ca08d63fdb
Team has been triaging counters using a github project. These are the changes to TA01: - Add C00220: develop a monitoring and intelligence plan - C00159: change title - Add C00221: run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors - C00176: change title - Merge C00055 into C00012 - Merge C00057 into C00010 - C0006: update notes - C00153: change title - C00017: change title - Merge C00023 into C00027 - Merge C00025 and C00024, change title to "promote healthy narratives" - Merge C00018 and C00019, change title to "reduce effect of division-enablers" - C00026 - change title - C00022 - change title - Merge C00020 , C00174, C00157, change title to "create a healthier news environment" - Merge C00007 into C00013, edit title - Move C00008 to Degrade - Merge C00033, C00054, C00061, C00049 into C00073 - C00016 - change title - Delete C00001: Better models of info spread up the layers - Delete C00004: Managing like a chronic disease - Delete C00003: How can we safeguard against extremists using the tools that we will produce? - Delete C00005: Policy: makers, terminology, elements: a) broad, b) specific TA01 now contains techniques [6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27, 73, 153, 159, 161, 170, 174, 176, 205, 220, 221]
2.6 KiB
Technique T0007: Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
- Summary: Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets.
Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.
Examples: Ukraine elections (2019) circumvent Facebook’s new safeguards by paying Ukrainian citizens to give a Russian agent access to their personal pages. EU Elections (2019) Avaaz reported more than 500 suspicious pages and groups to Facebook related to the three-month investigation of Facebook disinformation networks in Europe. Mueller report (2016) The IRA was able to reach up to 126 million Americans on Facebook via a mixture of fraudulent accounts, groups, and advertisements, the report says. Twitter accounts it created were portrayed as real American voices by major news outlets. It was even able to hold real-life rallies, mobilizing hundreds of people at a time in major cities like Philadelphia and Miami.
- Belongs to tactic stage: TA03
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|---|---|
| I00005 Brexit vote | Fake FB groups + dark content |
| I00006 Columbian Chemicals | Fake twitter profiles to amplify |
| I00009 PhilippinesExpert | FB pages |
| I00010 ParklandTeens | FB pages/groups/profiles |
| I00017 US presidential elections | Fake FB groups + dark content |
| I00022 #Macronleaks | Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content |
| I00032 Kavanaugh | Fake FB groups/pages/profiles |
| I00056 Iran Influence Operations | Fake FB groups/pages/profiles + dark content (non-paid advertising) |
| Counters | Response types |
|---|---|
| C00012 Platform regulation | D2 Deny |
| C00036 Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide) | D2 Deny |
| C00039 Standard reporting for false profiles | D2 Deny |
| C00133 Deplatform Account* | D3 Disrupt |
| C00135 Deplatform message groups and/or message boards | D3 Disrupt |
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW