


# OPCDE: Red Team Handcuffs

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Agenda

WHAT IS THIS

WHO WE ARE

**HANDCUFFS** 

**C**ONCLUSION

## WHAT THIS IS

How a Red Team (us) deals with real world constraints that:

- Impact our day to day job
- Force us to change tactics
- Require additional actions





Some things cannot be overcome with determination and a positive attitude.

#### WHO WE ARE

One of several Microsoft Red Teams

- 8 Members (6 FTE + 1 intern + 1 manager)
- Responsible for CDG
  - COSINE (think Windows)
  - Devices
  - Gaming

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#### **DEFINITIONS**

#### Handcuffs

verb (used with object)

- to put handcuffs on.
- to restrain or thwart (someone) by or as if by handcuffing:
- Ex: The amendments handcuffed the committee and prevented further action.



# HANDCUFFS

## LIMITATION: USING EXTERNAL RESOURCES

- · Attackers host and use resources that they may not fully control.
- · Example:
- Stuxnet used c2 servers out of US, Canada, France, and Thailand:
- smartclick.org
- Best-advertising.net
- Internetadvertising4u.com
- Ad-marketing.net



ALL YOUR BASE ARE BELONG TO US.

### LIMITATION: USING EXTERNAL RESOURCES

#### Why this matters:

- We cannot tolerate potentially leaking data by using external, public, or untrusted resources
- Attacking from only resources we control or own makes it much easier to detect, deconflict, and respond to us
- May not fully test the incident response process as short cuts will be taken
- Adds additional overhead as we must log all actions, data, traffic, etc.

## **SOLUTION: EXTERNAL RESOURCES**


## It's **often** just traffic

- Use hosted infrastructure from legitimate resources like AWS,
   Digital Ocean, etc
- Assume the infrastructure will be compromised; only use pass through proxies and custom payload (data) encryption
- Ideally tooling should generate payloads (data) that is protocol agnostic (chunking and tracking)

A basic implementation of this principle

- NGINX pass-thru proxies

# **Solution: External Resources**



## LIMITATION: ATTACKING PERSONAL DEVICES

Attackers can (and do) compromise non-corporate devices to look for ways of gaining corpnet access

#### Example:

Android malware focused on fraud will be used for other purposes if additional access is found

## LIMITATION: ATTACKING PERSONAL DEVICES

- Why this matters:
- We cannot break the law and compromise personal devices or do pre-texting (in some cases)
- Personal devices **are** a valid risk to corporate regardless of training or state of device
- Erodes employee trust in team, harms or limits BYOD initiatives



## **SOLUTION: ATTACKING PERSONAL DEVICES**

Via assume breach mentality, emulate said compromise

- Have a scenario that relies on the compromise of a personal device as a starting point; use same level of access or knowledge as would be obtained from a personal device compromise
  - Example: endpoints that are not otherwise discoverable
- Maintain personas that can be used or burned
- Work with corporate HR to figure out how to fake a user

## LIMITATION: TOOLSET DEVELOPMENT

Adversaries routinely build completely new custom targeted toolsets and malware for each campaign.

#### Examples:

- Stuxtnet
- Duqu
- Flame
- etc



## **LIMITATION: TOOLSET DEVELOPMENT**

#### Why this matters:

- When we get signatured, the cost to re-tool is high
- Not allowing for tooling to be signatured limits testing of a full response
- Fast paced cadence of work requires flexibility vs customization tradeoffs
- Potentially unable to implement attacks due to architecture choices

## **SOLUTION:** TOOLSET DEVELOPMENT

#### In coordination with Hunt:

- Agree on what is signatured and how
  - "Silent Alerts"
- Age out tools periodically
- Have a robust development pipeline and skillset
  - We by design hire people that can code
- Manage tool development tightly

## LIMITATION: WEAKEN SECURITY

Adversaries can (and often do) weaken the overall state of security of systems they compromise.

#### Examples:

- Disabling patching
- Leaving less than secure shells on system
- Disabling defensive components on system



Username : admin Password : admin

## LIMITATION: WEAKEN SECURITY

#### Why this matters:

- We cannot introduce additional risk as part of our tests
- We must leave systems and compromised data in the same or greater state of security than how we find them
- We cannot risk a third-party compromise of a system we have compromised resulting in inability to correctly attribute activity

## **SOLUTION: WEAKEN SECURITY**

#### Several components:

- All tooling must be reviewed internally for security flaws
- All tooling must perform strong authentication
- All actions must be logged, via automation if possible
- Internal process exists for deconflicting or evaluating potentially compromised devices
  - If compromise is found, terminate test and let Blue Team respond
- Notify Blue Team of any critical vulnerabilities that cross identity boundaries

## **LIMITATION: TIME BOXED**

Adversaries can spend months attacking a single target.

#### Examples:

Almost any active campaign out there (hence the term campaign)

#### Why this matters:

- We have 4-12 weeks on average to accomplish our goal
  - Includes breach, action on objective, and report
  - Subject to business rhythm constraints (change freeze, holiday, etc.)

## **SOLUTION:** TIME BOXED

#### Maintain persistence


- We have dedicated tooling for this (separate from main toolset)
- Generate an irregular signal for Blue Team to hunt on

Use automation to track system state and watch for opportunity

We have dedicated tooling for this (separate from main toolset)

Plan engagements out several cycles in advance

We can swap or change around if opportunity arises



## **CONCLUSION**

#### **SUMMARY**

Coordinate closely with your partners

- Blue Team (IR, Hunt, Forensics)

Use creative thinking to evaluate situations

- Allow for fluidity in your schedule



- Leverage internal knowledge, tooling, and partnerships to be more efficient

# **Q**UESTIONS

