8bb63006b6
- Merged C00145 into C00178. Deleted C00145 - Updated text in C00144 - Added warning label to C000139 - Merged C00137 into C00149. Deleted C00137 - Moved C00090 to TA07 - Updated text in C00211 - Updated text in C00030 - Merged C00158 into C00073. Deleted C00158 - Merged C00102 into C00101. Deleted C00102 - Merged C00089 into C00101. Deleted C00089 - Added note to C00200 - Merged C00194 into C00174. Deleted C00194 - Merged C00151 into C00190. Deleted C00151 - Updated text in C00182 - Added warning to C00122 - Updated text in C00211 - Updated text in C00030 - Merged C00215 into C00012. Deleted C00215 - Merged C00214 into C00012. Deleted C000214 - Merged C00196 into C00012. Deleted C000196 - Updated text in C00111 - Merged C00167 into C00026. Deleted C00167 - Added warning to C00056 - Updated text in C00172 - Merged C00171 into C00107. Deleted C00171 - Updated text in C00103 - Merged C00110 into C00195. Deleted C00110 - Updated text in C00117 - Merged C00193 into C00188. Deleted C00193 - Merged C00204 into C00188. Deleted C00204 - Moved C00217 to detections F00094
2.5 KiB
2.5 KiB
Technique T0049: Flooding
- Summary: Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.
Example (2018): bots flood social media promoting messages which support Saudi Arabia with intent to cast doubt on allegations that the kingdom was involved in Khashoggi’s death.
- Belongs to tactic stage: TA09
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|---|---|
| I00033 China 50cent Army | 2,000,000 people (est.) part of state run/sponsored astroturfing |
| I00034 DibaFacebookExpedition | flood the Facebook pages of Taiwanese politicians and news agencies with a pro-PRC message, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), attracted nearly 40,000 Facebook comments in just eight hours. |
| Counters | Response types |
|---|---|
| C00006 Charge for social media | D2 Deny |
| C00006 Censorship | D2 Deny |
| C00012 Platform regulation | D2 Deny |
| C00044 Keep people from posting to social media immediately | D3 Disrupt |
| C00072 Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups – not recommended | D2 Deny |
| C00074 Identify and delete or rate limit identical content | D2 Deny |
| C00085 Mute content | D3 Disrupt |
| C00086 Distract from noise with addictive content | D4 Degrade |
| C00087 Make more noise than the disinformation | D4 Degrade |
| C00091 Honeypot social community | D5 Deceive |
| C00101 Create friction by rate-limiting engagement | D4 Degrade |
| C00122 Content moderation | D2 Deny |
| C00123 Remove or rate limit botnets | D3 Disrupt |
| C00128 Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other "decelerants" | D3 Disrupt |
| C00131 Seize and analyse botnet servers | D2 Deny |
| C00153 Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure | D3 Disrupt |
| C00176 Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private | D7 Deter |
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW