127 KiB
127 KiB
| 1 | Serial_Number | Campaign_ID | Long_Description | Date_Start_Year | Date_Start_Month | Date_Start_Certainty | Date_End_Year | Date_End_Month | Date_End_Certainty | Year_of_Report | Month_of_Report | Citation_1 | Link_1 | Citation_2 | Link_2 | Meta_Notes | Primary_Target_Nation_of_Origin | Primary_Target_Regional_Bloc | Primary_Target_Other | Primary_Target_Notes | Target_Category_Government_Civilian | Target_Category_Government_Military | Target_Category_Political_Party | Target_Category_NonState_Political_Actor | Target_Category_Business | Target_Category_Influential_Individuals | Target_Category_Electorate | Target_Category_Racial_Ethnic_Religious_Sexual_Identity_Group | Target_Category_Other | Target_Category_Notes | Target_Political_Stability_Year_Prior | Target_Political_Stability_Year_Prior_Data_Year | Target_Political_Stability | Target_Political_Stability_Data_Year | Target_Political_Stability_Year_After | Target_Political_Stability_Year_After_Data_Year | Target_Conflict_Deaths | Target_Conflict_Deaths_Data_Year | Target_Refugee_Stock | Target_Refugee_Stock_Data_Years | Target_Voice_and_Accountability_Year_Prior | Target_Voice_and_Accountability_Year_Prior_Data_Year | Target_Voice_and_Accountability | Target_Voice_and_Accountability_Data_Year | Target_Voice_and_Accountability_Year_After | Target_Voice_and_Accountability_Year_After_Data_Year | Target_Internet_Freedom_Year_Prior | Target_Internet_Freedom_Year_Prior_Data_Year | Target_Internet_Freedom | Target_Internet_Freedom_Data_Year | Target_Internet_Freedom_Year_After | Target_Internet_Freedom_Year_After_Data_Year | Target_Concurrent_Events_Interstate_War | Target_Concurrent_Events_Extrastate_War | Target_Concurrent_Events_IntraState_War | Target_Concurrent_Events_NonState_War | Target_Concurrent_Events_Federal_Election | Target_Concurrent_Events_State_Election | Target_Concurrent_Events_Other | Target_Concurrent_Events_Notes | Secondary_Target_Nation_of_Origin | Secondary_Target_Regional_Bloc | Secondary_Target_Other | Secondary_Target_Notes | Tertiary_Target_Nation_of_Origin | Tertiary_Target_Regional_Bloc | Tertiary_Target_Other | Tertiary_Target_Notes | Platforms_Open_Web_State_Media | Platforms_Open_Web_Independent_Media | Platforms_Open_Web_Junk_News_Website | Platforms_Social_Media_Facebook | Platforms_Social_Media_Instagram | Platforms_Social_Media_Twitter | Platforms_Social_Media_Youtube | Platforms_Social_Media_LinkedIn | Platforms_Social_Media_Reddit | Platforms_Social_Media_VK | Platforms_Social_Media_Forum_Board | Platforms_Social_Media_Other | Platforms_Messaging_Platforms_WhatsApp | Platforms_Messaging_Platforms_Telegram | Platforms_Messaging_Platforms_Signal | Platforms_Messaging_Platforms_Line | Platforms_Messaging_Platforms_WeChat | Platforms_Messaging_Platforms_SMS | Platforms_Messaging_Platforms_SMS | Platforms_Advertisement | Platforms_Email | Platforms_Other | Platforms_Notes | Content_Language | Content_Topics_Government | Content_Topics_Military | Content_Topics_Political_Party | Content_Topics_Elections | Content_Topics_NonState_Political_Actor | Content_Topics_Business | Content_Topics_Influential_Individual | Content_Topics_Racial_Ethnic_Religious_Sexual_Identity_Group | Content_Topics_Terrorism | Content_Topics_Immigration | Content_Topics_Economic_Issues | Content_Topics_Other | Content_Notes | Methods_Tactics_Brigading | Methods_Tactics_Sockpuppets | Methods_Tactics_Botnets | Methods_Tactics_Search_Engine_Manipulation | Methods_Tactics_Hacking_Ddos | Methods_Tactics_Hacking_Data_Exfiltration | Methods_Tactics_Deceptive_Content_Manipulation_Deep_Learning_Processes | Methods_Tactics_Deceptive_Content_Manipulation_Other | Methods_Tactics_Other | Methods_Tactics_Notes | Methods_Narrative_Techniques_Constructive_Activate | Methods_Narrative_Techniques_Constructive_Astroturf | Methods_Narrative_Techniques_Destructive_Suppress | Methods_Narrative_Techniques_Destructive_Discredit | Methods_Narrative_Techniques_Oblique_Troll | Methods_Narrative_Techniques_Oblique_Flood | Methods_Narrative_Techniques_Notes | Primary_Disinformant_Nation_of_Origin | Primary_Disinformant_Regional_Bloc | Primary_Disinformant_Other | Primary_Disinformant_Notes | Disinformant_Category_Government_Direct_Attribution | Disinformant_Category_Government_Proxy_Inferred_Attribution | Disinformant_Category_Political_Party | Disinformant_Category_NonState_Political_Actor | Disinformant_Category_Business | Disinformant_Category_Influential_Individual | Disinformant_Category_Electorate | Disinformant_Category_Racial_Ethnic_Religious_Sexual_Identity_Group | Disinformant_Category_Other | Disinformant_Category_Notes | Disinformant_Political_Stability_Year_Prior | Disinformant_Political_Stability_Year_Prior_Data_Year | Disinformant_Political_Stability | Disinformant_Political_Stability_Data_Year | Disinformant_Political_Stability_Year_After | Disinformant_Political_Stability_Year_After_Data_Year | Disinformant_Conflict_Deaths | Disinformant_Conflict_Deaths_Data_Year | Disinformant_Refugee_Stock | Disinformant_Refugee_Stock_Data_Years | Disinformant_Voice_and_Accountability_Year_Prior | Disinformant_Voice_and_Accountability_Year_Prior_Data_Year | Disinformant_Voice_and_Accountability | Disinformant_Voice_and_Accountability_Data_Year | Disinformant_Voice_and_Accountability_Year_After | Disinformant_Voice_and_Accountability_Year_After_Data_Year | Disinformant_Internet_Freedom_Year_Prior | Disinformant_Internet_Freedom_Year_Prior_Data_Year | Disinformant_Internet_Freedom | Disinformant_Internet_Freedom_Data_Year | Disinformant_Internet_Freedom_Year_After | Disinformant_Internet_Freedom_Year_After_Data_Year | Disinformant_Concurrent_Events_Interstate_War | Disinformant_Concurrent_Events_Extrastate_War | Disinformant_Concurrent_Events_IntraState_War | Disinformant_Concurrent_Events_NonState_War | Disinformant_Concurrent_Events_Federal_Election | Disinformant_Concurrent_Events_State_Election | Disinformant_Concurrent_Events_Other | Disinformant_Concurrent_Events_Notes | Secondary_Disinformant_Nation_of_Origin | Secondary_Disinformant_Regional_Bloc | Secondary_Disinformant_Other | Secondary_Disinformant_Notes | Tertiary_Disinformant_Nation_of_Origin | Tertiary_Disinformant_Regional_Bloc | Tertiary_Disinformant_Other | Tertiary_Disinformant_Notes | Intent_Objective | Intent_Category_Civil | Intent_Category_Social | Intent_Category_Economic | Intent_Category_Military | Intent_Notes | |
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| 2 | 1 | Hong Kong >>> China 2019 | In order to obstruct discourse about the Hong Kong protests and sow discord, a network consisting of approximately 200,000 accounts took aim at pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong via commerical spam and political tweets. | 2019 | June | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2019 | August | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | September | <93>Twitter's Hong Kong Archives: Chinese Commercial Bots at Work.<2E> Medium. DFRLab, September 4, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/twitters-hong-kong-archives-chinese-commercial-bots-at-work-f4c7ae8eea64. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/twitters-hong-kong-archives-chinese-commercial-bots-at-work-f4c7ae8eea64 | Hong Kong | Hong Kong is a Chinese territory | 1 | 1 | Influential Individuals are Hong Kong protesters and activists. Electorate is Hong Kong natives. | 1 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Catalyst of protests was an extradition bill that was going to be voted on in Hong Kong's legislature. | 1 | 1 | Sina Weibo / Tencent / Sohu / NetEase / Fanwei | A network of 200,000 Twitter accounts was suspended. 936 of the accounts were analyzed by the DFRLab. Some of the Twitter accounts used VPNs, while others were from specific unblocked IP addresses in mainland China. Some of the Twitter accounts used Chinese applications including FaWave, Yibo Android, and Sina Weibo. | Cantonese, Chinese, Indonesian, Arabic, English, Spanish | 1 | 1 | Hong Kong extradition bill | 1 | 1 | China | 1 | -0.26 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 88 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | talyst of protests was an extradition bill that was going to be voted on in Hong Kong's legislature. | To obstruct discourse about the Hong Kong protests and sew discord. Target individuals speaking out about mainland China. | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3 | 2 | Spain >>> --- 2018 | The Catalan independence movement was artificially amplified through the use 130+ Twitter accounts. | 2018 | December | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2019 | June | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | August | <93>Catalonia Twitter Takedown: Inorganic Campaign Pushed Pro-Independence Content.<2E> Medium. DFRLab, August 9, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/catalonia-twitter-takedown-inorganic-campaign-pushed-pro-independence-content-fe9ee0e44f3c. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/catalonia-twitter-takedown-inorganic-campaign-pushed-pro-independence-content-fe9ee0e44f3c | Spain | Catalonia is a state within Spain, although it is highly contested. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Nonstate Political Actor is Catalan independence movement. | 0.28 | 2017 | 0.25 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1.03 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | Catalan Independence Referendum | Catalan Parliament declared independence from Spain in October 2017 following the referendum; September 11 anniversary of the 1714 siege of Barcelona; imprisonment of two Catalan pro-independence leaders (Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sanchez) on October 16, 2017 on sedition charges. | 1 | Third party twitter apps were used | A website was dedicated to one of the amplified Catalan independence hashtags (#FemXarxa). | The most amplified hashtag pushing Catalan independence, #FemXarxa, received ~7,500 retweets. The second most amplified hashtag was #11S. The third most amplified hashtag was #USVolemACasa, demanding the release of two Catalan pro-independence leaders. | Catalan, Spanish, English, Portuguese | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Some automation for retweets using Botize and IFTTT though negligible | 1 | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Russia | Venezuala | Venezuala-adjacent accounts; no affirmative state attribution. | The goal was to amplify pro-Catalan independence messaging in Spain. | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4 | 3 | Turkey >>> Saudi Arabia 2017 | A Saudi-associated network of Facebook, Instagram, and web assets promoted Saudi geopolitical interests while pushing content against Turkey, Iran, and Qatar. | 2017 | January | 2019 | August | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | August | <93>Royally Removed: Facebook Takes Down Pages Promoting Saudi Interests.<2E> Medium. DFRLab, August 14, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/royally-removed-facebook-takes-down-pages-promoting-saudi-interests-edc0ce8b972a. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/royally-removed-facebook-takes-down-pages-promoting-saudi-interests-edc0ce8b972a | https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/08/cib-uae-egypt-saudi-arabia/ | Turkey | Specifically content undermining Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an | 1 | Government - Civilian = Royal Family. | -2.01 | 2016 | -1.79 | 2017 | -1.33 | 2018 | 6.2 | 2017 | -0.61 | 2016 | -0.71 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | 61 | 2016 | 66 | 2017 | 66 | 2018 | 1 | Erdo?an wrote an op-ed decrying death of Khashoggi. | Federal Election = the 2018 Turkish presidential elections occurred in the time frame of this campaign. | Qatar | Specifically, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, the former Emir of Qatar | Iran | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 387 Assets | Arabic, English | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Constructive for pro-Saudi narrative; destructive for anti-Qatar, Turkey, and Iran narratives. | Saudi Arabia | 1 | -0.46 | 2016 | -0.58 | 2017 | -0.52 | 2018 | 2.5 | 2017 | -1.73 | 2016 | -1.68 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | 72 | 2016 | 72 | 2017 | 73 | 2018 | 1 | Extra-state war = Yemen | Promote anti-Turkey, Qatar, and Iran narratives while pushing pro-Saudi interests. | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5 | 4 | Colombia >>> --- 2019 | A group of accounts that exhibited bot-like behavior amplified three pro-government hashtags in Colombia between May and July 2019. | 2019 | May | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2019 | July | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | August | Bot-Like Accounts and Pro-Government Hashtags in Colombia. Medium. DFRLab, August 29, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/bot-like-accounts-and-pro-government-hashtags-in-colombia-35609a5b62f1 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/bot-like-accounts-and-pro-government-hashtags-in-colombia-35609a5b62f1 | Colombia | 1 | -0.81 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 31 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | The extradition of former Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development Andr<64>s Felipe Arias | 1 | Three hashtags amplified by bot-like accounts. | Spanish | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | The extradition of former Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development Andr<64>s Felipe Arias | To make it appear that Colombian state interests were broadly supported on Twitter | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6 | 5 | Georgia >>> --- 2019 | Georgian Facebook pages spread coordinated narratives to discredit Georgian protesters following "Gavrilov's Night." | 2019 | June | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2019 | July | Gavrilov<92>s Night': Multiple Facebook Pages Target Protests in Georgia. Medium. DFRLab, July 23, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/gavrilovs-night-multiple-facebook-pages-target-protests-in-georgia-6c8bc3106822 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/gavrilovs-night-multiple-facebook-pages-target-protests-in-georgia-6c8bc3106822 | Georgia | 1 | 1 | Influential Individuals are Georgian protesters. Electorate is Georgian. | -0.43 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 25 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | On June 20, 2019, Sergei Gavrilov (a Russian Parliament member) visited the Georgian Parliament and sat in the speaker's chair. triggering protests in Georgia. | Sergei Gavrilov (member of the Russian Parliment) visits Georgian parliament | 1 | 15 Facebook pages were analyzed. One page analyzed -- "I Remember" -- had over 27k followers and 24k likes. | Georgian | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | To discredit pro-Georgian protests and its participants by defrauding the online communities intent. Prior to the campaign the community presented consistent partisan messaging, during the attack and to date the community page "I Remember" represents inconsistent and contradictory views. | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 7 | 6 | Ukraine >>> Russia 2012 | Five Facebook pages targeted Ukraine with pro-Kremlin and socially divisive content, amplifying conspiracy theories about Ukrainian events. | 2012 | April | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2019 | July | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | July | Facebook Takes Down the 'Voice of Truth' in Ukraine. Medium. DFRLab, July 25, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-takes-down-the-voice-of-truth-in-ukraine-683fec18bfbd | https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-takes-down-the-voice-of-truth-in-ukraine-683fec18bfbd | Ukraine | 1 | 1 | 1 | -0.07 | 2011 | -0.09 | 2012 | -0.78 | 2013 | 27.1 | 2012 | -0.13 | 2011 | -0.28 | 2012 | -0.32 | 2013 | No Data | No Data | 28 | 2012 | 28 | 2013 | 2018 Moscow-Constantinople Schism within the Eastern Orthodox Church. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Four of the five Facebook pages amplified content from a single news website, golospravdy.com (or "Voice of Truth"). This site aggregated blogs, videos, and news content that was anti-Ukrainian government and pro-Kremlin. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Activate coded to encompass the Sweets-challenge to criticize then-President Poroshenko's alleged corruption. | Russia | 1 | -1 | 2011 | -0.82 | 2012 | -0.74 | 2013 | 83.3 | 2012 | -0.88 | 2011 | -0.98 | 2012 | -1.02 | 2013 | 52 | 2011 | 54 | 2012 | 54 | 2013 | Pro-Kremlin and Pro-Russian messaging accompanied attacks on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and criticisms of the Ukrainian Government. | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8 | 7 | Thailand >>> Russia 2010 | 22 Thai Facebook and Instagram assets engaged in coordinated inauthentic behavior, pushing divisive narratives on geopolitical issues. | 2010 | May | 2019 | July | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | July | Facebook Takes Down Inauthentic Pages with Connections to Thailand. Medium. DFRLab, July 25, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-takes-down-inauthentic-pages-with-connections-to-thailand-7dbf331f5ba5 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-takes-down-inauthentic-pages-with-connections-to-thailand-7dbf331f5ba5 | Thailand | 1 | -1.42 | 2009 | -1.44 | 2010 | -1.13 | 2011 | -3.8 | 2010 | -0.46 | 2009 | -0.5 | 2010 | -0.41 | 2011 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 61 | 2011 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | One of the external websites, journal-neo.org, posts articles on geopolitical, economic, and social issues; it is run by the Institute of Oriental Studies under the Russian Academy of Sciences (hence the 'state media' coding). Several websites, including journal-neo.org, AltThaiNews, Land Destroyer, and The New Atlas look similar and crosspost the same content. | English, Thai, Russian, Arabic | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Russia | 1 | -0.97 | 2009 | -0.93 | 2010 | -1 | 2011 | 23.5 | 2010 | -0.9 | 2009 | -0.89 | 2010 | -0.88 | 2011 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 52 | 2011 | Spread anti-western sentiments in an attempt to polarize the Thai people and their discourse. | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 9 | 8 | Libya >>> --- 2019 | A network of more than 100 Twitter accounts exhibited inauthentic coordinated behavior by encouraging public support for Libyan General Khalifa Haftar and his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) while simultaneously criticizing Qatar and promoting the interests of the United Arab Emirates. | 2019 | April | 2019 | July | <93>Libyan Hashtag Campaign Has Broader Designs: Trolling Qatar.<2E> Medium. DFRLab, July 31, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/libyan-hashtag-campaign-has-broader-designs-trolling-qatar-8b2ba69c7334. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/libyan-hashtag-campaign-has-broader-designs-trolling-qatar-8b2ba69c7334 | While some of the UAE-Qatar rivalry Twitter accounts date back to 2015, many of the accounts were created when Khalifa Haftar launched his offensive against the UN-backed Libyan government in Tripoli in April 2019, so that was coded as the starting date. | Libya | 1 | Government - Military = the Libyan National Army (LNA) and General Khalifa Haftar | -2.44 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 51 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Intra-state war = ongoing second Libyan Civil War | Qatar | The campaign also criticized Qatar for the government's human rights abuses and more. | 1 | The same tweet supportive of Haftar and the LNA was reposted by 90+ Twitter accounts. | French, English | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | These accounts evidence automation with human management. | 1 | 1 | tweets posted verbatim across the network of accounts | The campaign supported the UAE's broad regional interests, but attribution -- either directly or inferred -- was not given, so UAE was not coded. | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | To promote Libian General Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army as well as the United Arab Emirates while criticizing Qatar and activating the UAE - Qatari rivalry online. | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 10 | 9 | United States >>> Iran 2015 | 92 Facebook assets, often engaging in political messaging, targeted the United States, United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia in coordinated inauthentic behavior attributed to Iran. | 2015 | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2017 | 2019 | May | Facebook Removes Iran-based Assets. Again. Medium. DFRLab. May 30, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-removes-iran-based-assets-again-f17358ef21f | https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-removes-iran-based-assets-again-f17358ef21f | The Facebook pages were taken down in May 2019, but the pages had stopped being active far before that, around 2017. Hence 2017 is coded as end date. | United States | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.58 | 2014 | 0.68 | 2015 | 0.4 | 2016 | 15 | 2015 | 1.07 | 2014 | 1.11 | 2015 | 1.11 | 2016 | 19 | 2014 | 19 | 2015 | 18 | 2016 | 1 | 1 | Accounts active in the time leading up to the United States 2016 Presidential Election, efforts began even before those of the IRA | United Kingdom | The campaign focused on British politics, and Jeremy Corbyn in particular. | Saudi Arabia | The campaign attacked Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman. | 1 | 1 | Some Facebook assets posted articles from RT and from Saudi-funded broadcaster AlArabiya.net | English, Arabic, French | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Iran | 1 | -0.87 | 2014 | -0.93 | 2015 | -0.81 | 2016 | -1.8 | 2015 | -1.58 | 2014 | -1.51 | 2015 | -1.34 | 2016 | 89 | 2014 | 87 | 2015 | 87 | 2016 | Promote anti-Saudi Arabian narratives attacking the Crown Prince in particular. Promoting Iran and its virtues. Infiltrate domestic American political discourse and encourage partisan resentment in the time leading up to the 2016 election. | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 11 | 10 | West and Central Africa >>> Iran 2015 | In a coordinated effort, Iranian Facebook assets amplified the Pars Today network, a multilingual radio broadcaster that is a part of Iranian state-run media. The assets targeted audiences of up to 90,000 in West and Central Africa, Europe, and South Asia, pushing both regional and international content with a strong pro-Iran slant. | 2015 | 2019 | March | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | April | Facebook Dismantled Iranian Influence Operation. Medium, DFRLab. April 19, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-dismantled-iranian-influence-operation-e7ff859763a8 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-dismantled-iranian-influence-operation-e7ff859763a8 | West and Central Africa | While the campaign spanned multiple regions, many Facebook assets were in Hausa. Topics were relevant to West and Central Africa, such as discussions of political parties and leaders in Nigeria, security agreements between Sudan and South Sudan, and military interventions in the Central African Republic. | 1 | Target appears to be Hausa-language speakers. | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Bangladesh | While the campaign spanned multiple regions, some Facebook assets specifically targeted Bangladesh, while some specifically targeted India. | India | While the campaign spanned multiple regions, some Facebook assets targeted Francophone and English-language audiences. | 1 | 1 | 1 | The Facebook assets reached an audience of up to 90,000 users. One Facebook page, "Pars Today Hausa," had over 90,000 followers. | Kazakh, English, Hausa, Hindi, Bengali, French | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Region specific current events | 1 | Facebook defined the campaign as "engaged in coordinated inauthentic behavior on Facebook." They stated that the assets <20>used similar tactics by creating networks of accounts to mislead others about who they were and what they were doing.<2E> | 1 | Iran | Campaign linked to the state-run IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting). | 1 | -0.87 | 2014 | -0.93 | 2015 | -0.81 | 2016 | -1.8 | 2015 | -1.58 | 2014 | -1.51 | 2015 | -1.34 | 2016 | 89 | 2014 | 87 | 2015 | 87 | 2016 | Publish content in support of the Iranian government's agenda. Mislead others about who Pars Today was and what they were doing. | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 12 | 11 | India >>> --- 2019 | A pro-Modi hashtag was amplified by Twitter bots ahead of India's February 2019 general election. To a lesser extent, an anti-Modi hashtag was also amplified. | 2019 | February | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2019 | Febuary | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | April | #ElectionWatch: Bots on Both Sides in India. Medium. DFRLab, April 9, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-bots-on-both-sides-in-india-c87c84040229 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-bots-on-both-sides-in-india-c87c84040229 | campaign took place from February 9th to February 10th | India | 1 | 1 | 1 | Electorate = Indian electorate was targeted ahead of the 2019 February general elections. Government civilian = Incumbent PM Narendra Modi | -0.96 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 43 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | Federal Election = February 2019 Indian general election | 1 | #TNwelcomesModi was mentioned over 777,000 times on February 9-10, 2019. | English, Tamils, Telugu | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Drive engagement in partisan discourse online in the time leading up the the federal election. | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 13 | 12 | Indonesia >>> Iran 2016 | A Facebook campaign re-posted Iranian state media messages, directing Facebook users to off platform sites that published identical content with pro-Iranian, pro-Hezbollah, anti-Israel, and anti-U.S. messages. | 2016 | 2019 | March | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | March | IN DEPTH: Iranian Propaganda Network Goes Down. Medium. DFRLab, March 26, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/takedown-details-of-the-iranian-propaganda-network-d1fad32fdf30 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/takedown-details-of-the-iranian-propaganda-network-d1fad32fdf30 | Indonesia | While the campaign spanned multiple regions and continents, most targeted Facebook assets targeted Indonesia specifically. | 1 | Some Facebook pages were specifically targeted to Indonesian users. | -0.62 | 2015 | -0.37 | 2016 | -0.5 | 2017 | 1.1 | 2016 | 0.18 | 2015 | 0.17 | 2016 | 0.13 | 2017 | 42 | 2015 | 44 | 2016 | 47 | 2017 | India | While the campaign spanned multiple regions and continents, India was the second most targeted country. For example, one Facebook page was created to build an Indian audience by posting about an Indian cricket star, and then repurposed to pass that audience Iranian messaging. | East and West Africa | While the campaign spanned multiple regions and continents, East Africa and West Africa were explicitly mentioned as targeted areas in the text. Hausa was one of the languages used by at least one Facebook asset, and information propagated about the detention of Nigerian Shia leader Ibrahim Zakzaky. | 1 | 1 | Indonesian, English, Hausa, Arabic | 1 | 1 | Geopolitical interests | 1 | Facebook said, <20>The administrators and account owners represented themselves as locals and made-up media entities, often using fake accounts <20> and they impersonated real political groups and media organizations. They posted news stories on current events and frequently repurposed and amplified content from Iranian state media" | 1 | 1 | Establishing a media presence that is sympathetic to Iranian interests | Iran | Iranian state messaging often directly reproduced on social media and linked websites. | 1 | -0.93 | 2015 | -0.81 | 2016 | -0.93 | 2017 | -0.2 | 2016 | -1.51 | 2015 | -1.34 | 2016 | -1.3 | 2017 | 87 | 2015 | 87 | 2016 | 85 | 2017 | To establish a media presence abroad that is sympathetic to Iranian interests | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 14 | 13 | Venezuela >>> Venezuela 2014 | A state-backed influence operation promoted the Maduro regime and made use of bespoke automation tools to spread messaging that was sympathetic to Venezuelan state interests. | 2014 | 2019 | January | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | March | #TrollTracker: Venezuelan Government-linked Influence Campaign on Twitter. Medium. DFRLab, March 13, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-venezuelan-government-linked-influence-campaign-on-twitter-63a8fe7a62e0 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-venezuelan-government-linked-influence-campaign-on-twitter-63a8fe7a62e0 | Venezuela | 1 | -1.08 | 2013 | -0.85 | 2014 | -0.98 | 2015 | No Data | No Data | -0.95 | 2013 | -1.08 | 2014 | -1.09 | 2015 | 53 | 2013 | 56 | 2014 | 57 | 2015 | new government attempt. | Relevant protests: In the first quarter of 2014, a series of protests took place to draw attention to the Venezuela<6C>s high levels of urban violence, rampant economic inflation, and chronic shortages of basic goods; Twitter accounts were then made on this date. On March 14, 2016, tens of thousands of pro-Maduro demonstrators gathered in the streets to protest U.S. sanctions, opposed by anti-Maduro activists. @DFRLab determined that at least 91 accounts were created that same day. On January 20, 2017, there was a noticeable increase in account creation activity after protests broke out when multiple opposition leaders were arrested following the collapse of a planned dialogue with the Maduro government. | referenced influence abroad but did not specify | 1 | 1 | RTNicolasMaduro, an app directly linked to Nicolas Maduro and the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) that can be used to retweet Maduro. It was used in 4000 tweets. | Twitter removed 1196 accounts associated with this domestic state-backed influence campaign.The operation primarily used government-linked propaganda hashtags such as #LegionFANB, which expressed support for the National Bolivarian Armed Forces of Venezuela, and #Tropa, a hashtag commonly used by regime supporters on Twitter to identify themselves. An app was used -- RTNicolasMaduro -- to retweet Maduro's tweets, and was used in 4000 tweets. Additionally, out of the top 10 hashtag combinations used, two in particular <20> #RT #Noticias and #Noticias #RT <20> often accompanied stories from Russia Today (hence the coding of state media). | Spanish | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Venezuela | 1 | 1 | No Data | No Data | -0.85 | 2014 | -0.98 | 2015 | No Data | No Data | -0.95 | 2013 | -1.08 | 2014 | -1.09 | 2015 | 53 | 2013 | 56 | 2014 | 57 | 2015 | new government attempt. | Relevant protests: In the first quarter of 2014, a series of protests took place to draw attention to the Venezuela<6C>s high levels of urban violence, rampant economic inflation, and chronic shortages of basic goods; Twitter accounts were then made on this date. On March 14, 2016, tens of thousands of pro-Maduro demonstrators gathered in the streets to protest U.S. sanctions, opposed by anti-Maduro activists. @DFRLab determined that at least 91 accounts were created that same day. On January 20, 2017, there was a noticeable increase in account creation activity after protests broke out when multiple opposition leaders were arrested following the collapse of a planned dialogue with the Maduro government. | To support the incumbent Moduro and change opinions about the regime among the Venezuelan electorate and abroad. | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 15 | 14 | United Kingdom >>> --- | Facebook assets engaged in coordinated inauthentic behavior to propagate pro-Islam and anti-extremist messaging in the United Kingdom. | 2019 | March | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | March | #TrollTracker: Facebook Takes Down Fake Network in the United Kingdom. Medium. DFRLab, March 7, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/exclusive-facebook-takes-down-fake-network-in-the-united-kingdom-58350e0f3401 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/exclusive-facebook-takes-down-fake-network-in-the-united-kingdom-58350e0f3401 | United Kingdom | 1 | anti-Islam users | Influential Individual = Tommy Robinson (former leader of the far-right extremist group English Defense League.) | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | On March 7, Facebook removed 23 pages, 74 Facebook accounts, five groups, and 35 Instagram accounts that the company assessed to be <20>engaging in coordinated inauthentic behavior as part of a domestic-focused network in the UK.<2E> These pages had approximately 175,000 followers, and approximately 4,500 accounts followed at least one of the removed Instagram accounts.Facebook determined that individuals behind the accounts violated the platform<72>s ban on <20>coordinated inauthentic behavior<6F> by running a network relying on <20>fake accounts to misrepresent themselves.<2E> | English | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | No attribution given in the text, although the Facebook assets had ties to Pakistan. Given the United Kingdom's long-established Pakistani community, it is unclear whether the campaign was run by people based in the UK or based in Pakistan. | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | To promote Anti-Islamophobic and Anti-extremist narratives. In some cases trolling UK far-right Facebook with a honeypot conservative community/group only to switch messaging to pro-Islam and pro-Pakistan. | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 16 | 15 | Romania >>> Romania 2018 | Facebook assets spread highly biased political messaging in favor of Romania<69>s ruling Social Democratic Party (PSD), and denigrated opposing politicians. | 2018 | 2019 | March | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | March | #TrollTracker: Facebook Takes Down Fake Network in Romania. Medium. DFRLab, March 7, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/exclusive-facebook-takes-down-fake-network-in-romania-20c33591b4ea | https://medium.com/dfrlab/exclusive-facebook-takes-down-fake-network-in-romania-20c33591b4ea | Romania | 1 | 0.06 | 2017 | 0.06 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 0.52 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | EU-Romania relations | Federal Election: Romanian President Klaus Iohannis is up for re-election in the upcoming November 2019 presidential elections. Other - EU-Romania relations: In 2019, Romania took over the EU<45>s rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union, a position it held until June 30, 2019. Additionally, the EU accused the Romanian government of stalling its efforts to combat corruption. An EU communique urged the country to reform its judicial system and appoint a new anti-corruption prosecutor. Romania<69>s former chief anti-corruption prosecutor, Laura Codru?a K<>vesi, spearheaded various anti-corruption initiatives that jailed prominent former politicians, including high-ranking PSD members. She was later dismissed from her post. | 1 | 1 | On March 7, 2019, Facebook removed a network of four Romanian Facebook pages, 26 Facebook accounts, and a public Facebook group. At least four of the Facebook pages linked to affiliate news sites that produced highly biased content. | Romanian, English | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Romania | 1 | 0.06 | 2017 | 0.06 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 0.52 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | To support the image of the ruling PSD party in Romania by promoting its incumbent members and attacking its rivals. | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 17 | 16 | United States >>> --- 2019 | Thousands of accounts spammed U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo<65>s Instagram account by posting duplicate and often pro-Iran, anti-U.S. comments. Some accounts also advocated for Iranian opposition movements. | 2019 | January | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2019 | February | #TrollTracker: Spam Attack on Secretary Pompeo. Medium. DFRLab, February 25, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-spam-attack-on-secretary-pompeo-d2ab638f0b5 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-spam-attack-on-secretary-pompeo-d2ab638f0b5e | United States | 1 | Government - Civilian = US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo | 0.48 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 22 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | January 11 Americans announced Warsaw Conference; February 13-14 2019 Warsaw Conference | American Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced an international summit on Middle East security and Iran<61>s threat to stability in the region on January 11, 2019. The summit, called the Warsaw Conference, was in Poland from February 13-14, 2019. | 1 | 1 | Instagram was the primary platform; Instagram accounts spammed US Secretary of State's Instagram posts, predominantly with pro-Iran messaging (although some of the accounts advocated for Iranian opposition movements.) Some amplified hashtags were seen on Twitter as well, but the main hashtag -- #InviteRestartLeadersToWarsaw -- is supportive of an Iranian opposition movement. | English | 1 | Geopolitical issues | 1 | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | January 11 Americans announced Warsaw Conference; February 13-14 2019 Warsaw Conference | American Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced an international summit on Middle East security and Iran<61>s threat to stability in the region on January 11, 2019. The summit, called the Warsaw Conference, was in Poland from February 13-14, 2019. Iran<61>s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif criticized Poland for jointly hosting the summit with the United States, calling it a <20>desperate anti-Iran circus.<2E> | To spam Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, spread anti-American sentiment, and encourage President Donald Trump to invite Iran's Prince Reza Pahlavi to the Warsaw Summit. | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 18 | 17 | Ukraine >>> Russia | 24 Instagram pages masqueraded as news aggregators in central and western Ukraine. | 2019 | January | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | February | #ElectionWatch: Insta-Deception Targets Ukraine. Medium. DFRLab, February 19, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-insta-deception-targets-ukraine-6f4a820bace0 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-insta-deception-targets-ukraine-6f4a820bace0 | Ukraine | Central and Western Ukraine | 1 | The 24 Instagrams posted as local news aggregators in different Ukrainian districts, particularly targeting central and western Ukraine. | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | 1 | Federal Election (binary) | Intra-state war = War in Donbass | 1 | 1 | 1 | 24 Instagram pages taken down by the platform posted more than 24,000 posts and accumulated nearly 80,000 followers. | Ukrainian, Russian | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Not all engagement appears to have been organic. A closer investigation of the accounts revealed that some of the users engaging with the Today Network<72>s content were Turkish, not Ukrainian. It suggests that the engagement may not have been organic and the network used artificial amplification to build up an audience. | 1 | Russia | Facebook said that the accounts "shared characteristics" with Internet Research Agency (IRA) operations. The IRA is linked to the Kremlin. There is not other evidence of attribution to the IRA. | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | Extra-state war = Ukraine intervention | Expand Russian information campaign operations into more central and western parts of Ukraine, targeting the March 2019 Presidential Election. | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 19 | 18 | Venezuela >>> Venezuela 2018 | A campaign by the Venezuelan government provided civilians with financial incentives to engage in inorganic behavior online, spreading state propaganda under the guise of "defending truth." | 2018 | December | 2019 | February | #InfluenceForSale: Venezuela<6C>s Twitter Propaganda Mill. Medium. DFRLab, February 3, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/influenceforsale-venezuelas-twitter-propaganda-mill-cd20ee4b33d8 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/influenceforsale-venezuelas-twitter-propaganda-mill-cd20ee4b33d8 | Venezuela | 1 | -1.25 | 2017 | -1.34 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | -1.21 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 63 | 2017 | 66 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | new government attempt | 1 | 1 | One account rewards people who tweet using the designated hashtags with money through an app called VeMonedero, a digital wallet where the government deposits aid money to an account tied to Venezuelan people<6C>s Carnet de la Patria (Motherland Card), an ID card that identifies social aid recipients. In order to receive money for tweeting, people register their Twitter accounts in the app and tweet the hashtags. Some of the hashtags are also pushed on state media television programs. | A Telegram channel acts like a direct feed bot to one account's Twitter activity. | Spanish | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Accounts demonstrated bot-like behavior but at a lower score than usual, only so much as to infer partial automation | 1 | 1 | Venezuela | 1 | -1.28 | 2017 | -1.34 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | -1.21 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 63 | 2017 | 66 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | new government attempt | Boost the Maduro government on Twitter, building the facade of popular support online. | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20 | 19 | Middle East >>> Iran 2010 | Facebook identified a network of pages originating from Iran targeting more than a dozen countries in eight languages. 783 Facebook assets were taken down for coordinated inauthentic behavior. | 2010 | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2019 | January | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | January | #TrollTracker: Outward Influence Operation From Iran. Medium. DFRLab, January 31, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-outward-influence-operation-from-iran-cc4539684c8d | https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-outward-influence-operation-from-iran-cc4539684c8d | Middle East | While the campaign spanned regions and continents, the Middle East was one main target. The majority of Facebook pages were published in Arabic. | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | unofficial Arab-Israeli pact against Iran | North America | While the campaign spanned regions and continents, some pages were targeted at North America, particularly the US. | North Africa | While the campaign spanned regions and continents, some pages were targeted at North Africa in particular. | 1 | 1 | Some Facebook assets linked to websites sharing biased content. 97 pages were created between 2010 and 2018, and at least 38 pages were active for more than five years. In total, the pages amassed nearly 2.5 million followers, of which 1.95 million were not duplicated. Facebook removed 783 assets in total. | Arabic, English, French, Hebrew, Persian, Spanish, Hindi, Indonesian | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9/11 conspiracies | 1 | 1 | Apart from images and memes, a page called @StopMEK shared a link to an archived "unclassified" governmental report on how the United States was monitoring the MEK<45>s movement in Iran in the mid-1990<39>s. The file was embedded as a QR code on one of the page<67>s images. Unclear if the document was faked or not. | 1 | 1 | Iran | Facebook assessed that the campaign was associated with Iran. | 1 | -1.56 | 2009 | -1.63 | 2010 | -1.42 | 2011 | 1.9 | 2010 | -1.58 | 2009 | -1.61 | 2010 | -1.58 | 2011 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 89 | 2011 | Spread anti-Israeli, anti-US, and generally anti-Western narratives and messaging that aligns with Iranian interests regionally and abroad. | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21 | 20 | Mexico >>> 2018 | Inauthentic activity originating from South Asian Facebook accounts artificially inflated the number of Facebook <20>likes<65> on social media content for and about the state government of Oaxaca in Mexico. The main beneficiary of the activity was Alejandro Murat Hinojosa, the governor of the state of Oaxaca. | 2018 | May | 2019 | January | #ElectionWatch: Likes from Afar in Oaxaca. Medium. DFRLab, January 17, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-likes-from-afar-in-oaxaca-b7c7d5fcedf6 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-likes-from-afar-in-oaxaca-b7c7d5fcedf6 | Mexico | 1 | -0.72 | 2017 | -0.57 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | -0.08 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 39 | 2017 | 40 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No concurrent events indicates change as inauthentic activity happens outside of election cycle. | 1 | Fake likes appear on Facebook pages for the Government of the State of Oaxaca, including the governor's page and his wife's page. | 1 | Faked likes | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Suspected "likes-for-hire" style engagement. | Create a base of engagement in Spanish speaking and Mexican spheres online, likely to set a precedent for later activation come time for election interference. | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22 | 21 | Baltic States >>> Russia 2010 | Around 300 Facebook pages masqueraded as groups with special interests <20> ranging from food to support for authoritarian presidents <20> and amplified content from the Kremlin<69>s media agency, Rossiya Segodnya. It appears to be a systematic and covert attempt to build Rossiya Segodnya's online audience in over a dozen countries. Sputnik, an outlet in Rossiya Segodnya's portfolio, was particularly boosted in this campaign. | 2010 | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2019 | January | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | January | Facebook<92>s Sputnik Takedown <20> In Depth. Medium. DFRLab, January 17, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebooks-sputnik-takedown-in-depth-f417bed5b2f8 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebooks-sputnik-takedown-in-depth-f417bed5b2f8 | Most common page creation dates were October 2017 and November - October 2018. Some pages had been abandoned by 2018, while others were still active before the Facebook takedown. | Baltic States | The campaign spanned countries, but the Baltic States -- Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania -- were explicitly targeted. While not in the Baltic States, Belarus, a neighboring country, was also explicitly targeted. | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Central Asia | The campaign spanned countries. Certain states in Central Asia were particularly targeted, including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. | Caucasus | The campaign spanned countries, but the Caucasus -- specifically, Armenia, Georgia, and Chechnya -- were explicitly targeted. While not in the Caucasus, Moldova was also targeted. | 1 | 1 | TOK | Some of the Facebook assets linked to Sputnik, a Russian state media outlet. Many of the pages cross-posted videos from Sputnik and from TOK (a video service that is also part of Rossiya Segodnya's portfolio). | Russian | 1 | 1 | Geopolitical interests; random content. | 1 | 1 | Saturating the information space | Russia | In the case of Latvia, Facebook concluded that the Facebook assets were linked to Sputnik employees. | 1 | 1 | -0.97 | 2009 | -0.93 | 2010 | -1 | 2011 | 23.5 | 2010 | -0.9 | 2009 | -0.89 | 2010 | -0.88 | 2011 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 52 | 2011 | 1 | To increase the reach of Rossiya Segodnya across countries by building audiences based on specific interests. | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 23 | 22 | Italy >>> Italy 2014 | Civilian and corporate Twitter accounts were registered for a service hosted on Italian politician Matteo Salvini's personal website which allowed the accounts to partially be used as bots in a larger network. The dormant network was activated in the time leading up to Italy's March 2018 federal election. | 2014 | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2018 | January | #ElectionWatch: Italy<6C>s Self-Made Bots. Medium. DFRLab, January 25, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-italys-self-made-bots-200e2e268d0e | https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-italys-self-made-bots-200e2e268d0e | https://www.davidpuente.it/blog/2018/01/24/tweet-automatici-della-lega-nord-su-twitter-un-matteo-salvini-strepitoso-su-la7-siete-daccordo/ | Start Year = mentioned in accompanying link 2 stating that the registration page was available in 2014 | Italy | 1 | 0.5 | 2013 | 0.46 | 2014 | 0.38 | 2015 | 22.9 | 2014 | 0.95 | 2013 | 1 | 2014 | 1.03 | 2015 | 23 | 2013 | 22 | 2014 | 23 | 2015 | 1 | Federal Election = March 2018 Italian National Election | 1 | Twitter accounts activated by a subscription service that operated the accounts as a botnet. | An app that Twitter users sign up for that automatically sends tweets from their accounts. | Italian | 1 | 1 | 1 | An app that Twitter users sign up for that automatically sends tweets from their accounts. | Brigading because inauthentic activity was executed under the users' real names | 1 | Italy | 1 | 0.5 | 2013 | 0.46 | 2014 | 0.38 | 2015 | 22.9 | 2014 | 0.95 | 2013 | 1 | 2014 | 1.03 | 2015 | 23 | 2013 | 22 | 2014 | 23 | 2015 | 1 | Federal Election = March 2018 national elections in Italy | To amplify the Lega party on Twitter. | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 24 | 23 | United States >>> Russia 2017 | A hashtag decrying Morgan Freeman (after he warned that Russia was waging an information war in the United States) was perpetuated by a group associated with Russia's Internet Research Agency. RT spread the hashtag and related media, and it was then amplified on several other platforms. | 2017 | September | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2018 | January | Russia<92>s Full Spectrum Propaganda. Medium. DFRLab, January 23, 2017. https://medium.com/dfrlab/russias-full-spectrum-propaganda-9436a246e970 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/russias-full-spectrum-propaganda-9436a246e970 | United States | Target was not clearly defined, but it is implied that the target is the United States because the disinformation repudiated Morgan Freeman's claim that Russia was waging information war on the United States. | 1 | 0.4 | 2016 | 0.34 | 2017 | 0.48 | 2018 | 18.9 | 2017 | 1.11 | 2016 | 1.05 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | 18 | 2016 | 21 | 2017 | 22 | 2018 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | The campaign originated from the website of a group called Agitpolk that appeared to be independent of the government (but was not, since the campaign was conducted by the Internet Research Agency, a Russian government contractor). The #StopMorganLie Twitter campaign gathered under 10,000 tweets, including retweets. The VK post was viewed 14,000 times, but liked just 124 times. RT then amplified the hashtag in an English-language article, and posted the article on Facebook, where it was picked up by: a Pinterest page focused on socialism and politics; an aggregator site called pressaspect.com; an ostensibly travel-focused site based in Hawaii; and a site dedicated to Russians in Florida. | Russian, English | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | The hashtag was amplified in a variety of ways. Two Twitter accounts associated with Agitpolk -- one official, and one a sockpuppet -- boosted it. Bots amplified the hashtag, and it was then amplified by official and verified Russian government accounts. | 1 | Memes were spread attacking Freeman as a hysterical and ill-informed drug user. | Russia | 1 | -0.95 | 2016 | -0.64 | 2017 | -0.5 | 2018 | 0 | 2017 | -1.13 | 2016 | -1.09 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | 65 | 2016 | 66 | 2017 | 67 | 2018 | 1 | To debase the claims of high profile actor Morgan Freeman after he spoke out against Russian disinformation and its threat to the United States' electoral process. | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 25 | 24 | France >>> --- 2018 | A network of coordinated and inauthentic Facebook and Instagram accounts impersonated French-speaking users. The network's posts ranged from soccer and fashion tips for Muslim women to attacks on French President Emmanuel Macron. | 2018 | 2018 | November | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2018 | November | #TrollTracker: Glimpse Into a French Operation. Medium. DFRLab, November 28, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-glimpse-into-a-french-operation-f78dcae78924 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-glimpse-into-a-french-operation-f78dcae78924 | France | 1 | France is the inferred target of this campaign, since the accounts posed as French-language people with interests in French politics, soccer, and more. | 0.28 | 2017 | 0.11 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1.15 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 26 | 2017 | 25 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | 1 | 1 | 39 Facebook Accounts, 6 Facebook Pages, 99 Instagram Accounts | French | 1 | 1 | 1 | Geopolitical issues | 1 | 1 | 1 | There is insufficient evidence to provide a firm attribution to the Russian Internet Research Agency; the accounts certainly behaved like troll factory accounts, but such behavior is not confined to Russian information operations. | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | The network of inauthentic accounts were derailed before they would be mobilized. Likely intention to create a base and spread incendiary messaging a la the Russian interference in the United States between 2014 and 2018. | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 26 | 25 | Lithuania >>> Pro-Kremlin Blogger 2018 | An established Lithuanian news media outlet was hacked and a fake article depicting an alleged invasion plan of the Baltic states by NATO forces was published on the site | 2018 | October | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2018 | November | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2018 | November | #BalticBrief: NATO Not Planning To Invade Belarus." Medium. DFRLab, November 21, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/balticbrief-nato-not-planning-to-invade-belarus-d694d34f04ba | https://medium.com/dfrlab/balticbrief-nato-not-planning-to-invade-belarus-d694d34f04ba | https://kaunas.kasvyksta.lt/2018/11/08/112/portalas-kas-vyksta-kaune-patyre-kibernetine-ataka/ | Citation 2 = Kas Vyksta Kaune is the first reporting. | Lithuania | 1 | 0.78 | 2017 | 0.75 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 0.99 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | ongoing NATO exercise Anakonda 2018 | 1 | 1 | 9gag; :Liveleak | Medium | The text was first published on Military International New Blog. It was planted on the Lithuanian news site Kas vyksta Kaune. It was removed as soon as the media outlet became aware of the story. Among the seven outlets which picked up the article was the pro-Kremlin news aggregator The Russophile (also known as Russia News Now). | English, Lithuanian | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Hackers infiltrated the news outlet using the login credentials of a former employee. The story was also published on Medium by "Paul Black," who does not have a digital footprint. It is estimated that the account is fake. | 1 | 1 | Destructive - Discredit (binary) = Platform appropriated by disinformant to spread misleading messaging and by extension discredit the affected media outlet. Oblique - Troll (binary) = Platform infiltrated and messaging convoluted | Pro-Kremlin Blogger | The inferred hacker is Rudis Kronitis is a pro-Kremlin blogger in Latvia. He is known for disseminating disinformation and falsified information relating to NATO and Baltic states<65> defense capabilities. In 2017, he published an article, which falsely accused the Lithuanian media of covering up a sex scandal that Lithuania<69>s Minister of Defense was allegedly involved in. In another one of his posts, he falsely accused U.S. troops of killing a child during a military exercise in Lithuania, which was quickly debunked by the Lithuanian media. Ruditis has also published editorials claiming that NATO makes Latvia vulnerable. | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Disinformation designed to spread pro-Kremlin messaging and erode trust among Baltic State nations with NATO and their neighbors. To sew discord between Baltic State nations (citing Lithuania and Latvia). | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 27 | 26 | United States >>> Russia | A campaign attributed to the Internet Research Agency or <20>troll factory<72> in Russia ran over 100 accounts on Instagram and Facebook. According to traces of this activity left online, the campaign posted divisive content from all political angles, right up to the eve of the U.S. midterm elections. | 2018 | November | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2018 | November | #TrollTracker: Facebook<6F>s Midterm Takedown. Medium. DFRLab, November 13, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-facebooks-midterm-takedown-f3451ee5dc2 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-facebooks-midterm-takedown-f3451ee5dc2 | United States | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | 1 | Federal Election = American 2016 presidential election and 2018 midterms | 1 | 1 | At least 99 Instagram accounts, 36 Facebook accounts, and six Facebook pages were taken down. | English | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Domestic issues | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Russia | Initial suspicions were that the accounts were run by the Internet Research Agency or <20>troll factory<72> in St. Petersburg. A website which claimed to be affiliated to the troll factory said it ran them, although any such claim should be viewed with caution. Facebook took the accounts offline after a tip from U.S. law enforcement. | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | To build American audiences around a range of issues while furthering domestic polarization and social discord. | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 28 | 27 | Brazil >>> --- 2018 | In the months leading up to Brazil's 2018 federal election, 232 Twitter accounts propagated false information relating to Brazilian politics. The accounts belonged to international and external groups across Brazilian party lines. | 2018 | August | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2018 | September | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2018 | November | #ElectionWatch: FGV DAPP Uncovers Foreign Twitter Influence in Brazil. Medium. DFRLab, November 1, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-fgv-dapp-uncovers-foreign-twitter-influence-in-brazil-7ab24e34223 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-fgv-dapp-uncovers-foreign-twitter-influence-in-brazil-7ab24e34223 | Brazil | 1 | 1 | 1 | -0.42 | 2017 | -0.36 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 0.45 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 33 | 2017 | 31 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | 1 | Federal Election = October 2018 Brazil general elections. | 1 | 1 | State Media = Russian media outlets including RT and Sputnik. 232 suspicious Twitter profiles were identified. Tweets were identified in more than 40 distinct languages, and the profiles had previously tweeted about other international elections, including in Germany, the US, France, Mexico, the UK, Paraguay, and Argentina. | Portuguese, English, Spanish, Italian | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | A network of automated profiles from Venezuela, Argentina, Cuba and Ecuador published content supporting the Workers<72> Party (PT) candidacy. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Astroturfing occurred in the network of automated profiles that published content in support of the Workers' Party (PT). | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | To influence the Brazilian 2018 general election in favor of certain candidates and parties. | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 29 | 28 | United States >>> Iran | Facebook removed 82 pages, accounts, and groups for coordinated inauthentic behavior that originated in Iran and targeted people in the United States and United Kingdom. | 2018 | October | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2018 | October | <93>#TrollTracker: Facebook Uncovers Iranian Influence Operation.<2E> Medium, DFRLab. October 26, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-facebook-uncovers-iranian-influence-operation-d21c73cd71be. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-facebook-uncovers-iranian-influence-operation-d21c73cd71be | Starting Year (year) = two of the most popular pages were created on February 3 and April 1 2018. | United States | 1 | Target coded as electorate because divisive content was promoted. The accounts primarily masqueraded as American liberals, posting relevant and divisive left-leaning content. | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | 1 | Federal Election = 2018 Midterms | United Kingdom | One of the taken-down Facebook accounts focused on boosting left-leaning posts in the UK. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 82 pages, accounts, and groups were taken down in the network. Some of the Facebook pages had very large followings and many shares. For example, a page called "I need Justice Now" had over 13 million video views, while another, "No Racism No War," had over 412,000 likes and almost half a million followers. | English | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Some of the accounts were artificially amplified, particularly the amount of their shares. | 1 | Iran | -0.93 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | To inflame America<63>s partisan divides. | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 30 | 29 | United States >>> Russia 2018 | The Russian government hacked into the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), and exposed private information in an attempt to discredit both the WADA and American athletes. In a cyber-enabled influence operation, the leaked information was amplified by the Russian government and Kremlin-associated media to push a narrative emphasizing American hypocrisy and the deceits of the WADA. | 2018 | 2018 | October | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2018 | October | #PutinAtWar: WADA Hack Shows Kremlin Full-Spectrum Approach. Medium. DFRLab, October 14, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/putinatwar-wada-hack-shows-kremlin-full-spectrum-approach-21dd495f2e91 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/putinatwar-wada-hack-shows-kremlin-full-spectrum-approach-21dd495f2e91 | United States | United States are by extension the target of defamation in this campaign | 1 | Influential Individuals = American athletes that were targeted in the amplification of the hacked WADA materials, including Serena Williams, Simone Biles, and Elena Delle Donne. | 0.34 | 2017 | 0.48 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1.05 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 21 | 2017 | 22 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Open Web Other - Hacker collective "Fancy Bear" website | The hacked content was amplified on Twitter, on a corresponding website (fancybears.net, which has subsequently been seized by the FBI), and in Kremlin-associated media such as Sputnik. | English, Russian | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Russia | Attribution is not certain | 1 | -0.64 | 2017 | -0.5 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | -1.09 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 66 | 2017 | 67 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | 1 | To discredit the World Anti-Doping Agency and the US by amplifying narratives about how they are hypocritical, while also mischaracterizing the actions of Russian athletes previously caught doping. | 1 | To vilify the United States Athletes of bribery and unsportsmanlike conduct among national sports teams and athletes. To slander American athletes and support a narrative of hypocritical morals and practices. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 31 | 30 | Brazil >>> --- 2018 | Bolsonaro supporters spread false information about opposition, spreading old videos with the intention to mislead. Efforts to exaggerate pro-Bolsonaro turnout and diminish ant-Bolsonaro activism repurposed old images of a Carnival parade. | 2018 | 2018 | 2018 | October | #ElectionWatch: Protests Reinterpreted Online in Brazil. Medium. DFRLab, October 5, 2018 https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-protests-reinterpreted-online-in-brazil-128c6f1a9b1a. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-protests-reinterpreted-online-in-brazil-128c6f1a9b1a | Brazil | 1 | 1 | -0.42 | 2017 | -0.36 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 0.45 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 33 | 2017 | 31 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | 1 | Federal Election (binary) = 2018 Presidential Election | 1 | 1 | 1 | The false claim was amplified by FB pages such as <20>Por Um Brasil Melhor<6F> (For a better Brazil), with 740,000 followers. | Portuguese | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Deceptive Content Manipulation (binary) = Images misrepresenting the size of the protest crowd Hacking - Data Exfiltration (binary) = Women against Bolsonaro Facebook group hacked. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Destructive - Suppress (binary) = one of the page administrators was assaulted on September 24. | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | To discredit the Anti-Bolsonaro base by spreading false content under the guise that it was sourced from the Bolsonaro opposition. To suppress the Balsonaro opposition by way of fabricated content and even physical violence. | 1 | 1 | To shift perceptions of Bolsonaro's opposition in the time leading up the 2018 presidential election | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 32 | 31 | North Macedonia >>> Vietnam 2018 | Ahead of the September 30, 2018 nationwide referendum to determine the countries name, Macedonia became the subject of authentic targeted behavior online as local and Vietnamese users coordinated in shaping the information space around the naming vote. | 2018 | September | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2018 | September | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2018 | September | #ElectionWatch: Inauthentic Activity Tested Ahead Naming Referendum. Medium. DFRLab, September 29, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-inauthentic-activity-tested-ahead-naming-referendum-1ff6b97cb5fb | https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-inauthentic-activity-tested-ahead-naming-referendum-1ff6b97cb5fb | North Macedonia | 1 | -0.25 | 2017 | -0.2 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | -0.14 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | Federal Election = Macedonia's September 30 naming referendum | 1 | Negative sentiment by Vietnamese users coordinated against a live Facebook video of a local "Yes" campaign event in Macedonia. The main reaction they used on the video was the "Angry" react. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Botnets (binary) = appearance of online behavior symptomatic of like farm intervention. | 1 | 1 | Oblique - Flood (binary) = distract from consensus online by way of fuzzing reactions to referendum specific content. | Vietnam | It is unknown who the Vietnam FB users were directed by. | Like farm consisting of accounts with Vietnamese names | 0.29 | 2017 | 0.2 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | -1.4 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 76 | 2017 | 76 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | To intercept discussion about the forthcoming nationwide referendum to change the nation's name. To create the appearance heated discord about the referendum. | 1 | 1 | To simulate partisanship and activate disagreement about the referendum . | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 33 | 32 | United States >>> Iran | A network of websites and social media pages in both English and Spanish language was traced back to Iran. The advanced distribution network published pro-Iranian content and messaging that was friendly to Iranian international and regional interests. | 2018 | August | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2018 | August | <93>#TrollTracker: Iran<61>s Suspected Information Operation.<2E> DFRLab, Medium. August 27, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-irans-suspected-information-operation-153fc7b60126. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-irans-suspected-information-operation-153fc7b60126 | <93>Taking Down More Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior - About Facebook.<2E> Facebook Newsroom, Facebook. August 21, 2019. https://about.fb.com/news/2018/08/more-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior/. | https://about.fb.com/news/2018/08/more-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior/ | United States | Much of the content was in English, making the English-speaking world a target here. The US is specifically coded as the target here since some pages had names like "Berniecrats," meaning they were explicitly targeting an American audience. The FireEye report referenced in the text said that the target appears aimed at "audiences in the U.S., United Kingdom, Latin America, and the Middle East." | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | Latin America | Much content was written in Spanish. One of the main implicated websites self-described itself as content specifically for Latin America. The FireEye report referenced in the text said that the target appears aimed at "audiences in the U.S., United Kingdom, Latin America, and the Middle East." | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 600 Facebook pages and accounts were taken down. One big platform were seemingly independent news sites including InstitutoManquehue.org and libertyfrontpress.com. | English, Spanish | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Global politics | 1 | 1 | 1 | Iran | FireEye stated that the influence operation "appears to originate from Iran" based on website registrant emails associated with Iranian locations and services,Twitter accounts registered using Iranian telephone numbers, and pro-Iranian content. | 1 | -0.81 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | To present a specific and receptive international audience to messaging sympathetic of Iranian international and regional interests. | 1 | To influence opinions about intervention by the United States and the United Kingdom in the Middle East. To promote politically liberal groups to support messaging that is sympathetic to Iranian interests, likely in an effort to drive a specific electoral outcome. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 34 | 33 | Mexico >>> --- 2018 | After a tie in a gubernatorial election in Puebla, Mexico, two hashtags in support of one of the candidates were amplified by bot-like accounts. | 2018 | July | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2018 | July | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2018 | July | #ElectionWatch: Post-Electoral Bots in Puebla. Medium. DFRLab, July 20, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-post-electoral-bots-in-puebla-569bc88f0c0b | https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-post-electoral-bots-in-puebla-569bc88f0c0b | Mexico | Specifically, Puebla, Mexico | 1 | -0.72 | 2017 | -0.57 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | -0.08 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 39 | 2017 | 40 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | 1 | State Election = July 2018 gubernatorial elections | 1 | Two hashtags were used to support one of the candidates, Martha Erika Alonso: #PueblaEligi<67>PAN and #YoVot<6F>XMarthaErika. This second hashtag received 16,600 mentions from 1,623 users. | Spanish | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | To populate the narrative across party lines following Mexico's largest election. In lieu of both leading candidates declaring victory, inauthentic support and celebration online convoluted the information space in which an already questionable electoral procedure is resolved. | 1 | Likely to amplify messaging in support of the winning candidate. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 35 | 34 | United States >>> Russia 2017 | Facebook assets, sharing characteristics congruent with Russia "troll-farm" and the IRA activity posted divisive political content, likely with the intention sought to polarize political debate in the United States. | 2017 | 2018 | July | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2018 | August | <93>#TrollTracker: Russian Traces in Facebook Takedown" DFRLab, Medium. August 16, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-russian-traces-in-facebook-takedown-767aac0a3483. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-russian-traces-in-facebook-takedown-767aac0a3483 | <93>Removing Bad Actors on Facebook - About Facebook,<2C> Facebook Newsroom. July 31, 2018. https://about.fb.com/news/2018/07/removing-bad-actors-on-facebook/. | https://about.fb.com/news/2018/07/removing-bad-actors-on-facebook/ | United States | 1 | 0.4 | 2016 | 0.34 | 2017 | 0.48 | 2018 | 18.9 | 2017 | 1.11 | 2016 | 1.05 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | 18 | 2016 | 21 | 2017 | 22 | 2018 | 1 | 1 | 32 Facebook pages and accounts were taken down; the DFRLab studied eight of them. | English | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | The pages and accounts were taken down by Facebook for coordinated inauthentic behavior. | 1 | 1 | Russia | 1 | -0.95 | 2016 | -0.64 | 2017 | -0.5 | 2018 | 0 | 2017 | -1.13 | 2016 | -1.09 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | 65 | 2016 | 66 | 2017 | 67 | 2018 | 1 | Activate a liberal base in opposition to artificially circulated misogynistic, anti-feminist, and xenophobic content. | 1 | 1 | To enrage, federate, and possibly mobilize a liberal audience in reaction to artificially disseminated enraging content. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 36 | 35 | Netherlands >>> Pakistan 2018 | Provocations by Dutch alt-right figures who solicited cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammad were met with an inauthentic response as bot-like behavior on twitter suggests an artificially amplified backlash. | 2018 | July | 2018 | July | 2018 | July | #BotSpot: Bots Join Backlash Against Islamophobic Cartoon Contest. Medium. DFRLab, July 29, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/botspot-bots-join-backlash-against-islamophobic-cartoon-contest-1c0f2a9462ab | https://medium.com/dfrlab/botspot-bots-join-backlash-against-islamophobic-cartoon-contest-1c0f2a9462ab | Netherlands | 1 | Political Party - Dutch far-right politician Geert Wilders and his Freedom Party | 0.92 | 2017 | 0.87 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1.57 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Prophet Mohammad cartoon competition | On June 12 2018, Dutch far-right politician Geert Wilders announced that his Freedom Party will hold a competition for cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammad. | 1 | The hashtag campaign, starting on July 6 2018, generated more than 481,000 mentions by 128,000 users. The main hashtag was #StopBlasphemousCartoonContest. There were also tweets of the same phrase. | English | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Pakistan | The majority of the users participating in the campaign appear to be from Pakistan; however, a look at the most active accounts revealed that some of those are far more likely to be bots than real Pakistani Twitter users. | -2.41 | 2017 | -2.27 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | -0.69 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 71 | 2017 | 73 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | To denounce the Dutch far-right party's inflammatory cartoon contest on social media. | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 37 | 36 | Latvia >>> Latvia 2018 | Website Redzams.lv publishes disinformation about a shopping mall in Latvia purported to have collapsed, incurring hundreds of casualties. Although the article was debunked, alarmed social media users spread the messages as spectators amassed 7,800 shares for the fake article. | 2018 | July | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2018 | July | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2018 | July | <93>#BalticBrief: False Story About Collapsed Mall Doesn<73>t Hold Up.<2E> Medium, DFRlab. July 20, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/balticbrief-false-story-about-collapsed-mall-doesnt-hold-up-325ca506edfd. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/balticbrief-false-story-about-collapsed-mall-doesnt-hold-up-325ca506edfd | Latvia | 1 | 0.46 | 2017 | 0.42 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 0.8 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | 1 | The website spreading the false information is called Redzams. Fake Facebook pages shared the website's content, driving traffic to them. The page follower count varied from hundreds to thousands, with the average follower count for one of the pages around 2,800. | Latvian | Mall collapse | 1 | 1 | Latvia | Open source evidence suggested that the public-facing owner of Redzams.lv Niks Endzins was not the sole owner of the website. Attribution is to Latvia because Niks Endzins does at least in part own the site and resides in Latvia | 1 | 1 | 0.46 | 2017 | 0.42 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 0.8 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | To draw viewership to the Redzams website and spread disinformation to drive spectacle about the website and its presence on social media. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 38 | 37 | Italy >>> Italy 2018 | Ahead of Italy's March 4, 2018 federal election, fake documents involving candidates were disseminated less than 48 hours before the vote, during a period of media silence as stipulated by Italian election law. | 2018 | March | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2018 | March | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2018 | March | #ElectionWatch: Italy<6C>s Far Right Attacks Right in Closing Moments. Medium. DFRLab, March 4, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-italys-far-right-attacks-right-in-closing-moments-10bdfc6bdeca | https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-italys-far-right-attacks-right-in-closing-moments-10bdfc6bdeca | Italy | 1 | 1 | Political Party = the far-right Lega party (the League, formerly known as Lega Nord) and the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle, MS5). To a lesser extent, the leftist Piu Europa (More Europe) party was also targeted. | 0.31 | 2017 | 0.31 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1.05 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 25 | 2017 | 25 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | 1 | Federal Election (binary) = Nationwide election and federal mandated media silence about the election and its candidates 48 hours prior to the vote. | 1 | 1 | Faked documents | On Friday, March 2 2018, #SorosLega5Stelle appeared online. On Facebook and Twitter, images of doctored documents were released. The documents do not appear wholly authentic, and appear doctored. | Italian | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Deceptive Content Manipulation = doctored documents. | 1 | 1 | Italy | 1 | 0.31 | 2017 | 0.31 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1.05 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 25 | 2017 | 25 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | 1 | Federal Election = March 4, 2108 run up to Italy's national elections | To saturate the information space in the normative silence leading up the Italy's 2018 federal election with the intent to alter perception of the candidates at a time when the media could not legally intervene to debunk radical messaging. | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 39 | 38 | Latvia >>> 2018 | A Latvian pro-Kremlin activist spread a false story that suggested American troops had plans to execute an "ethnic cleansing" of Russian language speaking Latvians. The story spread from social to traditional media. | 2018 | April | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2018 | April | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2018 | April | <93>#BalticBrief: False Claim of Plans for Ethnic Cleansing in Latvia.<2E> Medium, @DFRLab. April 27, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/balticbrief-false-claim-of-plans-for-ethnic-cleansing-in-latvia-ddb1ba111c39 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/balticbrief-false-claim-of-plans-for-ethnic-cleansing-in-latvia-ddb1ba111c39 | Latvia | 1 | 0.46 | 2017 | 0.42 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 0.8 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Latvian social media portal (Draugiem.lv) | Pro-Kremlin activist published a Facebook post with the false information on April 16, 2018. AT least 366 Facebook users reacted to the post with like, anger, or surprise emojis. The post garnered 88 comments and was shared 415 times. He republished the post as an article on an opinion website. A Latvian tabloid, Jauns.lv, published a story about it, and it was spread on Facebook, Twitter, and Latvian social media portal Draugiem.lv. After Gaponenko was arrested for unrelated reasons, Russian-funded media outlets including RIA Novosti picked up the story, continued to publish the false info Gaponenko had spread. | Latvian, Russian | 1 | 1 | 1 | Ethnic cleansing | 1 | The primary disinformant is Aleksandr Gaponenko, a well-known pro-Kremlin activist in Latvia. | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | To sow distrust of American and NATO forces amongst Russian-speaking Latvians. | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 40 | 39 | Mexico >>> --- 2018 | Twitter accounts in support and opposition to Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador displayed suspicious activity during a campaign festival ahead of the Mexico's July 1, 2018 presidential election. | 2018 | June | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2018 | July | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2018 | June | Bot Battlefield at #AMLOFest. Medium. DFRLab, June 30, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/botspot-amlofest-turns-into-a-bot-battlefield-796d8d048389 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/botspot-amlofest-turns-into-a-bot-battlefield-796d8d048389 | Mexico | 1 | 1 | Political Party = presidential candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, also known as AMLO | -0.72 | 2017 | -0.57 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | -0.08 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 39 | 2017 | 40 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | 1 | Federal Election = July 2018 Mexican presidential election. Suspicious Twitter activity occurred after presidential candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador organized a festival to commemorate the closing of his electoral campaign on June 28, 2018. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Obrador's festival was accompanied by a hashtag campaign, #AMLOFest, which was appropriated by both pro-AMLO and anti-AMLO accounts. Anti-AMLO accounts spread another hashtag, #ObscuroSecretoDeAMLO, through inauthentic activity. Six users shared links to a website, www.elobscurosecretodeamlo.com, which translated from Spanish means, <20>the dark secret of AMLO.<2E> The site consisted of a landing page and an embedded YouTube video called <20>AMLO<4C>s dark secret<65>. The YouTube video was uploaded on June 26 and was viewed 13,000 times at the time of this report. | Spanish | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Some Twitter accounts were designed to promote presidential candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador ahead of the 2018 Mexican presidential elections, while other accounts spread false information about him to smear him. | 1 | Exploit the period of media silence as mandated by Mexican law in the the few days leading up the the vote to establish messaging before the media is able to quell reception. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 41 | 40 | Lithuania >>> --- 2018 | A fake translation of a video depicting Lithuania<69>s Minister of Defense Raimundas Karoblis was intended to cause a rift between Lithuania and Ukraine. | 2018 | March | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2018 | March | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2018 | March | <93>#BalticBrief: Disinformation Through Mistranslation.<2E> Medium, @DFRLab. March 6, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/balticbrief-disinformation-through-mistranslation-18c0d600c00d. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/balticbrief-disinformation-through-mistranslation-18c0d600c00d | Certainty End (binary) = one instance of deceptive content manipulation circulated online. | Lithuania | 1 | 1 | 0.78 | 2017 | 0.75 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 0.99 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Ukraine | The fake translation seems designed to cause a rift between Lithuania and Ukraine. | 1 | liveleak.com and toptopic.com | toptopic.com is a social media platform akin to Reddit. The users that spread this faulty translated video did not have any previous following or activity on youtube, toptopic, and liveleak. | Russian, Ukrainian | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | To mislead Ukrainian and Russian speakers into believing that a Lithuanian minister recognized Crimea as Russian. | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 42 | 41 | Armenia >>> Russia | Facebook pages and groups with links to Sputnik Armenia employees distributed content that targeted Armenian diaspora populations regionally and abroad. | 2019 | Not Certain | 2019 | September | Inauthentic Sputnik-Linked Pages Target the Armenian Diaspora. Medium, DFRLab. September 5, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/inauthentic-sputnik-linked-pages-target-the-armenian-diaspora-3e4ed8923525 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/inauthentic-sputnik-linked-pages-target-the-armenian-diaspora-3e4ed8923525 | Armenia | The Armenian diaspora was targeted. | 1 | 1 | Racial, Ethnic, Religious, or Sexual Identity Group (binary) = Armenian diaspora population in Armenia and abroad | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | 1 | On Facebook, four individual users, 14 pages, and 18 groups were part of this network. Overall engagement with the network<72>s assets was moderate, at roughly 138,000 interactions over a six-month period. | Spanish, Armenian, Western Armenian | 1 | 1 | Random Content | 1 | The two adult users who ran much of the network -- who indicated they were married to each other on their Facebook profiles -- made accounts using images of what appears to be their children, who are minors. It's likely that the accounts are inauthentic, run by the adults, not the children. | 1 | 1 | Russia | Two individuals, Ordyan Aida (<28>Aida Ordyan<61>) and Rudik Petrosyan, who are likely married to each other, were managers of the Sputnik Armenia pages and other assets in the network. They are described in the text as an "Armenian family." | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Armenia | To build an Armenian diaspora audience that can be used, at a later date, to push Kremlin propaganda. | 1 | That much of the network<72>s content was not political suggested that the operation was in an early audience-building stage. Kremlin disinformation campaigns often start with banal, non-ideological topics to attract a wide audience; at a later stage, they begin to inject that audience<63>s media diet with Kremlin propaganda. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 43 | 42 | Middle East >>> Egypt 2015 | Two digital marketing companies published divisive socio-political content in the Middle East. Facebook removed many of their assets in August 2019, some of which had been active since 2015. | 2015 | 2019 | August | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | August | Facebook Disabled Assets Linked to Egypt and UAE-Based Firms. Medium, DFRLab. August 14, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-disabled-assets-linked-to-egypt-and-uae-based-firms-a232d9effc32 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-disabled-assets-linked-to-egypt-and-uae-based-firms-a232d9effc32 | Middle East | Some pages targeted the MENA region generally. Page-specific countries targeted include Egypt, the UAE, Somalia, Kuwait, Turkey, Palestine, Sudan, and Mauritania. | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | North Africa | 1 | 1 | Many of the Facebook pages linked to fake news sites. For example, a page called Ahrar Al Somali presented itself as the social media arm of an online publication called Somalianow. Another page, "Palastine Alyoum" (Palastine Today), presented itself as a magazine, while the page "Mowatenchinguitti" (Mauritania Today), presented itself as a local news outlet. The pages had more than 13.7 million followers combined. | Arabic, Turkish | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Local news and regional politics | 1 | 1 | 1 | Egypt | Two companies were linked to this operation: New Waves in Egypt and Newave in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). New Waves has been in operation since 2015. The individual likely behind the company, Amr Hussein, has other organizations registered under his email address. | 1 | -1.63 | 2014 | -1.5 | 2015 | -1.44 | 2016 | 31.7 | 2015 | -1.18 | 2014 | -1.18 | 2015 | -1.2 | 2016 | 60 | 2014 | 61 | 2015 | 63 | 2016 | United Arab Emirates | Two companies were linked to this operation: New Waves in Egypt and Newave in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Newave was a PR and marketing firm headquartered in Abu Dhabi, according to the information on its website. | To build audiences across the Middle East and North Africa while perpetuating anti-Qatar and anti-Muslim Brotherhood narratives in parallel with the political interests of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain. | 1 | 1 | To change public opinions about targeted nations and promote the client's regional and international interests. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 44 | 43 | --- >>> Israel 2019 | A pro-Israel smartphone app coordinated and amplified messages across social media platforms to promote Israel's foreign policy objectives. After a May 2019 Hamas and IDF skirmish, the app amplified pro-Israel, anti-Hamas talking points. | 2019 | May | 2019 | May | 2019 | August | How a <20>Political Astroturfing<6E> App Coordinates Pro-Israel Influence Operations. Medium, DFRLab. August 19, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-a-political-astroturfing-app-coordinates-pro-israel-influence-operations-bf1104fa5c7f | https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-a-political-astroturfing-app-coordinates-pro-israel-influence-operations-bf1104fa5c7f | While the smartphone app was launched in June 2017, the campaign studied in the text occurred during and after events in May 2019. | 1 | The target here is diffuse. | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | ften tracks ongoing and concurrent armed conflicts with Israel's neighbors and regional adversaries. | On May 4 2019, Hamas militants fired 600+ rockets into Israeli territory, killing 4 Israeli civilians. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) fought back with airstrikes and the targeted assassination of individual Hamas members, killing around 22 Palestinians, half of them civilians. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Act.IL application | smartphone app | The smarphone app, called Act.IL, describes itself as <20>Online Community for Israel.<2E> The app assigns users a series of <20>missions<6E> <20> typically a comment, retweet, or <20>like<6B> <20> intended to boost pro-Israel content across multiple platforms. These missions typically involve amplifying positive social media posts about Israel or, alternatively, bombarding unfavorable posts with negative comments and mass content moderation reports. By design, such actions are indistinguishable from organic social media activity. Act.IL relies on an honor system by which users track and report their own completed missions. There are roughly 17,500 registered accounts. | English | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Israel | Act.IL is ostensibly a nongovernmental organization, but is linked to the Israeli government, as well as American billionaires Sheldon Adelson and Haim Saban. The Act.IL smartphone app launched as part of the 4IL initiative, a web campaign intended to bolster Israeli public diplomacy that is sponsored by the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs and Public Diplomacy. Act.IL was created by Yarden Ben Yosef, a former IDF commander. Act.IL<49>s staff, which includes other former IDF intelligence officers, claims to maintain contact with Israeli military and domestic intelligence services. | 1 | 1 | -0.79 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | To promote Israeli foreign policy objectives on social media. | 1 | To inflate support regarding Israeli regional conflicts and interests to a regional and international English speaking audience. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 45 | 44 | Puerto Rico >>> Puerto Rico 2018 | A group of Puerto Rican officials, among them Governor Ricardo Rossell<6C>, used a private Telegram chat group to discuss at least 12 specific actions that either boosted pro-government messages or targeted government opponents. Shortly after each initiative was discussed, a group of troll accounts mobilized to execute the inauthentic amplification on Twitter. | 2018 | December | 2019 | January | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | July | From Telegram to Twitter: Top Puerto Rican Officials Plotted Possible Information Operation. Medium, DFRLab. July 29, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/from-telegram-to-twitter-top-puerto-rican-officials-plotted-possible-information-operation-a899a00e078e | https://medium.com/dfrlab/from-telegram-to-twitter-top-puerto-rican-officials-plotted-possible-information-operation-a899a00e078e | Puerto Rico | 1 | 1 | 0.48 | 2017 | 0.4 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 0.49 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | A group of the same 51 accounts <20> many of them trolls <20> were involved in at least six of the 12 planned campaigns. These accounts<74> interactions with one another as well as other users suggested they belonged to a network that supported the government and targeted political opponents. | Spanish | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Puerto Rico | 1 | No Data | No Data | 0.4 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 0.49 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | To monitor and influence conversations about the Puerto Rican government on social media, promoting the interests of the incumbent government and take aim at their political opponents. | 1 | 1 | To activate the Puerto Rican population online with hostilities towards the governments political opponents | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 46 | 45 | Armenia >>> --- 2018 | Fake disinformation watchdog sites took aim at Armenian audiences spreading their messaging on Facebook and targeting the recently elected Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. | 2018 | 2019 | 2019 | May | Armenia Assailed by Deceptive <20>Fact-Checking<6E> Groups, Part 1: The Players. Medium, DFRLab. May 2, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/armenia-assailed-by-deceptive-fact-checking-groups-part-i-the-players-2ce03daf2d28 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/armenia-assailed-by-deceptive-fact-checking-groups-part-i-the-players-2ce03daf2d28 | Armenia | 1 | -0.62 | 2017 | -0.42 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | -0.56 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 32 | 2017 | 27 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Junk news site is a blog. "Junk news" site is also a website called AntiFake.am, which claimed to focus on exposing fake news, while in reality is spread misinformation. | Armenian | 1 | Disinformation | 1 | 1 | 1 | The DFRLab identified three individuals -- Narek Samsonyan, Arthur Danielyan, and Narek Malyan who were associated with two of the Facebook pages that promoted a large proportion of the #SutNikol content. The DFRLab also uncovered some evidence to suggest that AntiFake.am was not an entirely domestic operation. A lookup of the domain<69>s public Whois record revealed that its IP location was listed as Saint Petersburg, Russia. | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | To stymie the developments of the "Velvet Revolution" and the election of Nikol Pashinyan | 1 | To validate uncertainty and distrust among Armenians about their government and purport Armenian dependence on Russian defense and support. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 47 | 46 | Indonesia >>> --- 2019 | Spam accounts manipulated Twitter campaigns and hashtags in favor of the incumbent President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo. Accounts coordinated to get hashtags to trend inauthentically. | 2019 | March | 2019 | April | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | April | Social Media Spam Tactics in Indonesia. Medium, DFRLab. April 16, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/social-media-spam-tactics-in-indonesia-1fd0beb8d5dd | https://medium.com/dfrlab/social-media-spam-tactics-in-indonesia-1fd0beb8d5dd | Indonesia | 1 | The hashtag campaign attempted to manipulate public sentiment on Twitter in favor of one political candidate for the presidential elections. | -0.53 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 46 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | Federal elections in Indonesia on April 17, 2019. | 1 | The hashtag #JokowiLagi (<28>Jokowi Again,<2C> translated from Indonesian) received about 25 percent of tweets from automated applications from March 10 to April 10 2019. | Indonesian | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Unable to make a confident attribution, it is possible that this operation may have been conducted by a buzzer team to amplify Jokowi campaign in the time leading up to the election. | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 48 | 47 | >>> Israel 2017 | Israeli political marketing firm the Archimedes Group targeted audiences around the world with inauthentic Facebook assets to influence elections and establish local audiences. The commercial network targeted at least 13 countries; their assets were followed by over 2.8 million users. | 2017 | 2019 | May | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | May | Inauthentic Israeli Facebook Assets Target the World. Medium, DFRLab. May 17, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/inauthentic-israeli-facebook-assets-target-the-world-281ad7254264 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/inauthentic-israeli-facebook-assets-target-the-world-281ad7254264 | Oldest pages created in 2017 as seen from screenshots of Facebook transparency pages. | West Africa | The network targeted at least 13 countries around the world, including countries in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Africa is coded as the primary target because Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Ghana, Togo, Algeria, Angola, and Mozambique were all explicitly targeted by country-specific Facebook pages. Additionally, Africa as a whole was targeted through Facebook pages like "L<>Afrique Cach<63>e" ("The Hidden Africa"). | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Government - Civilian (binary) = messaging in support of incumbent Nigerian President Political Party (binary) = messaging in opposition to incumbent Nigerian president Electorate (binary) = false watch political violence and disinformation watchdogs target media consumers. Inauthentic news media outlets. Fake data ex-filtration pages alleging African corruption. Inaccurate regional specific depictions of target nations. Racial, Ethnic, Religious, or Sexual Identity Group (binary) = messaging designed for Nigerian Muslim population | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | Federal Elections = February 2019 Nigerian presidential elections, which were a specific target of some Facebook pages. | Central America | Regional Bloc (bloc) = Honduras, Mexico | 1 | 1 | 256 Facebook and Instagram assets | French, Spanish, English | 1 | 1 | 1 | Disinformation | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Destructive - Discredit (binary) = Pages designed to expose alleged corruption | Israel | Archimedes Group is an Israeli political marketing firm that claims to run <20>winning campaigns worldwide,<2C> indicating both the political and global scope of its activities. | 1 | -0.79 | 2016 | -0.89 | 2017 | -0.93 | 2018 | 0 | 2017 | 0.79 | 2016 | 0.7 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | To push political and region specific messaging on behalf of clients, presumably around the world, for financial incentives. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 49 | 48 | Indonesia >>> --- | Ahead of Indonesia's April 2019 election, several Facebook pages were removed for "coordinated inauthentic behavior." The pages shared content that targeted the incumbent President Joko Widodo and supported his political rival Prabowo Subianto. | 2019 | April | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | April | #ElectionWatch: Facebook Takes Down Network Supporting Indonesian Presidential Candidate Prabowo Subianto. Medium, DFRLab. April 12, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-facebook-takes-down-network-supporting-indonesian-presidential-candidate-prabowo-18b8792e9529 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-facebook-takes-down-network-supporting-indonesian-presidential-candidate-prabowo-18b8792e9529 | Indonesia | 1 | 1 | The pages targeted incumbent President Joko Widodo ahead of the April 2019 election. | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | Federal Elections = April 2019 Indonesian presidential election | 1 | 234 facebook assets | English, Chinese, Russian, Indonesian | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | To denounce the incumbent and support his rival ahead of the April 2019 Indonesian presidential election. | 1 | the campaign's proximity to the elections did contribute to its potential to spread false or divisive messaging. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 50 | 49 | Venezuela >>> Venezuela 2019 | Venezuelan civilian militias used institutional accounts to manipulate Twitter traffic in an effort to make pro-Maduro hashtags trend in the country. Maduro reciprocated, calling for more Venezuelans to join militias. | 2019 | April | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2019 | April | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | May | Civilian Militias in Venezuela Coordinate on Twitter. Medium, DFRLab. May 1, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/civilian-militias-in-venezuela-coordinate-on-twitter-aadcd86d6186 | https://medium.com/dfrlab/civilian-militias-in-venezuela-coordinate-on-twitter-aadcd86d6186 | Venezuela | 1 | Electorate (binary) = Messaging tailored to support Maduro in response to opposition leader Juan Guaid<69>. | -1.34 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 66 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | contentious election of Nicolas Maduro and announcements by Maduro's opposition leader Juan Guaid<69>. | The attempt to manipulate Twitter traffic happened as the leader of the country, Nicolas Maduro, who has led Venezuela since the passing of Hugo Chavez in 2013, called for a million more Venezuelans to join the militia before the end of the year. | 1 | The DFRLab analyzed three hashtags that were amplified possibly artificially. This hashtag #somostodosmilicia (<28>We are all militia<69>) was mentioned 4,001 times between April 12 and 14. #Rumboalos3milliones was used 4,163 times between April 7 and 23. #miliciapuebloenarmas used 1,528 times between April 10 and 16. | Spanish | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | While there was evidence of traffic manipulation on Twitter, it is unclear whether or not some of the accounts using the hashtag are fake. Many of the accounts tweeting are real militia accounts. | 1 | 1 | Venezuela | Members of the Venezuelan militia used their institutional Twitter accounts to manipulate Twitter traffic. | 1 | -1.34 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 66 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Maduro-Guaido conflict | To promote Nicolas Maduro as the leader of Venezuela in response to messaging from Juan Guaid<69> and the Venezuelan military. To match and counter threats by Maduro opposition who purported to embark on the "final phase" to remove Maduro. To associate with and promote the role of civilian militia forces in Venezuela. | 1 | 1 | To saturate the information space around anit-Maduro narratives with reminders of civilian militia loyalty to the interim president. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 51 | 50 | Malaysia >>> --- 2018 | Ahead of the Malaysian general elections, Twitter bots launched two hashtag campaigns in defense of an opposition coalition of center left parties. | 2018 | April | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2018 | 2018 | April | #BotSpot: Bots Target Malaysian Elections. Medium, DFRLab. April 20, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/botspot-bots-target-malaysian-elections-785a3c25645b | https://medium.com/dfrlab/botspot-bots-target-malaysian-elections-785a3c25645b | Malaysia | 1 | 0.12 | 2017 | 0.24 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | -0.4 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 44 | 2017 | 45 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | 1 | Federal Election (binary) = May 9, 2019 general election | 1 | Two hashtags <20> #SayNOtoPH and #KalahkanPakatan <20> were used 44,100 times by 17,600 Twitter users. 17,000 of those users were bots. The campaign reached more than 300,000 users. | Malay | 1 | 1 | 1 | No certain attribution can be made but the content appears to be overtly supportive of the Barisan Nasional party. Bot herder profiles are Russian sounding Cyrillic screen names | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | To denounce the opposition party in the time leading up Malaysia's 2019 general elections. Accounts remained largely within their network and were, for the most part, ineffective at gaining an organic following. | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 52 | 51 | Latin America >>> Iran 2016 | Network of Facebook assets frequently re-purposed Iranian state media targeting Latin American and United States audiences. | 2016 | August | 2019 | October | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | October | <93>Facebook Takes down Iranian Assets, Some Targeting Latin American Audiences.<2E> DFRLab, Medium. October 24, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-takes-down-iranian-assets-some-targeting-latin-american-audiences-58a964dc0597. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-takes-down-iranian-assets-some-targeting-latin-american-audiences-58a964dc0597 | Latin America | The campaign spanned countries, targeting many specific countries in Latin America, including Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Mexico. | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | United States | One of the pages the DFRLab analyzed seemingly promoting the Black Lives Matter movement (<28>BLMNews<77>) in the United States. | 1 | 1 | In total, the five pages the DFRLab analyzed had 14,605 followers and 13,943 likes. One page linked to a junk news site, BLMnews.com, that was hosted in Iran. | Spanish, English | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Iran | One of the websites was hosted in Iran, and the page mangers of the Facebook assets were located in Iran. Some of the content referred to Iranian state-sponsored communications. | 1 | Government - Proxy/Inferred Attribution | -1.31 | 2015 | -0.81 | 2016 | -0.93 | 2017 | -0.2 | 2016 | -1.51 | 2015 | -1.34 | 2016 | -1.3 | 2017 | 87 | 2015 | 87 | 2016 | 85 | 2017 | To spread pro-Iranian messaging mixed in with region specific topics in the Americas. To take aim at American interests abroad, criticizing Israel and pushing the BDS movement. To target Latin American audiences on Iranian Spanish speaking media outlets such as HispanTV and on Spanish language Facebook pages. | 1 | To spread Iranian friendly sentiments in the Americas | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 53 | 52 | India >>> --- 2019 | Sock-puppet accounts appeared amid increased public attention to the India's space agency following an unsuccessful attempt at a lunar landing. Accounts interspersed false reporting with factual content about ongoing developments. | 2019 | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2019 | September | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | November | <93>Sockpuppet Accounts Impersonate India<69>s Space Agency Chief.<2E> Medium, DFRLab. November 18, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/sockpuppet-accounts-impersonate-indias-space-agency-chief-7fc2c1980f13. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/sockpuppet-accounts-impersonate-indias-space-agency-chief-7fc2c1980f13 | India | 1 | The sockpuppet Twitter accounts impersonated Dr. Kailasavadivoo Sivan, the chairman of India<69>s national space agency. | -0.96 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 43 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Failed attempt at lunar landing by the Indian space agency or ISRO | The appearance of the fake accounts coincided with the start of India<69>s first lunar landing. The lander was set to touch down on the far side of the moon but, as the lander descended, lost contact with the control room around 2 kilometers above the surface. | 1 | The sockpuppet Twitter accounts made it onto lists by actual news sites, including the Times of India, Indian Express, and BoomLive. | English, Hindi | 1 | 1 | Indian lunar landing attempt | 1 | 1 | Oblique - Troll (binary) = Infiltrated the narratives impersonating as a high profile official, interspersing reporting with false narratives. | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Intent is unclear, outside of promoting BJP officials and talking points. It is not uncommon for high profile events, such as a moon landing to be used as a vector to interject divisive content into an ongoing conversation. | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 54 | 53 | Greenland >>> --- 2019 | One-off accounts used English and Russian self-publishing platforms, targeting U.S. President Donald Trump's attempts to buy Greenland by way of fabricated government document - a letter sent on the official letterhead of Greenland. | 2019 | November | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2019 | 2019 | November | <93>Secondary Infektion Redux? Suspected Russian Intelligence Operation Targets Greenland.<2E> Medium, DFRLab. November 13, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/secondary-infektion-redux-suspected-russian-intelligence-operation-targets-greenland-c4e04deb27c5. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/secondary-infektion-redux-suspected-russian-intelligence-operation-targets-greenland-c4e04deb27c5 | Greenland | 1 | The content also spread on Eastern European blogging and media outlets in Ukraine and Latvia, suggesting that Russian-language speakers in these countries were another possible target. | 1.94 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | American President Trump offered to buy Greenland in August 2019 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Indybay.org | The false article originally appeared on the self-publishing platform Indybay.org. The same day, a Reddit account posted the story. The article gained some engagement on Facebook; the article translated in Russian was also shared on perevodika.ru and Yandex Zen. The article was also published on a Latvian regional website called D Fakti, an Azerbaijani web forum called Disput.az, and in a Ukrainina regional media outlet named Berdichevsky Poglyad. For most of these platform, the accounts posted the article solely and have not posted before or since, suggesting a high level of operational security in a possible intelligence operation. | English, Russian | 1 | 1 | Deceptive Content Manipulation (binary) = fake government document | 1 | Attribution is inferred to Russia. As with the forged documents in Operation Secondary Infektion, the letter contained many grammar errors and stylistic mistakes that are not characteristic to official correspondence and that resemble those commonly made by native Russian speakers with an intermediate grasp of English. | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | To sow discord in Greenland and among Russian-language speakers in Eastern Europe, convincing them that the US was attempting to buy Greenland. | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 55 | 54 | Spain >>> Spain 2019 | Facebook and Twitter removed over 300 accounts run by the conservative Partido Popular party, one of Spain's major political parties, for inauthentic behavior. | 2019 | 2019 | September | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | October | <93>Facebook and Twitter Remove Accounts Connected to Spanish Political Party.<2E> Medium, DFRLab. October 2,2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-and-twitter-remove-accounts-connected-to-spanish-political-party-9218db0a3d95. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-and-twitter-remove-accounts-connected-to-spanish-political-party-9218db0a3d95 | Spain | 1 | 1 | 0.25 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | The removal of the accounts occurred amid political instability in Spain. In the country<72>s April general elections, Prime Minister Pedro Sanch<63>z and his center-left PSOE (<28>Socialist Workers<72> Party of Spain<69>) won the most seats but failed to gain an outright majority of votes, which would have allowed it to govern by itself. PSOE then failed to form a coalition, and, as such, Spain is thus headed for another vote in November 2019. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | An assessment of URLs tweeted by the Twitter accounts revealed that the accounts amplified an invitation to an official WhatsApp channel run by the party. | Spanish | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Some of the accounts taken down were real users who worked for the PP. Other accounts were fake, designed to look as if they were real people. The fake Facebook accounts were primarily used to amplify the content (pages and posts) of other Facebook assets. | 1 | 1 | Spain | The network of inauthentic activity was linked to the PP. | 1 | 0.25 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 1 | The removal of the accounts occurred amid political instability in Spain. In the country<72>s April general elections, Prime Minister Pedro Sanch<63>z and his center-left PSOE (<28>Socialist Workers<72> Party of Spain<69>) won the most seats but failed to gain an outright majority of votes, which would have allowed it to govern by itself. PSOE then failed to form a coalition, and, as such, Spain is thus headed for another vote in November 2019. | To artificially boost support for the PP online ahead of Spain's 2019 November election. | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 56 | 55 | Macedonia >>> Albania 2018 | Coordinated spam accounts uniformly commented on the Macedonian government's Facebook page. The spam accounts advocating for equal rights for Albanians in Macedonia were quickly removed, presumably by Facebook's automated content review system. | 2018 | December | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2019 | January | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | January | <93>Coordinated Comments in Macedonia<69> Medium, DFRLab. January 21, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/coordinated-comments-in-macedonia-517fe904359b. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/coordinated-comments-in-macedonia-517fe904359b | Macedonia | 1 | 1 | The spam comments were on a Facebook post made by the Macedonian government's Facebook page. | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | International solidarity day in Macedonia | The Facebook post, which was subjected to spam comments, was written in celebration of International Solidarity Day. | 1 | The comments were quickly removed, presumably by Facebook<6F>s automated or content review systems. | Albanian | 1 | 1 | Equal rights | 1 | The DFRLab's analysis of the profiles of the commenters indicated that they were authentic accounts. | 1 | Oblique - Flood (binary) = Spam attack in the comments section of a government Facebook post. | Albania | The DFRLab's analysis of the profiles of commenters indicated that they were of Albanian origin. | 0.38 | 2017 | 0.38 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 0.2 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | A to hijack the national solidarity day movement to emphasize the role of Albanians in the Macedonian population and draw attention to the prisoners of the 2015 Kumanovo incident. | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 57 | 56 | >>> Turkey 2019 | As Turkey prepared to take large swaths of northeast Syria in October 2019 after the removal of American troops from the region, bot-like pro-Turkish Twitter accounts waged a concurrent disinformation campaign which demonized Syrian Kurds and the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). | 2019 | October | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2019 | 2019 | October | <93>Bot-like Turkish Accounts Complement Military Operation in Syria.<2E> Medium, DFRLab. October 16, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/bot-like-turkish-accounts-wage-anti-kurdish-hashtag-campaign-9b1a2908f5b3. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/bot-like-turkish-accounts-wage-anti-kurdish-hashtag-campaign-9b1a2908f5b3 | The target of this campaign was also likely global, since one language used was English. | 1 | 1 | Non-State Political Actor (binary) = YPG and PKK forces. Racial, Ethnic, Religious, or Sexual Identity Group (binary) = Kurdish Syrians. | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Turkish advances into North East Syria | An October 2019 executive order from the American President removed US troops from northeastern Syria. Turkish forces in northeastern Syria bombarded the Kurdish militia allied with the United States in its counter-Islamic State campaign. | 1 | #BabyKillerPKK began trending on Twitter in Turkey on October 10, 2019, registering roughly 118,000 mentions over a period of 12 hours. | English, Turkish | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | The accounts were likely bots. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Turkey | The accounts perpetuating the hashtag were likely Turkish in origin, according to the DFRLab's analysis. | 1 | -1.33 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 66 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Turkish offensive into North East Syria | Campaign designed to saturate the information space around the Turkish offensive into north east Syria. To change opionions about the Kurdish defending forces and bolster positive sentiments around the Turkish attacking forces. | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 58 | 57 | Egypt >>> Egypt 2018 | Facebook and Instagram assets associated with the Egyptian newspaper El Fagr were removed for coordinated inauthentic behavior after they masqueraded as regional news outlets and amplified divisive political content. | 2018 | December | 2019 | October | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | October | <93>Facebook Removes Assets Connected to Egyptian Newspaper El Fagr.<2E> Medium, DFRLab. October 15, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-removes-assets-connected-to-egyptian-newspaper-el-fagr-7ff5e5b41f78. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-removes-assets-connected-to-egyptian-newspaper-el-fagr-7ff5e5b41f78 | Egypt | Egypt coded as primary target because many of the inauthentic assets amplified content on domestic news and political topics. However, other countries were also targeted. | 1 | -1.42 | 2017 | -1.16 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | -1.25 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 68 | 2017 | 72 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | Protests | Anti-government protests in Egypt in September and October 2019 against President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi | Middle East and North Africa (MENA) | A significant portion of the inauthentic pages associated with El Fagr focused on various other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, including Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia. These pages masqueraded as independent local and regional outlets, even though they were linked to El Fagr. | 1 | 1 | 1 | Arabic | 1 | 1 | 1 | Some pages were directly linked to El Fagr, while other pages masqueraded as regional news outlets in other countries. | 1 | 1 | Constructive - Astroturf (binary) = engagement ranging from 90 - 17,000 on page content represents CIB to feign interest in site content. | Egypt | The pages were managed from Egypt, and some of the pages were directly linked to Mostafa Thabet, the Editor-in-Chief of El Fagr. | 1 | 1 | No Data | No Data | -1.16 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | -1.25 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 68 | 2017 | 72 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | Protests | Anti-government protests in Egypt in September and October 2019 against President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. | To spread anti-Qatari, Iranian, and Houthi narratives while supporting the Egyptian government under el-Sisi | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 59 | 58 | Middle East and North Africa (MENA) >>> United Arab Emirates 2018 | Facebook pages created by a for-profit marketing firm in the United Arab Emirates were taken down for inauthentic behavior. The Facebook pages targeted Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood while spreading misleading content. | 2018 | 2019 | October | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | October | <93>UAE Facebook Pages Targeted Qatar and Muslim Brotherhood.<2E> Medium, DFRLab. October 15, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/uae-facebook-pages-targeted-qatar-and-muslim-brotherhood-8aec916fa1f7. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/uae-facebook-pages-targeted-qatar-and-muslim-brotherhood-8aec916fa1f7 | Middle East and North Africa (MENA) | Based on information gleaned from the pages themselves, the DFRLab<61>s analysis also suggested that the operation targeted many other regions, including North America, Europe, Southeast Asia, and Africa. | 1 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | Europe | Southeast Asia | 1 | 1 | The Facebook pages often linked to inflammatory "news" sites with misleading content. | English | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Sockpuppets (binary) = Charles Communications and Matrix Media Solutions propagated messaging on a network of fake Facebook accounts. | 1 | 1 | Destructive - Discredit (binary) = Attempts to link Qatar to the September 11, 2001 attacks. | United Arab Emirates | Facebook attributed some of the assets to Charles Communication Pvt, Ltd., a UAE-based marketing firm. The DFRLab<61>s investigation corroborated that attribution. | 1 | No Data | No Data | 0.74 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | -1.1 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 69 | 2017 | 69 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | According to Facebook<6F>s statement, the pages ran operations with the aim of <20>artificially increas[ing] engagement<6E> in several countries. | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 60 | 59 | Indonesia >>> Indonesia 2018 | Inauthentic pages on Facebook, designed to appear supportive of the West Papuan independence movement in Indonesia, spread divisive political rhetoric demonizing West Papuan protesters and amplified pro-Indonesian government talking points. | 2018 | 2019 | October | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | October | <93>Facebook Takes down Pro-Indonesian Pages Targeting West Papua.<2E> Medium, DFRLab. October 10, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-takes-down-pro-indonesian-pages-targeting-west-papua-3c8b56449bfd. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-takes-down-pro-indonesian-pages-targeting-west-papua-3c8b56449bfd | Indonesia | 1 | 1 | 1 | Racial, Ethnic, Religious, or Sexual Identity Group (binary) = West Papuan people | -0.5 | 2017 | -0.53 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 0.13 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 47 | 2017 | 46 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | 2019 UNGA | West Papuans have a long history of protesting for independence from the rest of Indonesia. Amid allegations of Indonesian racism against West Papuans, there were protests in September 2019 that resulted in the deaths of 30 to 40 people. There was controversy over whether or not the deaths were the result of Indonesian police violence. West Papuan sovereignty was a topic of discussion at the 2019 UN General Assembly, as it has been in the past. | 1 | 1 | 1 | In total, Facebook took down 69 Facebook accounts, 42 pages, and 34 Instagram accounts for engaging in <20>coordinated inauthentic behavior.<2E> The DFRLab analyzed 23 of the Facebook pages ahead of their removal. | Indonesian, English | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Destructive - Discredit (binary) = fueled sentiments against West Papuan actors engaging in independence movements branding them as criminals. | Indonesia | Some of the content shared by the pages directly came from the Indonesian government<6E>s state news agency, Antara. Facebook linked the activity to an Indonesian media firm, InsightID. | 1 | 1 | No Data | No Data | -0.53 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 0.13 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 47 | 2017 | 46 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | 2019 UNGA | To characterize the West Papuan independence movement as radical and dangerous, despite considerable support. The pages pushed positive narratives about Indonesian development in West Papua, advocated for Indonesian interests in the United Nations, and defended Indonesia<69>s human rights record. | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 61 | 60 | Georgia >>> Georgia 2018 | A network of inauthentic pages, disguised as news organizations, political parties, public figures, activist groups, and media entities, spread divisive socio-political content that promoted the majority government in Georgia while discrediting rivals. The network was linked to Georgian majority government party the Georgia Dream Party, as well as to an advertising agency in Georgia. | 2018 | November | Clearly stated campaign start within time frame | 2019 | December | Clearly stated campaign ended within time frame | 2019 | December | <93>Inauthentic Pages Linked to Majority Government Taken down in Georgia.<2E> Medium, DFRLab. December 20, 2019. https://medium.com/dfrlab/inauthentic-pages-linked-to-majority-government-taken-down-in-georgia-e31baebfa73a. | https://medium.com/dfrlab/inauthentic-pages-linked-to-majority-government-taken-down-in-georgia-e31baebfa73a | Georgia | 1 | -0.37 | 2017 | -0.43 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 0.26 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 24 | 2017 | 25 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | 1 | Protests | 1 | While these Facebook pages ostensibly looked to be named after off-platform websites, none of the eponymous URLs appeared to be available off-platform as independent websites. | Georgian | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Georgia | The pages were linked to Panda, an advertising agency in Georgia, as well as the Georgian Dream-led government. | 1 | -0.37 | 2017 | -0.43 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 0.26 | 2017 | No Data | No Data | No Data | No Data | 24 | 2017 | 25 | 2018 | No Data | No Data | 1 | To bolster the political objectives of the ruling government party in Georgia, the Georgia Dream Party, amid political turmoil domestically. | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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