AMITT/techniques/T0047.md
Sara-Jayne Terp ca08d63fdb Updated the TA01 Strategic Planning counters
Team has been triaging counters using a github project.  These are the changes to TA01:

- Add C00220: develop a monitoring and intelligence plan
- C00159: change title
- Add C00221: run a disinformation red team, and design mitigation factors
- C00176: change title
- Merge C00055 into C00012
- Merge C00057 into C00010
- C0006: update notes
- C00153: change title
- C00017: change title
- Merge C00023 into C00027
- Merge C00025 and C00024, change title to "promote healthy narratives"
- Merge C00018 and C00019, change title to "reduce effect of division-enablers"
- C00026 - change title
- C00022 - change title
- Merge C00020 , C00174, C00157, change title to "create a healthier news environment"
- Merge C00007 into C00013, edit title
- Move C00008 to Degrade
- Merge C00033, C00054, C00061, C00049 into C00073
- C00016 - change title
- Delete C00001: Better models of info spread up the layers
- Delete C00004: Managing like a chronic disease
- Delete C00003: How can we safeguard against extremists using the tools that we will produce?
- Delete C00005: Policy: makers, terminology, elements: a) broad, b) specific

TA01 now contains techniques [6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27, 73, 153, 159, 161, 170, 174, 176, 205, 220, 221]
2021-02-24 21:02:41 +00:00

1.7 KiB

Technique T0047: Muzzle social media as a political force

  • Summary: Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports. (Example 20190 Singapore Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill would make it illegal to spread "false statements of fact" in Singapore, where that information is "prejudicial" to Singapore's security or "public tranquility." Or India/New Delhi has cut off services to Facebook and Twitter in Kashmir 28 times in the past five years, and in 2016, access was blocked for five months -- on the grounds that these platforms were being used for anti-social and "anti-national" purposes.

  • Belongs to tactic stage: TA09

Incident Descriptions given for this incident
I00033 China 50cent Army cow online opinion leaders into submission, muzzling social media as a political force
Counters Response types
C00012 Platform regulation D2 Deny
C00027 Create culture of civility D7 Deter
C00060 Enhanced legal enforcement against for-profit follower/engagement factories D3 Disrupt
C00092 Establish a truth teller reputation score for individuals with many followers D7 Deter
C00093 Establish tailored code of conduct for individuals with many followers D7 Deter
C00120 Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes D7 Deter

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