146 строки
12 KiB
Markdown
146 строки
12 KiB
Markdown
# IO-Campaign-Collections
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Collection of reports on Influence Operation campaigns.
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## 2022
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* Nov 1 - [[Election Integrity Partnership] Assessing Inauthentic Networks Commenting on the US Midterms](https://www.eipartnership.net/blog/inauthentic-foreign-networks)
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* Oct 26 - [[Mandiant] Pro-PRC DRAGONBRIDGE Influence Campaign Leverages New TTPs to Aggressively Target U.S. Interests, Including Midterm Elections](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/prc-dragonbridge-influence-elections)
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* Oct 25 - [[Althea Group] Network of Inauthentic Twitter Accounts Spreads Polarizing Content Ahead of U.S. Midterm Elections](https://www.aletheagroup.com/post/network-of-inauthentic-twitter-accounts-spreads-polarizing-content-ahead-of-u-s-midterm-elections)
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* Oct 19 - [[Nisos] Twitter: Fake Accounts Amplify Chinese State Media for the 20th National Congress](https://www.nisos.com/library/twitter-fake-accounts-amplify-ccp-for-national-congress-report/)
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* Oct 05 - [[Nisos] Russian’s RT Leads a Global “Information Militia” on Social Media to Bypass Censorship on Ukraine-Related Disinformation](https://6068438.fs1.hubspotusercontent-na1.net/hubfs/6068438/Nisos-Report-on-RT-Global-Information-Militia.pdf)
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* Sep 21 - [[Stanford Internet Observatory] My Heart Belongs to Kashmir: An Analysis of a Pro-Indian Army Covert Influence Operation on Twitter](https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:zs105tw7107/20220921%20India%20takedown.pdf)
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* Aug 24 - [[Graphika & Stanford Internet Observatory] Unheard Voice: Evaluating five years of pro-Western covert influence operations](https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:nj914nx9540/unheard-voice-tt.pdf)
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* Aug 04 - [[Stanford Internet Observatory] Mind Farce: An Investigation into an Inauthentic Facebook and Instagram Network Linked to an Israeli Public Relations Firm](https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:vh191ny7721/20220804%20Mind%20Force.pdf)
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* Aug 04 - [[Meta] Meta’s Adversarial Threat Report, Second Quarter 2022](https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Quarterly-Adversarial-Threat-Report-Q2-2022.pdf)
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* Aug 04 - [[Mandiant] Pro-PRC “HaiEnergy” Information Operations Campaign Leverages Infrastructure from Public Relations Firm to Disseminate Content on Inauthentic News Sites](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/pro-prc-information-operations-campaign-haienergy)
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* Jul 12 - [[Google Threat Analysis Group] TAG Bulletin: Q2 2022](https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q2-2022/)
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* Jul 07 - [[Recorded Future] Russian Information Operations Aim to Divide the Western Coalition on Ukraine](https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22080550/ta-2022-0707-1.pdf)
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* Jun 28 - [[Mandiant] Pro-PRC DRAGONBRIDGE Influence Campaign Targets Rare Earths Mining Companies in Attempt to Thwart Rivalry to PRC Market Dominance](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/dragonbridge-targets-rare-earths-mining-companies)
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* Jun 22 - [[Microsoft] Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War](https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE50KOK)
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* May 18 - [[Mandiant] The IO Offensive: Information Operations Surrounding the Russian Invasion of Ukraine](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/information-operations-surrounding-ukraine)
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* May 09 - [[CEPA] Post-Mortem: Russian and Chinese COVID-19 Information Operations](https://cepa.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/COVID-Phase-4-v3.pdf)
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* Apr 07 - [[Graphika] Slash and Burner Accounts](https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_slash_and_burner_accounts.pdf)
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* Feb 28 - [[Google Threat Analysis Group] TAG Bulletin: Q1 2022](https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q1-2022/)
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## 2021
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* Dec 02 - [[Stanford Internet Observatory] One Topic, Two Networks: Evaluating Two Chinese Influence Operations on Twitter Related to Xinjiang](https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:sn407zm8237/20211202-china-twitter-takedown.pdf)
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* Dec 02 - [[Stanford Internet Observatory] In Bed with Embeds: How a Network Tied to IRA Operations Created Fake “Man on the Street” Content Embedded in News Articles](https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:xw115vb5420/20211202-mena-twitter-takedown.pdf)
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* Oct 11 - [[Graphika] Likes for Lorestan - Unraveling a Decade of Iran-Linked Information Operations Targeting Domestic Audiences and International Critics](https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_likes_for_lorestan.pdf)
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* Sep 07 - [[Mandiant] Pro-PRC Influence Campaign Expands to Dozens of Social Media Platforms, Websites, and Forums in at Least Seven Languages, Attempted to Physically Mobilize Protesters in the U.S.](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/pro-prc-influence-campaign-expands-dozens-social-media-platforms-websites-and-forums)
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* Jul 07 - [[Stanford Internet Observatory] My Heart Loves the Army: An Investigation into a Jordanian Disinformation Campaign on Facebook, TikTok and Twitter](https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:hh528nc2557/20210707-jordan-fb-takedown.pdf)
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* Jun 16 - [[Facebook] Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior From Ethiopia](https://about.fb.com/news/2021/06/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-from-ethiopia/)
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* Jun 07 - [[Graphika] Posing as Patriots](https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_posing_as_patriots.pdf)
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* Mar 17 - [[FireEye] Ghostwriter Update: Cyber Espionage Group UNC1151 Likely Conducts Ghostwriter Influence Activity](https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/unc1151-ghostwriter-update-report.pdf)
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* Mar 12 - [[CEPA] Information Bedlam: Russian and Chinese Information Operations During COVID-19](https://cepa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/CEPA-Russia-China-9.14.21.pdf)
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* Feb - [[Stanford Internet Observatory] Sockpuppets Target Nagorno-Karabakh](https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:ym664kv8876/twitter-takedown-about-azerbaijan-feb-2021.pdf)
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* Jan 12 - [[Graphika] Echoes of Fake News](https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_echoes_of_fake_news.pdf)
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## 2020
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* Dec 15 - [[Stanford Internet Observatory] Stoking Conflicts by Keystroke: An Operation Run by IRA-Linked Individuals Targeting Libya, Sudan, and Syria](https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:qg973fs1649/IRALibyaSudanSyriaReport.pdf)
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* Dec 15 - [[Facebook] Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior from France and Russia](https://about.fb.com/news/2020/12/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-france-russia/)
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* Oct 22 - [[Omelas] Minds Besieged - Digital Warfare Against the American Electorate](https://www.omelas.io/mb-report)
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* Sep 24 - [[Graphika] GRU and the Minions](https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_gru_minions.pdf)
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* Jul 28 - [[Mandiant] 'Ghostwriter' Influence Campaign: Unknown Actors Leverage Website Compromises and Fabricated Content to Push Narratives Aligned With Russian Security Interests](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/ghostwriter-influence-campaign)
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* Jun 16 - [[Graphika] Secondary Infektion](https://secondaryinfektion.org/downloads/secondary-infektion-report.pdf)
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* Jun 11 - [[Stanford Internet Observatory] Sockpuppets Spin COVID Yarns: An Analysis of PRC-Attributed June 2020 Twitter takedown](https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:zf032rd0838/20200611_China_Report.pdf)
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* May 12 - [[Omelas] Viral Overload - An Analysis of COVID-19 Information Operations](https://www.omelas.io/viral-overload)
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* Apr 29 - [[Recorded Future] Chinese Influence Operations Evolve in Campaigns Targeting Taiwanese Elections, Hong Kong Protests](https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2020-0429.pdf)
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* Apr 08 - [[Recorded Future] Intent to Infekt: ‘Operation Pinball’ Tactics Reminiscent of ‘Operation Secondary Infektion’](https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2020-0408.pdf)
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* Apr 02 - [[Stanford Internet Observatory] “Fighting Like a Lion for Serbia”: An Analysis of Government-Linked Influence Operations in Serbia](https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/serbia_march_twitter.pdf)
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* Apr 02 - [[Stanford Internet Observatory] Blame it on Iran, Qatar, and Turkey: An analysis of a Twitter and Facebook operation linked to Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia](https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/20200402_blame_it_on_iran_qatar_and_turkey_v2_0.pdf)
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* Mar 30 - [[Recorded Future] Chinese State Media Seeks to Influence International Perceptions of COVID-19 Pandemic](https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2020-0330.pdf)
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* Mar 12 - [[Facebook] Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior From Russia](https://about.fb.com/news/2020/03/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-from-russia/)
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* Mar 02 - [[Graphika] Operation Red Card](https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_operation_redcard.pdf)
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* Feb 21 - [[FireEye] ‘Ghostwriter’ Influence Campaign: Unknown Actors Leverage Website Compromises and Fabricated Content to Push Narratives Aligned with Russian Security Interests](https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/Ghostwriter-Influence-Campaign.pdf)
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* Feb 12 - [[Graphika] From Russia With Blogs](https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_from_russia_with_blogs.pdf)
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* Feb 12 - [[FireEye] "Distinguished Impersonator" Information Operation That Previously Impersonated U.S. Politicians and Journalists on Social Media Leverages Fabricated U.S. Liberal Personas to Promote Iranian Interests](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/02/information-operations-fabricated-personas-to-promote-iranian-interests.html)
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## 2019
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* Oct 29 - [[Stanford Internet Observatory] Evidence of Russia-Linked Influence Operations in Africa](https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/29oct2019_sio_-_russia_linked_influence_operations_in_africa.final_.pdf)
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* Nov 08 - [[Stanford Internet Observatory] Potemkin Pages & Personas: Assessing GRU Online Operations, 2014-2019](https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/potemkin-pages-personas-sio-wp.pdf)
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* Sep 19 - [[Graphika] Cross-Platform Spam Network Targeted Hong Kong Protests](https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_spamouflage.pdf)
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* Jun 20 - [[Atlantic Council] The “Macron Leaks” Operation: A Post-Mortem](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/The_Macron_Leaks_Operation-A_Post-Mortem.pdf)
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* May 28 - [[FireEye] Network of Social Media Accounts Impersonates U.S. Political Candidates, Leverages U.S. and Israeli Media in Support of Iranian Interests](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/05/social-media-network-impersonates-us-political-candidates-supports-iranian-interests.html)
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* May 17 - [[DFRLab] Inauthentic Israeli Facebook Assets Target the World](https://medium.com/dfrlab/inauthentic-israeli-facebook-assets-target-the-world-281ad7254264)
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* Mar 06 - [[Recorded Future] Beyond Hybrid War: How China Exploits Social Media to Sway American Opinion](https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2019-0306.pdf)
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## 2018
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* Nov - [[New Knowledge] The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet Research Agency](https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/533-read-report-internet-research-agency/7871ea6d5b7bedafbf19/optimized/full.pdf)
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* Aug 21 - [[FireEye] Suspected Iranian Influence Operation Leveraging Inauthentic News Sites and Social Media Aimed at U.S., U.K., Other Audiences](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/05/social-media-network-impersonates-us-political-candidates-supports-iranian-interests.html)
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## Unknown Date
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* [[Omelas] Digital Assault on the US Defense Industrial Base - How US Defense Contractors are Targeted by Information Operations](https://www.omelas.io/defense-contractors)
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## Analysis Frameworks
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* [[DISARM Foundation] DISARM Disinformation TTP (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) Framework](https://github.com/DISARMFoundation/DISARMframeworks)
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* [[Recorded Future] The Diamond Model for Influence Operations Analysis](https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/white-papers/diamond-model-influence-operations-analysis.pdf)
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* [[FFI] Understanding Influence Operations in Social Media: A Cyber Kill Chain Approach](https://publications.ffi.no/nb/item/asset/dspace:7027/1855480.pdf)
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* [[Atlantic Council] SCOTCH: A Framework for Rapidly Assessing Influence Operations](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/geotech-cues/scotch-a-framework-for-rapidly-assessing-influence-operations/)
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* [[Brookings] The Breakout Scale: Measuring the Impact of Influence Operations](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Nimmo_influence_operations_PDF.pdf)
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* [[Francois] Disinformation ABC (+D)](https://science.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Francois%20Addendum%20to%20Testimony%20-%20ABC_Framework_2019_Sept_2019.pdf)
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* [[CogSec Collaborative] AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Processes (TTP) Framework](https://github.com/cogsec-collaborative/AMITT)
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