91 строка
5.9 KiB
Plaintext
91 строка
5.9 KiB
Plaintext
TXT version of the V1 Guide:
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Foreword:
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Threat actor profiles are made for a range of reasons. An example trigger for creating
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a new profile can include after an incident, e.g., an internal detection or supply chain
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breach has been observed. Alternatively, CTI research has identified that their
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organisation(s) or client(s) are likely to be targeted by the threat actor due to a
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number of factors.
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The ‘Threat Actor Profile Guide for CTI Analysts’ was created after multiple Curated
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Intelligence members requested advice about the topic and their creation. Individuals
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in our community expressed difficulty and some shared their experiences around the
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difficulty of making one for their stakeholders.
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This guide offers a templated introduction for CTI analysts getting started with
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profiling threat actors. Experienced CTI analysts and mature teams will likely have a
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more refined methodology and even different types of threat actor profiles tailored
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for a specific stakeholder type.
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Executive Summary
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Introduction: “As of $Month 20XX, the Cyber Threat Intelligence team has researched the $ThreatActor”
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• An Executive Summary should ideally be no longer than 10-15 lines (2-3 paragraphs)
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• The main three questions to answer are “What?” “So What?” and “What Now?”
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• Explain the level of threat to the organisation, which includes the following:
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o Highlight organisation whether the threat actor has targeted your organisation’s sector, country, or region as early as you can.
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o Make a short assessment of why your organisation could be targeted (or why they have been targeted) by the $ThreatActor.
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o Make a short evaluation of the ability of your organisation’s defence mechanisms to mitigate the threat.
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Executive Summary | Stakeholder Their Needs
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The Executive Leadership Team (ELT)
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- Talk about the potential losses that could be caused by a successful attack.
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- Think about Intellectual Property Theft, Customer Data Theft, and Financial Theft.
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- Focus on the impact to the organisation’s investments.
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Operational (SOC, CERT, Security Engineering, Security Awareness, etc.)
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- Talk about what tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that $ThreatActor uses.
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- Highlight significant technical findings, like the fact that it exploits a certain CVE that is highly present in the organisation’s or client’s environment.
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About $ThreatActor
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• Creating a Table of Threat Actor Aliases (sometimes referred to as cryptonyms) helps lay the foundation of the analysis in the profile.
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• The Table helps readers quickly understand that multiple organisations are tracking what is essentially the same activity group using their own moniker.
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• The analyst can discuss (and potentially use a diagram) if the attribution to a named threat actor the profile is for is not clearly defined elsewhere.
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• For more guidance, Curated Intelligence has blogged previously on Threat Actor Naming Schemes (https://www.curatedintel.org/2022/05/threat-group-naming-schemes-in-cyber.html)
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Once the bit of Threat Actor Alias housekeeping is done, the CTI analyst can
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begin to introduce the $ThreatActor.
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• The introduction should ultimately answer the following questions:
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o What type of threat actor (group) is it? E.g., Cybercrime, Espionage, Hacktivism, etc.
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o What areas does $ThreatActor specialise in?
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o What type of campaign does $ThreatActor launch?
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o Make a short assessment of how advanced the $ThreatActor is based on Reason X, Y, and Z.
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o Discuss notable technical observations, such as software and TTPs.
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Targets of $ThreatActor
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• Which sectors/verticals does $ThreatActor target?
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o Think: Proximity to our sector/region
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o Think: Recency of when their attacks were
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• What does the $ThreatActor group do once they are inside a victim’s environment?
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• How long have they been known to persist inside a victim’s environment?
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• Are the targets of $ThreatActor related to each other?
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o Think: Cyber-enablement campaigns
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$ThreatActor Diamond Model Attributes
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• The Diamond Model Attributes are the key pieces of information required to rapidly understand the $ThreatActor.
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• After these are filled out by the CTI analyst, they can then be added to a Diamond Model Diagram.
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• Once the Diagram is complete, the CTI analyst can introduce the threat actor and hit on the key points from their research and extraction of threat data.
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Adversary - Origin, Motivation, Activity
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Victim - Targeting, Locations, Systems
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Capabilities - IN, THROUGH, OUT
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Infrastructure - Attack Infrastructure, Support Infrastructure
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$ThreatActor Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)
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• The first few lines of this section should include a summary of technical details at a high level that can be useful for all stakeholders.
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o This can be done by borrowing the Unified Kill Chain’s three stages: IN, THROUGH, and OUT
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o https://www.unifiedkillchain.com/assets/The-Unified-KillChain.pdf
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• To discuss the $ThreatActor TTPs in detail, the MITRE ATT&CK framework is recommended.
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o https://attack.mitre.org
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• It is also recommended to create a table for TTPs: ATT&CK ID, Description, Observable, Source
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• The point of this exercise is to demonstrate our technical understanding of the $ThreatActor.
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• The TTPs can also be used for other activities by other stakeholders.
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• Security Engineering will find these helpful in implementing detection for the activities.
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• Red Teamers may use these for adversary emulation during engagements.
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• The SOC will find these helpful for situational awareness and supporting their triaging of events
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References
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• Add all external references you intend to cite in your report
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• Use in-line citations to show the source of information (in paragraphs)
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• Consider highlighting problematic sources and perform source evaluation.
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o This can be a footnote on a page of the threat actor card if there is contention around technical aspects or attribution assessments.
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o Only include if it is important for readers to know about.
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