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38 строки
2.5 KiB
Markdown
38 строки
2.5 KiB
Markdown
# Technique T0049: Flooding
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* **Summary**: Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.
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Example (2018): bots flood social media promoting messages which support Saudi Arabia with intent to cast doubt on allegations that the kingdom was involved in Khashoggi’s death.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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| -------- | -------------------- |
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| [I00033 China 50cent Army](../incidents/I00033.md) | 2,000,000 people (est.) part of state run/sponsored astroturfing |
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| [I00034 DibaFacebookExpedition](../incidents/I00034.md) | flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), attracted nearly 40,000 Facebook comments in just eight hours. |
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| Counters | Response types |
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| -------- | -------------- |
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| [C00006 Charge for social media](../counters/C00006.md) | D2 Deny |
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| [C00006 Censorship](../counters/C00006.md) | D2 Deny |
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| [C00012 Platform regulation](../counters/C00012.md) | D2 Deny |
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| [C00044 Keep people from posting to social media immediately](../counters/C00044.md) | D3 Disrupt |
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| [C00072 Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups – not recommended](../counters/C00072.md) | D2 Deny |
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| [C00074 Identify and delete or rate limit identical content](../counters/C00074.md) | D2 Deny |
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| [C00085 Mute content](../counters/C00085.md) | D3 Disrupt |
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| [C00086 Distract from noise with addictive content](../counters/C00086.md) | D4 Degrade |
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| [C00087 Make more noise than the disinformation](../counters/C00087.md) | D4 Degrade |
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| [C00091 Honeypot social community](../counters/C00091.md) | D5 Deceive |
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| [C00101 Create friction by rate-limiting engagement](../counters/C00101.md) | D4 Degrade |
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| [C00122 Content moderation](../counters/C00122.md) | D2 Deny |
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| [C00123 Remove or rate limit botnets](../counters/C00123.md) | D3 Disrupt |
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| [C00128 Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other "decelerants"](../counters/C00128.md) | D3 Disrupt |
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| [C00131 Seize and analyse botnet servers](../counters/C00131.md) | D2 Deny |
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| [C00153 Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure](../counters/C00153.md) | D3 Disrupt |
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| [C00176 Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private](../counters/C00176.md) | D7 Deter |
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DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW |