# AMITT Counters:

<table border="1">
<tr>
<th>id</th>
<th>name</th>
<th>summary</th>
<th>metatechnique</th>
<th>tactic</th>
<th>responsetype</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00006.md">C00006</a></td>
<td>Charge for social media</td>
<td>Include a paid-for privacy option, e.g. pay Facebook for an option of them not collecting your personal information.  There are examples of this not work, e.g. most people don’t use proton mail etc. </td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00006.md">C00006</a></td>
<td>Censorship</td>
<td>Alter and/or block the publication/dissemination of adversary controlled information</td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00008.md">C00008</a></td>
<td>Create shared fact-checking database</td>
<td>Snopes is best-known example</td>
<td>M006 - scoring</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00009.md">C00009</a></td>
<td>Educate high profile influencers on best practices</td>
<td></td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00010.md">C00010</a></td>
<td>Enhanced privacy regulation for social media</td>
<td>Privacy standards</td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00011.md">C00011</a></td>
<td>Media literacy. Games to identify fake news</td>
<td></td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00012.md">C00012</a></td>
<td>Platform regulation</td>
<td>Empower existing regulators to govern social media. Also covers Destroy.  Includes: Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media - The European Union created significant new regulations in 2018; the U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance. Includes Create policy that makes social media police disinformation - example: German model: facebook forced to police content by law. Includes: Use fraud legislation to clean up social media</td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00013.md">C00013</a></td>
<td>Rating framework for news</td>
<td>This is "strategic innoculation", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news. Example: journalistic ethics, or journalistic licensing body.  Include full transcripts, link source, add items. </td>
<td>M006 - scoring</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00014.md">C00014</a></td>
<td>Real-time updates to fact-checking database</td>
<td>existing examples at Buzzfeed and Fema, especially during disasters</td>
<td>M006 - scoring</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00017.md">C00017</a></td>
<td>Repair broken social connections</td>
<td>For example, use a media campaign to promote in-group to out-group in person communication / activities . Technique could be in terms of forcing a reality-check by talking to people instead of reading about bogeymen. </td>
<td>M010 - countermessaging</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00019.md">C00019</a></td>
<td>Reduce effect of division-enablers</td>
<td>includes Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers, and Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers</td>
<td>M003 - daylight</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00021.md">C00021</a></td>
<td>Encourage in-person communication</td>
<td></td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00022.md">C00022</a></td>
<td>Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety</td>
<td>Used to counter ability based and fear based attacks</td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00024.md">C00024</a></td>
<td>Promote healthy narratives</td>
<td>Includes promoting constructive narratives i.e. not polarising (e.g. pro-life, pro-choice, pro-USA).  Includes promoting identity neutral narratives. </td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00026.md">C00026</a></td>
<td>Shore up democracy based messages</td>
<td>Messages about e.g. peace, freedom. And make it sexy. Includes Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft: Promote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess U.S. messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacy</td>
<td>M010 - countermessaging</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00027.md">C00027</a></td>
<td>Create culture of civility</td>
<td>This is passive.  Includes promoting civility as an identity that people will defend. </td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D7 Deter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00028.md">C00028</a></td>
<td>Make information provenance available</td>
<td>Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments.  Use blockchain technology to require collaborative validation before posts or comments are submitted.

This could be used to adjust upvote weight via a trust factor of people and organisations you trust, or other criteria.</td>
<td>M011 - verification</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00029.md">C00029</a></td>
<td>Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise</td>
<td></td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00030.md">C00030</a></td>
<td>Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)</td>
<td>Example: Reality Team.
https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Counter-narrative-Handbook_1.pdf </td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00031.md">C00031</a></td>
<td>Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify</td>
<td>Create competing narratives. Included "Facilitate State Propaganda" as diluting the narrative could have an effect on the pro-state narrative used by volunteers, or lower their involvement.</td>
<td>M009 - dilution</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00032.md">C00032</a></td>
<td>Hijack content and link to truth- based info</td>
<td>Link to platform</td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00034.md">C00034</a></td>
<td>Create more friction at account creation</td>
<td>Counters fake account</td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA03 Develop People</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00036.md">C00036</a></td>
<td>Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide)</td>
<td>All of these would be highly affected by infiltration or false-claims of infiltration.</td>
<td>M013 - targeting</td>
<td>TA03 Develop People</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00040.md">C00040</a></td>
<td>third party verification for people</td>
<td>counters fake experts</td>
<td>M011 - verification</td>
<td>TA03 Develop People</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00042.md">C00042</a></td>
<td>Address truth contained in narratives</td>
<td></td>
<td>M010 - countermessaging</td>
<td>TA03 Develop People</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00044.md">C00044</a></td>
<td>Keep people from posting to social media immediately</td>
<td>My interpretation is that this is method would be used to slow down activities or force a small delay between posts or replies to new posts.</td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA03 Develop People</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00046.md">C00046</a></td>
<td>Marginalise and discredit extremist groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>M013 - targeting</td>
<td>TA03 Develop People</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00047.md">C00047</a></td>
<td>Coordinated inauthentics</td>
<td></td>
<td>M008 - data pollution</td>
<td>TA04 Develop Networks</td>
<td>D5 Deceive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00048.md">C00048</a></td>
<td>Name and Shame Influencers</td>
<td>Think about the different levels: individual vs state-sponsored account.  Includes “call them out” and “name and shame”.  Note that USAID operations were at a different level. Identify social media accounts as sources of propaganda—“calling them out”— might be helpful to prevent the spread of their message to audiences that otherwise would consider them factual. USAID has been restructuring its programs to address predatory Chinese development projects and the information operations that support them. USAID’s new strategy has tailored programs to counter Chinese educational exchange programs and to support free and fair elections, youth empowerment, democratic governance, and free press. USAID’s Russia regional teams have also been compiling a strategy for Russia’s information operations. One strong point of USAID’s programming is a system of indicators and measurements for a country’s vulnerability to foreign influence and information operations.  Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target externally-based nonattributed social media accounts.  Impact of and Dealing with Trolls - "Chatham House has observed that trolls also sometimes function as decoys, as a way of “keeping the infantry busy” that “aims to wear down the other side” (Lough et al., 2014). Another type of troll involves “false accounts posing as authoritative information sources on social media”.</td>
<td>M003 - daylight</td>
<td>TA03 Develop People</td>
<td>D7 Deter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00051.md">C00051</a></td>
<td>Counter social engineering training</td>
<td>Includes anti-elicitation training, phishing prevention education. </td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA03 Develop People</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00052.md">C00052</a></td>
<td>Infiltrate platforms</td>
<td>Detect and degrade</td>
<td>M013 - targeting</td>
<td>TA04 Develop Networks</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00053.md">C00053</a></td>
<td>Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts</td>
<td></td>
<td>M012 - cleaning</td>
<td>TA04 Develop Networks</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00056.md">C00056</a></td>
<td>Get off social media</td>
<td>We don't expect this to work</td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA04 Develop Networks</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00058.md">C00058</a></td>
<td>Report crowdfunder as violator</td>
<td>counters crowdfunding. Includes ‘Expose online funding as fake”. </td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA03 Develop People</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00059.md">C00059</a></td>
<td>Verification of project before posting (counters funding campaigns)</td>
<td></td>
<td>M011 - verification</td>
<td>TA04 Develop Networks</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00060.md">C00060</a></td>
<td>Legal action against for-profit engagement factories</td>
<td></td>
<td>M013 - targeting</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00062.md">C00062</a></td>
<td>Free open library sources worldwide</td>
<td>Open-source libraries could be created that aid in some way for each technique. Even for Strategic Planning, some open-source frameworks such as AMITT can be created to counter the adversarial efforts.</td>
<td>M010 - countermessaging</td>
<td>TA04 Develop Networks</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00065.md">C00065</a></td>
<td>Reduce political targeting</td>
<td>Includes “ban political micro targeting” and “ban political ads”</td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA05 Microtargeting</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00066.md">C00066</a></td>
<td>Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back)</td>
<td></td>
<td>M009 - dilution</td>
<td>TA05 Microtargeting</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00067.md">C00067</a></td>
<td>Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding)</td>
<td></td>
<td>M013 - targeting</td>
<td>TA03 Develop People</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00070.md">C00070</a></td>
<td>Block access to disinformation resources</td>
<td>Resources = accounts, channels etc.  Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker.

TA02*: DDOS at the critical time (ie. midterm-2018 elections DDOS against troll farms) to deny an adversary's time-bound objective.

T0008: A quick response to a proto-viral story will affect it's ability to spread and raise questions about their legitimacy.

Hashtag: Against the platform, by drowning the hashtag.

T0046 - Search Engine Optimization: Sub-optimal website performance affect its search engine rank, which I interpret as "blocking access to a platform".</td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00071.md">C00071</a></td>
<td>Block source of pollution</td>
<td></td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00072.md">C00072</a></td>
<td>Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups – not recommended</td>
<td></td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00073.md">C00073</a></td>
<td>Inoculate populations through media literacy training</td>
<td>Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations. Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution.  Build cultural resistance to false content, e.g. cultural resistance to bullshit.  Influence literacy training, to inoculate against “cult” recruiting.  Media literacy training: leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Inoculate at language.   Strategic planning included as inoculating population has strategic value. Example is the "Learn to Discern" Program, funded by the Canadian government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016. The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in ‘’safe, informed media consumption techniques,’’ including avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech, verifying expert credentials, detecting censorship, and debunking news, photos, and videos.”  Example: NGO Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, with some international funding, provides training to journalists in the Baltics and conducts media literacy training in the region. In addition to helping journalists avoid becoming “unwitting multipliers of misleading information,” the organization works with school teachers in the region to help them “decode media and incorporate media research into teaching.” concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training.  Covers detect, deny, and degrade. </td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00074.md">C00074</a></td>
<td>Identify and delete or rate limit identical content</td>
<td>
</td>
<td>M012 - cleaning</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00075.md">C00075</a></td>
<td>normalise language</td>
<td></td>
<td>M010 - countermessaging</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00076.md">C00076</a></td>
<td>Prohibit images in political discourse channels</td>
<td></td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00077.md">C00077</a></td>
<td>Active defence: run TA03 "develop people” - not recommended</td>
<td></td>
<td>M013 - targeting</td>
<td>TA03 Develop People</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00078.md">C00078</a></td>
<td>Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content</td>
<td>Includes “change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists” and “Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side”</td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00080.md">C00080</a></td>
<td>Create competing narrative</td>
<td>Could also be degrade</td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00081.md">C00081</a></td>
<td>Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations</td>
<td>Discredit by pointing out the "noise" and informing public that "flooding" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of "noise"</td>
<td>M003 - daylight</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00082.md">C00082</a></td>
<td>Ground truthing as automated response to pollution</td>
<td>e.g. RealityTeam work that adds clear information to spaces with disinformation in.  Also inoculation.</td>
<td>M010 - countermessaging</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00084.md">C00084</a></td>
<td>Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them</td>
<td>Includes “poison pill recasting of message” and “steal their truths”.  Many techniques involve promotion which could be manipulated. For example, online fundings or rallies could be advertised, through compromised or fake channels, as being associated with "far-up/down/left/right" actors. "Long Game" narratives could be subjected in a similar way with negative connotations.  Can also replay technique T0003. </td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00085.md">C00085</a></td>
<td>Mute content</td>
<td>Rate-limit disinformation content.  Reduces its effects, whilst not running afoul of censorship concerns.

Online archives of content (archives of websites, social media profiles, media, copies of published advertisements; or archives of comments attributed to bad actors, as well as anonymized metadata about users who interacted with them and analysis of the effect) is useful for intelligence analysis and public transparency, but will need similar muting or tagging/ shaming as associated with bad actors.</td>
<td>M003 - daylight</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00086.md">C00086</a></td>
<td>Distract from noise with addictive content</td>
<td>Example: Interject addictive links or contents into discussions of disinformation materials and measure a "conversion rate" of users who engage with your content and away from the social media channel's "information bubble" around the disinformation item. Use bots to amplify and upvote the addictive content. 

Note: This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted comments are all jokes, preventing serious discussion from being discovered by those who filter by upvotes.</td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00087.md">C00087</a></td>
<td>Make more noise than the disinformation</td>
<td>Examples: kPop stans, #proudboys takeover by LGBT community</td>
<td>M009 - dilution</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00090.md">C00090</a></td>
<td>Fake engagement system</td>
<td></td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA07 Channel Selection</td>
<td>D5 Deceive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00091.md">C00091</a></td>
<td>Honeypot social community</td>
<td>Set honeypots, e.g. communities, in networks likely to be used for disinformation. </td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D5 Deceive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00092.md">C00092</a></td>
<td>Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers</td>
<td>Includes "Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers” and “Reputation scores for social media users”.  Influencers are individuals or accounts with many followers. </td>
<td>M006 - scoring</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D7 Deter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00093.md">C00093</a></td>
<td>Influencer code of conduct</td>
<td>Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers.  Can be platform code of conduct; can also be community code, e.g. the Pro-Truth Pledge. </td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA03 Develop People</td>
<td>D7 Deter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00094.md">C00094</a></td>
<td>Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research</td>
<td>Accountability move: make sure research is published with its funding sources. </td>
<td>M003 - daylight</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00096.md">C00096</a></td>
<td>Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers</td>
<td></td>
<td>M006 - scoring</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D7 Deter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00097.md">C00097</a></td>
<td>Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment</td>
<td></td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA07 Channel Selection</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00098.md">C00098</a></td>
<td>Revocation of allowlisted or "verified" status</td>
<td></td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA07 Channel Selection</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00099.md">C00099</a></td>
<td>Strengthen verification methods</td>
<td></td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA07 Channel Selection</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00100.md">C00100</a></td>
<td>Hashtag jacking</td>
<td></td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA08 Pump Priming</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00101.md">C00101</a></td>
<td>Create friction by rate-limiting engagement</td>
<td>Create participant friction.  Includes Make repeat voting hard, and throttle number of forwards. </td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA07 Channel Selection</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00103.md">C00103</a></td>
<td>Create a bot that engages / distract trolls</td>
<td>This is reactive, not active measure (honeypots are active).  It's a platform controlled measure.</td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA07 Channel Selection</td>
<td>D5 Deceive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00105.md">C00105</a></td>
<td>Buy more advertising than the adversary to shift influence and algorithms</td>
<td></td>
<td>M009 - dilution</td>
<td>TA07 Channel Selection</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00106.md">C00106</a></td>
<td>Click-bait centrist content</td>
<td>Create emotive centrist content that gets more clicks</td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00107.md">C00107</a></td>
<td>Content moderation</td>
<td>includes social media content take-downs, e.g. facebook or Twitter content take-downs</td>
<td>M006 - scoring, M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00109.md">C00109</a></td>
<td>Dampen Emotional Reaction</td>
<td></td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA09 Exposure</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00111.md">C00111</a></td>
<td>Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views</td>
<td>Example: The Commons Project (BuildUp) work. </td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00112.md">C00112</a></td>
<td>"Prove they are not an op!"</td>
<td></td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA08 Pump Priming</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00113.md">C00113</a></td>
<td>Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials. Attack audience quality of fake expert</td>
<td></td>
<td>M003 - daylight</td>
<td>TA08 Pump Priming</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00114.md">C00114</a></td>
<td>Don't engage with payloads</td>
<td></td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA08 Pump Priming</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00115.md">C00115</a></td>
<td>Expose actor and intentions</td>
<td></td>
<td>M003 - daylight</td>
<td>TA08 Pump Priming</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00116.md">C00116</a></td>
<td>Provide proof of involvement</td>
<td></td>
<td>M003 - daylight</td>
<td>TA08 Pump Priming</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00117.md">C00117</a></td>
<td>Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people</td>
<td>Label promote counter to disinformation</td>
<td>M010 - countermessaging</td>
<td>TA08 Pump Priming</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00118.md">C00118</a></td>
<td>Repurpose images with new text</td>
<td></td>
<td>M010 - countermessaging</td>
<td>TA08 Pump Priming</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00119.md">C00119</a></td>
<td>Engage payload and debunk. Provide link to facts. </td>
<td>Might be okay. </td>
<td>M010 - countermessaging</td>
<td>TA08 Pump Priming</td>
<td>D7 Deter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00120.md">C00120</a></td>
<td>Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes</td>
<td></td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA08 Pump Priming</td>
<td>D7 Deter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00121.md">C00121</a></td>
<td>Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow. </td>
<td></td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA08 Pump Priming</td>
<td>D7 Deter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00122.md">C00122</a></td>
<td>Content moderation</td>
<td>Beware: content moderation misused becomes censorship. </td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA09 Exposure</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00123.md">C00123</a></td>
<td>Remove or rate limit botnets</td>
<td></td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA09 Exposure</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00124.md">C00124</a></td>
<td>Don't feed the trolls</td>
<td></td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA09 Exposure</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00125.md">C00125</a></td>
<td>Prebunking</td>
<td></td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA09 Exposure</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00126.md">C00126</a></td>
<td>Social media amber alert</td>
<td></td>
<td>M003 - daylight</td>
<td>TA09 Exposure</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00128.md">C00128</a></td>
<td>Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other "decelerants"</td>
<td></td>
<td>M009 - dilution</td>
<td>TA09 Exposure</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00129.md">C00129</a></td>
<td>Use banking to cut off access </td>
<td>fiscal sanctions; parallel to counter terrorism</td>
<td>M014 - reduce resources</td>
<td>TA09 Exposure</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00130.md">C00130</a></td>
<td>Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously.</td>
<td></td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA05 Microtargeting</td>
<td>D7 Deter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00131.md">C00131</a></td>
<td>Seize and analyse botnet servers</td>
<td></td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA11 Persistence</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00133.md">C00133</a></td>
<td>Deplatform Account*</td>
<td>Note: Similar to Deplatform People but less generic. Perhaps both should be left.</td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA03 Develop People</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00135.md">C00135</a></td>
<td>Deplatform message groups and/or message boards</td>
<td>Merged two rows here. </td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA04 Develop Networks</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00136.md">C00136</a></td>
<td>Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages</td>
<td></td>
<td>M010 - countermessaging</td>
<td>TA08 Pump Priming</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00138.md">C00138</a></td>
<td>Spam domestic actors with lawsuits</td>
<td></td>
<td>M014 - reduce resources</td>
<td>TA11 Persistence</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00139.md">C00139</a></td>
<td>Weaponise youtube content matrices</td>
<td>God knows what this is. Keeping temporarily in case we work it out. </td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA11 Persistence</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00140.md">C00140</a></td>
<td>"Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls</td>
<td>Applies to most of the content used by exposure techniques except "T0055 - Use hashtag”. Applies to analytics</td>
<td>M008 - data pollution</td>
<td>TA12 Measure Effectiveness</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00142.md">C00142</a></td>
<td>Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content</td>
<td>Includes “this has been disproved: do you want to forward it”. Includes “"Hey this story is old" popup when messaging with old URL” - this assumes that this technique is based on visits to an URL shortener or a captured news site that can publish a message of our choice.  Includes “mark clickbait visually”. </td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00143.md">C00143</a></td>
<td>(botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time</td>
<td>Use copyright infringement claims to remove videos etc. </td>
<td>M013 - targeting</td>
<td>TA11 Persistence</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00144.md">C00144</a></td>
<td>Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs</td>
<td>Degrade the infrastructure. Could e.g. pay to not act for 30 days.  Not recommended</td>
<td>M014 - reduce resources</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00147.md">C00147</a></td>
<td>Make amplification of social media ports expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days)</td>
<td></td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA09 Exposure</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00148.md">C00148</a></td>
<td>Add random links to network graphs</td>
<td>If creators are using network analysis to determine how to attack networks, then adding random extra links to those networks might throw that analysis out enough to change attack outcomes. Unsure which AMITT techniques.</td>
<td>M008 - data pollution</td>
<td>TA12 Measure Effectiveness</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00149.md">C00149</a></td>
<td>Poison the monitoring & evaluation data</td>
<td>Includes Pollute the AB-testing data feeds: Polluting A/B testing requires knowledge of MOEs and MOPs. A/B testing must be caught early when there is relatively little data available so infiltration of TAs and understanding of how content is migrated from testing to larger audiences is fundamental.</td>
<td>M008 - data pollution</td>
<td>TA12 Measure Effectiveness</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00153.md">C00153</a></td>
<td>Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure</td>
<td>Align offensive cyber action with information operations and counter disinformation approaches, where appropriate.</td>
<td>M013 - targeting</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00154.md">C00154</a></td>
<td>Ask media not to report false information</td>
<td></td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA08 Pump Priming</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00155.md">C00155</a></td>
<td>Ban incident actors from funding sites</td>
<td></td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA03 Develop People</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00156.md">C00156</a></td>
<td>Better tell your country or organization story</td>
<td>Civil engagement activities conducted on the part of EFP forces. In Latvia, for example, U.S. soldiers have reportedly conducted numerous civil engagements with the local populations. In one example, soldiers cut firewood for local Russian-speaking Latvians. Locals were reportedly overheard saying, “A Russian soldier wouldn’t do that.” NATO should likewise provide support and training, where needed, to local public affairs and other communication personnel. Local government and military public affairs personnel can play their part in creating and disseminating entertaining and sharable content that supports the EFP mission. </td>
<td>M010 - countermessaging</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00159.md">C00159</a></td>
<td>Have a disinformation response plan</td>
<td>e.g. Create a campaign plan and toolkit for competition short of armed conflict (this used to be called “the grey zone”). The campaign plan should account for own vulnerabilities and strengths, and not over-rely on any one tool of statecraft or line of effort.  It will identify and employ a broad spectrum of national power to deter, compete, and counter (where necessary) other countries’ approaches, and will include understanding of own capabilities, capabilities of disinformation creators, and international standards of conduct to compete in, shrink the size, and ultimately deter use of competition short of armed conflict.</td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00160.md">C00160</a></td>
<td>find and train influencers</td>
<td>Identify key influencers (e.g. use network analysis), then reach out to identified users and offer support, through either training or resources.</td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA03 Develop People</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00161.md">C00161</a></td>
<td>Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements</td>
<td>Advance coalitions across borders and sectors, spanning public and private, as well as foreign and domestic, divides. Improve mechanisms to collaborate, share information, and develop coordinated approaches with the private sector at home and allies and partners abroad.</td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D7 Deter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00162.md">C00162</a></td>
<td>Unravel/target the Potemkin villages</td>
<td>Kremlin’s narrative spin extends through constellations of “civil society” organizations, political parties, churches, and other actors. Moscow leverages think tanks, human rights groups, election observers, Eurasianist integration groups, and orthodox groups. A collection of Russian civil society organizations, such as the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, together receive at least US$100 million per year, in addition to government-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), at least 150 of which are funded by Russian presidential grants totaling US$70 million per year.</td>
<td>M013 - targeting</td>
<td>TA04 Develop Networks</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00164.md">C00164</a></td>
<td>compatriot policy</td>
<td>protect the interests of this population and, more importantly, influence the population to support pro-Russia causes and effectively influence the politics of its neighbors</td>
<td>M013 - targeting</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00165.md">C00165</a></td>
<td>Ensure integrity of official documents</td>
<td>e.g. for leaked legal documents, use court motions to limit future discovery actions</td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00169.md">C00169</a></td>
<td>develop a creative content hub</td>
<td>international donors will donate to a basket fund that will pay a committee of local experts who will, in turn, manage and distribute the money to Russian-language producers and broadcasters that pitch various projects.</td>
<td>M010 - countermessaging</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00170.md">C00170</a></td>
<td>elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft</td>
<td>Shift from reactive to proactive response, with priority on sharing relevant information with the public and mobilizing private-sector engagement. Recent advances in data-driven technologies have elevated information as a source of power to influence the political and economic environment, to foster economic growth, to enable a decision-making advantage over competitors, and to communicate securely and quickly.</td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00172.md">C00172</a></td>
<td>social media source removal</td>
<td>Removing accounts, pages, groups, e.g. facebook page removal</td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA04 Develop Networks</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00174.md">C00174</a></td>
<td>Create a healthier news environment</td>
<td>Free and fair press: create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom.  Note difference between news and editorialising.  Build alternative news sources: create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets. Delegitimize the 24 hour news cycle.  includes Provide an alternative to disinformation content by expanding and improving local content: Develop content that can displace geopolitically-motivated narratives in the entire media environment, both new and old media alike.</td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique, M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00176.md">C00176</a></td>
<td>Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private</td>
<td>Coordinated disinformation challenges are increasingly multidisciplinary, there are few organizations within the national security structures that are equipped with the broad-spectrum capability to effectively counter large-scale conflict short of war tactics in real-time. Institutional hurdles currently impede diverse subject matter experts, hailing from outside of the traditional national security and foreign policy disciplines (e.g., physical science, engineering, media, legal, and economics fields), from contributing to the direct development of national security countermeasures to emerging conflict short of war threat vectors. A Cognitive Security Action Group (CSAG), akin to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), could drive interagency alignment across equivalents of DHS, DoS, DoD, Intelligence Community, and other implementing agencies, in areas including strategic narrative, and the nexus of cyber and information operations. </td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D7 Deter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00178.md">C00178</a></td>
<td>Fill information voids with non-disinformation content</td>
<td>1) Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!). 2) fill data voids with relevant information, e.g. increase Russian-language programming in areas subject to Russian disinformation.  Examples include using Current Time videos (viewed 40 million times online) to draw viewers away from Russian TV programming in RT and Sputnik. POtential content for this includes conventional entertainment programming (source: The conomist, “America’s Answer to Russian Propaganda TV,” 2017).</td>
<td>M009 - dilution, M008 - data pollution</td>
<td>TA05 Microtargeting</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00182.md">C00182</a></td>
<td>Redirection / malware detection/ remediation</td>
<td>Detect redirction or malware, then quarantine or delete.  Example: (2015) Trustwave reported that a Bedep Trojan malware kit had begun infecting machines and forcing them to browse certain sites, artificially inflating traffic to a set of pro-Russia</td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA09 Exposure</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00184.md">C00184</a></td>
<td>Media exposure</td>
<td></td>
<td>M003 - daylight</td>
<td>TA08 Pump Priming</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00188.md">C00188</a></td>
<td>Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves</td>
<td>Includes SEO influence.  August 2014, Russian news agency Rossiya Segodnya commissioned a poll in France with poorly worded questions and a statistically insignificant subsample that RT used to back a story titled “15% of French people back ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] militants, poll finds.” The story and summary infographic circulated on the internet, initially appearing primarily on French sites. After a week, the generally respectable digital U.S. news outlet Vox ran the story, now titled “One in Six French People Say They Support ISIS.” Although this effect has now worn off or been overwritten, for a time—despite a later story from The Washington Post debunking the claim—typing “ISIS France” into Google resulted in an autosuggestion of “ISIS France support” (Borthwick, 2015). Includes promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”: journalism training “would be helpful, especially for the online community.  Includes Strengthen local media: Improve effectiveness of local media outlets. Using eastern Latvia media outlets as an example, one expert noted that the media outlets are “very weak,” are often politically affiliated, or have “little local oligarchs that control them.”</td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA08 Pump Priming</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00189.md">C00189</a></td>
<td>Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts</td>
<td>Use ongoing analysis/monitoring of "flagged" profiles.  Confirm whether platforms are actively removing flagged accounts, and raise pressure via e.g. government organizations to encourage removal</td>
<td>M003 - daylight</td>
<td>TA03 Develop People</td>
<td>D6 Destroy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00190.md">C00190</a></td>
<td>open engagement with civil society</td>
<td>Government open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. Government seeks to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by competitor nations. Includes “fight in the light”: Use leadership in the arts, entertainment, and media to highlight and build on fundamental tenets of democracy.</td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00195.md">C00195</a></td>
<td>Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content </td>
<td>Use Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or Russian propaganda themes. Taking advantage of the technology behind Google AdWords, this method identifies potential ISIS recruits through their Google searches and exposes them to curated YouTube videos debunking ISIS recruiting themes. Apply this method to Russian propaganda. Includes Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist content. </td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA07 Channel Selection</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00197.md">C00197</a></td>
<td>remove suspicious accounts</td>
<td>Standard reporting for false profiles (identity issues).  Includes detecting hijacked accounts and reallocating them - if possible, back to original owners. </td>
<td>M005 - removal</td>
<td>TA03 Develop People</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00200.md">C00200</a></td>
<td>Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo</td>
<td>Has been done in e.g. India. FIXIT: standardize language used for influencer/ respected figure. </td>
<td>M010 - countermessaging</td>
<td>TA09 Exposure</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00202.md">C00202</a></td>
<td>Set data 'honeytraps'</td>
<td>Set honeytraps in content likely to be accessed for disinformation.   NB Macron election team modified docs to spike a hack and leak. </td>
<td>M002 - diversion</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00203.md">C00203</a></td>
<td>Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets</td>
<td></td>
<td>M004 - friction</td>
<td>TA04 Develop Networks</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00205.md">C00205</a></td>
<td>strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting</td>
<td>Increase civic resilience by partnering with business community to combat gray zone threats and ensuring adequate reporting and enforcement mechanisms. </td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00207.md">C00207</a></td>
<td>Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended</td>
<td>E.g. Saudi tit-for-tat campaign </td>
<td>M013 - targeting</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D7 Deter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00211.md">C00211</a></td>
<td>Use humorous counter-narratives</td>
<td>Examples:
 
* Baltic Elves.
https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/07/disinformation-nation-the-slovaks-fighting-in-defence-of-facts/ 
* Taiwan humor over rumor strategy.https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/feb/17/humour-over-rumour-taiwan-fake-news 
*  Taiwan “humor over rumour" 
https://internews.org/story/using-comedy-and-social-media-educate-disinformation </td>
<td>M010 - countermessaging</td>
<td>TA09 Exposure</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00212.md">C00212</a></td>
<td>build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant</td>
<td>Increase public service experience, and support wider civics and history education.</td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00216.md">C00216</a></td>
<td>Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors</td>
<td>Prevent ad revenue going to disinformation domains</td>
<td>M014 - reduce resources</td>
<td>TA05 Microtargeting</td>
<td>D2 Deny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00219.md">C00219</a></td>
<td>Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators</td>
<td>Steganography. Adding date, signatures etc to stop issue of photo relabelling etc. </td>
<td>M003 - daylight</td>
<td>TA06 Develop Content</td>
<td>D4 Degrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00220.md">C00220</a></td>
<td>Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan</td>
<td></td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00221.md">C00221</a></td>
<td>Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors</td>
<td>Include PACE plans - Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency</td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00222.md">C00222</a></td>
<td>Tabletop simulations</td>
<td></td>
<td>M007 - metatechnique</td>
<td>TA02 Objective Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="counters/C00223.md">C00223</a></td>
<td>Strengthen Trust in social media platforms</td>
<td></td>
<td>M001 - resilience</td>
<td>TA01 Strategic Planning</td>
<td>D3 Disrupt</td>
</tr>
</table>