8bb63006b6
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3.5 KiB
Technique T0007: Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
- Summary: Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets.
Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.
Examples: Ukraine elections (2019) circumvent Facebook’s new safeguards by paying Ukrainian citizens to give a Russian agent access to their personal pages. EU Elections (2019) Avaaz reported more than 500 suspicious pages and groups to Facebook related to the three-month investigation of Facebook disinformation networks in Europe. Mueller report (2016) The IRA was able to reach up to 126 million Americans on Facebook via a mixture of fraudulent accounts, groups, and advertisements, the report says. Twitter accounts it created were portrayed as real American voices by major news outlets. It was even able to hold real-life rallies, mobilizing hundreds of people at a time in major cities like Philadelphia and Miami.
- Belongs to tactic stage: TA03
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|---|---|
| I00005 Brexit vote | Fake FB groups + dark content |
| I00006 Columbian Chemicals | Fake twitter profiles to amplify |
| I00009 PhilippinesExpert | FB pages |
| I00010 ParklandTeens | FB pages/groups/profiles |
| I00017 US presidential elections | Fake FB groups + dark content |
| I00022 #Macronleaks | Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content |
| I00032 Kavanaugh | Fake FB groups/pages/profiles |
| I00056 Iran Influence Operations | Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content (non-paid advertising) |
| Counters | Response types |
|---|---|
| C00006 Charge for social media | D2 Deny |
| C00006 Censorship | D2 Deny |
| C00012 Platform regulation | D2 Deny |
| C00036 Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) | D2 Deny |
| C00085 Mute content | D3 Disrupt |
| C00097 Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment | D2 Deny |
| C00099 Strengthen verification methods | D2 Deny |
| C00107 Content moderation | D2 Deny |
| C00122 Content moderation | D2 Deny |
| C00133 Deplatform Account* | D3 Disrupt |
| C00135 Deplatform message groups and/or message boards | D3 Disrupt |
| C00153 Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure | D3 Disrupt |
| C00172 social media source removal | D2 Deny |
| C00176 Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private | D7 Deter |
| C00189 Ensure that platforms are taking down flagged accounts | D6 Destroy |
| C00197 remove suspicious accounts | D2 Deny |
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