AMITT/counters_index.md

AMITT Counters:

id	name	summary	metatechnique	tactic	responsetype
C00006	Charge for social media	Include a paid-for privacy option, e.g. pay Facebook for an option of them not collecting your personal information. There are examples of this not work, e.g. most people don’t use proton mail etc.	M004 - friction	TA01 Strategic Planning	D2 Deny
C00008	Create shared fact-checking database	Snopes is best-known example	M006 - scoring	TA01 Strategic Planning	D4 Degrade
C00009	Educate high profile influencers on best practices		M001 - resilience	TA02 Objective Planning	D2 Deny
C00010	Enhanced privacy regulation for social media	Privacy standards	M004 - friction	TA01 Strategic Planning	D2 Deny
C00011	Media literacy. Games to identify fake news		M001 - resilience	TA02 Objective Planning	D2 Deny
C00012	Platform regulation	Empower existing regulators to govern social media. Also covers Destroy.	M007 - metatechnique	TA01 Strategic Planning	D2 Deny
C00013	Rating framework for news	This is "strategic innoculation", raising the standards of what people expect in terms of evidence when consuming news. Example: journalistic ethics, or journalistic licensing body. Include full transcripts, link source, add items.	M006 - scoring	TA01 Strategic Planning	D2 Deny
C00014	Real-time updates to fact-checking database	existing examples at Buzzfeed and Fema, especially during disasters	M006 - scoring	TA06 Develop Content	D4 Degrade
C00016	Censorship - not recommended	e.g. treating social media as a privilege not right	M012 - cleaning	TA01 Strategic Planning	D2 Deny
C00017	Repair broken social connections	For example, use a media campaign to promote in-group to out-group in person communication / activities . Technique could be in terms of forcing a reality-check by talking to people instead of reading about bogeymen.	M010 - countermessaging	TA01 Strategic Planning	D3 Disrupt
C00019	Reduce effect of division-enablers	includes Promote constructive communication by shaming division-enablers, and Promote playbooks to call out division-enablers	M003 - daylight	TA01 Strategic Planning	D3 Disrupt
C00021	Encourage in-person communication		M001 - resilience	TA01 Strategic Planning	D4 Degrade
C00022	Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety	Used to counter ability based and fear based attacks	M001 - resilience	TA01 Strategic Planning	D4 Degrade
C00024	Promote healthy narratives	Includes promoting constructive narratives i.e. not polarising (e.g. pro-life, pro-choice, pro-USA). Includes promoting identity neutral narratives.	M001 - resilience	TA01 Strategic Planning	D4 Degrade
C00026	Shore up democracy based messages	Messages about e.g. peace, freedom. And make it sexy	M010 - countermessaging	TA01 Strategic Planning	D4 Degrade
C00027	Create culture of civility	This is passive. Includes promoting civility as an identity that people will defend.	M001 - resilience	TA01 Strategic Planning	D7 Deter
C00028	Make information provenance available	Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments. Use blockchain technology to require collaborative validation before posts or comments are submitted. This could be used to adjust upvote weight via a trust factor of people and organisations you trust, or other criteria.	M011 - verification	TA02 Objective Planning	D3 Disrupt
C00029	Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise		M002 - diversion	TA02 Objective Planning	D3 Disrupt
C00030	Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)		M002 - diversion	TA02 Objective Planning	D3 Disrupt
C00031	Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify	Create competing narratives. Included "Facilitate State Propaganda" as diluting the narrative could have an effect on the pro-state narrative used by volunteers, or lower their involvement.	M009 - dilution	TA02 Objective Planning	D3 Disrupt
C00032	Hijack content and link to truth- based info	Link to platform	M002 - diversion	TA06 Develop Content	D3 Disrupt
C00034	Create more friction at account creation	Counters fake account	M004 - friction	TA03 Develop People	D2 Deny
C00036	Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide)	All of these would be highly affected by infiltration or false-claims of infiltration.	M013 - targeting	TA03 Develop People	D2 Deny
C00040	third party verification for people	counters fake experts	M011 - verification	TA03 Develop People	D2 Deny
C00042	Address truth contained in narratives		M010 - countermessaging	TA03 Develop People	D3 Disrupt
C00044	Keep people from posting to social media immediately	My interpretation is that this is method would be used to slow down activities or force a small delay between posts or replies to new posts.	M004 - friction	TA03 Develop People	D3 Disrupt
C00046	Marginalise and discredit extremist groups		M013 - targeting	TA03 Develop People	D4 Degrade
C00047	Coordinated inauthentics		M008 - data pollution	TA04 Develop Networks	D5 Deceive
C00048	Name and Shame Influencers	Think about the different levels: individual vs state-sponsored account. Includes “call them out” and “name and shame”. Note that USAID operations were at a different level. Identify social media accounts as sources of propaganda—“calling them out”— might be helpful to prevent the spread of their message to audiences that otherwise would consider them factual. USAID has been restructuring its programs to address predatory Chinese development projects and the information operations that support them. USAID’s new strategy has tailored programs to counter Chinese educational exchange programs and to support free and fair elections, youth empowerment, democratic governance, and free press. USAID’s Russia regional teams have also been compiling a strategy for Russia’s information operations. One strong point of USAID’s programming is a system of indicators and measurements for a country’s vulnerability to foreign influence and information operations. Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target externally-based nonattributed social media accounts. Impact of and Dealing with Trolls - "Chatham House has observed that trolls also sometimes function as decoys, as a way of “keeping the infantry busy” that “aims to wear down the other side” (Lough et al., 2014). Another type of troll involves “false accounts posing as authoritative information sources on social media”.	M003 - daylight	TA03 Develop People	D7 Deter
C00051	Counter social engineering training	Includes anti-elicitation training, phishing prevention education.	M001 - resilience	TA03 Develop People	D2 Deny
C00052	Infiltrate platforms	Detect and degrade	M013 - targeting	TA04 Develop Networks	D4 Degrade
C00053	Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts		M012 - cleaning	TA04 Develop Networks	D4 Degrade
C00056	Get off social media		M004 - friction	TA04 Develop Networks	D2 Deny
C00058	Report crowdfunder as violator	counters crowdfunding. Includes ‘Expose online funding as fake”.	M005 - removal	TA03 Develop People	D2 Deny
C00059	Verification of project before posting (counters funding campaigns)		M011 - verification	TA04 Develop Networks	D2 Deny
C00060	Legal action against for-profit engagement factories		M013 - targeting	TA02 Objective Planning	D3 Disrupt
C00062	Free open library sources worldwide	Open-source libraries could be created that aid in some way for each technique. Even for Strategic Planning, some open-source frameworks such as AMITT can be created to counter the adversarial efforts.	M010 - countermessaging	TA04 Develop Networks	D4 Degrade
C00065	Reduce political targeting	Includes “ban political micro targeting” and “ban political ads”	M005 - removal	TA05 Microtargeting	D3 Disrupt
C00066	Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back)		M009 - dilution	TA05 Microtargeting	D3 Disrupt
C00067	Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding)		M013 - targeting	TA03 Develop People	D3 Disrupt
C00070	Block access to disinformation resources	Resources = accounts, channels etc. Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker. TA02*: DDOS at the critical time (ie. midterm-2018 elections DDOS against troll farms) to deny an adversary's time-bound objective. T0008: A quick response to a proto-viral story will affect it's ability to spread and raise questions about their legitimacy. Hashtag: Against the platform, by drowning the hashtag. T0046 - Search Engine Optimization: Sub-optimal website performance affect its search engine rank, which I interpret as "blocking access to a platform".	M005 - removal	TA02 Objective Planning	D2 Deny
C00071	Block source of pollution		M005 - removal	TA06 Develop Content	D2 Deny
C00072	Content censorship in non-relevant domains e.g. Pinterest antivax		M005 - removal	TA06 Develop Content	D2 Deny
C00073	Inoculate populations through media literacy training	Educate on how to handle info pollution. Push out targeted education on why it's pollution. Build cultural resistance to false content, e.g. cultural resistance to bullshit. Influence literacy training, to inoculate against “cult” recruiting. Media literacy training: leverage librarians / library for media literacy training. Inoculate at language. Strategic planning included as inoculating population has strategic value. Example is the "Learn to Discern" Program, funded by the Canadian government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016. The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in ‘’safe, informed media consumption techniques,’’ including avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech, verifying expert credentials, detecting censorship, and debunking news, photos, and videos.” Covers detect, deny, and degrade.	M001 - resilience	TA01 Strategic Planning	D2 Deny
C00074	Identify identical content and mass deplatform		M012 - cleaning	TA06 Develop Content	D2 Deny
C00075	normalise language		M010 - countermessaging	TA06 Develop Content	D2 Deny
C00076	Prohibit images in political discourse channels		M005 - removal	TA06 Develop Content	D2 Deny
C00077	Active defence: run TA03 "develop people” - not recommended		M013 - targeting	TA03 Develop People	D3 Disrupt
C00078	Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content	Includes “change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists” and “Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side”	M002 - diversion	TA06 Develop Content	D3 Disrupt
C00080	Create competing narrative	Could also be degrade	M002 - diversion	TA06 Develop Content	D3 Disrupt
C00081	Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations	Discredit by pointing out the "noise" and informing public that "flooding" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of "noise"	M003 - daylight	TA06 Develop Content	D3 Disrupt
C00082	Ground truthing as automated response to pollution	e.g. RealityTeam work that adds clear information to spaces with disinformation in. Also inoculation.	M010 - countermessaging	TA06 Develop Content	D3 Disrupt
C00084	Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them	Includes “poison pill recasting of message” and “steal their truths”. Many techniques involve promotion which could be manipulated. For example, online fundings or rallies could be advertised, through compromised or fake channels, as being associated with "far-up/down/left/right" actors. "Long Game" narratives could be subjected in a similar way with negative connotations. Can also replay technique T0003.	M002 - diversion	TA06 Develop Content	D3 Disrupt
C00085	Mute content	Rate-limit disinformation content. Reduces its effects, whilst not running afoul of censorship concerns. Online archives of content (archives of websites, social media profiles, media, copies of published advertisements; or archives of comments attributed to bad actors, as well as anonymized metadata about users who interacted with them and analysis of the effect) is useful for intelligence analysis and public transparency, but will need similar muting or tagging/ shaming as associated with bad actors.	M003 - daylight	TA06 Develop Content	D3 Disrupt
C00086	Distract from noise with addictive content	Example: Interject addictive links or contents into discussions of disinformation materials and measure a "conversion rate" of users who engage with your content and away from the social media channel's "information bubble" around the disinformation item. Use bots to amplify and upvote the addictive content. Note: This sounds eerlily like many Reddit communities where the most upvoted comments are all jokes, preventing serious discussion from being discovered by those who filter by upvotes.	M002 - diversion	TA06 Develop Content	D4 Degrade
C00087	Make more noise than the disinformation	Examples: kPop stans, #proudboys takeover by LGBT community	M009 - dilution	TA06 Develop Content	D4 Degrade
C00089	Throttle number of forwards		M004 - friction	TA09 Exposure	D4 Degrade
C00090	Fake engagement system		M002 - diversion	TA12 Measure Effectiveness	D5 Deceive
C00091	Honeypot social community	Set honeypots, e.g. communities, in networks likely to be used for disinformation.	M002 - diversion	TA06 Develop Content	D5 Deceive
C00092	Reputation scores for social media influencers	Includes "Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers” and “Reputation scores for social media users”. Influencers are individuals or accounts with many followers.	M006 - scoring	TA02 Objective Planning	D7 Deter
C00093	Influencer code of conduct	Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers. Can be platform code of conduct; can also be community code, e.g. the Pro-Truth Pledge.	M001 - resilience	TA03 Develop People	D7 Deter
C00094	Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research	Accountability move: make sure research is published with its funding sources.	M003 - daylight	TA06 Develop Content	D4 Degrade
C00096	Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers		M006 - scoring	TA01 Strategic Planning	D7 Deter
C00097	Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment		M004 - friction	TA07 Channel Selection	D2 Deny
C00098	Revocation of "verified"		M004 - friction	TA07 Channel Selection	D2 Deny
C00099	Strengthen verification methods		M004 - friction	TA07 Channel Selection	D2 Deny
C00100	Hashtag jacking		M002 - diversion	TA07 Channel Selection	D3 Disrupt
C00101	Create participant friction		M004 - friction	TA07 Channel Selection	D4 Degrade
C00102	Make repeat voting harder		M004 - friction	TA07 Channel Selection	D4 Degrade
C00103	Create a bot that engages / distract trolls	Use T00030 backstop personas	M002 - diversion	TA07 Channel Selection	D5 Deceive
C00105	Buy more advertising than the adversary to shift influence and algorithms		M009 - dilution	TA07 Channel Selection	D3 Disrupt
C00106	Click-bait centrist content	Create emotive centrist content that gets more clicks	M002 - diversion	TA07 Channel Selection	D3 Disrupt
C00107	Content moderation		M006 - scoring	TA07 Channel Selection	D2 Deny
C00109	De-escalation		M001 - resilience	TA07 Channel Selection	D3 Disrupt
C00110	Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist content		M004 - friction	TA07 Channel Selection	D2 Deny
C00111	Present sympathetic views of opposite side		M001 - resilience	TA07 Channel Selection	D4 Degrade
C00112	"Prove they are not an op!"	This applies to the entirety of the matrix as I read this as "create awareness around the use of all of these techniques"	M004 - friction	TA08 Pump Priming	D2 Deny
C00113	Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials. Attack audience quality of fake expert		M003 - daylight	TA08 Pump Priming	D2 Deny
C00114	Don't engage with payloads		M004 - friction	TA08 Pump Priming	D2 Deny
C00115	Expose actor and intentions		M003 - daylight	TA08 Pump Priming	D2 Deny
C00116	Provide proof of involvement		M003 - daylight	TA08 Pump Priming	D2 Deny
C00117	Downgrade de-amplify label promote counter to disinformation		M010 - countermessaging	TA08 Pump Priming	D4 Degrade
C00118	Repurpose images with new text		M010 - countermessaging	TA08 Pump Priming	D4 Degrade
C00119	Engage payload and debunk. Provide link to facts.	Might be okay.	M010 - countermessaging	TA08 Pump Priming	D7 Deter
C00120	Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes		M007 - metatechnique	TA08 Pump Priming	D7 Deter
C00121	Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow.		M001 - resilience	TA08 Pump Priming	D7 Deter
C00122	Content moderation. Censorship?		M004 - friction	TA09 Exposure	D2 Deny
C00123	Bot control		M004 - friction	TA09 Exposure	D3 Disrupt
C00124	Don't feed the trolls		M004 - friction	TA09 Exposure	D3 Disrupt
C00125	Prepare the population with pre-announcements		M001 - resilience	TA09 Exposure	D3 Disrupt
C00126	Social media amber alert		M003 - daylight	TA09 Exposure	D3 Disrupt
C00128	Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other "decelerants"		M009 - dilution	TA09 Exposure	D3 Disrupt
C00129	Use banking to cut off access	fiscal sanctions; parallel to counter terrorism	M014 - reduce resources	TA10 Go Physical	D2 Deny
C00130	Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously.		M001 - resilience	TA10 Go Physical	D7 Deter
C00131	Seize and analyse botnet servers		M005 - removal	TA11 Persistence	D2 Deny
C00133	Deplatform Account*	Note: Similar to Deplatform People but less generic. Perhaps both should be left.	M005 - removal	TA11 Persistence	D3 Disrupt
C00135	Deplatform message groups and/or message boards	Merged two rows here.	M005 - removal	TA11 Persistence	D3 Disrupt
C00136	Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages		M010 - countermessaging	TA11 Persistence	D3 Disrupt
C00137	Pollute the AB-testing data feeds	Polluting A/B testing requires knowledge of MOEs and MOPs. A/B testing must be caught early when there is relatively little data available so infiltration of TAs and understanding of how content is migrated from testing to larger audiences is fundamental.	M008 - data pollution	TA11 Persistence	D3 Disrupt
C00138	Spam domestic actors with lawsuits		M014 - reduce resources	TA11 Persistence	D3 Disrupt
C00139	Weaponise youtube content matrices		M004 - friction	TA11 Persistence	D3 Disrupt
C00140	"Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls	Applies to most of the content used by exposure techniques except "T0055 - Use hashtag”. Applies to analytics	M008 - data pollution	TA12 Measure Effectiveness	D3 Disrupt
C00142	Platform adds warning label and decision point when sharing content	Includes “this has been disproved: do you want to forward it”. Includes “"Hey this story is old" popup when messaging with old URL” - this assumes that this technique is based on visits to an URL shortener or a captured news site that can publish a message of our choice. Includes “mark clickbait visually”.	M004 - friction	TA06 Develop Content	D4 Degrade
C00143	(botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time		M013 - targeting	TA11 Persistence	D4 Degrade
C00144	Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs		M014 - reduce resources	TA11 Persistence	D4 Degrade
C00145	Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!)		M008 - data pollution	TA11 Persistence	D4 Degrade
C00147	Make amplification of social media ports expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days)		M004 - friction	TA12 Measure Effectiveness	D3 Disrupt
C00148	Add random links to network graphs	If creators are using network analysis to determine how to attack networks, then adding random extra links to those networks might throw that analysis out enough to change attack outcomes. Unsure which AMITT techniques.	M008 - data pollution	TA12 Measure Effectiveness	D4 Degrade
C00149	Poison the monitoring & evaluation data		M008 - data pollution	TA12 Measure Effectiveness	D4 Degrade
C00151	“fight in the light”	Use leadership in the arts, entertainment, and media to highlight and build on fundamental tenets of democracy.	M003 - daylight	TA09 Exposure	D3 Disrupt
C00153	Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure	Align offensive cyber action with information operations and counter disinformation approaches, where appropriate.	M013 - targeting	TA01 Strategic Planning	D3 Disrupt
C00154	Ask media not to report false information		M005 - removal	TA08 Pump Priming	D2 Deny
C00155	Ban incident actors from funding sites		M005 - removal	TA03 Develop People	D2 Deny
C00156	Better tell the U.S., NATO, and EU story.	Civil engagement activities conducted on the part of EFP forces. In Latvia, for example, U.S. soldiers have reportedly conducted numerous civil engagements with the local populations. In one example, soldiers cut firewood for local Russian-speaking Latvians. Locals were reportedly overheard saying, “A Russian soldier wouldn’t do that.” NATO should likewise provide support and training, where needed, to local public affairs and other communication personnel. Local government and military public affairs personnel can play their part in creating and disseminating entertaining and sharable content that supports the EFP mission.	M010 - countermessaging	TA09 Exposure	D3 Disrupt
C00158	Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations.	NGO Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, with some international funding, provides training to journalists in the Baltics and conducts media literacy training in the region. In addition to helping journalists avoid becoming “unwitting multipliers of misleading information,” the organization works with school teachers in the region to help them “decode media and incorporate media research into teaching.” concepts of media literacy to a mass audience that authorities launch a public information campaign that teaches the program will take time to develop and establish impact, recommends curriculum-based training	M001 - resilience	TA09 Exposure	D4 Degrade
C00159	Have a disinformation response plan	e.g. Create a campaign plan and toolkit for competition short of armed conflict (this used to be called “the grey zone”). The campaign plan should account for own vulnerabilities and strengths, and not over-rely on any one tool of statecraft or line of effort. It will identify and employ a broad spectrum of national power to deter, compete, and counter (where necessary) other countries’ approaches, and will include understanding of own capabilities, capabilities of disinformation creators, and international standards of conduct to compete in, shrink the size, and ultimately deter use of competition short of armed conflict.	M007 - metatechnique	TA01 Strategic Planning	D3 Disrupt
C00160	find and train influencers	Identify key influencers (e.g. use network analysis), then reach out to identified users and offer support, through either training or resources.	M001 - resilience	TA03 Develop People	D2 Deny
C00161	Coalition Building and Third-Party Inducements:	Advance coalitions across borders and sectors, spanning public and private, as well as foreign and domestic, divides. Improve mechanisms to collaborate, share information, and develop coordinated approaches with the private sector at home and allies and partners abroad.	M007 - metatechnique	TA01 Strategic Planning	D7 Deter
C00162	collect data/map constellations of Russian“civil society”. Unravel/target the Potemkin villages	Kremlin’s narrative spin extends through constellations of “civil society” organizations, political parties, churches, and other actors. Moscow leverages think tanks, human rights groups, election observers, Eurasianist integration groups, and orthodox groups. A collection of Russian civil society organizations, such as the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, together receive at least US$100 million per year, in addition to government-organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), at least 150 of which are funded by Russian presidential grants totaling US$70 million per year.	M013 - targeting	TA04 Develop Networks	D3 Disrupt
C00164	compatriot policy	protect the interests of this population and, more importantly, influence the population to support pro-Russia causes and effectively influence the politics of its neighbors	M013 - targeting	TA02 Objective Planning	D3 Disrupt
C00165	Limit access to alterable documents	e.g. for leaked legal documents, use court motions to limit future discovery actions	M004 - friction	TA06 Develop Content	D2 Deny
C00167	Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft	Promote a narrative of transparency, truthfulness, liberal values, and democracy. Implement a compelling narrative via effective mechanisms of communication. Continually reassess U.S. messages, mechanisms, and audiences over time. Counteract efforts to manipulate media, undermine free markets, and suppress political freedoms via public diplomacy	M010 - countermessaging	TA06 Develop Content	D2 Deny
C00169	develop a creative content hub	international donors will donate to a basket fund that will pay a committee of local experts who will, in turn, manage and distribute the money to Russian-language producers and broadcasters that pitch various projects.	M010 - countermessaging	TA09 Exposure	D3 Disrupt
C00170	elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft	Shift from reactive to proactive response, with priority on sharing relevant information with the public and mobilizing private-sector engagement. Recent advances in data-driven technologies have elevated information as a source of power to influence the political and economic environment, to foster economic growth, to enable a decision-making advantage over competitors, and to communicate securely and quickly.	M007 - metatechnique	TA01 Strategic Planning	D3 Disrupt
C00171	social media content take-downs	e.g. facebook or Twitter content take-downs	M005 - removal	TA06 Develop Content	D2 Deny
C00172	social media page removal	e.g. facebook page removal	M005 - removal	TA06 Develop Content	D2 Deny
C00174	Create a healthier news environment	Free and fair press: create bipartisan, patriotic commitment to press freedom. Note difference between news and editorialising. Build alternative news sources: create alternative local-language news sources to counter local-language propaganda outlets. Delegitimize the 24 hour news cycle	M007 - metatechnique	TA01 Strategic Planning	D2 Deny
C00176	Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private	Coordinated disinformation challenges are increasingly multidisciplinary, there are few organizations within the national security structures that are equipped with the broad-spectrum capability to effectively counter large-scale conflict short of war tactics in real-time. Institutional hurdles currently impede diverse subject matter experts, hailing from outside of the traditional national security and foreign policy disciplines (e.g., physical science, engineering, media, legal, and economics fields), from contributing to the direct development of national security countermeasures to emerging conflict short of war threat vectors. A Cognitive Security Action Group (CSAG), akin to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), could drive interagency alignment across equivalents of DHS, DoS, DoD, Intelligence Community, and other implementing agencies, in areas including strategic narrative, and the nexus of cyber and information operations.	M007 - metatechnique	TA01 Strategic Planning	D7 Deter
C00178	Fill information voids with non-disinformation content	e.g. increase Russian-language programming. The Economist notes, in May, Current Time videos were viewed 40 million times online (“America’s Answer to Russian Propaganda TV,” 2017). It would certainly be a positive development if Current Time could draw viewers away from Russian TV programming of RT and Sputnik. One effort that might assist in this regard is expanding programming to include more conventional entertainment programming	M009 - dilution	TA09 Exposure	D3 Disrupt
C00182	malware detection/quarantine/deletion	(2015) Trustwave reported that a Bedep Trojan malware kit had begun infecting machines and forcing them to browse certain sites, artificially inflating traffic to a set of pro-Russia	M005 - removal	TA09 Exposure	D2 Deny
C00184	Media exposure		M003 - daylight	TA09 Exposure	D4 Degrade
C00188	Newsroom/Journalist training to counter SEO influence	August 2014, Russian news agency Rossiya Segodnya commissioned a poll in France with poorly worded questions and a statistically insignificant subsample that RT used to back a story titled “15% of French people back ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] militants, poll finds.” The story and summary infographic circulated on the internet, initially appearing primarily on French sites. After a week, the generally respectable digital U.S. news outlet Vox ran the story, now titled “One in Six French People Say They Support ISIS.” Although this effect has now worn off or been overwritten, for a time—despite a later story from The Washington Post debunking the claim—typing “ISIS France” into Google resulted in an autosuggestion of “ISIS France support” (Borthwick, 2015).	M001 - resilience	TA08 Pump Priming	D3 Disrupt
C00189	Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts	Use ongoing analysis/monitoring of "flagged" profiles. Confirm whether platforms are actively removing flagged accounts, and raise pressure via e.g. government organizations to encourage removal	M003 - daylight	TA03 Develop People	D6 Destroy
C00190	open engagement with civil society	U.S. government should also open engagement with civil society as an independent check on government action and messaging. It should seek to coordinate and synchronize narrative themes with allies and partners while calibrating action in cases where elements in these countries may have been co-opted by U.S. competitors.	M001 - resilience	TA09 Exposure	D3 Disrupt
C00193	promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”	journalism training “would be helpful, especially for the online community	M001 - resilience	TA08 Pump Priming	D3 Disrupt
C00194	Provide an alternative to Russian information by expanding and improving local content.	Develop content that can displace geopolitically-motivated narratives in the entire media environment, both new and old media alike.	M002 - diversion	TA09 Exposure	D3 Disrupt
C00195	Redirect Method	Use Google AdWords to identify instances in which people search Google about particular fake-news stories or Russian propaganda themes. Taking advantage of the technology behind Google AdWords, this method identifies potential ISIS recruits through their Google searches and exposes them to curated YouTube videos debunking ISIS recruiting themes. Apply this method to Russian propaganda.	M002 - diversion	TA07 Channel Selection	D2 Deny
C00196	Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media	The European Union created significant new regulations in 2018; the U.S. approach will need to be carefully crafted to protect First Amendment principles, create needed transparency, ensure liability, and impose costs for noncompliance	M007 - metatechnique	TA07 Channel Selection	D3 Disrupt
C00197	remove suspicious accounts	Standard reporting for false profiles (identity issues). Includes detecting hijacked accounts and reallocating them - if possible, back to original owners.	M005 - removal	TA03 Develop People	D2 Deny
C00200	Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo	Has been done in e.g. India	M010 - countermessaging	TA09 Exposure	D3 Disrupt
C00202	Set data 'honeytraps'	Set honeytraps in content likely to be accessed for disinformation. NB Macron election team modified docs to spike a hack and leak.	M002 - diversion	TA06 Develop Content	D2 Deny
C00203	Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets		M004 - friction	TA08 Pump Priming	D3 Disrupt
C00204	Strengthen local media	Improve effectiveness of local media outlets. Using eastern Latvia media outlets as an example, one expert noted that the media outlets are “very weak,” are often politically affiliated, or have “little local oligarchs that control them.”	M001 - resilience	TA08 Pump Priming	D2 Deny
C00205	strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting	Increase civic resilience by partnering with business community to combat gray zone threats and ensuring adequate reporting and enforcement mechanisms.	M007 - metatechnique	TA01 Strategic Planning	D3 Disrupt
C00207	Run a competing disinformation campaign - not recommended	E.g. Saudi tit-for-tat campaign	M013 - targeting	TA02 Objective Planning	D7 Deter
C00211	Use humorous counter-narratives		M010 - countermessaging	TA09 Exposure	D3 Disrupt
C00212	build public resilence by making civil society more vibrant	Increase public service experience, and support wider civics and history education.	M001 - resilience	TA09 Exposure	D3 Disrupt
C00214	Create policy that makes social media police disinformation	German model: facebook forced to police content by law.	M007 - metatechnique	TA07 Channel Selection	D3 Disrupt
C00215	Use fraud legislation to clean up social media		M007 - metatechnique	TA07 Channel Selection	D3 Disrupt
C00216	Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors	Prevent ad revenue going to disinformation domains	M014 - reduce resources	TA05 Microtargeting	D2 Deny
C00217	Registries alert when large batches of newsy URLs get registered together		M003 - daylight	TA07 Channel Selection	D2 Deny
C00218	Censorship	Alter and/or block the publication/dissemination of adversary controlled information	M005 - removal	TA09 Exposure	D2 Deny
C00219	Add metadata to content that’s out of the control of disinformation creators	Steganography. Adding date, signatures etc to stop issue of photo relabelling etc.	M003 - daylight	TA06 Develop Content	D4 Degrade
C00220	Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan		M007 - metatechnique	TA01 Strategic Planning	D3 Disrupt
C00221	Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors	Include PACE plans - Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency	M007 - metatechnique	TA01 Strategic Planning	D3 Disrupt
C00222	Tabletop simulations		M007 - metatechnique	TA02 Objective Planning	D3 Disrupt
C00223	Strengthen Trust in social media platforms		M001 - resilience	TA01 Strategic Planning	D3 Disrupt