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2.7 KiB
Technique T0039: Bait legitimate influencers
- Summary: Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. "Influencers" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial.
By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders.
- Belongs to tactic stage: TA08
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|---|---|
| I00006 Columbian Chemicals | bait journalists/media/politicians |
| I00010 ParklandTeens | journalist/media baiting |
| I00015 ConcordDiscovery | journalist/media baiting |
| Counters | Response types |
|---|---|
| C00072 Remove non-relevant content from special interest groups – not recommended | D2 Deny |
| C00073 Inoculate populations through media literacy training | D2 Deny |
| C00076 Prohibit images in political discourse channels | D2 Deny |
| C00087 Make more noise than the disinformation | D4 Degrade |
| C00092 Establish a truth teller reputation score for influencers | D7 Deter |
| C00093 Influencer code of conduct | D7 Deter |
| C00114 Don't engage with payloads | D2 Deny |
| C00154 Ask media not to report false information | D2 Deny |
| C00160 find and train influencers | D2 Deny |
| C00162 Unravel/target the Potemkin villages | D3 Disrupt |
| C00169 develop a creative content hub | D3 Disrupt |
| C00184 Media exposure | D4 Degrade |
| C00188 Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves | D3 Disrupt |
| C00203 Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets | D3 Disrupt |
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW