4d02f1980e
These are the changes to TA06: - Merge C00015 into C00092 - Add C00223: strengthen trust in social media platforms - Merge C00088 onto C00084 - Merge C00079 onto C00078
1.6 KiB
Technique T0047: Muzzle social media as a political force
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Summary: Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports. (Example 20190 Singapore Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill would make it illegal to spread "false statements of fact" in Singapore, where that information is "prejudicial" to Singapore's security or "public tranquility." Or India/New Delhi has cut off services to Facebook and Twitter in Kashmir 28 times in the past five years, and in 2016, access was blocked for five months -- on the grounds that these platforms were being used for anti-social and "anti-national" purposes.
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Belongs to tactic stage: TA09
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|---|---|
| I00033 China 50cent Army | cow online opinion leaders into submission, muzzling social media as a political force |
| Counters | Response types |
|---|---|
| C00012 Platform regulation | D2 Deny |
| C00027 Create culture of civility | D7 Deter |
| C00060 Legal action against for-profit engagement factories | D3 Disrupt |
| C00092 Reputation scores for social media influencers | D7 Deter |
| C00093 Influencer code of conduct | D7 Deter |
| C00120 Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes | D7 Deter |
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