Hijack legitimate account * C00043: Detect hijacked accounts and reallocate them (needs platform_admin,activists,civil_society,money) -* C00045: S4d detection and re-allocation approaches (needs nan) +* C00045: S4d detection and re-allocation approaches (needs ) * C00053: Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts (needs platform_admin,platform_admin:socialmedia,public:account_owners) * C00133: Deplatform Account* (needs platform_admin) * C00135: Deplatform message groups and/or message boards (needs platform_admin) @@ -62,12 +62,12 @@ * C00008: Create shared fact-checking database (needs factcheckers) * C00012: Platform regulation (needs government:policymakers) * C00014: Real-time updates to fact-checking database (needs factcheckers) -* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs nan) +* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs ) * C00133: Deplatform Account* (needs platform_admin) ### T0015 Create hashtag * C00055: Empower existing regulators to govern social media (needs government:policymakers,government,platform_admin) -* C00066: Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back) (needs nan) -* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs nan) -* C00088: Poison pill recasting of message (needs nan) -* C00145: Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!) (needs nan) +* C00066: Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back) (needs ) +* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs ) +* C00088: Poison pill recasting of message (needs ) +* C00145: Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!) (needs ) diff --git a/counter_tactics/TA05counters.md b/counter_tactics/TA05counters.md index 7ac2f03..46cdffe 100644 --- a/counter_tactics/TA05counters.md +++ b/counter_tactics/TA05counters.md @@ -9,31 +9,31 @@ ### D3 Disrupt * C00065: Ban political ads (needs government:policymakers) -* C00066: Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back) (needs nan) -* C00067: Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding) (needs nan) -* C00068: Expose online funding as fake (needs nan) -* C00069: Mark clickbait visually (needs nan) +* C00066: Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back) (needs ) +* C00067: Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding) (needs ) +* C00068: Expose online funding as fake (needs ) +* C00069: Mark clickbait visually (needs ) ## by technique ### TA05 * C00011: Media literacy. Games to identify fake news (needs educators,gamesdesigners,developers) -* C00085: Demuting content (needs nan) -* C00140: "Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls (needs nan) +* C00085: Demuting content (needs ) +* C00140: "Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls (needs ) * C00141: "Hey this story is old" popup when messaging with old URL (needs platform_algorithms) * C00142: "This has been disproved - do you want to forward it" (needs platform_algorithms) ### T0016 Clickbait -* C00069: Mark clickbait visually (needs nan) +* C00069: Mark clickbait visually (needs ) ### T0017 Promote online funding -* C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) (needs nan) -* C00067: Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding) (needs nan) -* C00068: Expose online funding as fake (needs nan) -* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs nan) -* C00088: Poison pill recasting of message (needs nan) -* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs nan) +* C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) (needs ) +* C00067: Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding) (needs ) +* C00068: Expose online funding as fake (needs ) +* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs ) +* C00088: Poison pill recasting of message (needs ) +* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs ) * C00133: Deplatform Account* (needs platform_admin) * C00135: Deplatform message groups and/or message boards (needs platform_admin) diff --git a/counter_tactics/TA06counters.md b/counter_tactics/TA06counters.md index 67c8ae7..89b9c0f 100644 --- a/counter_tactics/TA06counters.md +++ b/counter_tactics/TA06counters.md @@ -4,47 +4,47 @@ ### D2 Deny -* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs nan) -* C00071: Block source of pollution (needs nan) -* C00072: Content censorship in non-relevant domains e.g. Pinterest antivax (needs nan) +* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs ) +* C00071: Block source of pollution (needs ) +* C00072: Content censorship in non-relevant domains e.g. Pinterest antivax (needs ) * C00073: Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution (needs educators) * C00074: Identify identical content and mass deplatform (needs platform_admin,platform_admin:socialmedia) -* C00075: normalise language (needs nan) -* C00076: Prohibit images in political discourse channels (needs nan) -* C00165: Limit access to alterable documents (needs nan) -* C00167: Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft (needs nan) +* C00075: normalise language (needs ) +* C00076: Prohibit images in political discourse channels (needs ) +* C00165: Limit access to alterable documents (needs ) +* C00167: Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft (needs ) * C00171: social media content take-downs (needs platform_admin:socialmedia) * C00172: social media page removal (needs platform_admin:socialmedia) -* C00202: Set data 'honeytraps' (needs nan) -* C00210: Use encrypted apps for confidential communication (needs nan) +* C00202: Set data 'honeytraps' (needs ) +* C00210: Use encrypted apps for confidential communication (needs ) ### D3 Disrupt -* C00077: Active defence: replay "develop people" (needs nan) -* C00078: Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content. More specifically, change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists (needs nan) -* C00079: Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side (needs nan) -* C00080: Create competing narrative (needs nan) -* C00081: Discredit by pointing out the "noise" and informing public that "flooding" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of "noise" (needs nan) -* C00082: Ground truthing as automated response to pollution (needs nan) -* C00084: Steal their truths (needs nan) -* C00219: Add metadata to content - out of the control of the adversary (needs nan) +* C00077: Active defence: replay "develop people" (needs ) +* C00078: Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content. More specifically, change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists (needs ) +* C00079: Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side (needs ) +* C00080: Create competing narrative (needs ) +* C00081: Discredit by pointing out the "noise" and informing public that "flooding" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of "noise" (needs ) +* C00082: Ground truthing as automated response to pollution (needs ) +* C00084: Steal their truths (needs ) +* C00219: Add metadata to content - out of the control of the adversary (needs ) ### D4 Degrade -* C00085: Demuting content (needs nan) -* C00086: Distract from noise with addictive content (needs nan) -* C00087: Make more noise (needs nan) -* C00088: Poison pill recasting of message (needs nan) -* C00089: Throttle number of forwards (needs nan) +* C00085: Demuting content (needs ) +* C00086: Distract from noise with addictive content (needs ) +* C00087: Make more noise (needs ) +* C00088: Poison pill recasting of message (needs ) +* C00089: Throttle number of forwards (needs ) ### D5 Deceive -* C00090: Fake engagement system (needs nan) -* C00091: Honeypot social community (needs nan) +* C00090: Fake engagement system (needs ) +* C00091: Honeypot social community (needs ) ### D7 Deter -* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs nan) -* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs nan) -* C00094: Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research (needs nan) -* C00095: Keep score (needs nan) -* C00096: Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers (needs nan) +* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs ) +* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs ) +* C00094: Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research (needs ) +* C00095: Keep score (needs ) +* C00096: Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers (needs ) ## by technique @@ -53,62 +53,62 @@ * C00008: Create shared fact-checking database (needs factcheckers) * C00014: Real-time updates to fact-checking database (needs factcheckers) * C00053: Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts (needs platform_admin,platform_admin:socialmedia,public:account_owners) -* C00085: Demuting content (needs nan) +* C00085: Demuting content (needs ) ### T0019 Generate information pollution -* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs nan) -* C00071: Block source of pollution (needs nan) +* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs ) +* C00071: Block source of pollution (needs ) * C00073: Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution (needs educators) -* C00091: Honeypot social community (needs nan) +* C00091: Honeypot social community (needs ) ### T0020 Trial content -* C00090: Fake engagement system (needs nan) -* C00137: Pollute the AB-testing data feeds (needs nan) -* C00149: Poison the monitoring & evaluation data (needs nan) +* C00090: Fake engagement system (needs ) +* C00137: Pollute the AB-testing data feeds (needs ) +* C00149: Poison the monitoring & evaluation data (needs ) ### T0021 Memes -* C00076: Prohibit images in political discourse channels (needs nan) -* C00079: Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side (needs nan) -* C00089: Throttle number of forwards (needs nan) +* C00076: Prohibit images in political discourse channels (needs ) +* C00079: Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side (needs ) +* C00089: Throttle number of forwards (needs ) ### T0022 Conspiracy narratives -* C00023: Promote civility as an identity that people will defend (needs nan) -* C00024: Promote constructive narratives i.e. not polarising. Pro-life, pro-choice, or pro-USA? (needs nan) -* C00025: Promote identity neutral narratives (needs nan) -* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs nan) -* C00072: Content censorship in non-relevant domains e.g. Pinterest antivax (needs nan) +* C00023: Promote civility as an identity that people will defend (needs ) +* C00024: Promote constructive narratives i.e. not polarising. Pro-life, pro-choice, or pro-USA? (needs ) +* C00025: Promote identity neutral narratives (needs ) +* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs ) +* C00072: Content censorship in non-relevant domains e.g. Pinterest antivax (needs ) * C00074: Identify identical content and mass deplatform (needs platform_admin,platform_admin:socialmedia) -* C00096: Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers (needs nan) +* C00096: Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers (needs ) ### T0023 Distort facts -* C00023: Promote civility as an identity that people will defend (needs nan) -* C00024: Promote constructive narratives i.e. not polarising. Pro-life, pro-choice, or pro-USA? (needs nan) -* C00025: Promote identity neutral narratives (needs nan) -* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs nan) -* C00095: Keep score (needs nan) +* C00023: Promote civility as an identity that people will defend (needs ) +* C00024: Promote constructive narratives i.e. not polarising. Pro-life, pro-choice, or pro-USA? (needs ) +* C00025: Promote identity neutral narratives (needs ) +* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs ) +* C00095: Keep score (needs ) ### T0024 Create fake videos and images -* C00076: Prohibit images in political discourse channels (needs nan) -* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs nan) +* C00076: Prohibit images in political discourse channels (needs ) +* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs ) ### T0025 Leak altered documents * C00012: Platform regulation (needs government:policymakers) -* C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) (needs nan) +* C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) (needs ) * C00074: Identify identical content and mass deplatform (needs platform_admin,platform_admin:socialmedia) -* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs nan) -* C00202: Set data 'honeytraps' (needs nan) -* C00210: Use encrypted apps for confidential communication (needs nan) +* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs ) +* C00202: Set data 'honeytraps' (needs ) +* C00210: Use encrypted apps for confidential communication (needs ) ### T0026 Create fake research * C00074: Identify identical content and mass deplatform (needs platform_admin,platform_admin:socialmedia) -* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs nan) -* C00094: Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research (needs nan) +* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs ) +* C00094: Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research (needs ) ### T0027 Adapt existing narratives -* C00023: Promote civility as an identity that people will defend (needs nan) -* C00024: Promote constructive narratives i.e. not polarising. Pro-life, pro-choice, or pro-USA? (needs nan) -* C00025: Promote identity neutral narratives (needs nan) -* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs nan) +* C00023: Promote civility as an identity that people will defend (needs ) +* C00024: Promote constructive narratives i.e. not polarising. Pro-life, pro-choice, or pro-USA? (needs ) +* C00025: Promote identity neutral narratives (needs ) +* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs ) ### T0028 Create competing narratives -* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs nan) +* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs ) diff --git a/counter_tactics/TA07counters.md b/counter_tactics/TA07counters.md index 0c677c5..5da709c 100644 --- a/counter_tactics/TA07counters.md +++ b/counter_tactics/TA07counters.md @@ -7,16 +7,16 @@ * C00097: Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment (needs platform_algorithms) * C00098: Revocation of "verified" (needs platform_admin) * C00099: Strengthen verification methods (needs platform_algorithms) -* C00107: Content moderation (needs nan) +* C00107: Content moderation (needs ) * C00110: Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist content (needs funding) -* C00195: Redirect Method (needs nan) +* C00195: Redirect Method (needs ) * C00217: Registries alert when large batches of newsy URLs get registered together (needs platform_admin) ### D3 Disrupt -* C00100: Hashtag jacking (needs nan) +* C00100: Hashtag jacking (needs ) * C00105: Buy more advertising than the adversary to shift influence and algorithms (needs money,adtech) -* C00106: Click-bait centrist content (needs nan) -* C00109: De-escalation (needs nan) +* C00106: Click-bait centrist content (needs ) +* C00109: De-escalation (needs ) * C00196: Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media (needs government) * C00214: Create policy that makes social media police disinformation (needs government:policymakers) * C00215: Use fraud legislation to clean up social media (needs government:policymakers) @@ -34,15 +34,15 @@ ### TA07 * C00012: Platform regulation (needs government:policymakers) -* C00016: Social media as a privilege not right (needs nan) -* C00028: Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments (needs nan) +* C00016: Social media as a privilege not right (needs ) +* C00028: Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments (needs ) * C00044: Keep people from posting to social media immediately (needs platform_algorithms) * C00055: Empower existing regulators to govern social media (needs government:policymakers,government,platform_admin) * C00060: Enhanced legal enforcement against for-profit follower/engagement factories (needs government:policymakers) -* C00078: Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content. More specifically, change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists (needs nan) -* C00085: Demuting content (needs nan) -* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs nan) -* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs nan) +* C00078: Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content. More specifically, change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists (needs ) +* C00085: Demuting content (needs ) +* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs ) +* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs ) * C00133: Deplatform Account* (needs platform_admin) * C00135: Deplatform message groups and/or message boards (needs platform_admin) @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ * C00101: Create participant friction (needs platform_algorithms) * C00102: Make repeat voting harder (needs platform_admin) * C00103: Create a bot that engages / distract trolls (needs developers) -* C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages (needs nan) +* C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages (needs ) ### T0030 Backstop personas * C00099: Strengthen verification methods (needs platform_algorithms) @@ -60,14 +60,14 @@ ### T0031 YouTube ### T0032 Reddit -* C00107: Content moderation (needs nan) +* C00107: Content moderation (needs ) ### T0033 Instagram ### T0034 LinkedIn ### T0035 Pinterest -* C00107: Content moderation (needs nan) +* C00107: Content moderation (needs ) ### T0036 WhatsApp diff --git a/counter_tactics/TA08counters.md b/counter_tactics/TA08counters.md index 104f572..be56be3 100644 --- a/counter_tactics/TA08counters.md +++ b/counter_tactics/TA08counters.md @@ -4,11 +4,11 @@ ### D2 Deny -* C00112: "Prove they are not an op!" (needs nan) -* C00113: Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials. Attack audience quality of fake expert (needs nan) +* C00112: "Prove they are not an op!" (needs ) +* C00113: Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials. Attack audience quality of fake expert (needs ) * C00114: Don't engage with payloads (needs public) -* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs nan) -* C00116: Provide proof of involvement (needs nan) +* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs ) +* C00116: Provide proof of involvement (needs ) * C00154: Ask media not to report false information (needs media) * C00204: Strengthen local media (needs media) @@ -18,13 +18,13 @@ * C00203: Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets (needs government) ### D4 Degrade -* C00117: Downgrade de-amplify label promote counter to disinformation (needs nan) -* C00118: Repurpose images with new text (needs nan) +* C00117: Downgrade de-amplify label promote counter to disinformation (needs ) +* C00118: Repurpose images with new text (needs ) ### D7 Deter -* C00119: Engage payload and debunk. Provide link to facts. (needs nan) -* C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes (needs nan) -* C00121: Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. (needs nan) +* C00119: Engage payload and debunk. Provide link to facts. (needs ) +* C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes (needs ) +* C00121: Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. (needs ) ## by technique @@ -34,50 +34,50 @@ * C00009: Educate high profile influencers on best practices (needs influencers,educators) * C00011: Media literacy. Games to identify fake news (needs educators,gamesdesigners,developers) * C00014: Real-time updates to fact-checking database (needs factcheckers) -* C00018: Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers (needs nan) -* C00019: Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers (needs nan) -* C00027: Create culture of civility (needs nan) -* C00028: Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments (needs nan) -* C00048: Name and Shame (needs nan) -* C00085: Demuting content (needs nan) -* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs nan) +* C00018: Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers (needs ) +* C00019: Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers (needs ) +* C00027: Create culture of civility (needs ) +* C00028: Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments (needs ) +* C00048: Name and Shame (needs ) +* C00085: Demuting content (needs ) +* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs ) * C00124: Don't feed the trolls (needs public,media) -* C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages (needs nan) +* C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages (needs ) ### T0039 Bait legitimate influencers -* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs nan) +* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs ) * C00114: Don't engage with payloads (needs public) ### T0040 Demand unsurmountable proof -* C00112: "Prove they are not an op!" (needs nan) +* C00112: "Prove they are not an op!" (needs ) ### T0041 Deny involvement -* C00116: Provide proof of involvement (needs nan) +* C00116: Provide proof of involvement (needs ) ### T0042 Kernel of Truth -* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs nan) -* C00112: "Prove they are not an op!" (needs nan) +* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs ) +* C00112: "Prove they are not an op!" (needs ) ### T0043 Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps * C00012: Platform regulation (needs government:policymakers) -* C00016: Social media as a privilege not right (needs nan) -* C00121: Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. (needs nan) +* C00016: Social media as a privilege not right (needs ) +* C00121: Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. (needs ) ### T0044 Seed distortions -* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs nan) -* C00118: Repurpose images with new text (needs nan) -* C00119: Engage payload and debunk. Provide link to facts. (needs nan) +* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs ) +* C00118: Repurpose images with new text (needs ) +* C00119: Engage payload and debunk. Provide link to facts. (needs ) ### T0045 Use fake experts -* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs nan) -* C00113: Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials. Attack audience quality of fake expert (needs nan) +* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs ) +* C00113: Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials. Attack audience quality of fake expert (needs ) * C00133: Deplatform Account* (needs platform_admin) * C00135: Deplatform message groups and/or message boards (needs platform_admin) ### T0046 Search Engine Optimization * C00012: Platform regulation (needs government:policymakers) -* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs nan) -* C00078: Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content. More specifically, change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists (needs nan) -* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs nan) -* C00117: Downgrade de-amplify label promote counter to disinformation (needs nan) -* C00145: Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!) (needs nan) +* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs ) +* C00078: Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content. More specifically, change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists (needs ) +* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs ) +* C00117: Downgrade de-amplify label promote counter to disinformation (needs ) +* C00145: Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!) (needs ) diff --git a/counter_tactics/TA09counters.md b/counter_tactics/TA09counters.md index 302ce83..9ab0a86 100644 --- a/counter_tactics/TA09counters.md +++ b/counter_tactics/TA09counters.md @@ -9,24 +9,24 @@ * C00218: Censorship (needs platform_admin) ### D3 Disrupt -* C00123: Bot control (needs nan) +* C00123: Bot control (needs ) * C00124: Don't feed the trolls (needs public,media) -* C00125: Prepare the population with pre-announcements (needs nan) -* C00126: Social media amber alert (needs nan) +* C00125: Prepare the population with pre-announcements (needs ) +* C00126: Social media amber alert (needs ) * C00128: Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other "decelerants" (needs influencers:trusted_authority) -* C00151: “fight in the light” (needs nan) +* C00151: “fight in the light” (needs ) * C00156: Better tell the U.S., NATO, and EU story. (needs government,military) -* C00169: develop a creative content hub (needs nan) -* C00178: Fill information voids with non-disinformation content (needs nan) +* C00169: develop a creative content hub (needs ) +* C00178: Fill information voids with non-disinformation content (needs ) * C00190: open engagement with civil society (needs public) -* C00194: Provide an alternative to Russian information by expanding and improving local content. (needs nan) +* C00194: Provide an alternative to Russian information by expanding and improving local content. (needs ) * C00200: Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo (needs influencers) -* C00211: Use humorous counter-narratives (needs nan) +* C00211: Use humorous counter-narratives (needs ) * C00212: build public resilence by making civil society more vibrant (needs educators,government) ### D4 Degrade * C00158: Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations. (needs educators,media) -* C00184: Media exposure (needs nan) +* C00184: Media exposure (needs ) ## by technique @@ -34,85 +34,85 @@ ### TA09 * C00011: Media literacy. Games to identify fake news (needs educators,gamesdesigners,developers) * C00012: Platform regulation (needs government:policymakers) -* C00018: Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers (needs nan) -* C00019: Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers (needs nan) -* C00028: Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments (needs nan) -* C00085: Demuting content (needs nan) -* C00086: Distract from noise with addictive content (needs nan) +* C00018: Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers (needs ) +* C00019: Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers (needs ) +* C00028: Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments (needs ) +* C00085: Demuting content (needs ) +* C00086: Distract from noise with addictive content (needs ) * C00124: Don't feed the trolls (needs public,media) * C00133: Deplatform Account* (needs platform_admin) * C00135: Deplatform message groups and/or message boards (needs platform_admin) -* C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages (needs nan) -* C00140: "Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls (needs nan) +* C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages (needs ) +* C00140: "Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls (needs ) * C00141: "Hey this story is old" popup when messaging with old URL (needs platform_algorithms) * C00142: "This has been disproved - do you want to forward it" (needs platform_algorithms) ### T0047 Muzzle social media as a political force -* C00027: Create culture of civility (needs nan) +* C00027: Create culture of civility (needs ) * C00055: Empower existing regulators to govern social media (needs government:policymakers,government,platform_admin) * C00060: Enhanced legal enforcement against for-profit follower/engagement factories (needs government:policymakers) -* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs nan) -* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs nan) -* C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes (needs nan) +* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs ) +* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs ) +* C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes (needs ) ### T0048 Cow online opinion leaders -* C00027: Create culture of civility (needs nan) -* C00048: Name and Shame (needs nan) +* C00027: Create culture of civility (needs ) +* C00048: Name and Shame (needs ) * C00055: Empower existing regulators to govern social media (needs government:policymakers,government,platform_admin) -* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs nan) -* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs nan) +* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs ) +* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs ) ### T0049 Flooding * C00044: Keep people from posting to social media immediately (needs platform_algorithms) -* C00123: Bot control (needs nan) +* C00123: Bot control (needs ) * C00131: Seize and analyse botnet servers (needs server_admin) ### T0050 Cheerleading domestic social media ops ### T0051 Fabricate social media comment * C00055: Empower existing regulators to govern social media (needs government:policymakers,government,platform_admin) -* C00123: Bot control (needs nan) +* C00123: Bot control (needs ) ### T0052 Tertiary sites amplify news -* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs nan) -* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs nan) -* C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes (needs nan) -* C00123: Bot control (needs nan) -* C00126: Social media amber alert (needs nan) +* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs ) +* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs ) +* C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes (needs ) +* C00123: Bot control (needs ) +* C00126: Social media amber alert (needs ) ### T0053 Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate -* C00027: Create culture of civility (needs nan) -* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs nan) -* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs nan) -* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs nan) -* C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes (needs nan) -* C00123: Bot control (needs nan) -* C00126: Social media amber alert (needs nan) -* C00144: Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs (needs nan) +* C00027: Create culture of civility (needs ) +* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs ) +* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs ) +* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs ) +* C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes (needs ) +* C00123: Bot control (needs ) +* C00126: Social media amber alert (needs ) +* C00144: Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs (needs ) ### T0054 Twitter bots amplify * C00044: Keep people from posting to social media immediately (needs platform_algorithms) -* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs nan) -* C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes (needs nan) -* C00123: Bot control (needs nan) -* C00126: Social media amber alert (needs nan) +* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs ) +* C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes (needs ) +* C00123: Bot control (needs ) +* C00126: Social media amber alert (needs ) * C00131: Seize and analyse botnet servers (needs server_admin) ### T0055 Use hashtag * C00055: Empower existing regulators to govern social media (needs government:policymakers,government,platform_admin) -* C00066: Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back) (needs nan) -* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs nan) -* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs nan) -* C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes (needs nan) -* C00123: Bot control (needs nan) -* C00126: Social media amber alert (needs nan) +* C00066: Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back) (needs ) +* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs ) +* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs ) +* C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes (needs ) +* C00123: Bot control (needs ) +* C00126: Social media amber alert (needs ) ### T0056 Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution -* C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) (needs nan) -* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs nan) -* C00071: Block source of pollution (needs nan) +* C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) (needs ) +* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs ) +* C00071: Block source of pollution (needs ) * C00073: Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution (needs educators) -* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs nan) -* C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes (needs nan) -* C00123: Bot control (needs nan) -* C00126: Social media amber alert (needs nan) +* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs ) +* C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes (needs ) +* C00123: Bot control (needs ) +* C00126: Social media amber alert (needs ) diff --git a/counter_tactics/TA10counters.md b/counter_tactics/TA10counters.md index c048af6..45d3fe7 100644 --- a/counter_tactics/TA10counters.md +++ b/counter_tactics/TA10counters.md @@ -4,37 +4,37 @@ ### D2 Deny -* C00129: Use banking to cut off access (needs nan) +* C00129: Use banking to cut off access (needs ) ### D7 Deter -* C00130: Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously. (needs nan) +* C00130: Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously. (needs ) ## by technique ### TA10 * C00012: Platform regulation (needs government:policymakers) -* C00018: Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers (needs nan) -* C00019: Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers (needs nan) -* C00028: Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments (needs nan) -* C00085: Demuting content (needs nan) +* C00018: Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers (needs ) +* C00019: Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers (needs ) +* C00028: Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments (needs ) +* C00085: Demuting content (needs ) * C00133: Deplatform Account* (needs platform_admin) * C00135: Deplatform message groups and/or message boards (needs platform_admin) -* C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages (needs nan) -* C00140: "Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls (needs nan) +* C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages (needs ) +* C00140: "Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls (needs ) * C00141: "Hey this story is old" popup when messaging with old URL (needs platform_algorithms) * C00142: "This has been disproved - do you want to forward it" (needs platform_algorithms) ### T0057 Organise remote rallies and events -* C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) (needs nan) -* C00048: Name and Shame (needs nan) -* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs nan) -* C00088: Poison pill recasting of message (needs nan) -* C00129: Use banking to cut off access (needs nan) +* C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) (needs ) +* C00048: Name and Shame (needs ) +* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs ) +* C00088: Poison pill recasting of message (needs ) +* C00129: Use banking to cut off access (needs ) ### T0061 Sell merchandising -* C00048: Name and Shame (needs nan) -* C00067: Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding) (needs nan) -* C00068: Expose online funding as fake (needs nan) -* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs nan) -* C00129: Use banking to cut off access (needs nan) +* C00048: Name and Shame (needs ) +* C00067: Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding) (needs ) +* C00068: Expose online funding as fake (needs ) +* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs ) +* C00129: Use banking to cut off access (needs ) diff --git a/counter_tactics/TA11counters.md b/counter_tactics/TA11counters.md index 5ba5ba1..f6c7f7d 100644 --- a/counter_tactics/TA11counters.md +++ b/counter_tactics/TA11counters.md @@ -9,31 +9,31 @@ ### D3 Disrupt * C00133: Deplatform Account* (needs platform_admin) * C00135: Deplatform message groups and/or message boards (needs platform_admin) -* C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages (needs nan) -* C00137: Pollute the AB-testing data feeds (needs nan) -* C00138: Spam domestic actors with lawsuits (needs nan) -* C00139: Weaponise youtube content matrices (needs nan) +* C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages (needs ) +* C00137: Pollute the AB-testing data feeds (needs ) +* C00138: Spam domestic actors with lawsuits (needs ) +* C00139: Weaponise youtube content matrices (needs ) ### D4 Degrade -* C00140: "Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls (needs nan) +* C00140: "Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls (needs ) * C00141: "Hey this story is old" popup when messaging with old URL (needs platform_algorithms) * C00142: "This has been disproved - do you want to forward it" (needs platform_algorithms) * C00143: (botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time (needs public,elves) -* C00144: Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs (needs nan) -* C00145: Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!) (needs nan) +* C00144: Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs (needs ) +* C00145: Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!) (needs ) ## by technique ### TA11 -* C00085: Demuting content (needs nan) +* C00085: Demuting content (needs ) ### T0058 Legacy web content ### T0059 Play the long game * C00011: Media literacy. Games to identify fake news (needs educators,gamesdesigners,developers) -* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs nan) -* C00088: Poison pill recasting of message (needs nan) +* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs ) +* C00088: Poison pill recasting of message (needs ) ### T0060 Continue to amplify * C00147: Make amplification of social media ports expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days) (needs platform_algorithms) diff --git a/counter_tactics/TA12counters.md b/counter_tactics/TA12counters.md index 10b6d1f..26b58fa 100644 --- a/counter_tactics/TA12counters.md +++ b/counter_tactics/TA12counters.md @@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ ### D4 Degrade * C00148: Add random links to network graphs (needs platform_algorithms) -* C00149: Poison the monitoring & evaluation data (needs nan) +* C00149: Poison the monitoring & evaluation data (needs ) ## by technique ### TA12 -* C00149: Poison the monitoring & evaluation data (needs nan) +* C00149: Poison the monitoring & evaluation data (needs ) diff --git a/counters/C00001.md b/counters/C00001.md index ee91908..9a735a2 100644 --- a/counters/C00001.md +++ b/counters/C00001.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00001 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: metatechnique -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00003.md b/counters/C00003.md index bfe572c..0b7ddb3 100644 --- a/counters/C00003.md +++ b/counters/C00003.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00003 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: metatechnique -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00004.md b/counters/C00004.md index ce0771e..f3a1e4d 100644 --- a/counters/C00004.md +++ b/counters/C00004.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00004 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: metatechnique -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00005.md b/counters/C00005.md index 8e9a574..d30dbe8 100644 --- a/counters/C00005.md +++ b/counters/C00005.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00005 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: metatechnique -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00006.md b/counters/C00006.md index c52042b..e41bdea 100644 --- a/counters/C00006.md +++ b/counters/C00006.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: No corresponding AMITT technique. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction diff --git a/counters/C00007.md b/counters/C00007.md index 4a3d64a..9220bac 100644 --- a/counters/C00007.md +++ b/counters/C00007.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: No corresponding AMITT technique. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: scoring -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00008.md b/counters/C00008.md index e1032b4..211bcf0 100644 --- a/counters/C00008.md +++ b/counters/C00008.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Snopes is best-known example -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: scoring diff --git a/counters/C00009.md b/counters/C00009.md index f2fe6da..831ddb7 100644 --- a/counters/C00009.md +++ b/counters/C00009.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00009 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience diff --git a/counters/C00010.md b/counters/C00010.md index fca7fb0..cd80312 100644 --- a/counters/C00010.md +++ b/counters/C00010.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: No corresponding AMITT technique. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction diff --git a/counters/C00011.md b/counters/C00011.md index 9e688d9..9e9f410 100644 --- a/counters/C00011.md +++ b/counters/C00011.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id**: C00011 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: * **Playbooks**: Game Mechanics: -Show examples of fake news and train the user to identify them on the basis of various types of indicators diff --git a/counters/C00012.md b/counters/C00012.md index 1a2670a..a36dc6a 100644 --- a/counters/C00012.md +++ b/counters/C00012.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id**: C00012 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: * **Playbooks**: Develop a regulatory body like the CFPB to regulate and enforce regulation for digital organizations diff --git a/counters/C00013.md b/counters/C00013.md index f3d1f4f..81f3849 100644 --- a/counters/C00013.md +++ b/counters/C00013.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Technique should be in terms of "strategic innoculation", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news. No corresponding AMITT technique. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: scoring -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00014.md b/counters/C00014.md index 87bf854..c969b01 100644 --- a/counters/C00014.md +++ b/counters/C00014.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: existing examples at Buzzfeed and Fema, especially during disasters -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: scoring diff --git a/counters/C00015.md b/counters/C00015.md index 10b1f11..75e31c4 100644 --- a/counters/C00015.md +++ b/counters/C00015.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00015 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: scoring diff --git a/counters/C00016.md b/counters/C00016.md index 013de90..8fec6d2 100644 --- a/counters/C00016.md +++ b/counters/C00016.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00016 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: cleaning -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00017.md b/counters/C00017.md index 20591ad..e29315e 100644 --- a/counters/C00017.md +++ b/counters/C00017.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Technique could be in terms of forcing a reality-check by talking to people instead of reading about bogeymen. No corresponding AMITT technique. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: countermessaging diff --git a/counters/C00018.md b/counters/C00018.md index d204c00..20f9517 100644 --- a/counters/C00018.md +++ b/counters/C00018.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Duplicate of "Promote playbooks to call out dividers" -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00019.md b/counters/C00019.md index 56050f0..07b27f9 100644 --- a/counters/C00019.md +++ b/counters/C00019.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00020.md b/counters/C00020.md index 00d2984..4e8b5e1 100644 --- a/counters/C00020.md +++ b/counters/C00020.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Unsure -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction diff --git a/counters/C00021.md b/counters/C00021.md index c86e4c8..078534a 100644 --- a/counters/C00021.md +++ b/counters/C00021.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00021 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00022.md b/counters/C00022.md index 50720e5..4e74950 100644 --- a/counters/C00022.md +++ b/counters/C00022.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Unsure -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00023.md b/counters/C00023.md index 6cdbc70..a2290de 100644 --- a/counters/C00023.md +++ b/counters/C00023.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id**: C00023 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: * **Playbooks**: Playbook 1: Recruit respected thought leaders to model behavior Playbook 2: Feature established respected thought leaders to model behavior @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Playbook 4: Establish facilitation guidelines for "civil" interaction. * **Metatechnique**: resilience -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00024.md b/counters/C00024.md index 9415959..ef23095 100644 --- a/counters/C00024.md +++ b/counters/C00024.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00024 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00025.md b/counters/C00025.md index 5c46a2a..a162f4a 100644 --- a/counters/C00025.md +++ b/counters/C00025.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00025 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: countermessaging -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00026.md b/counters/C00026.md index 096ad9b..82f7f54 100644 --- a/counters/C00026.md +++ b/counters/C00026.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Unsure -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: countermessaging -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00027.md b/counters/C00027.md index 4e19db4..a7960fd 100644 --- a/counters/C00027.md +++ b/counters/C00027.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00027 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00028.md b/counters/C00028.md index 240ad5e..0f5fa31 100644 --- a/counters/C00028.md +++ b/counters/C00028.md @@ -10,11 +10,11 @@ This could be used to adjust upvote weight via a trust factor of people and organisations you trust, or other criteria. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: verification -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02 diff --git a/counters/C00029.md b/counters/C00029.md index cef3eaa..314bbf9 100644 --- a/counters/C00029.md +++ b/counters/C00029.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id**: C00029 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: * **Playbooks**: -Identify ignorant agents (ex: anti-vaxx people willing to pay money to advertise their cause) -Sell physical merchandise that has instructive counter-effect @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Secondary Objective: * **Metatechnique**: diversion -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02 diff --git a/counters/C00030.md b/counters/C00030.md index 7c29d22..f56b824 100644 --- a/counters/C00030.md +++ b/counters/C00030.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00030 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: diversion -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02 diff --git a/counters/C00031.md b/counters/C00031.md index ea8f462..bb21346 100644 --- a/counters/C00031.md +++ b/counters/C00031.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Playbook 2: Dissect narrative, piecemeal the components and then amplify * **Metatechnique**: dilution -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02 diff --git a/counters/C00032.md b/counters/C00032.md index 72112a4..aae9d18 100644 --- a/counters/C00032.md +++ b/counters/C00032.md @@ -6,14 +6,14 @@ * **Id**: C00032 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: * **Playbooks**: Playbook 1: Hijack hashtag and redirect conversation to truth based content. Playbook 2: Hijack (man in the middle) redirect from bad content to good content * **Metatechnique**: diversion -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02 diff --git a/counters/C00033.md b/counters/C00033.md index b0e435f..54e74a2 100644 --- a/counters/C00033.md +++ b/counters/C00033.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Cultural resistance to bullshit -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03 diff --git a/counters/C00034.md b/counters/C00034.md index 93af2dc..c8d954e 100644 --- a/counters/C00034.md +++ b/counters/C00034.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Counters fake account -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03 diff --git a/counters/C00035.md b/counters/C00035.md index ac9b711..d2b576c 100644 --- a/counters/C00035.md +++ b/counters/C00035.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00035 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03 diff --git a/counters/C00036.md b/counters/C00036.md index 952fafb..5861cd5 100644 --- a/counters/C00036.md +++ b/counters/C00036.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ * **Metatechnique**: targeting -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03 diff --git a/counters/C00039.md b/counters/C00039.md index 3dbcf1d..8dc028a 100644 --- a/counters/C00039.md +++ b/counters/C00039.md @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Playbook 3: Report suspected bots. * **Metatechnique**: removal -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03 diff --git a/counters/C00040.md b/counters/C00040.md index cb2a6e5..8f5d7b7 100644 --- a/counters/C00040.md +++ b/counters/C00040.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ * **Metatechnique**: verification -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03 diff --git a/counters/C00042.md b/counters/C00042.md index a1dffe5..026c91e 100644 --- a/counters/C00042.md +++ b/counters/C00042.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00042 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: countermessaging -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03 diff --git a/counters/C00043.md b/counters/C00043.md index f77dc7f..d13d886 100644 --- a/counters/C00043.md +++ b/counters/C00043.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id**: C00043 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: * **Playbooks**: In all playbooks the platform must force user verification, credential reset and enable MFA. Suspend the account if it cannot be verified. Playbook 1: Use sites like https://haveibeenpwned.com to detect compromised and at risk user accounts. diff --git a/counters/C00045.md b/counters/C00045.md index e9b1d03..0bdaf53 100644 --- a/counters/C00045.md +++ b/counters/C00045.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: What's S4D? -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03 diff --git a/counters/C00046.md b/counters/C00046.md index 8c695c7..d222c27 100644 --- a/counters/C00046.md +++ b/counters/C00046.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Duplicate of "Name and Shame" - recommend removal. No, not quite. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: targeting -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03 diff --git a/counters/C00047.md b/counters/C00047.md index 60ae92c..39c7a6c 100644 --- a/counters/C00047.md +++ b/counters/C00047.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00047 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: data pollution -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03 diff --git a/counters/C00048.md b/counters/C00048.md index c15a904..20df0df 100644 --- a/counters/C00048.md +++ b/counters/C00048.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00048 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: * **Playbooks**: Identify the accounts, the real person's name and shame them on social media. * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03 diff --git a/counters/C00049.md b/counters/C00049.md index dc147c3..c2e1a4f 100644 --- a/counters/C00049.md +++ b/counters/C00049.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Inoculate against "cult" recruiting -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience diff --git a/counters/C00050.md b/counters/C00050.md index f5b82fa..76deb7c 100644 --- a/counters/C00050.md +++ b/counters/C00050.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00050 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience diff --git a/counters/C00051.md b/counters/C00051.md index 51178db..0c14aab 100644 --- a/counters/C00051.md +++ b/counters/C00051.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00051 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience diff --git a/counters/C00052.md b/counters/C00052.md index 153e3d0..4f4d110 100644 --- a/counters/C00052.md +++ b/counters/C00052.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Detect and degrade -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: targeting diff --git a/counters/C00053.md b/counters/C00053.md index ec552ab..46517ae 100644 --- a/counters/C00053.md +++ b/counters/C00053.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id**: C00053 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: * **Playbooks**: Social media companies remove inactive accounts. Account holders remove accounts they're no longer using. Influencers encourage people to remove their inactive accounts "Do you really need that old account" campaign, world-war-two poster-style. Create alternative memorial websites for accounts of deceased people, so their accounts can't be reactivated on 'live' sites. Educate/scare users on the risks of losing control over a dormant account (would their employer be forgiving if an account associated with the user suddenly starting posting extremist content?). diff --git a/counters/C00054.md b/counters/C00054.md index 15ac946..4156daa 100644 --- a/counters/C00054.md +++ b/counters/C00054.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Covers detect, deny and degrade. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience diff --git a/counters/C00056.md b/counters/C00056.md index 9bb09a9..478d3d4 100644 --- a/counters/C00056.md +++ b/counters/C00056.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00056 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04 diff --git a/counters/C00057.md b/counters/C00057.md index 1563698..4293e69 100644 --- a/counters/C00057.md +++ b/counters/C00057.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00057 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: scoring -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04 diff --git a/counters/C00058.md b/counters/C00058.md index 8fcc220..53ccf4f 100644 --- a/counters/C00058.md +++ b/counters/C00058.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: counters crowdfunding -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04 diff --git a/counters/C00059.md b/counters/C00059.md index eef7ed7..600327c 100644 --- a/counters/C00059.md +++ b/counters/C00059.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00059 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: verification -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04 diff --git a/counters/C00060.md b/counters/C00060.md index 3dae2d3..f8accb5 100644 --- a/counters/C00060.md +++ b/counters/C00060.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00060 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: targeting diff --git a/counters/C00061.md b/counters/C00061.md index 52ca0e0..53953af 100644 --- a/counters/C00061.md +++ b/counters/C00061.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00061 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04 diff --git a/counters/C00062.md b/counters/C00062.md index f70c2e0..bb5c45f 100644 --- a/counters/C00062.md +++ b/counters/C00062.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Open-source libraries could be created that aid in some way for each technique. Even for Strategic Planning, some open-source frameworks such as AMITT can be created to counter the adversarial efforts. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: countermessaging -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04 diff --git a/counters/C00063.md b/counters/C00063.md index 2081363..14b90ae 100644 --- a/counters/C00063.md +++ b/counters/C00063.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00063 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal diff --git a/counters/C00065.md b/counters/C00065.md index 4b1e796..dad52f5 100644 --- a/counters/C00065.md +++ b/counters/C00065.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00065 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal diff --git a/counters/C00066.md b/counters/C00066.md index c943fa6..967c64f 100644 --- a/counters/C00066.md +++ b/counters/C00066.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00066 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: dilution -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05 diff --git a/counters/C00067.md b/counters/C00067.md index 446fa06..bc02a77 100644 --- a/counters/C00067.md +++ b/counters/C00067.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00067 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: targeting -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05 diff --git a/counters/C00068.md b/counters/C00068.md index 7eb56c0..e87954d 100644 --- a/counters/C00068.md +++ b/counters/C00068.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00068 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05 diff --git a/counters/C00069.md b/counters/C00069.md index de2c085..a9fae3b 100644 --- a/counters/C00069.md +++ b/counters/C00069.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00069 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05 diff --git a/counters/C00070.md b/counters/C00070.md index 2d4292d..b05856f 100644 --- a/counters/C00070.md +++ b/counters/C00070.md @@ -14,11 +14,11 @@ Hashtag: Against the platform, by drowning the hashtag. T0046 - Search Engine Optimization: Sub-optimal website performance affect its search engine rank, which I interpret as "blocking access to a platform". -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00071.md b/counters/C00071.md index 31ed7cb..311cc1a 100644 --- a/counters/C00071.md +++ b/counters/C00071.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00071 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00072.md b/counters/C00072.md index ea8af06..4610a91 100644 --- a/counters/C00072.md +++ b/counters/C00072.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00072 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00073.md b/counters/C00073.md index fb3b61d..efd7844 100644 --- a/counters/C00073.md +++ b/counters/C00073.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Strategic planning included as innoculating population has strategic value. Example is the "Learn to Discern" Program, funded by the Canadian government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016. The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in ‘’safe, informed media consumption techniques,’’ including avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech, verifying expert credentials, detecting censorship, and debunking news, photos, and videos." -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience diff --git a/counters/C00075.md b/counters/C00075.md index 9083447..2b62b83 100644 --- a/counters/C00075.md +++ b/counters/C00075.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00075 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: countermessaging -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00076.md b/counters/C00076.md index 2e8c415..d9c0fa3 100644 --- a/counters/C00076.md +++ b/counters/C00076.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00076 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00077.md b/counters/C00077.md index e4d6212..189e4e1 100644 --- a/counters/C00077.md +++ b/counters/C00077.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00077 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: targeting -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00078.md b/counters/C00078.md index 935c34e..265dde4 100644 --- a/counters/C00078.md +++ b/counters/C00078.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Note: Suggest a more generic technique since this applies to non-image content and to non-hate groups. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: diversion -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00079.md b/counters/C00079.md index 2a68671..631f5ab 100644 --- a/counters/C00079.md +++ b/counters/C00079.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00079 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: diversion -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00080.md b/counters/C00080.md index f2d853e..c6d7abb 100644 --- a/counters/C00080.md +++ b/counters/C00080.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00080 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: diversion -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00081.md b/counters/C00081.md index 6f937dc..12acef1 100644 --- a/counters/C00081.md +++ b/counters/C00081.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00081 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00082.md b/counters/C00082.md index 4b54791..826615b 100644 --- a/counters/C00082.md +++ b/counters/C00082.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00082 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: countermessaging -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00084.md b/counters/C00084.md index 88053bc..16ac16c 100644 --- a/counters/C00084.md +++ b/counters/C00084.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Try technique T0003. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: diversion -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00085.md b/counters/C00085.md index cc1beef..182bad2 100644 --- a/counters/C00085.md +++ b/counters/C00085.md @@ -14,11 +14,11 @@ In others, content would be archives of comments attributed to bad actors, as we Having these tagged and shamed for as associated by bad actors would be beneficial for public vigilance. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00086.md b/counters/C00086.md index b9a660b..bb061e1 100644 --- a/counters/C00086.md +++ b/counters/C00086.md @@ -10,11 +10,11 @@ Note: This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted comments are all jokes, preventing serious discussion from being discovered by those who filter by upvotes. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: diversion -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00087.md b/counters/C00087.md index b61764c..e15789d 100644 --- a/counters/C00087.md +++ b/counters/C00087.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Recommend Removal: I see "Make More Noise" as similar to "Do everything in AMITT, better than the adversary". It is not a counter in itself but rather an adversarial attack tool that can be used for blue team narratives. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: dilution -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00088.md b/counters/C00088.md index 53ac8fb..7c15858 100644 --- a/counters/C00088.md +++ b/counters/C00088.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Unsure how to interpret. The techniques listed all involve some amount of promotion which could be manipulated. For example, online fundings or rallies could be advertised, through compromised or fake channels, as being associated with "far-up/down/left/right" actors. "Long Game" narratives could be subjected in a similar way with negative connotations. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: diversion -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00089.md b/counters/C00089.md index ecc147e..430efb0 100644 --- a/counters/C00089.md +++ b/counters/C00089.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00089 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00090.md b/counters/C00090.md index dd92220..7322726 100644 --- a/counters/C00090.md +++ b/counters/C00090.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00090 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: diversion -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00091.md b/counters/C00091.md index def29e4..5e3bb91 100644 --- a/counters/C00091.md +++ b/counters/C00091.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00091 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: diversion -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00092.md b/counters/C00092.md index cbc2d8c..ba37f41 100644 --- a/counters/C00092.md +++ b/counters/C00092.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00092 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: scoring -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00093.md b/counters/C00093.md index 4da87ea..f520427 100644 --- a/counters/C00093.md +++ b/counters/C00093.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00093 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00094.md b/counters/C00094.md index e60d26a..691147d 100644 --- a/counters/C00094.md +++ b/counters/C00094.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00094 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00095.md b/counters/C00095.md index d8fe600..83b0604 100644 --- a/counters/C00095.md +++ b/counters/C00095.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00095 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: scoring -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00096.md b/counters/C00096.md index b979e4e..5fb0792 100644 --- a/counters/C00096.md +++ b/counters/C00096.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00096 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: scoring -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00097.md b/counters/C00097.md index fb4bbd0..8c39654 100644 --- a/counters/C00097.md +++ b/counters/C00097.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00097 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction diff --git a/counters/C00098.md b/counters/C00098.md index e62cd16..25debba 100644 --- a/counters/C00098.md +++ b/counters/C00098.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id**: C00098 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: * **Playbooks**: Affected person contacts platform for action diff --git a/counters/C00099.md b/counters/C00099.md index 1adea93..5243c58 100644 --- a/counters/C00099.md +++ b/counters/C00099.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00099 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction diff --git a/counters/C00100.md b/counters/C00100.md index 0233b72..c6f1cd1 100644 --- a/counters/C00100.md +++ b/counters/C00100.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00100 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: diversion -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07 diff --git a/counters/C00101.md b/counters/C00101.md index 88264ce..e262562 100644 --- a/counters/C00101.md +++ b/counters/C00101.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00101 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction diff --git a/counters/C00102.md b/counters/C00102.md index 01231d9..deab65c 100644 --- a/counters/C00102.md +++ b/counters/C00102.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00102 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction diff --git a/counters/C00103.md b/counters/C00103.md index b52a3a9..a34dc65 100644 --- a/counters/C00103.md +++ b/counters/C00103.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Use T00030 backstop personas -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: diversion diff --git a/counters/C00105.md b/counters/C00105.md index bc93d64..523a7dc 100644 --- a/counters/C00105.md +++ b/counters/C00105.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00105 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: dilution diff --git a/counters/C00106.md b/counters/C00106.md index 456f280..ce664ff 100644 --- a/counters/C00106.md +++ b/counters/C00106.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Create emotive centrist content that gets more clicks -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: diversion -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07 diff --git a/counters/C00107.md b/counters/C00107.md index 8cf4df1..2cae6fe 100644 --- a/counters/C00107.md +++ b/counters/C00107.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00107 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: scoring -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07 diff --git a/counters/C00109.md b/counters/C00109.md index 3f27277..5ccb059 100644 --- a/counters/C00109.md +++ b/counters/C00109.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00109 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07 diff --git a/counters/C00110.md b/counters/C00110.md index 1921940..d82ae00 100644 --- a/counters/C00110.md +++ b/counters/C00110.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00110 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction diff --git a/counters/C00111.md b/counters/C00111.md index 06be51a..cafaf8b 100644 --- a/counters/C00111.md +++ b/counters/C00111.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00111 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience diff --git a/counters/C00112.md b/counters/C00112.md index b330dd6..774a377 100644 --- a/counters/C00112.md +++ b/counters/C00112.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: This applies to the entirety of the matrix as I read this as "create awareness around the use of all of these techniques" -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08 diff --git a/counters/C00113.md b/counters/C00113.md index 4945ffa..5ad91f7 100644 --- a/counters/C00113.md +++ b/counters/C00113.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00113 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08 diff --git a/counters/C00114.md b/counters/C00114.md index 9e8f952..5cab8da 100644 --- a/counters/C00114.md +++ b/counters/C00114.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00114 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction diff --git a/counters/C00115.md b/counters/C00115.md index c9dea36..27cae4a 100644 --- a/counters/C00115.md +++ b/counters/C00115.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00115 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08 diff --git a/counters/C00116.md b/counters/C00116.md index 3447622..439a70d 100644 --- a/counters/C00116.md +++ b/counters/C00116.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00116 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08 diff --git a/counters/C00117.md b/counters/C00117.md index 82767f4..73fe7a1 100644 --- a/counters/C00117.md +++ b/counters/C00117.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00117 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: countermessaging -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08 diff --git a/counters/C00118.md b/counters/C00118.md index 04c4c91..0c17190 100644 --- a/counters/C00118.md +++ b/counters/C00118.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00118 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: countermessaging -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08 diff --git a/counters/C00119.md b/counters/C00119.md index 5b39904..1405de1 100644 --- a/counters/C00119.md +++ b/counters/C00119.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Might be okay. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: countermessaging -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08 diff --git a/counters/C00120.md b/counters/C00120.md index adb4985..150058f 100644 --- a/counters/C00120.md +++ b/counters/C00120.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00120 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: metatechnique -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08 diff --git a/counters/C00121.md b/counters/C00121.md index 17adf89..343520f 100644 --- a/counters/C00121.md +++ b/counters/C00121.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00121 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08 diff --git a/counters/C00122.md b/counters/C00122.md index aee4eac..5377bd1 100644 --- a/counters/C00122.md +++ b/counters/C00122.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00122 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction diff --git a/counters/C00123.md b/counters/C00123.md index 1f13fa2..e8695a2 100644 --- a/counters/C00123.md +++ b/counters/C00123.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00123 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09 diff --git a/counters/C00124.md b/counters/C00124.md index 24a6f19..ddc12c5 100644 --- a/counters/C00124.md +++ b/counters/C00124.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00124 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction diff --git a/counters/C00125.md b/counters/C00125.md index cc9c920..93a2142 100644 --- a/counters/C00125.md +++ b/counters/C00125.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00125 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09 diff --git a/counters/C00126.md b/counters/C00126.md index a097ed5..62d1c64 100644 --- a/counters/C00126.md +++ b/counters/C00126.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00126 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09 diff --git a/counters/C00128.md b/counters/C00128.md index a369264..7778776 100644 --- a/counters/C00128.md +++ b/counters/C00128.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00128 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: dilution diff --git a/counters/C00129.md b/counters/C00129.md index b61f2e8..427ebba 100644 --- a/counters/C00129.md +++ b/counters/C00129.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: fiscal sanctions; parallel to counter terrorism -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: reduce resources -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10 diff --git a/counters/C00130.md b/counters/C00130.md index 51b1160..7da4f05 100644 --- a/counters/C00130.md +++ b/counters/C00130.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00130 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10 diff --git a/counters/C00131.md b/counters/C00131.md index c0f3efb..cd10bac 100644 --- a/counters/C00131.md +++ b/counters/C00131.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00131 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal diff --git a/counters/C00133.md b/counters/C00133.md index b7e28af..1fd6273 100644 --- a/counters/C00133.md +++ b/counters/C00133.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Note: Similar to Deplatform People but less generic. Perhaps both should be left. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal diff --git a/counters/C00135.md b/counters/C00135.md index b326b75..c148d22 100644 --- a/counters/C00135.md +++ b/counters/C00135.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Merged two rows here. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal diff --git a/counters/C00136.md b/counters/C00136.md index 944c839..cbac6ec 100644 --- a/counters/C00136.md +++ b/counters/C00136.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id**: C00136 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: * **Playbooks**: Playbook 1: Work with platform to identify active target audiences through finanical data and messaging. Playbook 2: Use a platform's publicly available advertising/targeting capabilities to enumerate a list of possible microtargeted demographics. Compare these to known TAs of past/ongoing influence ops to identify the vulnerable demographics. @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Playbook 2: Use a platform's publicly available advertising/targeting capabiliti * **Metatechnique**: countermessaging -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11 diff --git a/counters/C00137.md b/counters/C00137.md index 17b3768..642b43f 100644 --- a/counters/C00137.md +++ b/counters/C00137.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Playbook 3: If adtech is used, fake clicks and engagements on the content. * **Metatechnique**: data pollution -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11 diff --git a/counters/C00138.md b/counters/C00138.md index 7612160..046bc7c 100644 --- a/counters/C00138.md +++ b/counters/C00138.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00138 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: reduce resources -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11 diff --git a/counters/C00139.md b/counters/C00139.md index 6cfb03d..e9bde96 100644 --- a/counters/C00139.md +++ b/counters/C00139.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00139 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11 diff --git a/counters/C00140.md b/counters/C00140.md index b5039fc..909b835 100644 --- a/counters/C00140.md +++ b/counters/C00140.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Playbook 2: Compromise service and reroute links to benign content or counter me * **Metatechnique**: data pollution -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11 diff --git a/counters/C00141.md b/counters/C00141.md index 082c219..8f01bcc 100644 --- a/counters/C00141.md +++ b/counters/C00141.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: This assumes that this technique is based on visits to an URL shortener or a captured news site that can publish a message of our choice. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction diff --git a/counters/C00142.md b/counters/C00142.md index 75b3bac..8b85635 100644 --- a/counters/C00142.md +++ b/counters/C00142.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00142 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction diff --git a/counters/C00143.md b/counters/C00143.md index 22213e2..de02ca7 100644 --- a/counters/C00143.md +++ b/counters/C00143.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00143 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: targeting diff --git a/counters/C00144.md b/counters/C00144.md index 48343ca..08b4790 100644 --- a/counters/C00144.md +++ b/counters/C00144.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00144 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: reduce resources -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11 diff --git a/counters/C00145.md b/counters/C00145.md index 079f4f4..8736dc5 100644 --- a/counters/C00145.md +++ b/counters/C00145.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00145 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: data pollution -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11 diff --git a/counters/C00147.md b/counters/C00147.md index be05aa4..729108c 100644 --- a/counters/C00147.md +++ b/counters/C00147.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00147 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction diff --git a/counters/C00149.md b/counters/C00149.md index f0f915f..9976b02 100644 --- a/counters/C00149.md +++ b/counters/C00149.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id**: C00149 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: * **Playbooks**: Playbook 1: Distort TA demographics by posting irrelevant content, misleading demogaphic data, etc. Playbook 2: Work with the media platform to distort publicly available metrics. Can we work with Twitter to get crappy off-brand memes artificially bumped without needing to create fake accounts, etc.? @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Playbook 5: Distort TA emotional response to content/narratives. * **Metatechnique**: data pollution -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA12 diff --git a/counters/C00150.md b/counters/C00150.md index dad5a0e..4cbdca2 100644 --- a/counters/C00150.md +++ b/counters/C00150.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Identify social media accounts as sources of propaganda—“calling them out”— might be helpful to prevent the spread of their message to audiences that otherwise would consider them factual -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03 diff --git a/counters/C00151.md b/counters/C00151.md index 2f95fb6..a36c227 100644 --- a/counters/C00151.md +++ b/counters/C00151.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Use leadership in the arts, entertainment, and media to highlight and build on fundamental tenets of democracy. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09 diff --git a/counters/C00152.md b/counters/C00152.md index 208e8ac..afd590b 100644 --- a/counters/C00152.md +++ b/counters/C00152.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: USAID has been restructuring its programs to address predatory Chinese development projects and the information operations that support them. USAID’s new strategy has tailored programs to counter Chinese educational exchange programs and to support free and fair elections, youth empowerment, democratic governance, and free press. USAID’s Russia regional teams have also been compiling a strategy for Russia’s information operations. One strong point of USAID’s programming is a system of indicators and measurements for a country’s vulnerability to foreign influence and information operations -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04 diff --git a/counters/C00153.md b/counters/C00153.md index d01f7ad..bae0fcc 100644 --- a/counters/C00153.md +++ b/counters/C00153.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Align offensive cyber action with information operations and counter disinformation approaches, where appropriate. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: targeting diff --git a/counters/C00154.md b/counters/C00154.md index 1ad89cc..dd24c70 100644 --- a/counters/C00154.md +++ b/counters/C00154.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00154 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal diff --git a/counters/C00155.md b/counters/C00155.md index 649d109..cfc0478 100644 --- a/counters/C00155.md +++ b/counters/C00155.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00155 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal diff --git a/counters/C00156.md b/counters/C00156.md index c5e6f17..1c75a89 100644 --- a/counters/C00156.md +++ b/counters/C00156.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Civil engagement activities conducted on the part of EFP forces. In Latvia, for example, U.S. soldiers have reportedly conducted numerous civil engagements with the local populations. In one example, soldiers cut firewood for local Russian-speaking Latvians. Locals were reportedly overheard saying, “A Russian soldier wouldn’t do that.” NATO should likewise provide support and training, where needed, to local public affairs and other communication personnel. Local government and military public affairs personnel can play their part in creating and disseminating entertaining and sharable content that supports the EFP mission. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: countermessaging diff --git a/counters/C00157.md b/counters/C00157.md index db99a15..1531000 100644 --- a/counters/C00157.md +++ b/counters/C00157.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: countermessaging -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04 diff --git a/counters/C00158.md b/counters/C00158.md index ae908f6..05ed977 100644 --- a/counters/C00158.md +++ b/counters/C00158.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: NGO Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, with some international funding, provides training to journalists in the Baltics and conducts media literacy training in the region. In addition to helping journalists avoid becoming “unwitting multipliers of misleading information,” the organization works with school teachers in the region to help them “decode media and incorporate media research into teaching.” concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience diff --git a/counters/C00159.md b/counters/C00159.md index d9df211..f50f7ed 100644 --- a/counters/C00159.md +++ b/counters/C00159.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: A campaign plan for the gray zone must account for U.S. vulnerabilities and strengths and must take care not to over-rely on any one tool of statecraft or line of effort. If the United States is to engage seriously in gray zone competition, it will need to identify and employ a broad spectrum of its national power to deter, compete, and counter (where necessary) other countries’ approaches. It is therefore critical that the United States understands its own capabilities, the capabilities of its adversaries, and international standards of conduct to compete in, shrink the size, and ultimately deter use of the gray zone. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: metatechnique -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00160.md b/counters/C00160.md index 1552b58..44e8c13 100644 --- a/counters/C00160.md +++ b/counters/C00160.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Identify key influencers (e.g. use network analysis), then reach out to identified users and offer support, through either training or resources. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience diff --git a/counters/C00161.md b/counters/C00161.md index 5888928..e9bd7eb 100644 --- a/counters/C00161.md +++ b/counters/C00161.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Advance coalitions across borders and sectors, spanning public and private, as well as foreign and domestic, divides. Improve mechanisms to collaborate, share information, and develop coordinated approaches with the private sector at home and allies and partners abroad. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: metatechnique -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00162.md b/counters/C00162.md index da8cbd5..ab5ecf2 100644 --- a/counters/C00162.md +++ b/counters/C00162.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Kremlin’s narrative spin extends through constellations of “civil society” organizations, political parties, churches, and other actors. Moscow leverages think tanks, human rights groups, election observers, Eurasianist integration groups, and orthodox groups. A collection of Russian civil society organizations, such as the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, together receive at least US$100 million per year, in addition to government-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), at least 150 of which are funded by Russian presidential grants totaling US$70 million per year. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: targeting -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04 diff --git a/counters/C00164.md b/counters/C00164.md index 3a9181a..2bfad6c 100644 --- a/counters/C00164.md +++ b/counters/C00164.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: protect the interests of this population and, more importantly, influence the population to support pro-Russia causes and effectively influence the politics of its neighbors -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: targeting -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03 diff --git a/counters/C00165.md b/counters/C00165.md index 08786f6..ca23a91 100644 --- a/counters/C00165.md +++ b/counters/C00165.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: e.g. for leaked legal documents, use court motions to limit future discovery actions -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00167.md b/counters/C00167.md index b331f34..6f1a32c 100644 --- a/counters/C00167.md +++ b/counters/C00167.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Promote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess U.S. messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacy -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: countermessaging -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00169.md b/counters/C00169.md index 30c630f..e0c8b0c 100644 --- a/counters/C00169.md +++ b/counters/C00169.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: international donors will donate to a basket fund that will pay a committee of local experts who will, in turn, manage and distribute the money to Russian-language producers and broadcasters that pitch various projects. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: countermessaging -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09 diff --git a/counters/C00170.md b/counters/C00170.md index 733951e..5ed7bde 100644 --- a/counters/C00170.md +++ b/counters/C00170.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Shift from reactive to proactive response, with priority on sharing relevant information with the public and mobilizing private-sector engagement. Recent advances in data-driven technologies have elevated information as a source of power to influence the political and economic environment, to foster economic growth, to enable a decision-making advantage over competitors, and to communicate securely and quickly. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: metatechnique -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03 diff --git a/counters/C00171.md b/counters/C00171.md index ad11e9a..657d9f7 100644 --- a/counters/C00171.md +++ b/counters/C00171.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: e.g. facebook or Twitter content take-downs -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal diff --git a/counters/C00172.md b/counters/C00172.md index 71f891f..75f16f0 100644 --- a/counters/C00172.md +++ b/counters/C00172.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: e.g. facebook page removal -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal diff --git a/counters/C00174.md b/counters/C00174.md index 893bf97..a212175 100644 --- a/counters/C00174.md +++ b/counters/C00174.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ * **Metatechnique**: metatechnique -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04 diff --git a/counters/C00176.md b/counters/C00176.md index 44a465f..22d5b3a 100644 --- a/counters/C00176.md +++ b/counters/C00176.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: gray zone challenges are increasingly multidisciplinary, there are few organizations within the U.S. national security structure that are equipped with the broad-spectrum capability to effectively counter Russian and Chinese gray zone tactics in real-time. Furthermore, institutional hurdles currently impede diverse subject matter experts, hailing from outside of the traditional national security and foreign policy disciplines (e.g., physical science, engineering, media, legal, and economics fields), from contributing to the direct development of national security countermeasures to emerging gray zone threat vectors. Driving key lines of interagency alignment through a Gray Zone Action Group (GZAG), akin to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), in areas such as: Strategic narrative in coordination with DHS, DoS, DoD, Intelligence Community (IC), and other implementing agencies. Particular focus on the nexus of cyber and information operations; -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: metatechnique -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01 diff --git a/counters/C00178.md b/counters/C00178.md index 8d6f8fb..0f6e91d 100644 --- a/counters/C00178.md +++ b/counters/C00178.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: e.g. increase Russian-language programming. The Economist notes, in May, Current Time videos were viewed 40 million times online (“America’s Answer to Russian Propaganda TV,” 2017). It would certainly be a positive development if Current Time could draw viewers away from Russian TV programming of RT and Sputnik. One effort that might assist in this regard is expanding programming to include more conventional entertainment programming -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: dilution -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09 diff --git a/counters/C00179.md b/counters/C00179.md index 1c7e0cc..430925a 100644 --- a/counters/C00179.md +++ b/counters/C00179.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Impact of and Dealing with Trolls - "Chatham House has observed that trolls also sometimes function as decoys, as a way of “keeping the infantry busy” that “aims to wear down the other side” (Lough et al., 2014). Another type of troll involves “false accounts posing as authoritative information sources on social media," -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03 diff --git a/counters/C00182.md b/counters/C00182.md index e4c173f..6d1a67a 100644 --- a/counters/C00182.md +++ b/counters/C00182.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: (2015) Trustwave reported that a Bedep Trojan malware kit had begun infecting machines and forcing them to browse certain sites, artificially inflating traffic to a set of pro-Russia -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal diff --git a/counters/C00184.md b/counters/C00184.md index 141ed5c..7add2c3 100644 --- a/counters/C00184.md +++ b/counters/C00184.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00184 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09 diff --git a/counters/C00188.md b/counters/C00188.md index c6bbff3..7691214 100644 --- a/counters/C00188.md +++ b/counters/C00188.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: August 2014, Russian news agency Rossiya Segodnya commissioned a poll in France with poorly worded questions and a statistically insignificant subsample that RT used to back a story titled “15% of French people back ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] militants, poll finds.” The story and summary infographic circulated on the internet, initially appearing primarily on French sites. After a week, the generally respectable digital U.S. news outlet Vox ran the story, now titled “One in Six French People Say They Support ISIS.” Although this effect has now worn off or been overwritten, for a time—despite a later story from The Washington Post debunking the claim—typing “ISIS France” into Google resulted in an autosuggestion of “ISIS France support” (Borthwick, 2015). -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience diff --git a/counters/C00189.md b/counters/C00189.md index a0100b6..35b3129 100644 --- a/counters/C00189.md +++ b/counters/C00189.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Confirm whether platforms are actively removing flagged accounts, and raise pressure via e.g. government organizations to encourage removal -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03 diff --git a/counters/C00190.md b/counters/C00190.md index 1d3c6fb..5d1c44d 100644 --- a/counters/C00190.md +++ b/counters/C00190.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: U.S. government should also open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. It should seek to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by U.S. competitors. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience diff --git a/counters/C00194.md b/counters/C00194.md index a6c4a17..f8542cc 100644 --- a/counters/C00194.md +++ b/counters/C00194.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: To effectively compete, others argue, is to develop content that can displace the pro-Russia narrative. given the importance of affecting the entire media environment, we should note that these recommendations for alternative content span both new and old media alike. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: diversion -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09 diff --git a/counters/C00195.md b/counters/C00195.md index ce96b54..dd4bc28 100644 --- a/counters/C00195.md +++ b/counters/C00195.md @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ * **Summary**: Use Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or Russian propaganda themes. Taking advantage of the technology behind Google AdWords, this method identifies potential ISIS recruits through their Google searches and exposes them to curated YouTube videos debunking ISIS recruiting themes. Apply this method to Russian propaganda. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: diversion -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07 diff --git a/counters/C00196.md b/counters/C00196.md index 596fcbe..eab3800 100644 --- a/counters/C00196.md +++ b/counters/C00196.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: The European Union created significant new regulations in 2018; the U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: metatechnique diff --git a/counters/C00197.md b/counters/C00197.md index 242d0cd..49c4b2b 100644 --- a/counters/C00197.md +++ b/counters/C00197.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00197 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03 diff --git a/counters/C00200.md b/counters/C00200.md index 57364a6..81d3db3 100644 --- a/counters/C00200.md +++ b/counters/C00200.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Has been done in e.g. India -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: countermessaging diff --git a/counters/C00202.md b/counters/C00202.md index 8ff2f47..93dd38d 100644 --- a/counters/C00202.md +++ b/counters/C00202.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00202 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: diversion -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00203.md b/counters/C00203.md index 8beb88b..8baf30d 100644 --- a/counters/C00203.md +++ b/counters/C00203.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00203 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: friction diff --git a/counters/C00204.md b/counters/C00204.md index 44a26a8..6703215 100644 --- a/counters/C00204.md +++ b/counters/C00204.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Improve effectiveness of local media outlets. Using eastern Latvia media outlets as an example, one expert noted that the media outlets are “very weak,” are often politically affiliated, or have “little local oligarchs that control them.” -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience diff --git a/counters/C00205.md b/counters/C00205.md index c5dac69..2e37685 100644 --- a/counters/C00205.md +++ b/counters/C00205.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Increase civic resilience by partnering with business community to combat gray zone threats and ensuring adequate reporting and enforcement mechanisms. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: metatechnique diff --git a/counters/C00207.md b/counters/C00207.md index f91bcef..6d88be4 100644 --- a/counters/C00207.md +++ b/counters/C00207.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: As used by Saudis? -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: targeting diff --git a/counters/C00210.md b/counters/C00210.md index 1cf5689..402aee9 100644 --- a/counters/C00210.md +++ b/counters/C00210.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00210 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters/C00211.md b/counters/C00211.md index 8baa15e..812c07b 100644 --- a/counters/C00211.md +++ b/counters/C00211.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00211 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: countermessaging -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09 diff --git a/counters/C00212.md b/counters/C00212.md index bb101fc..98be2d6 100644 --- a/counters/C00212.md +++ b/counters/C00212.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Increase public service experience, and support wider civics and history education. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: resilience diff --git a/counters/C00214.md b/counters/C00214.md index 2394297..aab2cba 100644 --- a/counters/C00214.md +++ b/counters/C00214.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: German model: facebook forced to police content by law. -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: metatechnique diff --git a/counters/C00215.md b/counters/C00215.md index 1676344..b682b55 100644 --- a/counters/C00215.md +++ b/counters/C00215.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00215 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: metatechnique diff --git a/counters/C00216.md b/counters/C00216.md index b57dfd3..b1681d9 100644 --- a/counters/C00216.md +++ b/counters/C00216.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00216 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: reduce resources diff --git a/counters/C00217.md b/counters/C00217.md index 97fc9d8..fcc9430 100644 --- a/counters/C00217.md +++ b/counters/C00217.md @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ * **Id**: C00217 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: daylight diff --git a/counters/C00218.md b/counters/C00218.md index 5fd7b5c..701d336 100644 --- a/counters/C00218.md +++ b/counters/C00218.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ * **Summary**: Alter and/or block the publication/dissemination of adversary controlled information -* **Playbooks**: nan +* **Playbooks**: * **Metatechnique**: removal diff --git a/counters/C00219.md b/counters/C00219.md index 3c140ca..feb2cd2 100644 --- a/counters/C00219.md +++ b/counters/C00219.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id**: C00219 -* **Summary**: nan +* **Summary**: * **Playbooks**: Add date and source to images * **Metatechnique**: daylight -* **Resources needed:** nan +* **Resources needed:** * **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06 diff --git a/counters_index.md b/counters_index.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac44a89 --- /dev/null +++ b/counters_index.md @@ -0,0 +1,1517 @@ +# AMITT Counters: + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
idnamesummarymetatechniquetacticresponsetype
C00001Better models of info spread up the layersmetatechniqueTA01 Strategic PlanningALL
C00003How can we safeguard against extremists using the tools that we will produce?metatechniqueTA01 Strategic PlanningALL
C00004Managing like a chronic diseasemetatechniqueTA01 Strategic PlanningALL
C00005Policy: makers, terminology, elements: a) broad, b) specificmetatechniqueTA01 Strategic PlanningALL
C00006Charge for social mediaNo corresponding AMITT technique. frictionTA01 Strategic PlanningD2 Deny
C00007Create framework for BetterBusinessBureau (BBB) for news mediaNo corresponding AMITT technique.scoringTA01 Strategic PlanningD2 Deny
C00008Create shared fact-checking databaseSnopes is best-known examplescoringTA01 Strategic PlanningD2 Deny
C00009Educate high profile influencers on best practicesresilienceTA01 Strategic PlanningD2 Deny
C00010Enhanced privacy regulation for social mediaNo corresponding AMITT technique. frictionTA01 Strategic PlanningD2 Deny
C00011Media literacy. Games to identify fake newsresilienceTA01 Strategic PlanningD2 Deny
C00012Platform regulationmetatechniqueTA01 Strategic PlanningD2 Deny
C00013Rating framework for news - full transcripts, link source, add items, BBB for newsTechnique should be in terms of "strategic innoculation", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news. No corresponding AMITT technique. scoringTA01 Strategic PlanningD2 Deny
C00014Real-time updates to fact-checking databaseexisting examples at Buzzfeed and Fema, especially during disastersscoringTA01 Strategic PlanningD2 Deny
C00015Reputation scores for social media usersscoringTA01 Strategic PlanningD2 Deny
C00016Social media as a privilege not rightcleaningTA01 Strategic PlanningD2 Deny
C00017Media campaign promoting in-group to out-group in person communication / activitiesTechnique could be in terms of forcing a reality-check by talking to people instead of reading about bogeymen. No corresponding AMITT technique. countermessagingTA01 Strategic PlanningD3 Disrupt
C00018Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablersDuplicate of "Promote playbooks to call out dividers"daylightTA01 Strategic PlanningD3 Disrupt
C00019Promote playbooks to call out division-enablersDuplicate of "Promote constructive communication by shaming dividers"daylightTA01 Strategic PlanningD3 Disrupt
C00020Deligitimise the 24 hour news cycleUnsurefrictionTA01 Strategic PlanningD4 Degrade
C00021Encourage in-person communicationresilienceTA01 Strategic PlanningD4 Degrade
C00022Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety - to counter ability and fear based attacksUnsureresilienceTA01 Strategic PlanningD4 Degrade
C00023Promote civility as an identity that people will defendresilienceTA01 Strategic PlanningD4 Degrade
C00024Promote constructive narratives i.e. not polarising. Pro-life, pro-choice, or pro-USA?resilienceTA01 Strategic PlanningD4 Degrade
C00025Promote identity neutral narrativescountermessagingTA01 Strategic PlanningD4 Degrade
C00026Shore up democracy based messages (peace, freedom) - make it sexyUnsurecountermessagingTA01 Strategic PlanningD4 Degrade
C00027Create culture of civilityresilienceTA01 Strategic PlanningD7 Deter
C00028Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post commentsUse blockchain technology to require collaborative validation before posts or comments are submitted. + +This could be used to adjust upvote weight via a trust factor of people and organisations you trust, or other criteria.verificationTA02 Objective PlanningD3 Disrupt
C00029Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandisediversionTA02 Objective PlanningD3 Disrupt
C00030Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)diversionTA02 Objective PlanningD3 Disrupt
C00031Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplifyCreate competing narratives. Included "Facilitate State Propaganda" as diluting the narrative could have an effect on the pro-state narrative used by volunteers, or lower their involvement.dilutionTA02 Objective PlanningD3 Disrupt
C00032Hijack content and link to truth- based info (platform) diversionTA02 Objective PlanningD3 Disrupt
C00033Build cultural resistance to false contentCultural resistance to bullshitresilienceTA03 Develop PeopleD2 Deny
C00034Create more friction at account creationCounters fake accountfrictionTA03 Develop PeopleD2 Deny
C00035FrictionfrictionTA03 Develop PeopleD2 Deny
C00036Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide)All of these would be highly affected by infiltration or false-claims of infiltration.targetingTA03 Develop PeopleD2 Deny
C00039Standard reporting for false profilesDeplatform. Reporting fake profiles is the only solution (identity issues). Only resolutionremovalTA03 Develop PeopleD2 Deny
C00040third party verification for peoplecounters fake expertsverificationTA03 Develop PeopleD2 Deny
C00042Address truth contained in narrativescountermessagingTA03 Develop PeopleD3 Disrupt
C00043Detect hijacked accounts and reallocate them cleaningTA03 Develop PeopleD3 Disrupt
C00044Keep people from posting to social media immediatelyMy interpretation is that this is method would be used to slow down activities or force a small delay between posts or replies to new posts.frictionTA03 Develop PeopleD3 Disrupt
C00045S4d detection and re-allocation approachesWhat's S4D?frictionTA03 Develop PeopleD3 Disrupt
C00046Marginalise and discredit extremistDuplicate of "Name and Shame" - recommend removal. No, not quite. targetingTA03 Develop PeopleD4 Degrade
C00047Coordinated inauthenticsdata pollutionTA03 Develop PeopleD5 Deceive
C00048Name and ShamedaylightTA03 Develop PeopleD7 Deter
C00049Influence literacy trainingInoculate against "cult" recruitingresilienceTA04 Develop NetworksD2 Deny
C00050Anti-elicitation trainingresilienceTA04 Develop NetworksD2 Deny
C00051Phishing prevention education etcresilienceTA04 Develop NetworksD2 Deny
C00052Infiltrate platformsDetect and degradetargetingTA04 Develop NetworksD4 Degrade
C00053Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accountscleaningTA04 Develop NetworksD4 Degrade
C00054Media literacy training. Leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Covers detect, deny and degrade.resilienceTA04 Develop NetworksD4 Degrade
C00055Empower existing regulators to govern social mediaAlso covers Destroy. metatechniqueTA04 Develop NetworksD2 Deny
C00056Get off social mediafrictionTA04 Develop NetworksD2 Deny
C00057Privacy standardsscoringTA04 Develop NetworksD2 Deny
C00058Report crowdfunder as violatorcounters crowdfundingremovalTA04 Develop NetworksD2 Deny
C00059Verification of project before posting (counters funding campaigns)verificationTA04 Develop NetworksD2 Deny
C00060Enhanced legal enforcement against for-profit follower/engagement factoriestargetingTA04 Develop NetworksD3 Disrupt
C00061Innoculating at languageresilienceTA04 Develop NetworksD3 Disrupt
C00062Free open library sources worldwideOpen-source libraries could be created that aid in some way for each technique. Even for Strategic Planning, some open-source frameworks such as AMITT can be created to counter the adversarial efforts.countermessagingTA04 Develop NetworksD6 Destroy
C00063Ban political microtargetingremovalTA05 MicrotargetingD2 Deny
C00065Ban political adsremovalTA05 MicrotargetingD3 Disrupt
C00066Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back)dilutionTA05 MicrotargetingD3 Disrupt
C00067Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding)targetingTA05 MicrotargetingD3 Disrupt
C00068Expose online funding as fakedaylightTA05 MicrotargetingD3 Disrupt
C00069Mark clickbait visuallydaylightTA05 MicrotargetingD3 Disrupt
C00070Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker.TA02*: DDOS at the critical time (ie. midterm-2018 elections DDOS against troll farms) to deny an adversary's time-bound objective. + +T0008: A quick response to a proto-viral story will affect it's ability to spread and raise questions about their legitimacy. + +Hashtag: Against the platform, by drowning the hashtag. + +T0046 - Search Engine Optimization: Sub-optimal website performance affect its search engine rank, which I interpret as "blocking access to a platform".removalTA06 Develop ContentD2 Deny
C00071Block source of pollutionremovalTA06 Develop ContentD2 Deny
C00072Content censorship in non-relevant domains e.g. Pinterest antivaxremovalTA06 Develop ContentD2 Deny
C00073Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollutionStrategic planning included as innoculating population has strategic value. Example is the "Learn to Discern" Program, funded by the Canadian government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016. The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in ‘’safe, informed media consumption techniques,’’ including avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech, verifying expert credentials, detecting censorship, and debunking news, photos, and videos."resilienceTA06 Develop ContentD2 Deny
C00074Identify identical content and mass deplatform +cleaningTA06 Develop ContentD2 Deny
C00075normalise languagecountermessagingTA06 Develop ContentD2 Deny
C00076Prohibit images in political discourse channelsremovalTA06 Develop ContentD2 Deny
C00077Active defence: replay "develop people"targetingTA06 Develop ContentD3 Disrupt
C00078Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content. More specifically, change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremistsNote: Suggest a more generic technique since this applies to non-image content and to non-hate groups.diversionTA06 Develop ContentD3 Disrupt
C00079Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite sidediversionTA06 Develop ContentD3 Disrupt
C00080Create competing narrativediversionTA06 Develop ContentD3 Disrupt
C00081Discredit by pointing out the "noise" and informing public that "flooding" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of "noise"daylightTA06 Develop ContentD3 Disrupt
C00082Ground truthing as automated response to pollutioncountermessagingTA06 Develop ContentD3 Disrupt
C00084Steal their truthsTry technique T0003. diversionTA06 Develop ContentD3 Disrupt
C00085Demuting contentUnsure. My interpretation is that disinformation campaigns can be disrupted by archiving their contents online, for intelligence analysis and public transparency. + +In some phases, contents would be archives of websites, social media profiles, media and copies of published advertisements. + +In others, content would be archives of comments attributed to bad actors, as well as anonymized metadata about users who interacted with them and analysis of the effect. + +Having these tagged and shamed for as associated by bad actors would be beneficial for public vigilance.daylightTA06 Develop ContentD4 Degrade
C00086Distract from noise with addictive contentExample: Interject addictive links or contents into discussions of disinformation materials and measure a "conversion rate" of users who engage with your content and away from the social media channel's "information bubble" around the disinformation item. Use bots to amplify and upvote the addictive content. + +Note: This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted comments are all jokes, preventing serious discussion from being discovered by those who filter by upvotes.diversionTA06 Develop ContentD4 Degrade
C00087Make more noiseRecommend Removal: I see "Make More Noise" as similar to "Do everything in AMITT, better than the adversary". It is not a counter in itself but rather an adversarial attack tool that can be used for blue team narratives.dilutionTA06 Develop ContentD4 Degrade
C00088Poison pill recasting of messageUnsure how to interpret. The techniques listed all involve some amount of promotion which could be manipulated. For example, online fundings or rallies could be advertised, through compromised or fake channels, as being associated with "far-up/down/left/right" actors. "Long Game" narratives could be subjected in a similar way with negative connotations.diversionTA06 Develop ContentD4 Degrade
C00089Throttle number of forwardsfrictionTA06 Develop ContentD4 Degrade
C00090Fake engagement systemdiversionTA06 Develop ContentD5 Deceive
C00091Honeypot social communitydiversionTA06 Develop ContentD5 Deceive
C00092Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followersscoringTA06 Develop ContentD7 Deter
C00093Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followersresilienceTA06 Develop ContentD7 Deter
C00094Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of researchdaylightTA06 Develop ContentD7 Deter
C00095Keep scorescoringTA06 Develop ContentD7 Deter
C00096Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellersscoringTA06 Develop ContentD7 Deter
C00097Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or commentfrictionTA07 Channel SelectionD2 Deny
C00098Revocation of "verified"frictionTA07 Channel SelectionD2 Deny
C00099Strengthen verification methodsfrictionTA07 Channel SelectionD2 Deny
C00100Hashtag jackingdiversionTA07 Channel SelectionD3 Disrupt
C00101Create participant frictionfrictionTA07 Channel SelectionD4 Degrade
C00102Make repeat voting harderfrictionTA07 Channel SelectionD4 Degrade
C00103Create a bot that engages / distract trollsUse T00030 backstop personasdiversionTA07 Channel SelectionD5 Deceive
C00105Buy more advertising than the adversary to shift influence and algorithmsdilutionTA07 Channel SelectionD3 Disrupt
C00106Click-bait centrist contentCreate emotive centrist content that gets more clicksdiversionTA07 Channel SelectionD3 Disrupt
C00107Content moderationscoringTA07 Channel SelectionD2 Deny
C00109De-escalationresilienceTA07 Channel SelectionD3 Disrupt
C00110Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist contentfrictionTA07 Channel SelectionD2 Deny
C00111Present sympathetic views of opposite sideresilienceTA07 Channel SelectionD4 Degrade
C00112"Prove they are not an op!"This applies to the entirety of the matrix as I read this as "create awareness around the use of all of these techniques"frictionTA08 Pump PrimingD2 Deny
C00113Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials. Attack audience quality of fake expertdaylightTA08 Pump PrimingD2 Deny
C00114Don't engage with payloadsfrictionTA08 Pump PrimingD2 Deny
C00115Expose actor and intentionsdaylightTA08 Pump PrimingD2 Deny
C00116Provide proof of involvementdaylightTA08 Pump PrimingD2 Deny
C00117Downgrade de-amplify label promote counter to disinformationcountermessagingTA08 Pump PrimingD4 Degrade
C00118Repurpose images with new textcountermessagingTA08 Pump PrimingD4 Degrade
C00119Engage payload and debunk. Provide link to facts. Might be okay. countermessagingTA08 Pump PrimingD7 Deter
C00120Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomesmetatechniqueTA08 Pump PrimingD7 Deter
C00121Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. resilienceTA08 Pump PrimingD7 Deter
C00122Content moderation. Censorship?frictionTA09 ExposureD2 Deny
C00123Bot controlfrictionTA09 ExposureD3 Disrupt
C00124Don't feed the trollsfrictionTA09 ExposureD3 Disrupt
C00125Prepare the population with pre-announcementsresilienceTA09 ExposureD3 Disrupt
C00126Social media amber alertdaylightTA09 ExposureD3 Disrupt
C00128Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other "decelerants"dilutionTA09 ExposureD3 Disrupt
C00129Use banking to cut off access fiscal sanctions; parallel to counter terrorismreduce resourcesTA10 Go PhysicalD2 Deny
C00130Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously.resilienceTA10 Go PhysicalD7 Deter
C00131Seize and analyse botnet serversremovalTA11 PersistenceD2 Deny
C00133Deplatform Account*Note: Similar to Deplatform People but less generic. Perhaps both should be left.removalTA11 PersistenceD3 Disrupt
C00135Deplatform message groups and/or message boardsMerged two rows here. removalTA11 PersistenceD3 Disrupt
C00136Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessagescountermessagingTA11 PersistenceD3 Disrupt
C00137Pollute the AB-testing data feedsPolluting A/B testing requires knowledge of MOEs and MOPs. A/B testing must be caught early when there is relatively little data available so infiltration of TAs and understanding of how content is migrated from testing to larger audiences is fundamental.data pollutionTA11 PersistenceD3 Disrupt
C00138Spam domestic actors with lawsuitsreduce resourcesTA11 PersistenceD3 Disrupt
C00139Weaponise youtube content matricesfrictionTA11 PersistenceD3 Disrupt
C00140"Bomb" link shorteners with lots of callsApplies to most of the content used by exposure techniques except "T0055 - Use hashtag"data pollutionTA11 PersistenceD4 Degrade
C00141"Hey this story is old" popup when messaging with old URLThis assumes that this technique is based on visits to an URL shortener or a captured news site that can publish a message of our choice.frictionTA11 PersistenceD4 Degrade
C00142"This has been disproved - do you want to forward it"frictionTA11 PersistenceD4 Degrade
C00143(botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group timetargetingTA11 PersistenceD4 Degrade
C00144Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobsreduce resourcesTA11 PersistenceD4 Degrade
C00145Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!)data pollutionTA11 PersistenceD4 Degrade
C00147Make amplification of social media ports expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days)frictionTA12 Measure EffectivenessD3 Disrupt
C00148Add random links to network graphsIf creators are using network analysis to determine how to attack networks, then adding random extra links to those networks might throw that analysis out enough to change attack outcomes. Unsure which AMITT techniques.data pollutionTA12 Measure EffectivenessD4 Degrade
C00149Poison the monitoring & evaluation datadata pollutionTA12 Measure EffectivenessD4 Degrade
C00150“calling them out”Identify social media accounts as sources of propaganda—“calling them out”— might be helpful to prevent the spread of their message to audiences that otherwise would consider them factualdaylightTA03 Develop PeopleD2 Deny
C00151“fight in the light”Use leadership in the arts, entertainment, and media to highlight and build on fundamental tenets of democracy.daylightTA09 ExposureD3 Disrupt
C00152“name and shame”USAID has been restructuring its programs to address predatory Chinese development projects and the information operations that support them. USAID’s new strategy has tailored programs to counter Chinese educational exchange programs and to support free and fair elections, youth empowerment, democratic governance, and free press. USAID’s Russia regional teams have also been compiling a strategy for Russia’s information operations. One strong point of USAID’s programming is a system of indicators and measurements for a country’s vulnerability to foreign influence and information operationsdaylightTA04 Develop NetworksD2 Deny
C00153Use offensive cyber actionAlign offensive cyber action with information operations and counter disinformation approaches, where appropriate.targetingTA01 Strategic PlanningD3 Disrupt
C00154Ask media not to report false informationremovalTA08 Pump PrimingD2 Deny
C00155Ban incident actors from funding sitesremovalTA03 Develop PeopleD2 Deny
C00156Better tell the U.S., NATO, and EU story.Civil engagement activities conducted on the part of EFP forces. In Latvia, for example, U.S. soldiers have reportedly conducted numerous civil engagements with the local populations. In one example, soldiers cut firewood for local Russian-speaking Latvians. Locals were reportedly overheard saying, “A Russian soldier wouldn’t do that.” NATO should likewise provide support and training, where needed, to local public affairs and other communication personnel. Local government and military public affairs personnel can play their part in creating and disseminating entertaining and sharable content that supports the EFP mission. countermessagingTA09 ExposureD3 Disrupt
C00157Build alternative news sourcesCreate alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outletscountermessagingTA04 Develop NetworksD2 Deny
C00158Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations.NGO Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, with some international funding, provides training to journalists in the Baltics and conducts media literacy training in the region. In addition to helping journalists avoid becoming “unwitting multipliers of misleading information,” the organization works with school teachers in the region to help them “decode media and incorporate media research into teaching.” concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based trainingresilienceTA09 ExposureD4 Degrade
C00159Campaign mindset and associated toolboxA campaign plan for the gray zone must account for U.S. vulnerabilities and strengths and must take care not to over-rely on any one tool of statecraft or line of effort. If the United States is to engage seriously in gray zone competition, it will need to identify and employ a broad spectrum of its national power to deter, compete, and counter (where necessary) other countries’ approaches. It is therefore critical that the United States understands its own capabilities, the capabilities of its adversaries, and international standards of conduct to compete in, shrink the size, and ultimately deter use of the gray zone.metatechniqueTA01 Strategic PlanningD3 Disrupt
C00160find and train influencersIdentify key influencers (e.g. use network analysis), then reach out to identified users and offer support, through either training or resources.resilienceTA03 Develop PeopleD2 Deny
C00161Coalition Building and Third-Party Inducements:Advance coalitions across borders and sectors, spanning public and private, as well as foreign and domestic, divides. Improve mechanisms to collaborate, share information, and develop coordinated approaches with the private sector at home and allies and partners abroad.metatechniqueTA01 Strategic PlanningD7 Deter
C00162collect data/map constellations of Russian“civil society”. Unravel/target the Potemkin villagesKremlin’s narrative spin extends through constellations of “civil society” organizations, political parties, churches, and other actors. Moscow leverages think tanks, human rights groups, election observers, Eurasianist integration groups, and orthodox groups. A collection of Russian civil society organizations, such as the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, together receive at least US$100 million per year, in addition to government-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), at least 150 of which are funded by Russian presidential grants totaling US$70 million per year.targetingTA04 Develop NetworksD3 Disrupt
C00164compatriot policyprotect the interests of this population and, more importantly, influence the population to support pro-Russia causes and effectively influence the politics of its neighborstargetingTA03 Develop PeopleD3 Disrupt
C00165Limit access to alterable documentse.g. for leaked legal documents, use court motions to limit future discovery actionsfrictionTA06 Develop ContentD2 Deny
C00167Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of StatecraftPromote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess U.S. messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacycountermessagingTA06 Develop ContentD2 Deny
C00169develop a creative content hubinternational donors will donate to a basket fund that will pay a committee of local experts who will, in turn, manage and distribute the money to Russian-language producers and broadcasters that pitch various projects.countermessagingTA09 ExposureD3 Disrupt
C00170elevate information as a critical domain of statecraftShift from reactive to proactive response, with priority on sharing relevant information with the public and mobilizing private-sector engagement. Recent advances in data-driven technologies have elevated information as a source of power to influence the political and economic environment, to foster economic growth, to enable a decision-making advantage over competitors, and to communicate securely and quickly.metatechniqueTA03 Develop PeopleD3 Disrupt
C00171social media content take-downse.g. facebook or Twitter content take-downsremovalTA06 Develop ContentD2 Deny
C00172social media page removale.g. facebook page removalremovalTA06 Develop ContentD2 Deny
C00174Free and Fair PressCreate bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom. metatechniqueTA04 Develop NetworksD2 Deny
C00176Improve Coordination with and feedback from the U.S. private sectorgray zone challenges are increasingly multidisciplinary, there are few organizations within the U.S. national security structure that are equipped with the broad-spectrum capability to effectively counter Russian and Chinese gray zone tactics in real-time. Furthermore, institutional hurdles currently impede diverse subject matter experts, hailing from outside of the traditional national security and foreign policy disciplines (e.g., physical science, engineering, media, legal, and economics fields), from contributing to the direct development of national security countermeasures to emerging gray zone threat vectors. Driving key lines of interagency alignment through a Gray Zone Action Group (GZAG), akin to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), in areas such as: Strategic narrative in coordination with DHS, DoS, DoD, Intelligence Community (IC), and other implementing agencies. Particular focus on the nexus of cyber and information operations;metatechniqueTA01 Strategic PlanningD7 Deter
C00178Fill information voids with non-disinformation contente.g. increase Russian-language programming. The Economist notes, in May, Current Time videos were viewed 40 million times online (“America’s Answer to Russian Propaganda TV,” 2017). It would certainly be a positive development if Current Time could draw viewers away from Russian TV programming of RT and Sputnik. One effort that might assist in this regard is expanding programming to include more conventional entertainment programmingdilutionTA09 ExposureD3 Disrupt
C00179Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target Russia-based nonattributed social media accounts Impact of and Dealing with Trolls - "Chatham House has observed that trolls also sometimes function as decoys, as a way of “keeping the infantry busy” that “aims to wear down the other side” (Lough et al., 2014). Another type of troll involves “false accounts posing as authoritative information sources on social media,"removalTA03 Develop PeopleD3 Disrupt
C00182malware detection/quarantine/deletion(2015) Trustwave reported that a Bedep Trojan malware kit had begun infecting machines and forcing them to browse certain sites, artificially inflating traffic to a set of pro-RussiaremovalTA09 ExposureD2 Deny
C00184Media exposuredaylightTA09 ExposureD4 Degrade
C00188Newsroom/Journalist training to counter SEO influenceAugust 2014, Russian news agency Rossiya Segodnya commissioned a poll in France with poorly worded questions and a statistically insignificant subsample that RT used to back a story titled “15% of French people back ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] militants, poll finds.” The story and summary infographic circulated on the internet, initially appearing primarily on French sites. After a week, the generally respectable digital U.S. news outlet Vox ran the story, now titled “One in Six French People Say They Support ISIS.” Although this effect has now worn off or been overwritten, for a time—despite a later story from The Washington Post debunking the claim—typing “ISIS France” into Google resulted in an autosuggestion of “ISIS France support” (Borthwick, 2015).resilienceTA08 Pump PrimingD3 Disrupt
C00189Ongoing analysis/monitoring of "flagged" profilesConfirm whether platforms are actively removing flagged accounts, and raise pressure via e.g. government organizations to encourage removaldaylightTA03 Develop PeopleD6 Destroy
C00190open engagement with civil societyU.S. government should also open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. It should seek to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by U.S. competitors.resilienceTA09 ExposureD3 Disrupt
C00193promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”journalism training “would be helpful, especially for the online communityresilienceTA08 Pump PrimingD3 Disrupt
C00194Provide an alternative to Russian information by expanding and improving local content.To effectively compete, others argue, is to develop content that can displace the pro-Russia narrative. given the importance of affecting the entire media environment, we should note that these recommendations for alternative content span both new and old media alike.diversionTA09 ExposureD3 Disrupt
C00195Redirect MethodUse Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or Russian propaganda themes. Taking advantage of the technology behind Google AdWords, this method identifies potential ISIS recruits through their Google searches and exposes them to curated YouTube videos debunking ISIS recruiting themes. Apply this method to Russian propaganda.diversionTA07 Channel SelectionD2 Deny
C00196Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for mediaThe European Union created significant new regulations in 2018; the U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliancemetatechniqueTA07 Channel SelectionD3 Disrupt
C00197remove suspicious facebook accountsremovalTA03 Develop PeopleD2 Deny
C00200Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfoHas been done in e.g. IndiacountermessagingTA09 ExposureD3 Disrupt
C00202Set data 'honeytraps'diversionTA06 Develop ContentD2 Deny
C00203Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outletsfrictionTA08 Pump PrimingD3 Disrupt
C00204Strengthen local mediaImprove effectiveness of local media outlets. Using eastern Latvia media outlets as an example, one expert noted that the media outlets are “very weak,” are often politically affiliated, or have “little local oligarchs that control them.”resilienceTA08 Pump PrimingD2 Deny
C00205strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reportingIncrease civic resilience by partnering with business community to combat gray zone threats and ensuring adequate reporting and enforcement mechanisms. metatechniqueTA01 Strategic PlanningD3 Disrupt
C00207tit-for-tat campaignAs used by Saudis? targetingTA01 Strategic PlanningD7 Deter
C00210Use encrypted apps for confidential communicationresilienceTA06 Develop ContentD2 Deny
C00211Use humorous counter-narrativescountermessagingTA09 ExposureD3 Disrupt
C00212build public resilence by making civil society more vibrantIncrease public service experience, and support wider civics and history education.resilienceTA09 ExposureD3 Disrupt
C00214Create policy that makes social media police disinformationGerman model: facebook forced to police content by law.metatechniqueTA07 Channel SelectionD3 Disrupt
C00215Use fraud legislation to clean up social mediametatechniqueTA07 Channel SelectionD3 Disrupt
C00216Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actorsreduce resourcesTA05 MicrotargetingD2 Deny
C00217Registries alert when large batches of newsy URLs get registered togetherdaylightTA07 Channel SelectionD2 Deny
C00218CensorshipAlter and/or block the publication/dissemination of adversary controlled informationremovalTA09 ExposureD2 Deny
C00219Add metadata to content - out of the control of the adversarydaylightTA06 Develop ContentD3 Disrupt
diff --git a/detections_index.md b/detections_index.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..63af51d --- /dev/null +++ b/detections_index.md @@ -0,0 +1,754 @@ +# AMITT Detections: + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
idnamesummarymetatechniquetacticresponsetype
F00001Analyse aborted / failed campaignsTA01 Strategic PlanningD1 Detect
F00002Analyse viral fizzleTA01 Strategic PlanningD1 Detect
F00003Exploit counter-intelligence vs bad actorsTA01 Strategic PlanningD1 Detect
F00004Recruit like-minded converts "people who used to be in-group" TA01 Strategic PlanningD1 Detect
F00005SWOT Analysis of Cognition in Various GroupsTA01 Strategic PlanningD1 Detect
F00006SWOT analysis of tech platformsTA01 Strategic PlanningD1 Detect
F00007Monitor account level activity in social networksTA02 Objective PlanningD1 Detect
F00008Detect abnormal amplificationTA03 Develop PeopleD1 Detect
F00009Detect abnormal eventsTA03 Develop PeopleD1 Detect
F00010Detect abnormal groupsTA03 Develop PeopleD1 Detect
F00011Detect abnormal pagesTA03 Develop PeopleD1 Detect
F00012Detect abnormal profiles, e.g. prolific pages/ groups/ peopleTA03 Develop PeopleD1 Detect
F00013Identify fake news sitesTA03 Develop PeopleD1 Detect
F00014Trace connectionsfor e.g. fake news sitesTA03 Develop PeopleD1 Detect
F00015Detect anomalies in membership growth patternsI include Fake Experts as they may use funding campaigns such as Patreon to fund their operations and so these should be watched.TA03 Develop PeopleD1 Detect
F00016Identify fence-sittersNote: In each case, depending on the platform there may be a way to identify a fence-sitter. For example, online polls may have a neutral option or a "somewhat this-or-that" option, and may reveal who voted for that to all visitors. This information could be of use to data analysts. + +In TA08-11, the engagement level of victims could be identified to detect and respond to increasing engagement.TA03 Develop PeopleD1 Detect
F00017Measure emotional valenceTA03 Develop PeopleD1 Detect
F00018Follow the moneytrack funding sourcesTA03 Develop PeopleD1 Detect
F00019Activity resurgence detection (alarm when dormant accounts become activated)TA04 Develop NetworksD1 Detect
F00020Detect anomalous activityTA04 Develop NetworksD1 Detect
F00021AI/ML automated early detection of campaign planningTA04 Develop NetworksD1 Detect
F00022Digital authority - regulating body (united states)TA04 Develop NetworksD1 Detect
F00023Periodic verification (counter to hijack legitimate account)TA04 Develop NetworksD1 Detect
F00024Teach civics to kids/ adults/ seniorsTA04 Develop NetworksD1 Detect
F00025Boots-on-the-ground early narrative detectionTA05 MicrotargetingD1 Detect
F00026Language anomoly detectionTA05 MicrotargetingD1 Detect
F00027Unlikely correlation of sentiment on same topicsTA05 MicrotargetingD1 Detect
F00028Associate a public key signature with government documentsTA06 Develop ContentD1 Detect
F00029Detect proto narratives, i.e. RT, SputnikTA06 Develop ContentD1 Detect
F00030Early detection and warning - reporting of suspect contentTA06 Develop ContentD1 Detect
F00031Educate on how to identify information pollutionStrategic planning included as innoculating population has strategic value.TA06 Develop ContentD1 Detect
F00032Educate on how to identify to pollutionDUPLICATE - DELETE TA06 Develop ContentD1 Detect
F00033Fake websites: add transparency on business modelTA06 Develop ContentD1 Detect
F00034Flag the information spaces so people know about active flooding effortTA06 Develop ContentD1 Detect
F00035Identify repeated narrative DNATA06 Develop ContentD1 Detect
F00036Looking for AB testing in unregulated channelsTA06 Develop ContentD1 Detect
F00037News content provenance certification. Original Comment: Shortcomings: intentional falsehood. Doesn't solve accuracy. Can't be mandatory. + +Technique should be in terms of "strategic innoculation", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news.TA06 Develop ContentD1 Detect
F00038Social capital as attack vectorUnsure I understood the original intention or what it applied to. Therefore the techniques listed (10, 39, 43, 57, 61) are under my interpretation - which is that we want to track ignorant agents who fall into the enemy's trap and show a cost to financing/reposting/helping the adversary via public shaming or other means.TA06 Develop ContentD1 Detect
F00039standards to track image/ video deep fakes - industryTA06 Develop ContentD1 Detect
F00040Unalterable metadata signature on origins of image and provenanceTA06 Develop ContentD1 Detect
F00041Bias detectionNot technically left of boomTA07 Channel SelectionD1 Detect
F00042Categorize polls by intentUse T00029, but against the creatorsTA07 Channel SelectionD1 Detect
F00043Monitor for creation of fake known personasTA07 Channel SelectionD1 Detect
F00044Forensic analysisCan be used in all phases for all techniques.TA08 Pump PrimingD1 Detect
F00045Forensic linguistic analysisCan be used in all phases for all techniques.TA08 Pump PrimingD1 Detect
F00046Pump priming analyticsTA08 Pump PrimingD1 Detect
F00047trace involved partiesTA08 Pump PrimingD1 Detect
F00048Trace known operations and connectionTA08 Pump PrimingD1 Detect
F00049trace moneyTA08 Pump PrimingD1 Detect
F00050Web cache analyticsTA08 Pump PrimingD1 Detect
F00051Challenge expertiseTA09 ExposureD1 Detect
F00052Discover sponsorsDiscovering the sponsors behind a campaign, narrative, bot, a set of accounts, or a social media comment, or anything else is useful.TA09 ExposureD1 Detect
F00053Government rumour control office (what can we learn?)TA09 ExposureD1 Detect
F00054Restrict people who can @ you on social networksTA09 ExposureD1 Detect
F00055Verify credentialsTA09 ExposureD1 Detect
F00056Verify organisation legitimacyTA09 ExposureD1 Detect
F00057Verify personal credentials of expertsTA09 ExposureD1 Detect
F00058Deplatform (cancel culture)*Deplatform People: This technique needs to be a bit more specific to distinguish it from "account removal" or DDOS and other techniques that get more specific when applied to content. + +For example, other ways of deplatforming people include attacking their sources of funds, their allies, their followers, etc.TA10 Go PhysicalD1 Detect
F00059Identify susceptible demographicsAll techniques provide or are susceptible to being countered by, or leveraged for, knowledge about user demographics.TA10 Go PhysicalD1 Detect
F00060Identify susceptible influencersI assume this was a transcript error. Otherwise, "Identify Susceptible Influences" as in the various methods of influences that may work against a victim could also be a technique. Nope, wasn't a transcript error: original note says influencers, as in find people of influence that might be targetted. TA10 Go PhysicalD1 Detect
F00061MicrotargetingTA10 Go PhysicalD1 Detect
F00062Detect when Dormant account turns activeTA11 PersistenceD1 Detect
F00063Linguistic change analysisTA11 PersistenceD1 Detect
F00064Monitor reports of account takeoverTA11 PersistenceD1 Detect
F00065Sentiment change analysisTA11 PersistenceD1 Detect
F00066Use language errors, time to respond to account bans and lawsuits, to indicate capabilitiesTA11 PersistenceD1 Detect
F00067Data forensicsI00029,I00045
F00068Resonance analysis
F00069Track Russian media and develop analytic methods.
F00070Full spectrum analyticsALL
F00071Network analysis Identify/cultivate/support influencers
F00072network analysis to identify central users in the pro-Russia activist community.
F00073collect intel/recon on black/covert content creators/manipulators
F00074identify relevant fence-sitter communities
F00075leverage open-source information
F00076Monitor/collect audience engagement data connected to “useful idiots”
F00077Model for bot account behaviorTA03 Develop People
F00078Monitor account level activity in social networksTA03 Develop People
F00079Network anomaly detectionTA05 Microtargeting
F00080Hack the polls/ content yourselfTA07 Channel Selection
F00081Need way for end user to report operationsTA09 Exposure
F00082Control the US "slang" translation boardsTA11 Persistence
F00083Build and own meme generator, then track and watermark contentsTA11 Persistence
F00084Track individual bad actorsTA03 Develop People
F00085detection of a weak signal through global noise
F00086Outpace Competitor Intelligence CapabilitiesTA02 Objective planning
F00087metatechniqueImprove Indications and Warning
F00088metatechniqueRevitalize an “active measures working group,”
F00089daylighttarget/name/flag "grey zone" website contentTA04 Develop Networks
F00090metatechniqueMatch Punitive Tools with Third-Party InducementsTA01 Strategic Planning
F00091metatechniquePartner to develop analytic methods & tools
F00092daylightWarn social media companies about an ongoing campaign (e.g. antivax sites). I00002TA09
diff --git a/incidents/I00001.md b/incidents/I00001.md index a067ad1..f0a630b 100644 --- a/incidents/I00001.md +++ b/incidents/I00001.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ * **Countries:** Russia , USA -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-02-24 diff --git a/incidents/I00002.md b/incidents/I00002.md index 4599ad8..067f46e 100644 --- a/incidents/I00002.md +++ b/incidents/I00002.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ * **Countries:** Russia , World -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-02-24 diff --git a/incidents/I00003.md b/incidents/I00003.md index 3c6c09f..e8c3718 100644 --- a/incidents/I00003.md +++ b/incidents/I00003.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ * **Countries:** Russia , USA -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-02-24 diff --git a/incidents/I00004.md b/incidents/I00004.md index 32a9d1a..1857e1c 100644 --- a/incidents/I00004.md +++ b/incidents/I00004.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ * **Countries:** Russia , France -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-02-24 diff --git a/incidents/I00005.md b/incidents/I00005.md index 54bc14d..d4c1f19 100644 --- a/incidents/I00005.md +++ b/incidents/I00005.md @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ The report adds that although officially the Russian government asserted its neu * **Countries:** Russia , UK -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-02-24 diff --git a/incidents/I00006.md b/incidents/I00006.md index 14060de..6986c3e 100644 --- a/incidents/I00006.md +++ b/incidents/I00006.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ * **Countries:** Russia , USA -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-02-24 diff --git a/incidents/I00007.md b/incidents/I00007.md index f8908d0..f2e2e63 100644 --- a/incidents/I00007.md +++ b/incidents/I00007.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ * **Countries:** Russia , USA -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-02-24 diff --git a/incidents/I00008.md b/incidents/I00008.md index fa2a246..381f240 100644 --- a/incidents/I00008.md +++ b/incidents/I00008.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id:** I00008 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2017 * **Countries:** Russia , Serbia -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-02-24 diff --git a/incidents/I00009.md b/incidents/I00009.md index 8654749..1e3367b 100644 --- a/incidents/I00009.md +++ b/incidents/I00009.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ * **Countries:** Russia , Philippines -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-02-24 diff --git a/incidents/I00010.md b/incidents/I00010.md index 3152ffc..f44540c 100644 --- a/incidents/I00010.md +++ b/incidents/I00010.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ * **Countries:** ?? , USA -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-02-01 diff --git a/incidents/I00011.md b/incidents/I00011.md index bcdcdd9..d06ca73 100644 --- a/incidents/I00011.md +++ b/incidents/I00011.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id:** I00011 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2019 * **Countries:** ?? , USA -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-02-01 diff --git a/incidents/I00012.md b/incidents/I00012.md index c186c7d..a77be87 100644 --- a/incidents/I00012.md +++ b/incidents/I00012.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id:** I00012 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2011 * **Countries:** China , China -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-02-24 diff --git a/incidents/I00013.md b/incidents/I00013.md index f826430..0185bb4 100644 --- a/incidents/I00013.md +++ b/incidents/I00013.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id:** I00013 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2014 * **Countries:** Russia , France -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-02-24 diff --git a/incidents/I00014.md b/incidents/I00014.md index a32f2ec..ee2c740 100644 --- a/incidents/I00014.md +++ b/incidents/I00014.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id:** I00014 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2018 * **Countries:** Russia , France -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-02-24 diff --git a/incidents/I00015.md b/incidents/I00015.md index 2f0d3fb..00b1437 100644 --- a/incidents/I00015.md +++ b/incidents/I00015.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ * **Countries:** Russia , USA -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-02-01 diff --git a/incidents/I00016.md b/incidents/I00016.md index 1765c4b..6f915c7 100644 --- a/incidents/I00016.md +++ b/incidents/I00016.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id:** I00016 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2014 * **Countries:** Russia , Lithuania -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-02-01 diff --git a/incidents/I00018.md b/incidents/I00018.md index e0806b0..27a5655 100644 --- a/incidents/I00018.md +++ b/incidents/I00018.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** I00018 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2016 diff --git a/incidents/I00020.md b/incidents/I00020.md index 21c2737..2766a50 100644 --- a/incidents/I00020.md +++ b/incidents/I00020.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** I00020 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2017 diff --git a/incidents/I00021.md b/incidents/I00021.md index f3e6355..f74566a 100644 --- a/incidents/I00021.md +++ b/incidents/I00021.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** I00021 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2017 diff --git a/incidents/I00023.md b/incidents/I00023.md index 127886e..7287e9e 100644 --- a/incidents/I00023.md +++ b/incidents/I00023.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** I00023 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2017 diff --git a/incidents/I00024.md b/incidents/I00024.md index 1e75a29..e2ed622 100644 --- a/incidents/I00024.md +++ b/incidents/I00024.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** I00024 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2017 diff --git a/incidents/I00026.md b/incidents/I00026.md index 8467a12..cc7d71b 100644 --- a/incidents/I00026.md +++ b/incidents/I00026.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** I00026 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2016 diff --git a/incidents/I00027.md b/incidents/I00027.md index 429217e..f45bfbe 100644 --- a/incidents/I00027.md +++ b/incidents/I00027.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** I00027 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2014 diff --git a/incidents/I00028.md b/incidents/I00028.md index 53fca9f..675f336 100644 --- a/incidents/I00028.md +++ b/incidents/I00028.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** I00028 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2014 diff --git a/incidents/I00030.md b/incidents/I00030.md index 314ac03..e20bb89 100644 --- a/incidents/I00030.md +++ b/incidents/I00030.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** I00030 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2018 diff --git a/incidents/I00031.md b/incidents/I00031.md index 2635f88..1cb4955 100644 --- a/incidents/I00031.md +++ b/incidents/I00031.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** I00031 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2018 diff --git a/incidents/I00036.md b/incidents/I00036.md index 1c8ebbf..7c74a20 100644 --- a/incidents/I00036.md +++ b/incidents/I00036.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** I00036 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2014 diff --git a/incidents/I00037.md b/incidents/I00037.md index 557286e..3cd6e69 100644 --- a/incidents/I00037.md +++ b/incidents/I00037.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** I00037 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2016 diff --git a/incidents/I00038.md b/incidents/I00038.md index 9786032..ed31e3d 100644 --- a/incidents/I00038.md +++ b/incidents/I00038.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** I00038 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2016 diff --git a/incidents/I00040.md b/incidents/I00040.md index a471b63..2bbc912 100644 --- a/incidents/I00040.md +++ b/incidents/I00040.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** I00040 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2015 diff --git a/incidents/I00041.md b/incidents/I00041.md index 19075a4..33d4eee 100644 --- a/incidents/I00041.md +++ b/incidents/I00041.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** I00041 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2017 diff --git a/incidents/I00043.md b/incidents/I00043.md index f6c6c0e..2df572f 100644 --- a/incidents/I00043.md +++ b/incidents/I00043.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** I00043 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2017 diff --git a/incidents/I00044.md b/incidents/I00044.md index 62b52e2..cb65a94 100644 --- a/incidents/I00044.md +++ b/incidents/I00044.md @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ * **Year started:** 2015 -* **Countries:** nan , USA +* **Countries:** , USA * **Found via:** MIS diff --git a/incidents/I00045.md b/incidents/I00045.md index 3ba34e0..9678606 100644 --- a/incidents/I00045.md +++ b/incidents/I00045.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ * **Countries:** Russia , UK -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00046.md b/incidents/I00046.md index 04b59bc..09c4610 100644 --- a/incidents/I00046.md +++ b/incidents/I00046.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id:** I00046 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2018 * **Countries:** Russia , Macedonia -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00047.md b/incidents/I00047.md index dbf4b95..02cd97e 100644 --- a/incidents/I00047.md +++ b/incidents/I00047.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which is also responsible for border * **Countries:** Russia , World -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00048.md b/incidents/I00048.md index f4b4104..0a72efb 100644 --- a/incidents/I00048.md +++ b/incidents/I00048.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id:** I00048 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2015 * **Countries:** Russia , World -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00049.md b/incidents/I00049.md index f147d8d..8ad95d7 100644 --- a/incidents/I00049.md +++ b/incidents/I00049.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ * **Countries:** Russia , World -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00050.md b/incidents/I00050.md index 4a0c1f3..add666f 100644 --- a/incidents/I00050.md +++ b/incidents/I00050.md @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Maduro has remained defiant in the face of domestic and international pressure, * **Countries:** Russia , World -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00051.md b/incidents/I00051.md index 7cc4f55..fc1ed29 100644 --- a/incidents/I00051.md +++ b/incidents/I00051.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ The FCO comments on the IfS were issued after a news report said the group had r * **Countries:** Russia , World -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00052.md b/incidents/I00052.md index 9567bb3..4b060d0 100644 --- a/incidents/I00052.md +++ b/incidents/I00052.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id:** I00052 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2015 * **Countries:** China , World -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00053.md b/incidents/I00053.md index c2c74ed..6b49a24 100644 --- a/incidents/I00053.md +++ b/incidents/I00053.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Geopolitically complex issue combines US/China trade; Security concerns/issues r * **Countries:** China , World -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00054.md b/incidents/I00054.md index 01a321f..6df15e0 100644 --- a/incidents/I00054.md +++ b/incidents/I00054.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id:** I00054 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2018 * **Countries:** China , World -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00055.md b/incidents/I00055.md index c806a92..986cf7a 100644 --- a/incidents/I00055.md +++ b/incidents/I00055.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id:** I00055 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2008 * **Countries:** China , World -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00056.md b/incidents/I00056.md index 577cdf1..d8eb38c 100644 --- a/incidents/I00056.md +++ b/incidents/I00056.md @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ While there is history to Iran’s information/influence operations, starting wi * **Countries:** Iran , World -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00057.md b/incidents/I00057.md index 2e27dc8..ca74a01 100644 --- a/incidents/I00057.md +++ b/incidents/I00057.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id:** I00057 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2018 * **Countries:** Russia/domestic , Mexico -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00058.md b/incidents/I00058.md index 03aa3f7..604b509 100644 --- a/incidents/I00058.md +++ b/incidents/I00058.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id:** I00058 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2018 * **Countries:** Russia , Germany -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00059.md b/incidents/I00059.md index ba64f8a..71aef86 100644 --- a/incidents/I00059.md +++ b/incidents/I00059.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id:** I00059 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2014 * **Countries:** Myanmar , Myanmar -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00060.md b/incidents/I00060.md index 4cfcff3..3384487 100644 --- a/incidents/I00060.md +++ b/incidents/I00060.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id:** I00060 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2018 * **Countries:** Russia , World -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00061.md b/incidents/I00061.md index 4e4019b..8ddde1a 100644 --- a/incidents/I00061.md +++ b/incidents/I00061.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id:** I00061 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2017 * **Countries:** Russia , US -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00062.md b/incidents/I00062.md index babbb1b..e9dafcf 100644 --- a/incidents/I00062.md +++ b/incidents/I00062.md @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ * **Id:** I00062 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Year started:** 2015 * **Countries:** Russia/domestic , UK -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-03-20 diff --git a/incidents/I00063.md b/incidents/I00063.md index 4bf780f..4ee23ac 100644 --- a/incidents/I00063.md +++ b/incidents/I00063.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ The investigation found corroborating evidence after conducting witness intervie * **Countries:** Russia , World -* **Found via:** nan +* **Found via:** * **Date added:** 2019-04-06 diff --git a/incidents_list.md b/incidents_index.md similarity index 85% rename from incidents_list.md rename to incidents_index.md index 5ec9bf0..22c9283 100644 --- a/incidents_list.md +++ b/incidents_index.md @@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ name type Year Started -From country To country Found via @@ -15,99 +14,88 @@ Blacktivists facebook group incident 2016 -Russia USA -nan + I00002 #VaccinateUS campaign 2014 -Russia World -nan + I00003 Beyonce protest rallies incident 2016 -Russia USA -nan + I00004 #Macrongate incident 2017 -Russia France -nan + I00005 Brexit vote campaign 2016 -Russia UK -nan + I00006 Columbian Chemicals incident 2014 -Russia USA -nan + I00007 Incirlik terrorists incident 2016 -Russia USA -nan + I00008 Bujic incident 2017 -Russia Serbia -nan + I00009 PhilippinesExpert incident 2017 -Russia Philippines -nan + I00010 ParklandTeens incident 2018 -?? USA -nan + I00011 CovingtonTeen incident 2019 -?? USA -nan + I00012 @@ -115,51 +103,45 @@ incident 2011 China -China -nan + I00013 FranceBlacktivists incident 2014 -Russia France -nan + I00014 GiletsJaunePileon incident 2018 -Russia France -nan + I00015 ConcordDiscovery incident 2019 -Russia USA -nan + I00016 LithuanianElves campaign 2014 -Russia Lithuania -nan + I00017 US presidential elections campaign 2016 -Russia USA OII @@ -168,7 +150,6 @@ DNC email leak incident tactic 2016 -Russia USA OII @@ -177,7 +158,6 @@ MacronTiphaine incident 2017 -unknown France OII @@ -186,7 +166,6 @@ 3000 tanks incident 2017 -Russia World OII @@ -195,7 +174,6 @@ Armenia elections campaign 2017 -Russia Armenia OII @@ -204,7 +182,6 @@ #Macronleaks incident 2017 -Russia France OII @@ -213,7 +190,6 @@ #dislikemacron incident 2017 -Russia France OII @@ -222,7 +198,6 @@ #syriahoax incident 2017 -Syria USA OII @@ -231,7 +206,6 @@ EU Army incident 2018 -Russia EU OII @@ -240,7 +214,6 @@ Netherlands referendum on Ukraine incident 2016 -Russia Netherlands OII @@ -249,7 +222,6 @@ crucifiedboy incident 2014 -Russia Ukraine OII @@ -258,7 +230,6 @@ mh17 downed incident 2014 -Russia Ukraine OII @@ -267,7 +238,6 @@ MH17 investigation campaign 2016 -Russia Ukraine OII @@ -276,7 +246,6 @@ LastJedi incident 2018 -Russia World OII @@ -285,7 +254,6 @@ antivax apt 2018 -Russia World OII @@ -294,7 +262,6 @@ Kavanaugh incident 2018 -Russia USA OII @@ -304,7 +271,6 @@ apt 2014 China -China OII @@ -312,7 +278,6 @@ DibaFacebookExpedition incident 2016 -China Taiwan OII @@ -322,7 +287,6 @@ campaign 2014 Brazil -Brazil OII @@ -331,7 +295,6 @@ incident 2014 Brazil -Brazil OII @@ -340,7 +303,6 @@ incident 2016 Brazil -Brazil OII @@ -349,7 +311,6 @@ incident 2016 Brazil -Brazil OII @@ -357,7 +318,6 @@ MerkelFacebook incident 2017 -unknown Germany OII @@ -366,7 +326,6 @@ modamaniSelfie incident 2015 -unknown Germany OII @@ -375,7 +334,6 @@ Refugee crime map incident 2017 -unknown Germany OII @@ -384,7 +342,6 @@ Saudi/Qatar bot dispute incident 2017 -SaudiArabia Qatar MIS @@ -393,7 +350,6 @@ FCC comments incident 2017 -unknown USA MIS @@ -402,7 +358,6 @@ JadeHelm exercise incident 2015 -nan USA MIS @@ -411,126 +366,112 @@ Skripal incident 2018 -Russia UK -nan + I00046 North Macedonia incident 2018 -Russia Macedonia -nan + I00047 Sea of Azov incident 2018 -Russia World -nan + I00048 White Helmets campaign 2015 -Russia World -nan + I00049 White Helmets: Chemical Weapons incident 2017 -Russia World -nan + I00050 #HandsOffVenezuela incident 2019 -Russia World -nan + I00051 Integrity Initiative incident 2018 -Russia World -nan + I00052 China overiew campaign 2015 -China World -nan + I00053 China Huawei CFO Arrest incident 2018 -China World -nan + I00054 China Muslims incident 2018 -China World -nan + I00055 50 Cent Army campaign 2008 -China World -nan + I00056 Iran Influence Operations campaign 2012 -Iran World -nan + I00057 Mexico Election incident 2018 -Russia/domestic Mexico -nan + I00058 Chemnitz incident 2018 -Russia Germany -nan + I00059 @@ -538,43 +479,38 @@ campaign 2014 Myanmar -Myanmar -nan + I00060 White Genocide campaign 2018 -Russia World -nan + I00061 Military veterans Targetting campaign 2017 -Russia US -nan + I00062 Brexit/UK ongoing campaign 2015 -Russia/domestic UK -nan + I00063 Olympic Doping Scandal campaign 2016 -Russia World -nan + diff --git a/metatechniques/cleaningcounters.md b/metatechniques/cleaningcounters.md index e424e65..a38ebd6 100644 --- a/metatechniques/cleaningcounters.md +++ b/metatechniques/cleaningcounters.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ ### D2 Deny -* C00016: Social media as a privilege not right (needs nan) +* C00016: Social media as a privilege not right (needs ) * C00074: Identify identical content and mass deplatform (needs platform_admin,platform_admin:socialmedia) ### D3 Disrupt diff --git a/metatechniques/countermessagingcounters.md b/metatechniques/countermessagingcounters.md index 5258ad8..88c3e30 100644 --- a/metatechniques/countermessagingcounters.md +++ b/metatechniques/countermessagingcounters.md @@ -4,28 +4,28 @@ ### D2 Deny -* C00075: normalise language (needs nan) -* C00157: Build alternative news sources (needs nan) -* C00167: Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft (needs nan) +* C00075: normalise language (needs ) +* C00157: Build alternative news sources (needs ) +* C00167: Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft (needs ) ### D3 Disrupt * C00017: Media campaign promoting in-group to out-group in person communication / activities (needs media) -* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs nan) -* C00082: Ground truthing as automated response to pollution (needs nan) -* C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages (needs nan) +* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs ) +* C00082: Ground truthing as automated response to pollution (needs ) +* C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages (needs ) * C00156: Better tell the U.S., NATO, and EU story. (needs government,military) -* C00169: develop a creative content hub (needs nan) +* C00169: develop a creative content hub (needs ) * C00200: Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo (needs influencers) -* C00211: Use humorous counter-narratives (needs nan) +* C00211: Use humorous counter-narratives (needs ) ### D4 Degrade -* C00025: Promote identity neutral narratives (needs nan) -* C00026: Shore up democracy based messages (peace, freedom) - make it sexy (needs nan) -* C00117: Downgrade de-amplify label promote counter to disinformation (needs nan) -* C00118: Repurpose images with new text (needs nan) +* C00025: Promote identity neutral narratives (needs ) +* C00026: Shore up democracy based messages (peace, freedom) - make it sexy (needs ) +* C00117: Downgrade de-amplify label promote counter to disinformation (needs ) +* C00118: Repurpose images with new text (needs ) ### D6 Destroy -* C00062: Free open library sources worldwide (needs nan) +* C00062: Free open library sources worldwide (needs ) ### D7 Deter -* C00119: Engage payload and debunk. Provide link to facts. (needs nan) +* C00119: Engage payload and debunk. Provide link to facts. (needs ) diff --git a/metatechniques/data pollutioncounters.md b/metatechniques/data pollutioncounters.md index ab797d1..55db28a 100644 --- a/metatechniques/data pollutioncounters.md +++ b/metatechniques/data pollutioncounters.md @@ -4,13 +4,13 @@ ### D3 Disrupt -* C00137: Pollute the AB-testing data feeds (needs nan) +* C00137: Pollute the AB-testing data feeds (needs ) ### D4 Degrade -* C00140: "Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls (needs nan) -* C00145: Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!) (needs nan) +* C00140: "Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls (needs ) +* C00145: Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!) (needs ) * C00148: Add random links to network graphs (needs platform_algorithms) -* C00149: Poison the monitoring & evaluation data (needs nan) +* C00149: Poison the monitoring & evaluation data (needs ) ### D5 Deceive -* C00047: Coordinated inauthentics (needs nan) +* C00047: Coordinated inauthentics (needs ) diff --git a/metatechniques/daylightcounters.md b/metatechniques/daylightcounters.md index 271d214..7fc966d 100644 --- a/metatechniques/daylightcounters.md +++ b/metatechniques/daylightcounters.md @@ -4,30 +4,30 @@ ### D2 Deny -* C00113: Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials. Attack audience quality of fake expert (needs nan) -* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs nan) -* C00116: Provide proof of involvement (needs nan) -* C00150: “calling them out” (needs nan) -* C00152: “name and shame” (needs nan) +* C00113: Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials. Attack audience quality of fake expert (needs ) +* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs ) +* C00116: Provide proof of involvement (needs ) +* C00150: “calling them out” (needs ) +* C00152: “name and shame” (needs ) * C00217: Registries alert when large batches of newsy URLs get registered together (needs platform_admin) ### D3 Disrupt -* C00018: Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers (needs nan) -* C00019: Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers (needs nan) -* C00068: Expose online funding as fake (needs nan) -* C00069: Mark clickbait visually (needs nan) -* C00081: Discredit by pointing out the "noise" and informing public that "flooding" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of "noise" (needs nan) -* C00126: Social media amber alert (needs nan) -* C00151: “fight in the light” (needs nan) -* C00219: Add metadata to content - out of the control of the adversary (needs nan) +* C00018: Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers (needs ) +* C00019: Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers (needs ) +* C00068: Expose online funding as fake (needs ) +* C00069: Mark clickbait visually (needs ) +* C00081: Discredit by pointing out the "noise" and informing public that "flooding" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of "noise" (needs ) +* C00126: Social media amber alert (needs ) +* C00151: “fight in the light” (needs ) +* C00219: Add metadata to content - out of the control of the adversary (needs ) ### D4 Degrade -* C00085: Demuting content (needs nan) -* C00184: Media exposure (needs nan) +* C00085: Demuting content (needs ) +* C00184: Media exposure (needs ) ### D6 Destroy -* C00189: Ongoing analysis/monitoring of "flagged" profiles (needs nan) +* C00189: Ongoing analysis/monitoring of "flagged" profiles (needs ) ### D7 Deter -* C00048: Name and Shame (needs nan) -* C00094: Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research (needs nan) +* C00048: Name and Shame (needs ) +* C00094: Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research (needs ) diff --git a/metatechniques/dilutioncounters.md b/metatechniques/dilutioncounters.md index b88399e..795355c 100644 --- a/metatechniques/dilutioncounters.md +++ b/metatechniques/dilutioncounters.md @@ -4,11 +4,11 @@ ### D3 Disrupt -* C00031: Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify (needs nan) -* C00066: Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back) (needs nan) +* C00031: Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify (needs ) +* C00066: Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back) (needs ) * C00105: Buy more advertising than the adversary to shift influence and algorithms (needs money,adtech) * C00128: Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other "decelerants" (needs influencers:trusted_authority) -* C00178: Fill information voids with non-disinformation content (needs nan) +* C00178: Fill information voids with non-disinformation content (needs ) ### D4 Degrade -* C00087: Make more noise (needs nan) +* C00087: Make more noise (needs ) diff --git a/metatechniques/diversioncounters.md b/metatechniques/diversioncounters.md index 163242c..717040f 100644 --- a/metatechniques/diversioncounters.md +++ b/metatechniques/diversioncounters.md @@ -4,26 +4,26 @@ ### D2 Deny -* C00195: Redirect Method (needs nan) -* C00202: Set data 'honeytraps' (needs nan) +* C00195: Redirect Method (needs ) +* C00202: Set data 'honeytraps' (needs ) ### D3 Disrupt -* C00029: Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise (needs nan) -* C00030: Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based) (needs nan) -* C00032: Hijack content and link to truth- based info (platform) (needs nan) -* C00078: Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content. More specifically, change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists (needs nan) -* C00079: Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side (needs nan) -* C00080: Create competing narrative (needs nan) -* C00084: Steal their truths (needs nan) -* C00100: Hashtag jacking (needs nan) -* C00106: Click-bait centrist content (needs nan) -* C00194: Provide an alternative to Russian information by expanding and improving local content. (needs nan) +* C00029: Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise (needs ) +* C00030: Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based) (needs ) +* C00032: Hijack content and link to truth- based info (platform) (needs ) +* C00078: Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content. More specifically, change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists (needs ) +* C00079: Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side (needs ) +* C00080: Create competing narrative (needs ) +* C00084: Steal their truths (needs ) +* C00100: Hashtag jacking (needs ) +* C00106: Click-bait centrist content (needs ) +* C00194: Provide an alternative to Russian information by expanding and improving local content. (needs ) ### D4 Degrade -* C00086: Distract from noise with addictive content (needs nan) -* C00088: Poison pill recasting of message (needs nan) +* C00086: Distract from noise with addictive content (needs ) +* C00088: Poison pill recasting of message (needs ) ### D5 Deceive -* C00090: Fake engagement system (needs nan) -* C00091: Honeypot social community (needs nan) +* C00090: Fake engagement system (needs ) +* C00091: Honeypot social community (needs ) * C00103: Create a bot that engages / distract trolls (needs developers) diff --git a/metatechniques/frictioncounters.md b/metatechniques/frictioncounters.md index c7318f6..328c6c9 100644 --- a/metatechniques/frictioncounters.md +++ b/metatechniques/frictioncounters.md @@ -6,30 +6,30 @@ ### D2 Deny * C00006: Charge for social media (needs platform_admin:socialmedia) * C00010: Enhanced privacy regulation for social media (needs government:policymakers) -* C00034: Create more friction at account creation (needs nan) -* C00035: Friction (needs nan) -* C00056: Get off social media (needs nan) +* C00034: Create more friction at account creation (needs ) +* C00035: Friction (needs ) +* C00056: Get off social media (needs ) * C00097: Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment (needs platform_algorithms) * C00098: Revocation of "verified" (needs platform_admin) * C00099: Strengthen verification methods (needs platform_algorithms) * C00110: Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist content (needs funding) -* C00112: "Prove they are not an op!" (needs nan) +* C00112: "Prove they are not an op!" (needs ) * C00114: Don't engage with payloads (needs public) * C00122: Content moderation. Censorship? (needs platform_admin) -* C00165: Limit access to alterable documents (needs nan) +* C00165: Limit access to alterable documents (needs ) ### D3 Disrupt * C00044: Keep people from posting to social media immediately (needs platform_algorithms) -* C00045: S4d detection and re-allocation approaches (needs nan) -* C00123: Bot control (needs nan) +* C00045: S4d detection and re-allocation approaches (needs ) +* C00123: Bot control (needs ) * C00124: Don't feed the trolls (needs public,media) -* C00139: Weaponise youtube content matrices (needs nan) +* C00139: Weaponise youtube content matrices (needs ) * C00147: Make amplification of social media ports expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days) (needs platform_algorithms) * C00203: Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets (needs government) ### D4 Degrade * C00020: Deligitimise the 24 hour news cycle (needs media) -* C00089: Throttle number of forwards (needs nan) +* C00089: Throttle number of forwards (needs ) * C00101: Create participant friction (needs platform_algorithms) * C00102: Make repeat voting harder (needs platform_admin) * C00141: "Hey this story is old" popup when messaging with old URL (needs platform_algorithms) diff --git a/metatechniques/metatechniquecounters.md b/metatechniques/metatechniquecounters.md index 2e5aea1..340506f 100644 --- a/metatechniques/metatechniquecounters.md +++ b/metatechniques/metatechniquecounters.md @@ -4,25 +4,25 @@ ### ALL -* C00001: Better models of info spread up the layers (needs nan) -* C00003: How can we safeguard against extremists using the tools that we will produce? (needs nan) -* C00004: Managing like a chronic disease (needs nan) -* C00005: Policy: makers, terminology, elements: a) broad, b) specific (needs nan) +* C00001: Better models of info spread up the layers (needs ) +* C00003: How can we safeguard against extremists using the tools that we will produce? (needs ) +* C00004: Managing like a chronic disease (needs ) +* C00005: Policy: makers, terminology, elements: a) broad, b) specific (needs ) ### D2 Deny * C00012: Platform regulation (needs government:policymakers) * C00055: Empower existing regulators to govern social media (needs government:policymakers,government,platform_admin) -* C00174: Free and Fair Press (needs nan) +* C00174: Free and Fair Press (needs ) ### D3 Disrupt -* C00159: Campaign mindset and associated toolbox (needs nan) -* C00170: elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft (needs nan) +* C00159: Campaign mindset and associated toolbox (needs ) +* C00170: elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft (needs ) * C00196: Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media (needs government) * C00205: strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting (needs companies,government) * C00214: Create policy that makes social media police disinformation (needs government:policymakers) * C00215: Use fraud legislation to clean up social media (needs government:policymakers) ### D7 Deter -* C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes (needs nan) -* C00161: Coalition Building and Third-Party Inducements: (needs nan) -* C00176: Improve Coordination with and feedback from the U.S. private sector (needs nan) +* C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes (needs ) +* C00161: Coalition Building and Third-Party Inducements: (needs ) +* C00176: Improve Coordination with and feedback from the U.S. private sector (needs ) diff --git a/metatechniques/reduce resourcescounters.md b/metatechniques/reduce resourcescounters.md index e92e7cd..8574a73 100644 --- a/metatechniques/reduce resourcescounters.md +++ b/metatechniques/reduce resourcescounters.md @@ -4,11 +4,11 @@ ### D2 Deny -* C00129: Use banking to cut off access (needs nan) +* C00129: Use banking to cut off access (needs ) * C00216: Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors (needs platform_admin:adtech) ### D3 Disrupt -* C00138: Spam domestic actors with lawsuits (needs nan) +* C00138: Spam domestic actors with lawsuits (needs ) ### D4 Degrade -* C00144: Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs (needs nan) +* C00144: Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs (needs ) diff --git a/metatechniques/removalcounters.md b/metatechniques/removalcounters.md index d7e31e8..b81c77e 100644 --- a/metatechniques/removalcounters.md +++ b/metatechniques/removalcounters.md @@ -4,24 +4,24 @@ ### D2 Deny -* C00039: Standard reporting for false profiles (needs nan) -* C00058: Report crowdfunder as violator (needs nan) +* C00039: Standard reporting for false profiles (needs ) +* C00058: Report crowdfunder as violator (needs ) * C00063: Ban political microtargeting (needs government:policymakers) -* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs nan) -* C00071: Block source of pollution (needs nan) -* C00072: Content censorship in non-relevant domains e.g. Pinterest antivax (needs nan) -* C00076: Prohibit images in political discourse channels (needs nan) +* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs ) +* C00071: Block source of pollution (needs ) +* C00072: Content censorship in non-relevant domains e.g. Pinterest antivax (needs ) +* C00076: Prohibit images in political discourse channels (needs ) * C00131: Seize and analyse botnet servers (needs server_admin) * C00154: Ask media not to report false information (needs media) * C00155: Ban incident actors from funding sites (needs platform_admin:fundingsites) * C00171: social media content take-downs (needs platform_admin:socialmedia) * C00172: social media page removal (needs platform_admin:socialmedia) * C00182: malware detection/quarantine/deletion (needs infosec) -* C00197: remove suspicious facebook accounts (needs nan) +* C00197: remove suspicious facebook accounts (needs ) * C00218: Censorship (needs platform_admin) ### D3 Disrupt * C00065: Ban political ads (needs government:policymakers) * C00133: Deplatform Account* (needs platform_admin) * C00135: Deplatform message groups and/or message boards (needs platform_admin) -* C00179: Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target Russia-based nonattributed social media accounts (needs nan) +* C00179: Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target Russia-based nonattributed social media accounts (needs ) diff --git a/metatechniques/resiliencecounters.md b/metatechniques/resiliencecounters.md index f619868..7a7de1f 100644 --- a/metatechniques/resiliencecounters.md +++ b/metatechniques/resiliencecounters.md @@ -6,35 +6,35 @@ ### D2 Deny * C00009: Educate high profile influencers on best practices (needs influencers,educators) * C00011: Media literacy. Games to identify fake news (needs educators,gamesdesigners,developers) -* C00033: Build cultural resistance to false content (needs nan) +* C00033: Build cultural resistance to false content (needs ) * C00049: Influence literacy training (needs educators) * C00050: Anti-elicitation training (needs educators) * C00051: Phishing prevention education etc (needs educators) * C00073: Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution (needs educators) * C00160: find and train influencers (needs data_scientist,influencers) * C00204: Strengthen local media (needs media) -* C00210: Use encrypted apps for confidential communication (needs nan) +* C00210: Use encrypted apps for confidential communication (needs ) ### D3 Disrupt -* C00061: Innoculating at language (needs nan) -* C00109: De-escalation (needs nan) -* C00125: Prepare the population with pre-announcements (needs nan) +* C00061: Innoculating at language (needs ) +* C00109: De-escalation (needs ) +* C00125: Prepare the population with pre-announcements (needs ) * C00188: Newsroom/Journalist training to counter SEO influence (needs media,educators) * C00190: open engagement with civil society (needs public) * C00193: promotion of a “higher standard of journalism” (needs media,educators) * C00212: build public resilence by making civil society more vibrant (needs educators,government) ### D4 Degrade -* C00021: Encourage in-person communication (needs nan) -* C00022: Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety - to counter ability and fear based attacks (needs nan) -* C00023: Promote civility as an identity that people will defend (needs nan) -* C00024: Promote constructive narratives i.e. not polarising. Pro-life, pro-choice, or pro-USA? (needs nan) +* C00021: Encourage in-person communication (needs ) +* C00022: Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety - to counter ability and fear based attacks (needs ) +* C00023: Promote civility as an identity that people will defend (needs ) +* C00024: Promote constructive narratives i.e. not polarising. Pro-life, pro-choice, or pro-USA? (needs ) * C00054: Media literacy training. (needs educators,libraries,schools,DHS,NGO,platform_outreach,media,community_groups,religious_organisations) * C00111: Present sympathetic views of opposite side (needs media,content_creators) * C00158: Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations. (needs educators,media) ### D7 Deter -* C00027: Create culture of civility (needs nan) -* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs nan) -* C00121: Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. (needs nan) -* C00130: Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously. (needs nan) +* C00027: Create culture of civility (needs ) +* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs ) +* C00121: Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. (needs ) +* C00130: Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously. (needs ) diff --git a/metatechniques/scoringcounters.md b/metatechniques/scoringcounters.md index 53c5372..bdb2a4b 100644 --- a/metatechniques/scoringcounters.md +++ b/metatechniques/scoringcounters.md @@ -4,15 +4,15 @@ ### D2 Deny -* C00007: Create framework for BetterBusinessBureau (BBB) for news media (needs nan) +* C00007: Create framework for BetterBusinessBureau (BBB) for news media (needs ) * C00008: Create shared fact-checking database (needs factcheckers) -* C00013: Rating framework for news - full transcripts, link source, add items, BBB for news (needs nan) +* C00013: Rating framework for news - full transcripts, link source, add items, BBB for news (needs ) * C00014: Real-time updates to fact-checking database (needs factcheckers) * C00015: Reputation scores for social media users (needs data_scientist,datastreams) -* C00057: Privacy standards (needs nan) -* C00107: Content moderation (needs nan) +* C00057: Privacy standards (needs ) +* C00107: Content moderation (needs ) ### D7 Deter -* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs nan) -* C00095: Keep score (needs nan) -* C00096: Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers (needs nan) +* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs ) +* C00095: Keep score (needs ) +* C00096: Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers (needs ) diff --git a/metatechniques/targetingcounters.md b/metatechniques/targetingcounters.md index e69d901..0cedfad 100644 --- a/metatechniques/targetingcounters.md +++ b/metatechniques/targetingcounters.md @@ -4,18 +4,18 @@ ### D2 Deny -* C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) (needs nan) +* C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) (needs ) ### D3 Disrupt * C00060: Enhanced legal enforcement against for-profit follower/engagement factories (needs government:policymakers) -* C00067: Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding) (needs nan) -* C00077: Active defence: replay "develop people" (needs nan) +* C00067: Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding) (needs ) +* C00077: Active defence: replay "develop people" (needs ) * C00153: Use offensive cyber action (needs infosec) -* C00162: collect data/map constellations of Russian“civil society”. Unravel/target the Potemkin villages (needs nan) -* C00164: compatriot policy (needs nan) +* C00162: collect data/map constellations of Russian“civil society”. Unravel/target the Potemkin villages (needs ) +* C00164: compatriot policy (needs ) ### D4 Degrade -* C00046: Marginalise and discredit extremist (needs nan) +* C00046: Marginalise and discredit extremist (needs ) * C00052: Infiltrate platforms (needs activists) * C00143: (botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time (needs public,elves) diff --git a/metatechniques/verificationcounters.md b/metatechniques/verificationcounters.md index d020c44..01c923b 100644 --- a/metatechniques/verificationcounters.md +++ b/metatechniques/verificationcounters.md @@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ ### D2 Deny -* C00040: third party verification for people (needs nan) -* C00059: Verification of project before posting (counters funding campaigns) (needs nan) +* C00040: third party verification for people (needs ) +* C00059: Verification of project before posting (counters funding campaigns) (needs ) ### D3 Disrupt -* C00028: Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments (needs nan) +* C00028: Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments (needs ) diff --git a/metatechniques_index.md b/metatechniques_index.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a8c12da --- /dev/null +++ b/metatechniques_index.md @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +# AMITT Metatechniques: + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
idnamesummary
M001resilienceIncrease the resilience to disinformation of the end subjects or other parts of the underlying system
M002diversionCreate alternative channels, messages etc in disinformation-prone systems
M003daylightMake disinformation objects, mechanisms, messaging etc visible
M004frictionSlow down transmission or uptake of disinformation objects, messaging etc
M005removalRemove disinformation objects from the system
M006scoring
M007metatechnique
M008data pollutionAdd artefacts to the underlying system that deliberately confound disinformation monitoring
M009dilutionDilute disinformation artefacts and messaging with other content (kittens!)
M010countermessagingCreate and distribute alternative messages to disinformation
M011verification
M012cleaningClean unneeded resources (accounts etc) from the underlying system so they can't be used in disinformation
M013targeting
diff --git a/phases_index.md b/phases_index.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..709b8d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/phases_index.md @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# AMITT Phases: + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
idnamesummary
P01PlanningEnvision the desired outcome. Lay out effective ways of achieving it. Communicate the vision, intent, and decisions, focusing on expected results.
P02PreparationActivities conducted before execution to improve the ability to conduct the action. Examples include: development of the ecosystem needed to support the action: people, network, channels, content etc.
P03ExecutionRun the action, from initial exposure to wrap-up and/or maintaining presence etc.
P04EvaluationEvaluate effectiveness of action, for use in future plans
diff --git a/resources_by_responsetype_table.md b/resources_by_responsetype_table.md index d65c227..77d5ab6 100644 --- a/resources_by_responsetype_table.md +++ b/resources_by_responsetype_table.md @@ -11,6 +11,16 @@ D6 Destroy D7 Deter TOTALS + +4 +34 +42 +19 +3 +2 +13 + + DHS diff --git a/resources_needed/counters.md b/resources_needed/counters.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ee9d79 --- /dev/null +++ b/resources_needed/counters.md @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +# resource counters: + +## by action + + +### ALL +* C00001: Better models of info spread up the layers (needs ) +* C00003: How can we safeguard against extremists using the tools that we will produce? (needs ) +* C00004: Managing like a chronic disease (needs ) +* C00005: Policy: makers, terminology, elements: a) broad, b) specific (needs ) + +### D2 Deny +* C00007: Create framework for BetterBusinessBureau (BBB) for news media (needs ) +* C00013: Rating framework for news - full transcripts, link source, add items, BBB for news (needs ) +* C00016: Social media as a privilege not right (needs ) +* C00033: Build cultural resistance to false content (needs ) +* C00034: Create more friction at account creation (needs ) +* C00035: Friction (needs ) +* C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) (needs ) +* C00039: Standard reporting for false profiles (needs ) +* C00040: third party verification for people (needs ) +* C00056: Get off social media (needs ) +* C00057: Privacy standards (needs ) +* C00058: Report crowdfunder as violator (needs ) +* C00059: Verification of project before posting (counters funding campaigns) (needs ) +* C00070: Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. (needs ) +* C00071: Block source of pollution (needs ) +* C00072: Content censorship in non-relevant domains e.g. Pinterest antivax (needs ) +* C00075: normalise language (needs ) +* C00076: Prohibit images in political discourse channels (needs ) +* C00107: Content moderation (needs ) +* C00112: "Prove they are not an op!" (needs ) +* C00113: Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials. Attack audience quality of fake expert (needs ) +* C00115: Expose actor and intentions (needs ) +* C00116: Provide proof of involvement (needs ) +* C00129: Use banking to cut off access (needs ) +* C00150: “calling them out” (needs ) +* C00152: “name and shame” (needs ) +* C00157: Build alternative news sources (needs ) +* C00165: Limit access to alterable documents (needs ) +* C00167: Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft (needs ) +* C00174: Free and Fair Press (needs ) +* C00195: Redirect Method (needs ) +* C00197: remove suspicious facebook accounts (needs ) +* C00202: Set data 'honeytraps' (needs ) +* C00210: Use encrypted apps for confidential communication (needs ) + +### D3 Disrupt +* C00018: Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers (needs ) +* C00019: Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers (needs ) +* C00028: Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments (needs ) +* C00029: Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise (needs ) +* C00030: Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based) (needs ) +* C00031: Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify (needs ) +* C00032: Hijack content and link to truth- based info (platform) (needs ) +* C00042: Address truth contained in narratives (needs ) +* C00045: S4d detection and re-allocation approaches (needs ) +* C00061: Innoculating at language (needs ) +* C00066: Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back) (needs ) +* C00067: Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding) (needs ) +* C00068: Expose online funding as fake (needs ) +* C00069: Mark clickbait visually (needs ) +* C00077: Active defence: replay "develop people" (needs ) +* C00078: Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content. More specifically, change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists (needs ) +* C00079: Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side (needs ) +* C00080: Create competing narrative (needs ) +* C00081: Discredit by pointing out the "noise" and informing public that "flooding" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of "noise" (needs ) +* C00082: Ground truthing as automated response to pollution (needs ) +* C00084: Steal their truths (needs ) +* C00100: Hashtag jacking (needs ) +* C00106: Click-bait centrist content (needs ) +* C00109: De-escalation (needs ) +* C00123: Bot control (needs ) +* C00125: Prepare the population with pre-announcements (needs ) +* C00126: Social media amber alert (needs ) +* C00136: Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages (needs ) +* C00137: Pollute the AB-testing data feeds (needs ) +* C00138: Spam domestic actors with lawsuits (needs ) +* C00139: Weaponise youtube content matrices (needs ) +* C00151: “fight in the light” (needs ) +* C00159: Campaign mindset and associated toolbox (needs ) +* C00162: collect data/map constellations of Russian“civil society”. Unravel/target the Potemkin villages (needs ) +* C00164: compatriot policy (needs ) +* C00169: develop a creative content hub (needs ) +* C00170: elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft (needs ) +* C00178: Fill information voids with non-disinformation content (needs ) +* C00179: Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target Russia-based nonattributed social media accounts (needs ) +* C00194: Provide an alternative to Russian information by expanding and improving local content. (needs ) +* C00211: Use humorous counter-narratives (needs ) +* C00219: Add metadata to content - out of the control of the adversary (needs ) + +### D4 Degrade +* C00021: Encourage in-person communication (needs ) +* C00022: Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety - to counter ability and fear based attacks (needs ) +* C00023: Promote civility as an identity that people will defend (needs ) +* C00024: Promote constructive narratives i.e. not polarising. Pro-life, pro-choice, or pro-USA? (needs ) +* C00025: Promote identity neutral narratives (needs ) +* C00026: Shore up democracy based messages (peace, freedom) - make it sexy (needs ) +* C00046: Marginalise and discredit extremist (needs ) +* C00085: Demuting content (needs ) +* C00086: Distract from noise with addictive content (needs ) +* C00087: Make more noise (needs ) +* C00088: Poison pill recasting of message (needs ) +* C00089: Throttle number of forwards (needs ) +* C00117: Downgrade de-amplify label promote counter to disinformation (needs ) +* C00118: Repurpose images with new text (needs ) +* C00140: "Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls (needs ) +* C00144: Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs (needs ) +* C00145: Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!) (needs ) +* C00149: Poison the monitoring & evaluation data (needs ) +* C00184: Media exposure (needs ) + +### D5 Deceive +* C00047: Coordinated inauthentics (needs ) +* C00090: Fake engagement system (needs ) +* C00091: Honeypot social community (needs ) + +### D6 Destroy +* C00062: Free open library sources worldwide (needs ) +* C00189: Ongoing analysis/monitoring of "flagged" profiles (needs ) + +### D7 Deter +* C00027: Create culture of civility (needs ) +* C00048: Name and Shame (needs ) +* C00092: Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers (needs ) +* C00093: Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers (needs ) +* C00094: Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research (needs ) +* C00095: Keep score (needs ) +* C00096: Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers (needs ) +* C00119: Engage payload and debunk. Provide link to facts. (needs ) +* C00120: Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes (needs ) +* C00121: Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. (needs ) +* C00130: Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously. (needs ) +* C00161: Coalition Building and Third-Party Inducements: (needs ) +* C00176: Improve Coordination with and feedback from the U.S. private sector (needs ) diff --git a/responsetype_index.md b/responsetype_index.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d42caed --- /dev/null +++ b/responsetype_index.md @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +# AMITT Response types: + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
idnamesummary
D1Detectdiscover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion into information systems. We included Detect because that’s what everyone was doing - looking, not reacting, and we wanted them to get that out of their systems.
D2Denyprevent disinformation creators from accessing and using critical information, systems, and services.
D3Disruptbreak or interrupt the flow of information.
D4Degradereduce the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary command and control or communications systems, and information collection efforts or means.
D5Deceivecause a person to believe what is not true. military deception seeks to mislead adversary decision makers by manipulating their perception of reality.
D6Destroydamage a system or entity so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt.
D7Deterdiscourage. We added Deter to the list as a potentially useful category too
diff --git a/tactics_index.md b/tactics_index.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..206a0ff --- /dev/null +++ b/tactics_index.md @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +# AMITT Tactics: + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
idnamesummaryphase_id
TA01Strategic PlanningDefine the desired end state, i.e. the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all objectives.P01
TA02Objective PlanningSet clearly defined, measurable, and achievable objectives. Achieving objectives ties execution of tactical tasks to reaching the desired end state. There are four primary considerations: +- Each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives +- The effect should be measurable +- The objective statement should not specify the way and means of accomplishment +- The effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or task.P01
TA03Develop PeopleDevelop online and offline users and agents, including automated personasP02
TA04Develop NetworksDevelop online and offline communities and transmission methods and cultivate assets and unwitting agentsP02
TA05MicrotargetingTarget very specific populations of peopleP02
TA06Develop ContentCreate and acquire content used in incidentP02
TA07Channel SelectionSet up specific delivery, amplification and manipulation channels for incident, including channels to attack. Each channel serves as an atomic surface (test bed) location/site for adversary to hide/conceal the work/content that goes into setting up for this channel and/or other specific platforms. Contributes to building out a connected ecosystem where this channel can operate as part of a whole campaign/incidentP02
TA08Pump PrimingRelease content on a targetted small scale, prior to general release, including releasing seed narrativesP03
TA09ExposureRelease content to general public or push to larger populationP03
TA10Go PhysicalMove incident into offline worldP03
TA11PersistenceKeep incident 'alive', beyond the incident creators' effortsP03
TA12Measure EffectivenessMeasure effectiveness of incident, for use in planning future eventsP04
diff --git a/tasks/TK0002.md b/tasks/TK0002.md index 5882e1d..f43249d 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0002.md +++ b/tasks/TK0002.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0002 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA01 diff --git a/tasks/TK0003.md b/tasks/TK0003.md index 83fd33d..a79dfa4 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0003.md +++ b/tasks/TK0003.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0003 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA01 diff --git a/tasks/TK0004.md b/tasks/TK0004.md index ffb291a..033d8e2 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0004.md +++ b/tasks/TK0004.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0004 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA02 diff --git a/tasks/TK0005.md b/tasks/TK0005.md index 625baa5..f6bf98f 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0005.md +++ b/tasks/TK0005.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0005 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA02 diff --git a/tasks/TK0006.md b/tasks/TK0006.md index c51f000..376103a 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0006.md +++ b/tasks/TK0006.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0006 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA02 diff --git a/tasks/TK0007.md b/tasks/TK0007.md index 9fa354a..e7803b0 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0007.md +++ b/tasks/TK0007.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0007 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA02 diff --git a/tasks/TK0008.md b/tasks/TK0008.md index 66a664b..fbaab00 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0008.md +++ b/tasks/TK0008.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0008 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA02 diff --git a/tasks/TK0009.md b/tasks/TK0009.md index 455a776..cae307c 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0009.md +++ b/tasks/TK0009.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0009 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA02 diff --git a/tasks/TK0010.md b/tasks/TK0010.md index 9a50ec1..15541a4 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0010.md +++ b/tasks/TK0010.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0010 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA03 diff --git a/tasks/TK0011.md b/tasks/TK0011.md index 28ba006..8729776 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0011.md +++ b/tasks/TK0011.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0011 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA03 diff --git a/tasks/TK0012.md b/tasks/TK0012.md index fa0ce63..de30ea2 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0012.md +++ b/tasks/TK0012.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0012 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA03 diff --git a/tasks/TK0013.md b/tasks/TK0013.md index ce6ba21..f1d031c 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0013.md +++ b/tasks/TK0013.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0013 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA03 diff --git a/tasks/TK0014.md b/tasks/TK0014.md index 36ded40..4569d69 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0014.md +++ b/tasks/TK0014.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0014 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA04 diff --git a/tasks/TK0015.md b/tasks/TK0015.md index be9c0ab..f6d5795 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0015.md +++ b/tasks/TK0015.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0015 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA04 diff --git a/tasks/TK0016.md b/tasks/TK0016.md index 8fc9a47..e5de7aa 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0016.md +++ b/tasks/TK0016.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0016 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA04 diff --git a/tasks/TK0017.md b/tasks/TK0017.md index 262d103..158d353 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0017.md +++ b/tasks/TK0017.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0017 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA06 diff --git a/tasks/TK0018.md b/tasks/TK0018.md index 1bbbae4..b656092 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0018.md +++ b/tasks/TK0018.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0018 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA06 diff --git a/tasks/TK0019.md b/tasks/TK0019.md index 8c2dd6d..ca7e2d5 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0019.md +++ b/tasks/TK0019.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0019 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA08 diff --git a/tasks/TK0020.md b/tasks/TK0020.md index 68fb6a8..52c7cce 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0020.md +++ b/tasks/TK0020.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0020 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA08 diff --git a/tasks/TK0021.md b/tasks/TK0021.md index 1e873f8..4dfeba0 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0021.md +++ b/tasks/TK0021.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0021 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA09 diff --git a/tasks/TK0022.md b/tasks/TK0022.md index e645a01..153c26f 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0022.md +++ b/tasks/TK0022.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0022 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA09 diff --git a/tasks/TK0023.md b/tasks/TK0023.md index 281483c..ccfb75b 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0023.md +++ b/tasks/TK0023.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0023 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA11 diff --git a/tasks/TK0024.md b/tasks/TK0024.md index 4c52619..e56aed0 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0024.md +++ b/tasks/TK0024.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0024 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA11 diff --git a/tasks/TK0025.md b/tasks/TK0025.md index c43637c..1dce874 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0025.md +++ b/tasks/TK0025.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0025 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA11 diff --git a/tasks/TK0026.md b/tasks/TK0026.md index 6e25e10..69176f9 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0026.md +++ b/tasks/TK0026.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0026 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA11 diff --git a/tasks/TK0027.md b/tasks/TK0027.md index c1cce75..29bda4b 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0027.md +++ b/tasks/TK0027.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0027 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA11 diff --git a/tasks/TK0028.md b/tasks/TK0028.md index bd3a483..4bb24ba 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0028.md +++ b/tasks/TK0028.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0028 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA12 diff --git a/tasks/TK0029.md b/tasks/TK0029.md index 52ffd77..8cca560 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0029.md +++ b/tasks/TK0029.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0029 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA12 diff --git a/tasks/TK0030.md b/tasks/TK0030.md index 1791cf6..7d4ae73 100644 --- a/tasks/TK0030.md +++ b/tasks/TK0030.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ * **Id:** TK0030 -* **Summary:** nan +* **Summary:** * **Tactic:** TA12 diff --git a/tasks_index.md b/tasks_index.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ab70fcc --- /dev/null +++ b/tasks_index.md @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +# AMITT Tasks: + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
idnamesummarytactic_id
TK0001Goal settingSet the goals for this incident. TA01
TK0002Population research / audience analysis (centre of gravity)TA01
TK0003Campaign design (objective design)TA01
TK0004Identify target subgroupsTA02
TK0005Analyse subgroupsTA02
TK0006create master narrativesTA02
TK0007Decide on techniques (4Ds etc)TA02
TK0008Create subnarrativesTA02
TK00094chan/8chan coordinating contentTA02
TK0010Create personasTA03
TK0011Recruit contractorsTA03
TK0012Recruit partisansTA03
TK0013find influencersTA03
TK0014Network buildingTA04
TK0015Network infiltrationTA04
TK0016identify targets - susceptible audience members in networksTA04
TK0017content creationTA06
TK0018content appropriationTA06
TK0019anchor trust / credibilityTA08
TK0020insert themesTA08
TK0021deamplification (suppression, censoring)TA09
TK0022amplificationTA09
TK0023retentionTA11
TK0024customer relationshipTA11
TK0025advocacy/ zealotryTA11
TK0026conversionTA11
TK0027keep recruiting/prospectingTA11
TK0028evaluationTA12
TK0029post-mortemTA12
TK0030after-action analysisTA12
diff --git a/techniques_index.md b/techniques_index.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..080da93 --- /dev/null +++ b/techniques_index.md @@ -0,0 +1,421 @@ +# AMITT Techniques: + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
idnamesummarytactic_id
T00015Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)Nimmo's "4Ds of propaganda": dismiss, distort, distract, dismay (MisinfosecWG added divide in 2019). Misinformation promotes an agenda by advancing narratives supportive of that agenda. This is most effective when the advanced narrative pre-dates the revelation of the specific misinformation content. This is often not possible.TA01
T0002Facilitate State PropagandaOrganize citizens around pro-state messaging. Paid or volunteer groups coordinated to push state propaganda (examples include 2016 Diba Facebook Expedition, coordinated to overcome China’s Great Firewall, to flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message).TA01
T0003Leverage Existing NarrativesUse or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices. Examples include midwesterners are generous, Russia is under attack from outside.TA01
T0004Competing NarrativesAdvance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. MH17 (example) "Russian Foreign Ministry again claimed that “absolutely groundless accusations are put forward against the Russian side, which are aimed at discrediting Russia in the eyes of the international community" (deny); "The Dutch MH17 investigation is biased, anti-Russian and factually inaccurate" (dismiss). + +Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. + +These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the "firehose of misinformation" approach.TA01
T0005Center of Gravity AnalysisRecon/research to identify "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act." Thus, the center of gravity is usually seen as the "source of strength". Includes demographic and network analysis of communitiesTA02
T0006Create Master NarrativesThe promotion of beneficial master narratives is perhaps the most effective method for achieving long-term strategic narrative dominance. From a "whole of society" perpective the promotion of the society's core master narratives should occupy a central strategic role. From a misinformation campaign / cognitive security perpectve the tactics around master narratives center more precisely on the day-to-day promotion and reinforcement of this messaging. In other words, beneficial, high-coverage master narratives are a central strategic goal and their promotion consitutes an ongoing tactical struggle carried out at a whole-of-society level. + +By way of example, major powers are promoting master narratives such as: +* "Huawei is detetmined to build trustworthy networks" +* "Russia is the victim of bullying by NATO powers" +* "USA is guided by its founding principles of liberty and egalitarianism" + +Tactically, their promotion covers a broad spectrum of activities both on- and offline.TA02
T0007Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / GroupsCreate key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets. + +Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are. + +Examples: Ukraine elections (2019) circumvent Facebook’s new safeguards by paying Ukrainian citizens to give a Russian agent access to their personal pages. EU Elections (2019) Avaaz reported more than 500 suspicious pages and groups to Facebook related to the three-month investigation of Facebook disinformation networks in Europe. Mueller report (2016) The IRA was able to reach up to 126 million Americans on Facebook via a mixture of fraudulent accounts, groups, and advertisements, the report says. Twitter accounts it created were portrayed as real American voices by major news outlets. It was even able to hold real-life rallies, mobilizing hundreds of people at a time in major cities like Philadelphia and Miami. TA03
T0008Create fake or imposter news sitesModern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details. A prominent case from the 2016 era was the _Denver Guardian_, which purported to be a local newspaper in Colorado and specialized in negative stories about Hillary Clinton.TA03
T0009Create fake expertsStories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself. For example, in the Jade Helm conspiracy theory promoted by SVR in 2015, a pair of experts--one of them naming himself a “Military Intelligence Analyst / Russian Regional CME” and the other a “Geopolitical Strategist, Journalist & Author”--pushed the story heavily on LinkedIn.TA03
T0010Cultivate ignorant agentsCultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as "useful idiots" or "unwitting agents".TA04
T0011Hijack legitimate accountHack or take over legimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content. Examples include Syrian Electronic Army (2013) series of false tweets from a hijacked Associated Press Twitter account claiming that President Barack Obama had been injured in a series of explosions near the White House. The false report caused a temporary plunge of 143 points on the Dow Jones Industrial Average.TA04
T0012Use concealmentUse anonymous social media profiles. Examples include page or group administrators, masked "whois" website directory data, no bylines connected to news article, no masthead connect to news websites. + +Example is 2016 @TEN_GOP profile where the actual Tennessee Republican Party tried unsuccessfully for months to get Twitter to shut it down, and 2019 Endless Mayfly is an Iran-aligned network of inauthentic personas and social media accounts that spreads falsehoods and amplifies narratives critical of Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel.TA04
T0013Create fake websitesCreate media assets to support fake organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations.TA04
T0014Create funding campaignsGenerate revenue through online funding campaigns. e.g. Gather data, advance credible persona via Gofundme; Patreon; or via fake website connecting via PayPal or Stripe. (Example 2016) #VaccinateUS Gofundme campaigns to pay for Targetted facebook ads (Larry Cook, targetting Washington State mothers, $1,776 to boost posts over 9 months).TA04
T0015Create hashtagMany incident-based campaigns will create a hashtag to promote their fabricated event (e.g. #ColumbianChemicals to promote a fake story about a chemical spill in Louisiana). + +Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: +1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only "real" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name! +2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior + +Asset needed to direct/control/manage "conversation" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites ie: Twitter, LinkedIn)TA04
T0016ClickbaitCreate attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. (example 2016) “Pope Francis shocks world, endorses Donald Trump for president.” (example 2016) "FBI director received millions from Clinton Foundation, his brother’s law firm does Clinton’s taxes”. This is a key assetTA05
T0017Promote online fundingDrive traffic/engagement to funding campaign sites; helps provide measurable metrics to assess conversion ratesTA05
T0018Paid targeted adsCreate or fund advertisements targeted at specific populationsTA05
T0019Generate information pollutionFlood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. "Nothing is true, but everything is possible." Akin to astroturfing campaign.TA06
T0020Trial contentIteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion ratesTA06
T0021MemesMemes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.TA06
T0022Conspiracy narratives"Conspiracy narratives appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the ""firehose of falsehoods"" model. + +Example: QAnon: conspiracy theory is an explanation of an event or situation that invokes a conspiracy by sinister and powerful actors, often political in motivation, when other explanations are more probable "TA06
T0023Distort factsChange, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper contentTA06
T0024Create fake videos and imagesCreate fake videos and/or images by manipulating existing content or generating new content (e.g. deepfakes). Examples include Pelosi video (making her appear drunk) and photoshoped shark on flooded streets of Houston TX.TA06
T0025Leak altered documentsObtain documents (eg by theft or leak), then alter and release, possibly among factual documents/sources. + +Example (2019) DFRLab report "Secondary Infektion” highlights incident with key asset being a forged “letter” created by the operation to provide ammunition for far-right forces in Europe ahead of the election.TA06
T0026Create fake researchCreate fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxxTA06
T0027Adapt existing narrativesAdapting existing narratives to current operational goals is the tactical sweet-spot for an effective misinformation campaign. Leveraging existing narratives is not only more effective, it requires substantially less resourcing, as the promotion of new master narratives operates on a much larger scale, both time and scope. Fluid, dynamic & often interchangeable key master narratives can be ("The morally corrupt West") adapted to divisive (LGBT propaganda) or to distort (individuals working as CIA operatives). For Western audiences, different but equally powerful framings are available, such as "USA has a fraught history in race relations, especially in criminal justice areas."TA06
T0028Create competing narrativesMisinformation promotes an agenda by advancing narratives supportive of that agenda. This is most effective when the advanced narrative pre-dates the revelation of the specific misinformation content. But this is often not possible. + +Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. + +These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the *firehose of misinformation* approach.TA06
T0029Manipulate online pollsCreate fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Examples: flooding FCC with comments; creating fake engagement metrics of Twitter/Facebook polls to manipulate perception of given issue. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as wellTA07
T0030Backstop personasCreate other assets/dossier/cover/fake relationships and/or connections or documents, sites, bylines, attributions, to establish/augment/inflate crediblity/believabilityTA07
T0031YouTubeUse YouTube as a narrative dissemination channelTA07
T0032RedditUse Reddit as a narrative dissemination channelTA07
T0033InstagramUse Instagram as a narrative dissemination channelTA07
T0034LinkedInUse LinkedIn as a narrative dissemination channelTA07
T0035PinterestUse Pinterest as a narrative dissemination channelTA07
T0036WhatsAppUse WhatsApp as a narrative dissemination channelTA07
T0037FacebookUse Facebook as a narrative dissemination channelTA07
T0038TwitterUse Twitter as a narrative dissemination channelTA07
T0039Bait legitimate influencersCredibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. "Influencers" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial. + +By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders.TA08
T0040Demand unsurmountable proofCampaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the "firehose of misinformation". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of "questions" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.TA08
T0041Deny involvementWithout "smoking gun" proof (and even with proof), incident creator can or will deny involvement. This technique also leverages the attacker advantages outlined in T0040 "Demand unsurmountable proof", specifically the asymmetric disadvantage for truth-tellers in a "firehose of misinformation" environment.TA08
T0042Kernel of TruthWrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. + +Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. + +When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.TA08
T0043Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat appsDirect messaging via encypted app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a diffucult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety.TA08
T0044Seed distortionsIncident creators often try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event in order to give a misleading account or impression. + +Examples: (2019) China formally arrests Canadians Spavor and Kovrig, accuses them of spying (in retaliation to detention of Hauwei CFO). (2018) The Russian ministry of defence put out a press release, claiming that they had intelligence Syrian rebel forces were about to gas their own people in Idlib province as part of a “false flag” operation to frame the Syrian government.TA08
T0045Use fake expertsUse the fake experts that were set up in T0009. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give "credility" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential biasTA08
T0046Search Engine OptimizationManipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka "Black-hat SEO" TA08
T0047Muzzle social media as a political forceUse political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports. (Example 20190 Singapore Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill would make it illegal to spread "false statements of fact" in Singapore, where that information is "prejudicial" to Singapore's security or "public tranquility." Or India/New Delhi has cut off services to Facebook and Twitter in Kashmir 28 times in the past five years, and in 2016, access was blocked for five months -- on the grounds that these platforms were being used for anti-social and "anti-national" purposes.TA09
T0048Cow online opinion leadersIntimidate, coerce, threaten critics/dissidents/journalists via trolling, doxing. Examples: Philippines, Maria Ressa and Rappler journalists targeted Duterte regime, lawsuits, trollings, banned from the presidential palace where press briefings take place; 2017 bot attack on five ProPublica Journalists.TA09
T0049FloodingFlooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect. + +Example (2018): bots flood social media promoting messages which support Saudi Arabia with intent to cast doubt on allegations that the kingdom was involved in Khashoggi’s death.TA09
T0050Cheerleading domestic social media opsDeploy state-coordinated social media commenters and astroturfers. Both internal/domestic and external social media influence operations, popularized by China (50cent Army manage message inside the "Great Firewall") but also technique used by Chinese English-language social media influence operations are seeded by state-run media, which overwhelmingly present a positive, benign, and cooperative image of China. TA09
T0051Fabricate social media commentUse government-paid social media commenters, astroturfers, chat bots (programmed to reply to specific key words/hashtags) influence online conversations, product reviews, web-site comment forums. (2017 example) the FCC was inundated with nearly 22 million public comments on net neutrality (many from fake accounts)TA09
T0052Tertiary sites amplify newsCreate content/news/opinion web-sites to cross-post stories. Tertiary sites circulate and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution. + +Examples of tertiary sites include Russia Insider, The Duran, geopolitica.ru, Mint Press News, Oriental Review, globalresearch.ca. Examples: (2019, Domestic news): Snopes reveals Star News Digital Media, Inc. may look like a media company that produces local news, but operates via undisclosed connections to political activism. (2018) FireEye reports on Iranian campaign that created between April 2018 and March 2019 sites used to spread inauthentic content from websites such as Liberty Front Press (LFP), US Journal, and Real Progressive Front during the 2018 US mid-terms.TA09
T0053Twitter trolls amplify and manipulateUse trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized) e.g. BlackLivesMatter or MeTooTA09
T0054Twitter bots amplifyUse bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more "popular" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.(example 2019) #TrudeauMustGo TA09
T0055Use hashtagUse a dedicated hashtag for the incident (e.g. #PhosphorusDisaster) - either create a campaign/incident specific hashtag, or take over an existing hashtag.TA09
T0056Dedicated channels disseminate information pollutionOutput information pollution (e.g. articles on an unreported false story/event) through channels controlled by or related to the incident creator. Examples include RT/Sputnik or antivax websites seeding stories.TA09
T0057Organise remote rallies and eventsCoordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives. Example: Facebook groups/pages coordinate/more divisive/polarizing groups and actvities into the public space. (Example) Mueller's report, highlights, the IRA organized political rallies in the U.S. using social media starting in 2015 and continued to coordinate rallies after the 2016 electionTA10
T0058Legacy web contentMake incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed.TA11
T0059Play the long gamePlay the long game can mean a couple of things: +1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold (e.g. China and its constant messaging that Taiwan and Hong Kong are part of one China). +2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.TA11
T0060Continue to amplifycontinue narrative or message amplification after the main incident work has finishedTA11
T0061Sell merchandisingSell hats, t-shirts, flags and other branded content that's designed to be seen in the real worldTA10