diff --git a/src/lib/components/AttributionInformation.svelte b/src/lib/components/AttributionInformation.svelte
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What was the attribution?
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Short Title (free text).
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Short Description (free text).
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Link to Attribution (link).
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When did the interference and attribution occur?
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Date(s) of Activity. Date or range of purported activity.
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Start (date). Input if start date is known; if not, omit.
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End (date). Input if end date is known, if not, omit.
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Date of Attribution (date). Date corresponds to date of link of attribution.
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Who is making the attribution, against whom?
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Source of Allegation (free text). The original source of the interference allegation.
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Source Nation (free text). The country where the source of the interference allegation originates. Since the scope of this dataset is interference in the US, the most common source nation for allegations is the United States. The source nation does not necessarily denote the actor was associated with a national government.
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+ Source Category (select all that apply).
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Civil Society Organization. A nonprofit, non-governmental, non-media entity, typically a university or think tank.
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Foreign Government Body. A non-US government entity.
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Government. Government agencies, elected representatives, and officials, even if quoted anonymously.
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Influential Individual. A noteworthy individual, not currently affiliated with another category, who is deemed nationally recognizable or operating in the public sphere.
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Media. Only applies if a news organization makes the allegation on the basis of its own investigation. A media organization reporting on an allegation made by someone else (e.g. an anonymous government official) is not included.
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Private Consultancy. A company engaged in private monitoring and risk consulting, typically in the field of cybersecurity.
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Technology Company. A company that operates a social media platform or offers a technology service.
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Actor (free text). Brief description of the actor purportedly responsible for the interference attempt.
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Actor Nation (free text). The country where the interference originates, according to the source. When an allegation comes from a non-state political actor, this field is the nation of origin of that non-state political actor. This does not necessarily denote an actor is associated with the national government.
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+ Attribution Type (select all that apply).
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Direct Attribution. The source directly accuses the actor of malicious political behavior.
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Proxy/Inferred Attribution. The source does not make a direct attribution, but clearly states that the activity is likely associated with the actor or strongly implies the accusation is directed at the actor.
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Non-Aligned Commercial Activity. The interference consists of malicious commercial activity rather than a politically motivated information operation.
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Campaign (free text). An identifying tag used to relate attributions to one another which revolve around the same emergent narratives, tactics, or subjects. Discrete tags indicating the activities were part of a larger pattern of behavior or a concerted effort.
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On what platforms did the interference purportedly take place?
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+ Media (select all that apply).
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State Media. A media outlet controlled by a government or government proxy, which is not editorially independent.
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Independent Media. Media outlets that are generally regarded as reputable, balanced, and independent of direct government control.
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"Junk News" Media. Unreliable, skewed, openly propagandistic, or fringe media outlets that lack discernable government ties.
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+ Platform (select all that apply). Platform(s) on which alleged interference occurred.
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Facebook
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Instagram
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X
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YouTube
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LinkedIn
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Reddit
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Discord
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VK
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Forum Board
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WhatsApp
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Telegram
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Signal
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WeChat
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SMS
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TikTok
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Unspecified
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Other (free text)
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Other Platforms (select all that apply).
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Advertisement (binary).
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Email (binary).
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How was the interference purportedly conducted?
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+ Method (select all that apply). Methods used in both the creation and the amplification of content related to the alleged foreign interference.
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Brigading. Authentic social media accounts but evidence of coordinated amplification or harassment.
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Sockpuppets. Inauthentic social media accounts; evidence suggests a high likelihood of human operation.
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Third-Party Automation. Inauthentic social media accounts; evidence suggests a high likelihood of automation by third-party program.
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DDoS. Distributed denial-of-service attack; malicious attempt to disrupt server traffic.
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Domain Spoofing. Manipulation of search queries and results; typosquatting.
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Influencer Payola. Clandestine or indirect payment to an organization or influential individual for the purposes of content creation or amplification.
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+ Hacking (select all that apply). Unauthorized and clandestine access to or manipulation of digital systems, networks, or data, often for the purpose of information gathering, system disruption, or data manipulation.
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Data Manipulation. The clandestine manipulation of computer systems or accounts; Account hijacking or the cooptation of users' social media profiles.
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Data Exfiltration. Unauthorized movement of data; spearphishing; hack-and-release.
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Other. Forms of hacking not captured by the categories above.
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Cheapfakes. Deceptively edited content; decontextualization of existing media, passed off as current; deceptive co-option of existing brands; does not include use of Generative AI.
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Generative AI. Augmented or fabricated content produced using artificial intelligence; "deep fakes"; textual generation. Sometimes referred to as "synthetic media," although this term does not adequately distinguish between the use of deep learning and use of more basic manipulative techniques.
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How far did the interference effort spread?
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+ Breakout Scale (binary, select one). Methodology is described above; Categorize the influence operation's reach and potential impact based on its spread across platforms, communities, and media types.
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Category One
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Category Two
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Category Three
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Category Four
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Category Five
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Category Six
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Not Applicable (Allegation is too vague to categorize)
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Offline Mobilization (binary). Tangible, real-world events and activities ascribed to the influence operation.
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How credible, biased, legitimate, and transparent is the allegation?
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+ Attribution Score. Methodology is described above; the goal of this score is to critically assess the validity of the allegation from multiple perspectives.
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Credibility
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Bias
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Evidence
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Transparency
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For each sub-attribution in a given case, the following data is included:
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Who, specifically, carried out the interference?
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Sub-Actor (free text). Expressly named Actor included in the primary attribution to whom specific activities are linked.
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Sub-Actor Nation (free text). National affiliation of the named sub-actor.
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Sub-Actor Parent Organization or Affiliation (free text). The organization, institution, or affiliation within which the sub-actor operates. This does not include Actor Nation. (Examples would include IRGC, 8200, CENTCOM, Ministry of Public Security.)
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Campaign Tag (free text). Does this sub-attribution connect to any larger pattern of behavior? See the existing list of "Campaign" Tags before making a new tag.
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Date of Activity (free text). Date or range of purported activity.
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\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/lib/components/Timeline.svelte b/src/lib/components/Timeline.svelte
index 2d63585..e905f34 100644
--- a/src/lib/components/Timeline.svelte
+++ b/src/lib/components/Timeline.svelte
@@ -155,7 +155,21 @@