AMITT/amitt_blue_framework.md

AMITT Blue: Latest Framework

TA01 Strategic Planning	TA02 Objective Planning	TA03 Develop People	TA04 Develop Networks	TA05 Microtargeting	TA06 Develop Content	TA07 Channel Selection	TA08 Pump Priming	TA09 Exposure	TA10 Go Physical	TA11 Persistence	TA12 Measure Effectiveness
C00006 Charge for social media	C00009 Educate high profile influencers on best practices	C00034 Create more friction at account creation	C00050 Anti-elicitation training	C00063 Ban political microtargeting	C00014 Real-time updates to fact-checking database	C00097 Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment	C00112 "Prove they are not an op!"	C00122 Content moderation. Censorship?	C00129 Use banking to cut off access	C00131 Seize and analyse botnet servers	C00147 Make amplification of social media ports expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days)
C00008 Create shared fact-checking database	C00011 Media literacy. Games to identify fake news	C00035 Friction	C00051 Phishing prevention education etc	C00065 Ban political ads	C00070 Block access to platform. DDOS an attacker.	C00098 Revocation of "verified"	C00113 Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials. Attack audience quality of fake expert	C00123 Bot control	C00130 Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously.	C00133 Deplatform Account*	C00148 Add random links to network graphs
C00010 Enhanced privacy regulation for social media	C00028 Blockchain audit log and validation with collaborative decryption to post comments	C00036 Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide)	C00052 Infiltrate platforms	C00066 Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back)	C00071 Block source of pollution	C00099 Strengthen verification methods	C00114 Don't engage with payloads	C00124 Don't feed the trolls		C00135 Deplatform message groups and/or message boards	C00149 Poison the monitoring & evaluation data
C00012 Platform regulation	C00029 Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise	C00039 Standard reporting for false profiles	C00053 Delete old accounts / Remove unused social media accounts	C00067 Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding)	C00072 Content censorship in non-relevant domains e.g. Pinterest antivax	C00100 Hashtag jacking	C00115 Expose actor and intentions	C00125 Prepare the population with pre-announcements		C00136 Microtarget most likely targets then send them countermessages
C00013 Rating framework for news	C00030 Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)	C00040 third party verification for people	C00056 Get off social media	C00068 Expose online funding as fake	C00074 Identify identical content and mass deplatform	C00101 Create participant friction	C00116 Provide proof of involvement	C00126 Social media amber alert		C00137 Pollute the AB-testing data feeds
C00015 Reputation scores for social media users	C00031 Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify	C00042 Address truth contained in narratives	C00058 Report crowdfunder as violator	C00069 Mark clickbait visually	C00075 normalise language	C00102 Make repeat voting harder	C00117 Downgrade de-amplify label promote counter to disinformation	C00128 Create friction by marking content with ridicule or other "decelerants"		C00138 Spam domestic actors with lawsuits
C00016 Censorship - not recommended	C00032 Hijack content and link to truth- based info (platform)	C00043 Detect hijacked accounts and reallocate them	C00059 Verification of project before posting (counters funding campaigns)	C00216 Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors	C00076 Prohibit images in political discourse channels	C00103 Create a bot that engages / distract trolls	C00118 Repurpose images with new text	C00151 “fight in the light”		C00139 Weaponise youtube content matrices
C00017 Repair broken social connections	C00207 tit-for-tat campaign	C00044 Keep people from posting to social media immediately	C00060 Enhanced legal enforcement against for-profit follower/engagement factories		C00077 Active defence: replay "develop people"	C00105 Buy more advertising than the adversary to shift influence and algorithms	C00119 Engage payload and debunk. Provide link to facts.	C00156 Better tell the U.S., NATO, and EU story.		C00140 "Bomb" link shorteners with lots of calls
C00019 Reduce effect of division-enablers		C00045 S4d detection and re-allocation approaches	C00062 Free open library sources worldwide		C00078 Change Search Algorithms for Disinformation Content. More specifically, change image search algorithms for hate groups and extremists	C00106 Click-bait centrist content	C00120 Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes	C00158 Use training to build the resilience of at-risk populations.		C00141 "Hey this story is old" popup when messaging with old URL
C00021 Encourage in-person communication		C00046 Marginalise and discredit extremist	C00152 “name and shame”		C00079 Change search algorithms for hate and extremist queries to show content sympathetic to opposite side	C00107 Content moderation	C00121 Tool transparency and literacy for channels people follow.	C00169 develop a creative content hub		C00142 "This has been disproved - do you want to forward it"
C00022 Innoculate. Positive campaign to promote feeling of safety		C00047 Coordinated inauthentics	C00162 collect data/map constellations of Russian“civil society”. Unravel/target the Potemkin villages		C00080 Create competing narrative	C00109 De-escalation	C00154 Ask media not to report false information	C00178 Fill information voids with non-disinformation content		C00143 (botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time
C00024 Promote healthy narratives		C00048 Name and Shame			C00081 Discredit by pointing out the "noise" and informing public that "flooding" is a technique of disinformation campaigns; point out intended objective of "noise"	C00110 Monetize centrist SEO by subsidizing the difference in greater clicks towards extremist content	C00188 Newsroom/Journalist training to counter SEO influence	C00182 malware detection/quarantine/deletion		C00144 Buy out troll farm employees / offer them jobs
C00026 Shore up democracy based messages		C00150 “calling them out”			C00082 Ground truthing as automated response to pollution	C00111 Present sympathetic views of opposite side	C00193 promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”	C00184 Media exposure		C00145 Pollute the data voids with wholesome content (Kittens! Babyshark!)
C00027 Create culture of civility		C00155 Ban incident actors from funding sites			C00084 Steal their truths	C00195 Redirect Method	C00203 Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets	C00190 open engagement with civil society
C00073 Inoculate populations through media literacy training		C00160 find and train influencers			C00085 Demuting content	C00196 Include the role of social media in the regulatory framework for media	C00204 Strengthen local media	C00194 Provide an alternative to Russian information by expanding and improving local content.
C00153 Take pre-emptive action against actors' infrastructure		C00164 compatriot policy			C00086 Distract from noise with addictive content	C00214 Create policy that makes social media police disinformation		C00200 Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo
C00159 Have a disinformation response plan		C00179 Identify, monitor, and, if necessary, target Russia-based nonattributed social media accounts			C00087 Make more noise	C00215 Use fraud legislation to clean up social media		C00211 Use humorous counter-narratives
C00161 Coalition Building and Third-Party Inducements:		C00189 Ongoing analysis/monitoring of "flagged" profiles			C00088 Poison pill recasting of message	C00217 Registries alert when large batches of newsy URLs get registered together		C00212 build public resilence by making civil society more vibrant
C00170 elevate information as a critical domain of statecraft		C00197 remove suspicious facebook accounts			C00089 Throttle number of forwards			C00218 Censorship
C00174 Create a healthier news environment					C00090 Fake engagement system
C00176 Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private					C00091 Honeypot social community
C00205 strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting					C00092 Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers
C00220 Develop a monitoring and intelligence plan					C00093 Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers
C00221 Run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors					C00094 Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of research
					C00095 Keep score
					C00096 Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers
					C00165 Limit access to alterable documents
					C00167 Deploy Information and Narrative-Building in Service of Statecraft
					C00171 social media content take-downs
					C00172 social media page removal
					C00202 Set data 'honeytraps'
					C00210 Use encrypted apps for confidential communication
					C00219 Add metadata to content - out of the control of the adversary